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This thesis evaluates the political function of formal education in deeply divided 
societies, and highlights constraints and opportunities for education reform in 
jurisdictions that adopt consociational power-sharing to manage violent identity-
based conflicts.  It compares education reforms in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia since the Taif Agreement (1989), the Belfast Agreement (1998) and the 
Ohrid Agreement (2001).  These three agreements are similar in that they 
established consociational power-sharing to regulate Lebanon’s civil war, Northern 
Ireland’s “Troubles” and Macedonia’s conflict, respectively.  All three presented 
schools as important instruments for furthering long-term peace, in particular 
through curricular reforms in history education, citizenship education and languages, 
as well as initiatives for contact among children of different ethnic, religious and 
national backgrounds. 
In four separate chapters, this thesis compares reforms in the areas of history 
education, citizenship education and languages of instruction, as well as in the 
overall structure of compulsory education, in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia.  Each chapter evaluates the extent to which the principles and practices 
of consociation influence and constrain education policy.  Two additional chapters 
provide the essential historical and theoretical background to the comparative 
analysis.  The analysis is based on over 75 interviews, official data and documents 
as well as a variety of secondary sources.   
This thesis contributes to theories of conflict regulation by showing that formal 
education, while furthering the short-term stability of power-sharing by reproducing 
its core narratives and hierarchies, may also plant the seeds of future conflicts.  It 
concludes that consociations may generate consociational education systems, 
which help reproduce the basic building blocks of political consociations: mutually 
exclusive confessional, ethnic, national and political communities.  A paradox 
characterises consociational education systems.  Initiatives that promote unity and 
integration in schools tend to generate backlashes against assimilation.  To further 
social cohesion and transition out of conflict, education reforms need to 
accommodate the separate institutions and mutually exclusive identity-forming 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
Macedonian and Arabic words and names have been transliterated in 
accordance with common English use in recent academic literature (e.g.  
Walid Jumblatt, Slobodan Milosevic).  All diacritics have been omitted in 





This research investigates the political function of education in three deeply 
divided societies that experienced violent identity-based conflict: Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter, 
Macedonia).1  By examining debates over education reform, it investigates 
the contribution of compulsory schooling to the regulation of identity-based 
conflicts through consociational power-sharing.   
An academic and policy consensus is emerging that consociational power-
sharing is the most acceptable and effective constitutional mechanism for 
managing violent conflict in deeply divided societies.2  Consociations are 
characterised by group cleavages and elite decision-making by consensus3 
and by four key constitutional provisions: executive power-sharing (or parity 
in executive participation), veto rights for community representatives, 
proportionality in elections or appointments, and communal autonomy.4  
In Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, three peace agreements (in 
1989, 1998 and 2001, respectively) restructured or established consociations 
to regulate conflicts between hostile religious, national and ethnic groups.  
Lebanon’s Document of National Accord (hereafter the Taif Agreement),5 
Northern Ireland’s Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations 
(hereafter the Belfast Agreement)6 and Macedonia’s Framework Agreement 
                                            
1 This thesis will use the term Macedonia rather than FYRoM.  The latter designation is 
official among the international community and at the United Nations but the former 
designation is employed in the country and deemed more respectful.  
2 Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O'Leary, Courts and Consociations. Human Rights 
Versus Power-Sharing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 2, 4. 
3   Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005): 31; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural 
Societies (London: Yale University Press, 1977): 5. 
4  Brendan  O’Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 
Arguments," in S. Noel (ed.), From Power Sharing to Democracy, (Quebec: McGill University 
Press, 2005): 35. 
5 See Appendix 3 for the full text. 
6 Also known as the Good Friday Agreement and, perhaps most accurately, as the British-
Irish Agreement as discussed in Brendan O'Leary, "The British-Irish Agreement of 1998: 
Results and Prospects," paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional Design 2000 
(University of Notre Dame: 1999).  For the full text of the Belfast Agreement, see Appendix 
3. 
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(hereafter the Ohrid Agreement)7 also mapped extensive reforms of formal 
education.  Schools, previously accused of contributing to mutual hostility by 
socialising children into separate worlds,8 were portrayed as instruments for 
peace-building.  In the new consociations, schooling would further ‘national 
belonging’ and ‘fusion’,9 develop a ‘culture of tolerance’10 and promote ‘the 
peaceful and harmonious development of society’.11   
What educational reforms were promoted and with what results in the 
following decades?  What narratives of identity and belonging came to 
dominate the manifest and hidden curricula?  Once the dust settled, did the 
three agreements, and the new patterns of power they institutionalised, 
fundamentally alter the political function of education in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia?  Ultimately, did consociations provide a political 
context conducive to the transformation of these religious, national and 
ethnic conflicts?  
To address these questions, this thesis looks at reforms of the history, 
citizenship and language curricula and at attempts to promote intergroup 
contact in schools after the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements.  It examines 
the dialectical relationship between education reforms, consociational 
principles and inter-group power hierarchies, to identify constraints and 
opportunities in compulsory schooling reform.  Finally, it traces the political 
function of education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia to 
evaluate whether consociations, effective in ending violence, also offer an 
opportunity to promote the long-term resolution of ethnic, religious and 
national conflicts. 
This thesis argues that despite a flurry of rhetoric in the immediate aftermath 
of the three peace agreements, education reforms consolidated rather than 
altered the political function of education in these three societies.  Before and 
during the violent conflicts, schools helped socialise children into the 
                                            
7 See Appendix 3 for the full text. 
8 Or into ‘worlds apart’, as first captured in the title of Dominic Murray’s seminal Worlds 
Apart: Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1985).  
9 Part III, Section F, Art.5, Taif Agreement.  
10 Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Reconciliation and Victims of Violence, 
Art.13, Belfast Agreement.  
11 Preamble, Ohrid Agreement. 
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separate and mutually exclusive identities associated with different ethnic, 
religious and national groups.  After the peace agreements, schools 
continued to defy the maxim that ‘in the field of public education, the doctrine 
of “separate but equal” has no place’.12  To this day, compulsory education in 
the three consociations often conveys separate narratives of belonging 
through the curricula and frequently furthers the separation of children of 
different backgrounds into different schools.  On the one hand, this sustains 
the integrity of ethnic, religious and national groups upon which a stable 
consociation rests, thereby contributing to short-term political and elite 
stability. 13   On the other hand, in this educational landscape, external 
pressures and internal political crises frequently translate into politicised 
zero-sum debates over education and into the reproduction of mutually 
exclusive narratives of identity.   
This study adds to the fields of comparative politics and comparative 
education.  The longstanding debate over the scope for long-term conflict 
regulation through consociational power-sharing has generally overlooked 
non-political institutions, but McCrudden and O'Leary’s work on domestic and 
international judiciaries signals a new interest in the contribution of such 
institutions to consociational stability and legitimacy.14  Despite recognising 
that schools contribute to the sanctioning of collective identity, the 
comparative politics literature has stopped short of comparing education 
policy across multiple consociations.  Through a comparison of the curricula 
and structures of compulsory education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, this thesis shows that the narratives and values promoted by 
schools can help stabilise and legitimise consociations but can also 
accelerate a relapse into conflict.   
                                            
12 Chief Justice Warren, qtd. in Luther A. Huston, "High Court Bans School Segregation. 9-
to-0 Decision Grants Time to Comply " New York Times, 18/05/1954. 
13 The Oxford Dictionary defines elites as ‘a group or class of people seen as having the 
most power and influence in a society, especially on account of their wealth or privilege’.  In 
the present context, their influence is due to their representing the local ethnic, religious and 
national communities.  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/elite?q=elite (last 
accessed 29/04/2014) 
14John  McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, "Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands," in 
Rupert Taylor (ed.), Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict, (London: Routledge, 2009): 25; McCrudden and O'Leary, Courts and 
Consociations. 
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Just as consociational research has overlooked the role of non-political 
institutions, research on education in post-conflict and divided societies has 
not confronted the relationship between constitutional arrangements and 
education policy. 15   In doing so, this thesis identifies a typology of 
consociational education systems, characterised by the tension between the 
protection of equally legitimate group identities and the promotion of 
overarching narratives.  It also shows that consociational politics places 
crucial constraints on the design and implementation of education reforms. 
1.1 Hypotheses  
This thesis compares reforms of the curricula of history, citizenship education 
and languages as well as of the structure of education systems after peace 
agreements in Lebanon (1989), Northern Ireland (1998) and Macedonia 
(2001), to investigate the political function of formal education in 
consociations.  It tests three hypotheses.   
The first hypothesis is that education systems help reproduce the founding 
values and narratives of power-sharing, thereby contributing to the stability of 
consociational government.  This analysis aims to highlight the extent to 
which the priorities and values underpinning education reform converge in 
the three consociations, and proposes a typology of consociational education 
systems.  It also aims to show that the existing literature has underestimated 
the contribution of non-political institutions to the legitimacy and stability of 
consociational power-sharing. 
The second hypothesis is that the success of specific education reforms 
depends on their compatibility with the values and hierarchies sustaining the 
political system.  This comparison shows that reform initiatives are 
considerably constrained by consociational education systems and that they 
are successfully implemented and mainstreamed only when, alongside 
fostering overarching plural identities, they promote group equality.  This 
explains the failure of efforts to integrate and homogenise the curricula and 
structures of schooling in the three societies, and initiates a debate on the 
                                            
15 Marc Howard Ross, "Peace Education and Political Science," in Gavriel Salomon and 
Edward Cairns (eds.), Handbook on Peace Education, (New York: Psychology Press, 2009), 
121. 
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most appropriate approaches to the design of education reforms in 
consociations.  
The third hypothesis is that consociation per se is not incompatible with long-
term conflict resolution.  This thesis shows that consociational governments 
can employ education to facilitate mutual knowledge and understanding and 
to help establish or re-establish peaceful, harmonious and interdependent 
relationships among the different communities in plural societies 
(reconciliation).  A prime example is Northern Ireland’s shared education 
initiatives.16  Yet, it also finds that in periods of political instability, schools 
often convey mutually exclusive and hostile narratives of identity, hindering 
rather than furthering peace processes.   
1.2 Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia were chosen as examples of 
deeply divided societies that experienced violent conflicts among religious, 
national and ethnic communities.  All three jurisdictions established 
consociational power-sharing to regulate these conflicts.  A comparison of 
education policies across these three consociations is particularly interesting 
because of the similarities and differences in their demographic structure, 
their violent conflicts and their peace agreements. 
1.2.1 Demography  
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia are heterogeneous societies and 
comprise several communities, which may be ‘“peoples”, “national groups”, 
cultural groups, ethnic, religious or language groups’. 17   Appendix 2 
describes all the main communities and introduces their political 
representatives, showing that the three societies differ in the degree of 
diversity in their populations, in the most (politically) relevant markers of 
identity and group membership, and in the political impact of demography.  
Moreover, Chapter 3, tracing the history of education in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia, confirms that the most politically salient marker of 
                                            
16 See Chapter 7. 
17 Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation 
(London: IB Tauris, 1994): 21. 
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identity in each society ‘is the one that is perceived as being important from 
the point of view of the allocation of government resources’.18   
Thus, religious affiliation emerged as the primary marker of communal 
belonging in Lebanon, where 18 official religious sects coexist.19  Religious 
sects in Lebanon largely determine ‘identity, social position and political 
power’ so they are functionally similar to ethnic, national and racial groups 
elsewhere.20  Chapter 3 explains that religious belonging has also been 
historically associated with diverging national outlooks, political ideologies 
and foreign affiliations, and has competed with important integrative factors, 
such as the overwhelming prevalence of the Arabic language as a mother-
tongue.  The last official census was conducted in 1932 and, as Figure 1 
shows, found a slight majority of Christians (Maronites, Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholics, Armenians and Other Christians) over Muslims (Sunni, Shia 
and Druze). 
The confessional political system of independent Lebanon overestimated the 
Christian population and assigned parliamentary seats according to a ratio of 
six Christians for every five Muslims.  The posts of president, prime minister 
and speaker of the parliament were allocated to individuals belonging to the 
three largest religious sects: a Maronite, a Sunni and a Shia, respectively.  
Due to the destabilising political impact of demographic change, no census 
has been conducted since 1932 and successive waves of refugees have 
been marginalised in economic life and excluded from political participation.  
Thus, Sawsan and Khawaja present the substantial Palestinian refugee 
population as Lebanon’s ‘unrecognised sect’, a group lacking political 
representation despite its considerable demographic weight.21  
                                            
18  Frances Stewart, Religion Versus Ethnicity as a Source of Mobilisation: Are There 
Differences?, Microcon Research Working Paper 18 (Brighton: MICROCON, 2009): 44. 
19 The term ‘sect’ is not derogatory in the Lebanese context: in fact, it is the most common 
translation of the Arabic taifa and simply designates ‘a group with somewhat different 
religious beliefs… from those of a larger [religious] group to which they belong’ according to 
the Oxford Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/sect (last 
accessed 2/05/2014).  
20 Abdulrahim Sawsan and Marwan Khawaja, "The Cost of Being Palestinian in Lebanon," 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 153. 
21 This is despite the religious and political differences among Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Sawsan and Khawaja, "The Cost of Being Palestinian," 155. 
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The constitutional reforms agreed after the 1975-1989 civil war acknowledge 
demographic change and a new balance of power among local communities: 
they assign equal numbers of parliamentary seats to Christians and Muslims 
as well as to the Sunni and Shia.23  In fact, electoral results suggest that the 
Christian Maronites may only account for 19 percent of the total Lebanese 
population, the Sunni Muslims for only 21 percent and the Shia Muslims for 
over 34 percent (Figure 2).24   
                                            
22 Lebanese 1932 Census, qtd. in Imad Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon 
(London: Routledge, 2014): 25. 
23 As Chapter 3 shows. 
24 The figure is based on electoral results, Muhammad Faour, "Religion, Demography, and 
Politics”, 912; A competing estimate, based on the number of registered voters by religious 
sect, is provided - as detailed in Appendix 2 - in Imad Salamey and Rhys Payne, 
“Parliamentary Consociationalism in Lebanon: Equal Citizenry vs Quotated 
Confessionalism”, The Journal of Legislative Studies 14, no.4 (2008): 457. 





















Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of the Three Largest 
Lebanese Sects in 2005.25 
 
Thus, the distribution of parliamentary seats does not reflect the relative 
demographic strength of Lebanon’s communities: it grants Christians a 
political influence disproportionate to their demographic weight and lessens 
the political relevance of Shia Muslims, thereby fuelling the Sunni-Shia 
resentments which, since 2005, have ‘replaced the civil war’s Muslim-
Christian divide’.26  
                                            
25 These figures are based on electoral results, Muhammad Faour, "Religion, Demography, 
and Politics in Lebanon," Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 912. 
26 Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr, "Introduction. The Cedar Revolution and Beyond" in Are 
Knudsen and Michael Kerr (eds.), Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, (London: Hurst, 
2013): 5; Ahmad Beydoun, "Movements of the Past and Deadlocks of the Present: Did the 
Violence of the Nineteenth Century Generate a Socity Prone to Civil War?," in Youssef 
Choueiri (ed.), Breaking the Cycle. Civil Wars in Lebanon., (London: Stacey International, 
2007): 13. Kerr explains that parity in the allocation of parliamentary seats partly 
compensated the Maronites for the curtailment of Presidential power. After Taif, he argues, 













Figure 3: Northern Ireland’s Population by Religious Affiliation According to 
the 2011 Census.27 
 
Similarly, Connolly and Maginn point to the ‘apparently contradictory fact that 
you can be a “Protestant” or a “Catholic” in Northern Ireland while also being 
an agnostic or an atheist’.28  As Chapter 3 explains, the political saliency of 
religious identities in Northern Ireland is due to their coincidence with national 
belonging and with aspirations for the constitutional future.  Northern Ireland 
is less religiously diverse than Lebanon, with only two major Christian 
denominations:29 Protestants account for about 42 percent and Catholics for 
about 40 percent of the population (Figure 3).   
                                            
27 'Religion - Full Detail_QS218NI' Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, Census 
2011,  
http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Theme.aspx?themeNumber=136&themeName=Censu
s%202011 (last accessed 2/05/2014). 
28 Paul Connolly and Paul Maginn, Sectarianism, Children and Community Relations in 
Northern Ireland (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1999): 7. 
29 A denomination is ‘a branch of any religion’ according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/denomination?q=denomination (last 





















Figure 4: Northern Ireland’s Population by National Identity According to the 
2011 Census.1  
 
Chapter 3 explains that Catholics historically viewed themselves as Irish and 
called for a united and independent Ireland, whilst Protestants privileged 
British nationality and sought to preserve the union of Northern Ireland with 
Great Britain.  In fact, the 2011 census questions this dichotomy: as Figure 4 
shows, in 2011, 40 percent of the population viewed themselves as British, 
21 percent as Northern Irish and only 25 percent as Irish.  This confirms that 
considerable numbers of Catholics do not hold an exclusively Irish national 
identity.30  
Macedonia is diverse in terms of its ethnic belonging and mother-tongue.  In 
2002, ethnic Macedonians accounted for only 64 percent of the population, 
with a further 25 percent of Albanians, four percent of Turks, three percent of 
Romas and smaller percentages of other ethnic groups (Figure 5).  Ethnic 
Macedonians speak the Macedonian language, whose genesis was 
inextricably linked to the creation of a state, as Chapter 3 shows.  The 
                                            
30	  A Census question on national identity was asked for the first time in 2011. Amendments 
to articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, removing Ireland’s irredentist claim to the North, 











mother-tongues of Albanians, Turks and Roma are the Albanian, Turkish and 
Romani languages respectively.   
 
Figure 5: Macedonia’s Population by Ethnic Affiliation According to the 2002 
Census.31 
 
Ethnicity also overlaps with religious belonging and, since the late 1990s, 
political discourse has increasingly identified Islam with being Albanian and 
Orthodox Christianity with being Macedonian.32  As Figure 6 shows, in 2001 
the majority of Macedonia’s population was Orthodox Christian or Muslim 
(primarily Sunni).  As in Lebanon, no census could be conducted since 2002 
because of the politicisation of demographic figures.   
 
                                            
31 State Statistical Office, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2002. Book X: 
Total Population According to Ethnic Affiliation, Mother Tongue and Religion, (Skopje: State 
Statistical Office, 2002): 62. 












Figure 6: Macedonia’s Population by Religious Affiliation According to the 
2002 Census.33 
 
A comparison of the demographic structures of Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia confirms that they are three deeply divided societies: among 
their indigenous populations, demographic and identity cleavages coincide, 
local communities claim separate descent and often ‘coexist in parallel rather 
than live together’.34  Whilst the existence of deep communal fractures is not 
sufficient ‘for the aggregation of interests’, 35  Appendix 2 provides more 
extensive demographic data and shows that in the three societies ‘most 
political parties mobilise along ethno-national lines’.36  However, in all three 
societies multiple political parties compete for the votes of members of each 
ethnic, confessional and national community.  Moreover, overarching 
interests and cross-cutting political cleavages exist in all three societies.  
Most apparently, Hanf found that most Lebanese hold a desire for peaceful 
                                            
33 Ibid., 334. 
34  International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Make or Break (Brussels: International Crisis 
Group, 2004): 4. 
35 Theodor Hanf, "The Sacred Marker. Religion, Communalism and Nationalism," in Theodor 
Hanf (ed.), Dealing with Difference. Religion, Ethnicity and Politics:Comparing Cases and 
Concepts, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999): 386. 
36 John Nagle and Mary-Alice Clancy, Shared Society or Benign Apartheid? Understanding 









coexistence and a perception of collective interests above those of different 
communities.37   
1.2.2 The Three Conflicts  
McCrudden and O’Leary reflect that ‘one person’s “national” conflict may be 
another’s “ethnic” conflict and in conflicts of these kinds, there may indeed be 
a “meta-conflict” – that is, a conflict about what the conflict is about’.38  This is 
certainly the case for the three, deeply different conflicts in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia.   
Chapter 3 explains in more detail the origins and course of the Lebanese civil 
war, the Northern Irish Troubles and the 2001 ethnic conflict in Macedonia. 
The Lebanese civil war claimed between 100,000 and 140,000 lives in its 15 
years of fighting (1975-1989).39  The Troubles, lasting three decades (1968-
1998), claimed 3,488 lives.40  In contrast, the ethnic conflict in Macedonia 
lasted about seven months (February-August 2001) and involved mainly 
paramilitaries and state security forces.  The conflict led to 150-200 deaths 
and 650 wounded and about seven percent of the population of Macedonia 
was displaced during this period.41   
The three conflicts differed in their scale and duration, in the number of 
competing groups involved and in the relationship between these groups and 
the institutions of each state.  But they are comparable as identity-based 
conflicts that set local religious, national and ethnic groups in competition for 
recognition and influence over the borders and institutions of contested 
states.  This is why formal education was at the heart of each violent conflict: 
for decades, schools legitimised and reproduced the prevailing power 
hierarchies and identity-forming narratives, as Chapter 3 shows.  Moreover, 
                                            
37 Hanf, Coexistence, 34. 
38 McCrudden and O'Leary, Courts and Consociations, 127. 
39 Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, "The Lebanese Civil War,” paper presented at the 
Yale-World Bank Workshop on “Case Studies on the Economics and Politics of Civil War,” 
April 13-14, 2002, Yale University, 2003, 23; Knudsen and Kerr,  “Introduction”, in Knudsen 
and Kerr (eds.), Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, 39. 
40 Between 14/07/1969 and 31/12/1998 according to Malcolm Sutton, "An Index of Deaths 
from the Conflict in Ireland", CAIN Web Service 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html (accessed 20/02/2014). 
41 Sasho Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia. Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia 
(London: First Forum Press, 2011): 100-101. 
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the three conflicts legitimised the involvement of external powers: Syria 
(primarily) in Lebanon, Britain and Ireland in Northern Ireland and the USA 
and the European Union in Macedonia.  In each case, the influence of these 
external parties affected both the contents of peace agreements and the 
extent of their implementation.42   
Finally, the three conflicts impacted the majority of the population in 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia either directly or indirectly, by 
furthering residential and social separation, and increasing cultural 
polarisation.43  Lebanon differs from Northern Ireland and Macedonia in that, 
as Hanf argues, ‘the Lebanese had an independent state but they became a 
nation only [in the 1980s] when the state was in mortal danger’.44  The 
embryonic ‘territorial’ Lebanese identity born out of the civil war 45  may 
explain the resilience of the state and society when faced with the powerful 
centrifugal pressures unleashed by the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the 
Arab Spring in 2011.    
1.2.3 Peace Agreements: Consociations and Education Reforms  
The Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements re-established or established 
consociational power-sharing to regulate the violent conflicts in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  Evoking the 1943 Lebanese National Pact, 
the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement and the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, these 
peace agreements established the four core features of consociations: 
executive power-sharing, communal autonomy, proportional representation 
and mutual veto rights.  Through these institutions, all three agreements 
attempted to ‘recognise the cleavages explicitly and turn them into 
constructive elements of stable democracy’.46   
Chapter 2 explores theoretical and policy debates over the structure and 
long-term impact of consociations in more detail.  The consociations 
                                            
42 Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing, 37-40.  
43 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto press, 2007): 233.  
44 Hanf, Coexistence, 642. 
45 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: 
Published by I.B. Tauris & Co 1988): 221. 
46 Andrew Finlay, Governing Ethnic Conflict. Consociation, Identity and the Price of Peace 
(London: Routledge, 2010): 60. 
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established in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia differ in their 
degree of liberalism.  Macedonia closely approximates an ideal liberal 
consociation, which ‘rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in 
democratic elections’. 47   In contrast, Lebanon approximates a corporate 
consociation because it accommodates communities according to pre-
determined, ascriptive identities (religious in this case) and assumes the 
permanence and internal homogeneity of groups.48  The variance of case 
studies along the liberal-corporate spectrum makes the findings of this 
research more widely applicable. 
The three consociations are similar in that they are ‘complex consociations’ 
which rely on ‘at least one other conflict-regulating strategy or principle 
[beyond consociational power-sharing] in their design’.49  As Chapters 2 and 
3 show, the Ohrid and Belfast Agreements map territorial autonomy and 
decentralisation, whilst the Taif agreement envisages measures for transition 
to majoritarian democracy and social integration, most evidently through 
education reform.50   
The fact that the peace agreements in question present education reforms as 
instruments for long-term peace-building and reconciliation, illustrates that 
schools were perceived as having contributed to violent conflict in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia. 51   The Taif Agreement calls for the 
protection of private institutions, the extension of state control over all 
schools, the reform of national curricula and the production of unified 
textbooks for history and civic education.52   These provisions aimed to 
                                            
47 Stefan Wolff, "Liberal Consociationalism in Theory and Practice: Power Sharing and 
Territorial Self-Governance," Unpublished Research Paper, 2011, 
http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/LibConTalkPaper.pdf (last accessed 24/04/2014): 4; 
Brendan O'Leary, "Foreword: The Realism of Power-Sharing," in Kerr, Imposing Power-
Sharing, xxv. 
48   Wolff,  "Liberal Consociationalism”, 4; O'Leary, "Foreword," in Kerr, Imposing Power-
Sharing, xxv. The Taif Agreement envisaged 'abolishing political sectarianism' but this 
provision was never implemented. 
49 O’Leary,  “Debating Consociational Politics”, in Noel, (ed.), From Power Sharing, 34-35; 
see also Stefan Wolff and Karl Cordell, "Power Sharing," in Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, (London: Routledge, 2010): 307. 
50 Tony Gallagher, "Balancing Difference and the Common Good: Lessons from a Post-
Conflict Society," Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 431. 
51 Kendra E.  Dupuy, "Education in Peace Agreements, 1989-2005," Conflict resolution 
quarterly 26, no. 2 (2008): 161.  
52 Part III, Section F, Taif Agreement.  
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encourage ‘feelings of unity among citizens and the development of notions 
of solidarity and fraternity’53 as well as to ‘consolidate the process of national 
cohesion’.54  
In contrast, the Belfast Agreement does not provide details for future 
education reforms, only calling for the promotion of the Irish language and 
‘initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education’.55  This thesis 
confirms that, as McGarry and O’Leary suggest, this is largely because even 
prior to 1998, Northern Ireland’s education system conformed to 
‘consociational’ principles: it allowed choice between Catholic maintained, 
state controlled (mainly Protestant) and integrated schools, all of which 
received equal funding.56   
Finally, the Albanian insurgency during the 2001 conflict in Macedonia 
demanded expansion of mother-tongue education and state funding for the 
Albanian-language Tetovo University.  Accordingly, the Ohrid Agreement 
granted official funding to universities teaching in languages spoken by at 
least 20 percent of the population (the Macedonian and Albanian 
languages).57  It also guaranteed the rights to compulsory education in the 
mother-tongue and to learning the official state language (Macedonian).58  
In sum, the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements present education reform as 
a tool for long-term peace-building through amendments of the history 
education and civic education curricula (in Lebanon), changes in the 
languages of instruction (in Northern Ireland and Macedonia) and promotion 
                                            
53 International Bureau of Education, World Data on Education, Sixth Edition, (Geneva: 
UNESCO, 2007): 34. 
54 Ibid., 32.  
55 Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Economic, Social and Cultural Issues, 
Art.4, and Reconciliation and Victims of Violence, Art.13, Belfast Agreement; The St 
Andrews Agreement adds the promotion of the Ulster Scots vernacular, Northern Ireland (St 
Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, (22/11/2006) 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/53/contents/enacted (last accessed 22/04/2014): 
16.  
56 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, 
and Its Agreement Part 2. What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland," 
Government and Opposition 41, no. 2 (2006): 275; Arend Lijphart, "The Framework 
Document on Northern Ireland and the Theory of Power-Sharing," Government and 
Opposition 31, no. 3 (1996): 272.  
57 Art.6.2, Ohrid Agreement.  
58 Ibid. 
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of contact between children of different backgrounds in schools (in Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland).  This suggests that education reform may be a 
mechanism complementary to constitutional reforms in post-conflict complex 
consociations.  This thesis analyses the four education reforms mapped in 
the peace agreements (history education, citizenship education, languages 
and the structure of the education system) to discern common and diverging 
approaches to schools in consociations.   
1.3 Methods 
This thesis investigates the political function of education in consociations 
through primarily qualitative methods.  The analysis is based on over 75 
semi-structured interviews carried out in the course of research visits to 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  The interviewees were key 
politicians, policymakers, representatives of monitoring agencies and 
educational practitioners from a variety of ethnic, national and religious 
backgrounds and representing different political opinions.  Most interviewees, 
in the course of their career, had worked in (or consulted for) the main 
centres of educational policymaking, including the local education ministries.  
The interview questions focused on the benefits and shortcomings of 
initiatives for the reform of history education, citizenship education, the 
language of instruction and the structure of the education system since the 
Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements.  More broadly, the interviews explored 
the intended and unintended socio-political consequences of education 
reforms, with particular reference to their impact on peace-building and 
reconciliation.  Qualitative analysis also relied on curricular and textbook 
material, government papers, official reports, case-specific literature, 
newspaper articles and a variety of other primary and secondary sources. 
Quantitative methods were used to compare and evaluate statistical data and 
surveys.  Government and international databases were employed to collect 
data on school enrolments, on the implementation of education reforms and 
on the ethnic, national and religious composition of the school population in 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  Finally, surveys carried out by 
national and international organisations (such as the UNDP and OSCE) 
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provided estimates of public support for specific reforms and of the long-term 
socio-political impact of certain education initiatives.   
There is considerable agreement that schools are one of the few 
‘institution[s] that society can formally, intentionally and extensively use to 
achieve the mission of peace education’ 59  or employ to reproduce the 
practices and narratives at the heart of conflict.   To highlight the educational 
priorities of successive consociational governments in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia, this thesis looks only at schools that adopt the official 
curriculum and/or receive some form of state subsidy.  These institutions are 
most receptive to reform initiatives and, as Chapter 3 shows, they represent 
the overwhelming majority of schools in the three societies.   
This analysis focuses on compulsory schooling because most children 
experience it during the most sensitive years for their socialisation into group 
values and identity (around 12 years of age). 60   About 97 percent of 
Lebanese children attend primary education and 76 percent attend 
secondary school;61 about 95 percent of children in Macedonia attend the 
compulsory, nine-year primary school;62 and about 99 percent of children in 
Northern Ireland attend compulsory education.63  
Finally, decision-making regarding curricular content and the basic structures 
of compulsory education is centralised in Beirut, Belfast and Skopje and this 
greatly facilitates comparative analysis of education reform.64  Indeed, this 
thesis frequently treats Northern Ireland as a separate state for analytical 
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purposes: despite being part of the UK, policymakers, even during direct rule, 
had considerable autonomy in the design of reforms, and education was 
regulated by separate legislation.   
1.4 Chapter Structure 
This introduction explains the rationale for this thesis, presents its 
hypotheses and introduces the three case studies: Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia.  It also summarises the research methods, chapter 
structure and its theoretical contribution to the fields of conflict regulation and 
education studies. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the academic literature on conflict 
regulation through consociational power-sharing and on the relationship 
between formal education and violent ethnic, religious and national conflicts.  
It aims to situate this thesis in the context of the most relevant academic and 
policy debates. 
Chapter 3 traces the history of education as an instrument for the building of 
nation-states65 and for the reproduction of communal identities in Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland since 1920, and in Macedonia since 1918.  It shows 
that, before and during the three conflicts, school curricula and structures 
contributed to perpetuating the narratives, values and practices that fed inter-
group animosity.  The Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements did not 
fundamentally alter the political function of education and the political 
priorities for education reform.  Actually, the four aspects of schooling they 
tackled (history education, civic education, languages and contact between 
pupils of different backgrounds) reflect both the most politically salient 
markers of group identity and the dominant perceptions of the roots of violent 
conflict. 
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Chapters 4 to 7 focus on history education, civic education, languages and 
the promotion of contact between children of different backgrounds in 
compulsory schools.  They first provide brief reviews of the literature and 
then analyse comparatively the debates over reform of each aspect of 
education in consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  
Chapter 4 focuses on reform of history education and finds that debates in 
the three societies reflect tensions between the two ideal functions of history: 
to promote unity among the diverse citizenry and/or to reflect, acknowledge 
and value the historical narratives of each religious, ethnic and national 
community.  Tracing debates over reform of the history curricula in the three 
consociations, Chapter 4 shows that the founding principles and practices of 
the political system impact on the contents of history education.  In Lebanon, 
the involvement of politicians representing each community in the process of 
curriculum drafting set the stage for the failure of efforts to frame a unified, 
homogeneous and nationalistic history textbook.  In Macedonia, the founding 
principle of proportionality seeped into the curriculum: information about the 
history of each ethnic community is proportional to its demographic weight.  
Finally, the Northern Ireland history curriculum focuses on historical skills 
rather than narratives, thus attempting to decouple history and national 
identity.  In all three cases, the teaching of history in schools reflects, and in 
some perspectives furthers, continuing communal monopolies over 
narratives of the past.66   
Similarly, lack of consensus about national identity and the legitimacy of the 
state problematises the definition of citizenship in the three societies.  
Chapter 5 explores reforms of citizenship education after the three peace 
agreements and shows that, similarly to history education, the citizenship 
education curricula are torn between the ambition to legitimise communal 
diversity and the desire to foster allegiance to the state.  In Northern Ireland, 
a flexible curriculum aims to stimulate, through debate and critical thinking, 
the formulation of consensual notions of citizenship.  In contrast, in Lebanon 
and Macedonia, the curricula promote overarching ‘national’ identities and 
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teach majoritarian democracy.  Thus, the contents of education clash with 
the reality of consociational politics and with the political saliency of ethnic 
and religious identities.  Chapter 5 highlights that schools contribute to inter-
group tensions and mistrust of state institutions when they convey values 
and principles incongruent with the dominant practices of wider politics and 
society.   
Chapter 6 draws attention to a further constraint to education reform in 
consociations: the need to ensure their symmetrical impact on all the major 
communities.  It does so by tracing initiatives to reform the language(s) of 
instruction in the three education systems.  In Lebanon, the end of the civil 
war brought a consensus on the benefits of multilingual education.  In 
contrast, in Northern Ireland, language is being politically constructed as a 
further marker of identity, coinciding with salient national and religious 
cleavages: Irish-medium schools are instrumental to this process.  Similarly, 
in Macedonia the expansion of mother-tongue education led to the physical 
separation of children belonging to different communities into different 
schools.  State initiatives to introduce the Macedonian language from the first 
grade aimed to reverse the trend of declining proficiency in the state 
language among children of Albanian, Turkish and Serbian backgrounds.  
These initiatives were bitterly opposed, and denounced as attempts to 
assimilate children into ethnic Macedonian culture.  
This echoes debates over the reform of the very structure of education 
systems in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, examined in Chapter 
7.  The Taif and Belfast Agreements called for more opportunities for contact 
among children belonging to different socio-economic, religious, ethnic and 
national backgrounds.  Similarly to Macedonia’s 2010 Strategy for Integrated 
Education, they implicitly endorsed the ‘contact hypothesis’, which states that 
inter-group contact furthers tolerance, reduces fear and promotes 
reconciliation in post-conflict societies.  In fact, Chapter 7 shows that the 
three consociations ultimately generated or entrenched consociational 
education systems, which rely on a plurality of separate institutions catering 
to different communities rather than on common, mixed schools.  Separate 
schools subsidised by the state may help individual social mobility, 
demonstrate group influence over state institutions, and even legitimise the 
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state among formerly marginalised communities.  Separate schools also 
reproduce the basic building blocks of the political system (the different 
religious, ethnic, national and political communities), thereby furthering the 
stability and legitimacy of consociational governments.  Yet, Chapter 7 warns 
that the physical separation of children can further prejudice, political 
extremism and fear of members of different communities. Thus, separate 
schools can hinder reconciliation.  Finally, it points out that separate schools 
are deeply different and provide different long-term opportunities: this may 
foster feelings of relative deprivation among the members of disadvantaged 
communities and destabilise peace processes.  In fact, ‘consociational 
education systems’ are not incompatible with initiatives for mixed education, 
which may contribute to the emergence of syncretistic identities and to the 
consolidation of peace.  To succeed, initiatives for inter-group contact need 
to promote both group equality and relationship building, to hold broad 
institutional support, to be tailored to the specific socio-political context and to 
impact symmetrically on the communities involved.   
This thesis concludes first, that the political function of education in 
consociations is remarkably similar to that of education during conflicts: it 
socialises children into different group identities and political allegiances 
through the curricula and separate schools. 67  ‘Consociational education 
systems’ reproduce group boundaries and consolidate the different political 
communities, thus legitimising consociational government and facilitating its 
operation.   
Second, the priorities for education reform in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia converge after the establishment of consociational power-
sharing.  Consociational education systems come to reflect the tension 
between two political principles: the fostering of group equality and the 
encouragement of overarching plural identities.  They do so both through the 
curricula for ‘national subjects’ and through the structure of the education 
system.   
Third, education reform cannot change society but it can make schools 
flexible enough to accommodate and even encourage social change if and 
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when it occurs.  In the three consociations, education reforms succeeded 
when they promoted values congruent with those of the political system and 
when they impacted similarly on all the main communities.  This suggests 
that the imposition of unified narratives of identity and the top-down 
integration of schools may be inadequate and even counterproductive in 
deeply divided societies. 
Finally, this thesis concludes that consociation per se is not incompatible with 
initiatives for conflict transformation.  Consociation provides the political and 
social stability essential for the formulation, promotion and implementation of 
initiatives for peace-building in the education system.  In turn, education can 
be employed as a complementary mechanism to further the long-term 
resolution of violent inter-group conflicts.  Yet, the cases of Lebanon and 
Macedonia show that when they are internally unstable or subject to negative 
external pressures, consociations allow for curricula which convey mutually 
exclusive narratives of identity and for the physical separation of children 
belonging to different communities.  This contributes to the long-term 
vulnerability of the system and the potential for relapse into violent conflict. 
1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis aims to contribute to the academic debate on conflict regulation 
through consociational power-sharing.  It looks at how formal education 
furthers the stability and legitimacy of consociations, thus redressing past 
consociational focus on ‘political (executive and legislative) issues’.68  By 
examining the curricula and structures of education systems, it adds an 
internal factor to the list of variables facilitating the persistence of 
consociations and their re-establishment after conflicts: the coherence 
between state values and the values conveyed by schools.   
This thesis also elaborates on the education system as an instrument for 
conflict transformation and long-term reconciliation in deeply divided 
societies.  Advocates of consociation admit that communities tend to further 
separate after the establishment of power-sharing, but argue that the stability 
and legitimacy provided by consociation may facilitate conflict resolution and 
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the emergence of overarching identities.69  Critics point out that conflict 
resolution is not an endogenous outcome of constitutional reforms, but 
should be consciously pursued through, for example, initiatives for social 
integration. 70   Recent conceptualisations of the practice of ‘complex 
consociation’ bridge these two positions and propose mechanisms to 
encourage long-term conflict resolution within a consociational framework.71  
Yet they overlook the potential contribution of non-political institutions, such 
as schools, to stability and long-term conflict management. 72   This is 
surprising, as consociational agreements, such as the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid 
Agreements, often present education as an instrument for long-term peace-
building.  Accordingly, education reforms can facilitate the transition from a 
conflict to a post-conflict society.73  This thesis opens a debate on the most 
effective approaches to education reform in post-conflict consociations. 
As far as the specific literature on education for peace is concerned, this is 
the first study of the reform of structures and curricula in the compulsory 
education systems of three consociations.  It finds that political and 
constitutional structures influence formal education: consociations generate 
consociational education systems which reflect the tension between 
pluralism and parity of esteem at the heart of power-sharing.  This thesis 
shows that successful initiatives for education reform generally acknowledge 
and accommodate both the fostering of group equality and the promotion of 
overarching allegiances.  Thus, it provides valuable insights on the factors 
constraining the formulation and implementation of education reforms in 
these three societies, and in deeply divided societies more generally.   
 
                                            
69 Lijphart, Democracy, 88; McGarry and O’Leary, "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland’s 
Conflict, and Its Agreement Part 2," 256. 
70    John McGarry, "Introduction: The Comparable Northern Ireland," in John McGarry (ed), 
Northern Ireland and the Divided World. Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative 
Perspective, (London: Routledge, 2001): 17; Rupert Taylor, "Northern Ireland: Consociation 
or Social Transformation?," in McGarry (ed), Northern Ireland and the Divided World, 38; 
McGarry and O’Leary, "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, and Its 
Agreement Part 2," 251. 
71  Wolff and Cordell, “Power Sharing,” 307. 
72  Brendan O'Leary, "Comparative Political Science and the British-Irish Agreement," in 
McGarry (ed), Northern Ireland and the Divided World, 301. 





2 Consociation and Education Policy in Deeply Divided 
Societies 
This thesis investigates the political function of compulsory education in 
deeply divided societies and its relationship to consociational political 
systems.  It does so by comparing debates over education reforms after 
peace agreements in Lebanon (1989), Northern Ireland (1998) and 
Macedonia (2001).  Before looking at the three case studies, it is necessary 
to outline the theoretical rationale for this research.   
This chapter examines first the theoretical approaches to the study of 
individual and group identities in deeply divided societies emerging from 
violent conflicts.  Second, it explores current debates on conflict regulation: it 
considers consociational approaches to the management of ethnic, national 
and religious conflicts and refers to specific features of Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia to illustrate the benefits and shortcomings of 
consociation.  Finally, it introduces the debate over the social and political 
function of education and over the contributions of schools to war and peace. 
This chapter aims to situate the thesis in its appropriate theoretical context 
and to demonstrate that the comparative analysis of education policy in 
consociations can contribute both to theories of conflict regulation and to 
theories of peace education. 
2.1 Individual and Ethnic Identities 
Whilst ethnicity may appear as an ascriptive characteristic acquired at birth 
by every individual,74 many of its constitutive elements are voluntaristic, and 
individuals have some choice in their degree of identification with ethnic 
groups.75  Smith argues that ethnic groups are characterised by a common 
name, a myth of common ancestry, elements of a common culture (such as 
religion or language), shared historical memories (often informed by religious 
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myths), a link to a territory or homeland and a sense of solidarity.76  As 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 2 explain, local religious, national and linguistic 
communities in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia meet Smith’s 
criteria and can be considered ethnic groups.  When ethnic groups demand 
sovereignty over a territory, as in the case of certain communities in Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia, they can be considered ethno-national.77   
According to Smith, the sum of accepted historical narratives (a common 
past generally linked to a homeland), markers of identity (both physical and 
immaterial features) and exemplary heroes and enemies (or stereotypes) 
constitutes a ‘myth-symbol complex’. 78   Myth-symbol complexes endow 
ethnic groups with ‘an aura of primordiality, of being a natural entity, of 
having always been there’.79  In fact, the markers and boundaries between 
communities in deeply divided societies are socially constructed and 
reproduced in a context where individual identities are ‘multiple, nested and 
overlapping’. 80   Yet, Chapter 3 will show that markers of identity and 
community boundaries are ‘deeply constructed’, making their change slow 
and painful.81   
The construction, reproduction and evolution of group identities occurs only 
in an inter-group context, where identity markers are expected to identify ‘a 
particular community as distinctive and bounded’.82  Markers of identity often 
maximise the perceived difference between communities in a plural society: 
Lambkin notes that had race been chosen as a ‘badge’ of identity in Northern 
Ireland, it would have eroded the boundary between the Unionist and 
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Nationalist communities.83  Similarly, the Arabic language mitigates more 
politically salient religious cleavages in Lebanon.  Indeed, Hughes 
summarises that the very existence of ethnic groups ‘is possible only if there 
are ways of telling who belongs to the group and who does not, and if a 
person learns early, deeply, and usually irrevocably to what group [he or she] 
belongs’.84 In other words, identity markers and group boundaries are salient, 
and can become politically relevant only if community members and non-
members are aware of their ‘distinctiveness’.85  
Moreover, politically salient markers and narratives of belonging are born out 
of the interaction between groups and the institutions of a state.  Stewart 
confirms that during violent conflicts, communities mobilise on the basis of 
the identity ‘that is perceived as being important from the point of view of the 
allocation of government resources’. 86   Brubaker also introduces the 
distinction between ‘state-formed’ nationalisms and ‘counter-state’ 
nationalisms,87 particularly relevant to deeply divided societies, where group 
identities are often framed in alignment or opposition to the state (as Chapter 
3 shows). 
Finally, the saliency of specific markers of identity depends on the political 
regime: in democratic contexts, the voluntaristic aspects of ethno-national 
belonging, such as a sense of solidarity or a shared history, assume 
particular significance.88   Indeed, group identities that are ‘experienced and 
understood as something deep and natural’ tend to be ‘learn[ed] over time 
and grounded in and shaped by a person’s experience’.89  But how do 
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individuals learn and internalise group identities? Why are collective identities 
so resilient? Social identity theory offers some answers to these questions. 
2.1.1 Social Identity Theory 
Refuting a mono-layered view of individual identity, social identity theory 
views identification as an individual process of construction and 
reconstruction of the self, and places the most significant sources of 
collective identity in categories which may appear as ascriptive, such as 
ethnicity, gender or nationality.90  It confirms that a minimal group identity can 
be provided through common characteristics apparent to outsiders, that set 
the group apart from an ‘other’.91  Nonetheless, collective identification is 
strongest when members of a group are aware of their similarities, and 
define themselves on this basis (through, for example, a common name, as 
in ‘Macedonians’).92   
Identification with a group and internalisation of group identity impacts on 
individual cognitive processes.  Tajfel argues that identification with groups 
provides individuals with an instrument to maximise self-esteem, and 
demonstrates that once a particular group identity (or social identity) has 
been internalised, individuals compare themselves to ‘others’ so as to fare 
favourably.93  Thus, they tend to favour fellow group members by, at a 
minimal level, discriminating against ‘others’,94  and to overestimate their 
commonalities with fellow group members, viewing non-members as 
maximally different.  This process of categorisation can culminate in 
depersonalisation as well as total identification of the self, and/or the other, 
with groups.95  
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Moreover, every individual unconsciously selects perceptual evidence in light 
of past experiences to make sense of the present.96   Evidence is then 
categorised into ‘explanatory clusters’: psychological ‘shortcuts’ essential to 
understanding the past, participating in collective life and responding to 
change.97  Stereotypes are a kind of explanatory cluster: they represent an 
abstract exemplary group member and produce expectations about the 
collective and individual behaviours of communities and their members.98  
Explanatory clusters and stereotypes are intrinsic to human cognition and 
impact on how information is selected and perceived: individuals tend to 
reject evidence deviating or contradicting their preconceptions. 99   Thus, 
individuals produce and reproduce stereotypes.100  
Viewed through the prism of social identity, stereotypes have important 
consequences for inter-group relations.  Far from being fixed, stereotypes 
tend to reflect the state of inter-group relations: worsening inter-group 
relations will result in negative stereotypes of the other and emphasise inter-
group differences.101  Thus, the state of inter-group relations can affect the 
contents and saliency of some aspects of group identity and vice versa.   
In sum, cognitive psychology and social identity theory draw a connection 
between the fate of groups and the self-esteem of their members, and show 
that the contents and saliency of group identity evolves alongside inter-group 
relations.102  This explains why, in the context of a politically salient Unionist-
Nationalist dichotomy in Northern Ireland, various Protestant denominations 
have downplayed their differences and endorsed an overarching Protestant 
identity whose minimal function is differentiation with 
Catholics/Nationalists. 103   Similarly, differences among Christian sects in 
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Lebanon are concealed by the adoption of a ‘Christian’ identity, maximally 
different from the (similarly heterogeneous) ‘Muslim’ group.   
Social psychology also demonstrates that individuals perceive themselves 
and others along a continuum, from uniqueness to full identification with 
group stereotypes, according to four factors.  First, perceptions of 
vulnerability in the face of a threat or inter-group competition harden group 
boundaries and lead to increasing identification with fellow group 
members.104   
Second, the permeability of group boundaries influences levels of 
identification: impermeable boundaries and immediate ability to identify group 
members (such as through obvious physical differences) help internalise 
identities.105  This partly explains the frequency of religious cleavages in 
intractable conflicts: religious groups have hard boundaries and encourage 
endogamy so that ‘a separate ethnic group can emerge in a relatively short 
time’.106   
Third, the stability and legitimacy of hierarchical patterns in society influences 
the intensity of individual identification with groups.  Where group hierarchy 
appears legitimate, members of low-status groups may regard discrimination 
as unavoidable, consent to it, and attempt to join the more prestigious, 
higher-status group. 107   Similarly, where a hierarchical pattern appears 
stable, members of low-status groups are discouraged from undertaking 
collective action against socio-political discrimination.108   
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Finally, the saliency of a particular identity at a particular time determines the 
intensity of individual identification with the group.109   As Tajfel puts it, 
‘groups (and intergroup relations) come to life when their potential 
designations as such have acquired a psychological and behavioural 
reality’.110  In other words, the relevance of communities depends on whether 
certain identity markers are politically, economically and socially salient at a 
particular time.  The interdependence of inter-group relations, group identity 
and individual self-esteem has important socio-political consequences in 
deeply divided societies. 
2.2 Deeply Divided Societies and Violent Conflict 
Paradigms of modernisation hold that states, through economic development 
and processes of nation-state building can impose on their citizens a 
homogeneous mass culture and common allegiance to the state.  Primordial 
ascriptive allegiances to religious, ethnic or linguistic groups would gradually 
disappear, alongside the distinctive myth-symbol complexes of local 
communities.  Nowhere has this proven more illusory than in divided or plural 
societies.111  
Indeed, despite efforts at nation-state building (further explored in Chapter 3), 
societies such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia remain divided 
by ‘segmental cleavages’ into the religious, linguistic, ethnic and national 
communities described in Appendix 2.112  This is partly due to their similar 
historical origins: 113  the three jurisdictions emerged from processes of 
decolonisation and the redistribution of imperial territories into ‘nation-
states’. 114   Chapter 3 explains that in the new political units, some 
communities had no allegiance to the state: the nationalism of Muslims in 
Lebanon, Nationalists in Northern Ireland and Albanians in the territory of 
present-day Macedonia emerged as a further societal cleavage ‘by providing 
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a loyalty to a “nation” that [was] not coeterminous with the state’. 115  
Moreover, controversies over the legitimacy of the state and its boundaries 
were amplified by the geographical positions of the three societies, situated 
on ‘ethnic frontiers’, in unstable regions at the margins of withdrawing 
empires. 116   Inter-communal cleavages were nurtured and exploited by 
external powers with irredentist claims, such as the Republic of Ireland.117   
Deeply divided societies are characterised by weak public allegiance to the 
state among a significant portion of their population and by strong loyalty to 
‘primordial’ communities or ethnic groups.118  The number of cleavages, and 
the extent to which these crosscut or coincide determines how divided a 
society is: deeply divided societies typically possess multiple and overlapping 
cleavages.  Here, members of different communities often lead separate and 
parallel lives, and political divisions frequently coincide with salient social 
fractures.119  In this context,  ‘the act of voting’ may become simply ‘a duty or 
means of expressing substantive [communal] loyalties’.120  Yet deep and 
overlapping cleavages do not necessarily lead to violent inter-communal 
conflict.   
2.2.1 Identity-Based Conflict in Deeply Divided Societies 
Ethnic conflicts emerge when ‘the goals of at least one conflict party are 
defined in … ethnic terms’ and ‘the primary fault line of confrontation is one 
of ethnic distinctions’. 121   Thus the Lebanese civil war, Northern Irish 
Troubles and 2001 conflict in Macedonia are ethnic conflicts which involved 
communities in violent struggles over the identity and very existence of the 
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state, the extent of power to be exercised centrally and ‘whether there should 
be one or more central governments’.122   
The relationship between ethno-national cleavages, other social, political and 
economic divisions, and the political system can facilitate the outbreak of 
violent conflict.123  Where societal cleavages coincide, they reinforce each 
other, and make violent conflict more likely.124   In pre-conflict Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia, religion, ethno-national identity, political 
allegiances and attitudes to the state overlapped, exacerbating inter-group 
tensions.125  
Moreover, when the legitimacy of a state is founded on narratives of common 
ethnic descent, and political order is premised on the ethno-cultural 
homogeneity of the citizenry, diversity can appear as a threat to popular 
sovereignty and be openly suppressed.126  This makes violent conflict more 
likely.  For example, in the 1990s, the founding narratives and state-building 
policies promoted by the newly independent Macedonian state emphasised 
the congruence of the state with the ethnic Macedonian nation.  These 
policies nurtured ethnic Albanian feelings of collective exclusion and fear of 
assimilation, which ultimately motivated the 2001 insurgency. 
Finally, the outbreak of violent conflict also depends on contextual and 
logistical factors.  Hanf argues that inter-group tensions increase with 
urbanisation, when their members ‘start competing’ for resources.127   A 
history of hostile inter-group relations, support for violence by public 
authorities or communal elites and a catalysing event may encourage 
descent into war. 128   The existence of logistical opportunities, such as 
support from external actors, inaccessible terrain, financial resources, 
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potential leaders and media outlets make armed conflict more likely.129  In 
this perspective, ethnicity is a tool for collective political mobilisation in the 
context of material grievances and opportunities for violent action. 
2.2.2 Group Identities and Violent Conflict  
The ‘psychocultural’ approach to ethnic conflict suggests that, far from being 
simply a label, ethno-national identity may be an independent factor in the 
outbreak and persistence of violent conflicts. 130   As explained, social 
psychology demonstrates that individuals identify most strongly with groups 
when salient group identities are threatened, group stereotypes are endorsed 
by group members, ‘others’ are depersonalised, group boundaries are 
impermeable and hierarchical patterns are deemed illegitimate and 
unstable.131  The same four variables also facilitate inter-group conflict.   
Thus, an analysis of markers of identity can shed light on the state of inter-
group relations in a society.132  This is because group leaders and ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ may help reformulate group identities,133 but the scope for the 
reinterpretation of identity markers, boundaries and stereotypes is in turn 
constrained by a community’s myth-symbol complex. 134   Myth-symbol 
complexes, or more simply, communal ‘cultures’, are conveyed through 
formal and informal social institutions (the family, media, schools and socio-
cultural organisations) long before the outbreak of violent conflicts.  Thus, the 
mobilisation of group identities for conflict follows a long process of social 
construction, institutionalisation and internalisation of identities.135   
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In turn, violent conflict hardens group boundaries and mutually exclusive 
identities and this hampers their inclusive reformulation. 136   Ross 
summarises that when ‘exclusive identity claims [are] concretised as mutually 
exclusive claims to control a territory’ or the institutions of a state, ‘material 
resource distribution will not settle the conflict’.137  This effectively means that 
the ‘psychological components’ of conflict, such as threatened group 
identities, ‘contribute to a continuation of the conflict even after the initial, 
objective causes have become irrelevant’.138  For example, Taush et al. 
argue that in Northern Ireland mounting calls for the protection of ‘symbols of 
cultural expression’ reflect a latent conflict, which continues despite 
decreasing socio-economic disparity.139  Thus, the myth-symbol complex, or 
‘culture’ of communities engaged in violent conflict is an independent factor 
hindering the de-mobilisation of identities after the signing of peace 
agreements.  This suggests that, beyond a redistribution of resources, 
conflict resolution requires ‘mutual acknowledgement and transforming the 
narrative about what is contested into an inclusive one’.140   
Chapter 3 shows that, before and during conflict, the contents and structures 
of compulsory education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
embodied, conveyed and reproduced both the power hierarchies among 
communities and their mutually exclusive myth-symbol complexes.  Social 
psychology suggests that for long-term reconciliation to occur, both the 
power hierarchies and the myth-symbol complexes conveyed by schools 
need to change.  This thesis aims to shed light on the process of 
reformulation of the curricula and structures of formal education, and to 
examine how unequal power relations and conflictual identities affected 
reforms.  It also aims to highlight which factors constrained the inclusive 
reinterpretation of core narratives and identities in plural societies emerging 
from conflict. 
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2.3 Conflict Resolution and Consociation  
Historically, most states have responded coercively to diversity and to 
identity-based conflicts on their territory, through the elimination, assimilation, 
oppression or subjugation of cultural and ethnic communities.  Despite this, 
research into the regulation of violent identity-based conflicts has largely 
focused on the benefits and shortcomings of non-coercive responses to inter-
group tensions.  Conflict regulation research and practice has focused on five 
main approaches: assimilation/integration, 141  partition, 142  autonomy, 143 
democratisation,144 and consociation.145   
This thesis only focuses on the latter because, as Nagle and Clancy put it in 
their critique of consociation, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Northern 
Ireland, from Macedonia to Iraq and Lebanon, ‘consociationalism is promoted 
as the only show in town’. 146   In fact, increasing numbers of conflict 
settlements include elements of consociational power-sharing, such as 
provisions for communal autonomy or mutual veto rights.  This is largely 
because such safeguards are often instrumental to achieving cease-fires.147  
Indeed, O’Leary summarises that if the priority is ‘limitation, mitigation and 
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containment of conflict without necessarily solving it’,148 it is often necessary 
to ‘give [consociational] power-sharing a chance’.149   
Consociational power-sharing challenges J.S. Mill’s maxim that ‘free 
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities’ where ‘the united public opinion necessary to the working of 
representative government cannot exist’.150  According to O’Leary, a political 
consociation is a ‘state or region within which two or more cultural or ethnic 
or national communities peaceably coexist, with none being institutionally 
superior to the others, and in which the relevant communities cooperate 
politically through self-government and shared government’.151  
The constitutional structure of consociations was first analysed by Ljiphart, 
who focused on plural societies characterised by ethnic, religious, cultural 
and linguistic cleavages (such as Lebanon).152  McGarry and O’Leary refined 
consociational theory and advocated its application to societies deeply 
divided along national lines (such as Northern Ireland and Macedonia).   
According to Lijphart, ‘consociational democracies’ are characterised by the 
presence of segmental cleavages and by consensus decision-making rather 
than competition among segmental elites. They have four characteristics.153  
First, consociations operate through executive power-sharing.  Executive 
power-sharing was initially interpreted as ‘a grand coalition’ of the leaders of 
all communities: in ‘unanimous’ consociations (such as Lebanon), the 
executive includes representatives of all the indigenous communities. 154   
McGarry and O’Leary reformulated the principle of executive power-sharing 
as ‘meaningful cross-community executive power sharing’ founded on the 
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principle of ‘joint consent.’ 155   Thus, in ‘concurrent consociations’ the 
executive includes representatives of the majority of each segment, and in 
‘weak consociations’ executive coalitions may include partners entrusted with 
a minority of communal votes.156  The constitutional structures of Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia favour meaningful rather than unanimous executives.   
Second, consociations prescribe mutual vetoes or concurrent majority rules 
to protect the interests of all communities in a society.  For example, the 
Lebanese cabinet is required to adopt resolutions on ‘major issues’ by 
consent or with a majority of two-thirds of its members.157  For certain laws, 
the Macedonian parliament requires a concurrent overall majority and a 
majority among the representatives ‘claiming to belong to the communities 
not in the majority in the population of Macedonia’.158  In Northern Ireland, 
‘key decisions’ are taken by parallel consent or weighted majority of the 
Unionist and Nationalist representatives.159  
Third, Lijphart argues that consociations require proportional electoral 
systems, political representation, civil service appointments and 
management of funding.  Proportionality is an important legitimating principle 
in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, but the three consociations 
vary, both in their electoral systems and mechanisms for cabinet allocation.   
Since the Taif agreement, Lebanon has allocated parliamentary seats 
according the principle of Muslim-Christian parity: the cabinet is a grand 
coalition of representatives of the religious sects, with the positions of 
president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament reserved for 
members of the Maronite, Sunni and Shia communities.  Lebanese 
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‘confessionalism’160 approximates an ideal type of ‘corporate consociation’, 
which accommodates communities according to ascriptive identities, such as 
religion or ethnicity, and assumes the permanence and internal homogeneity 
of groups.161  Corporate consociations are inherently fragile because they 
struggle to adapt to changing demographics: they create resentments both 
among excluded groups and among the communities participating in what is 
an inherently unequal sharing of government positions.162   Thus, ‘major 
problems’ such as the redistribution of power and executive positions ‘must 
wait for major upheavals’.163   In other words, communities can renegotiate 
their relative power and influence upon state institutions only during violent 
conflicts. 
In contrast, liberal consociation ‘rewards whatever salient political identities 
emerge in democratic elections’.164  It aims to flexibly and proportionally 
accommodate self-determined identities.  Macedonia is an almost ideal 
example of liberal consociation: it relies on a proportional electoral system 
and provides guarantees for communities accounting for over 20 percent of 
the total population (the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians).   
The fourth characteristic of consociations is the institutionalisation of 
segmental autonomy or self-government. 165   According to Lijphart, 
consociations can promote communal autonomy through three mechanisms.  
First, federal arrangements can ensure that state boundaries approximate 
linguistic boundaries (as in Switzerland). 166   Second, separate ‘personal 
status laws’ can regulate the conduct of members of religious or cultural 
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communities, as is the case in Lebanon.167  Third, communities can be 
granted the right to ‘establish and administer their own autonomous schools, 
fully supported by public funds’.168  
Educational autonomy appears integral to the structures of consociation as 
conceptualised by Lijphart.  He reiterates that ‘a solution that has worked 
well… is to provide educational autonomy by giving equal state financial 
support to all schools, public and private, as long as basic educational 
standards are met’.169  Similarly, he advocates the establishment of cultural 
councils for each community in plural societies: ‘one of its main 
responsibilities will be the administration of schools for those who wish to 
receive an education according to the group’s linguistic and cultural 
traditions’. 170   Finally, looking at Northern Ireland, he argues that 
‘“segregated schools” if they are under the community’s own control and are 
“separate and equal” in terms of government financial support’ contribute to 
cultural autonomy.171  Elsewhere, in an attempt to mitigate the sharp edges 
of autonomy, he admits that ‘voluntary self-segregation’ is a likely outcome of 
separate schools, but argues that this ‘is acceptable as long as the option of 
multicultural and multi-ethnic education is also made available and provided 
that all schools are treated equally’.172  
Thus, consociations, as conceptualised by Lijphart and refined by McGarry 
and O’Leary, manage politicised ethnic identities by recognising them 
explicitly and turning communities into the pillars supporting a stable 
representative democracy.173  Schooling and formal education are repeatedly 
mentioned as integral to the consociational institutions, but consociational 
theory has not analysed explicitly or extensively the educational 
arrangements of deeply divided societies.  The present study aims to fill this 
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gap by comparing education policy in consociational Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia. 
2.3.1 Establishment and Resilience of Consociations 
This thesis hypothesises that the values and narratives conveyed through 
formal education can contribute to the stability of consociational power-
sharing.  This contribution has been overlooked in the literature about the 
factors facilitating the establishment and maintenance of consociations. 
Lijphart argues that at a social level, a multiple balance of power between 
more than two groups, the isolation of communities and the presence of 
certain cross-cutting cleavages (such as socio-economic equality) further 
consociational stability.174  Chapter 1 has explained that members of different 
communities in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia often lead 
separate and parallel lives.   
At the political level, Lijphart argues that prior traditions of elite 
accommodation, a multi-party system with moderate representation of all 
segments and a small population size, providing for a small government 
workload, facilitate the success of consociational arrangements.175  The three 
societies have a small population size: 4,424,888 people in Lebanon,176 
1,811,000 people in Northern Ireland, 177  and 2,022,547 people in 
Macedonia. 178   Chapter 3 and Appendix 2 also explain that the three 
societies have multi-party systems, with most communities represented by 
more than one political party.  Finally, Lebanon has a prior tradition of elite 
accommodation, explored in Chapter 3: the National Pact of 1943-1975. 
McGarry and O’Leary add a further element to the political factors aiding 
consociational arrangements: the existence of elites determined to 
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cooperate, free to negotiate and able to muster popular support for power-
sharing.179  
Moreover, Lijphart argues that overarching threats (such as external threats 
perceived as such by all segments in a small country) or overarching 
loyalties (to the state or a monarchy for example) can help maintain 
consociations.  In the case of Macedonia, ambition to join the EU emerged 
as a significant cross-cutting cleavage after independence.  In the case of 
Lebanon, as explored, since the civil war, it has been ‘populated 
overwhelmingly by people who see themselves as Lebanese’.180   
Finally, Kerr demonstrated that external pressures were ‘the defining political 
factor in the success, implementation, maintenance and failure of 
consociation’ in Lebanon and Northern Ireland.181  This is also the case for 
Macedonia, where the USA and EU were instrumental in mediating and 
drafting the Ohrid agreement and in enforcing its implementation.   
In sum, with the possible exception of communal isolation, none of the key 
factors examined in the literature concern the contribution of non-political 
institutions (such as schools) to the establishment and maintenance of stable 
consociations.  Yet, as part and parcel of arrangements for communal 
autonomy and equality, schools deserve scholarly attention.   
2.3.2 Complex Consociations 
Recent consociational research has widened its scope to reflect the practice 
of conflict management and regulation, in particular ‘complex power-sharing’ 
or ‘complex consociation’.182  According to O’Leary, complex consociations 
combine the four constitutional and political institutions outlined above with 
‘policies, institutions, and constitutional arrangements that address an 
antagonistic self-determination dispute, incorporate peace processes, involve 
elements of at least one other major domestic conflict-regulating strategy 
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and, last, enlist external or international powers in the making, 
implementation and maintenance of the settlement’.183  
Complex power-sharing approximates closely the reality of peace 
agreements: beyond constitutional engineering, the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid 
agreements include mechanisms regulating the involvement of external 
actors, policies aimed at social integration, prescriptions for economic 
management, police restructuring and, as mentioned in Chapter 1, education 
reform.184  
In their complementary mechanisms, the three peace agreements reflect 
closely the negotiators’ perceptions of the underlying causes of conflict.  For 
example, the Belfast agreement is a settlement between national 
communities, and includes complementary trans-state arrangements (the 
North–South Ministerial Council and British–Irish Inter-Governmental 
Conference). 185   Complementary mechanisms regulating external 
involvement had a more detrimental effect in Lebanon, where continuing 
Syrian occupation stunted political development and the implementation of 
the consociational peace agreement.  The Ohrid agreement recognises the 
role of the EU, OSCE and USA in guaranteeing its implementation, but does 
not postulate any trans-state institutions, emphasising conflict regulation 
within Macedonia’s impermeable borders. 
The Ohrid agreement provides for territorial decentralisation as a 
complementary mechanism for conflict management, and recommends the 
decentralisation of the administration of some services at a municipal level. 
Chapter 7 will highlight its (limited) impact on schooling.  Northern Ireland 
(when powers are devolved) approaches a ‘federacy’ with the UK.186  In 
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contrast, Lebanon’s provisions for territorial devolution have never been 
implemented and the state remains centralised.187  
The Taif agreement combines rigid corporate consociational institutions with 
integrationist approaches to conflict resolution, embodied first and foremost 
in its extensive provisions for education reform.  In fact, as Chapter 1 
mentioned, the agreements of Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
present schools as an instruments to promote reconciliation.  This shows 
that, despite being overlooked in the literature, education reform is an 
integral part of complex consociational arrangements and of transition out of 
conflict in deeply divided societies.   
2.3.3 The Consociational Paradox and its Critiques  
The Prussian General von Clausewitz famously argued that ‘war is the 
continuation of politics by other means’. Miall suggests that consociation is 
‘Clausewitz in reverse’: the continuation of a military conflict by political 
means.188  Indeed, in contrast to coercive approaches, to assimilation and to 
partition, consociations do not explicitly seek conflict resolution in the short- 
to medium-term.  O’Leary confirms that accommodation of conflictual 
identities comes at the expense of a shared political vision, and that 
‘consociation is a politics with a shared vision of catastrophe’.189  
This does not mean that consociational arrangements should be conceived 
of as temporary: McCrudden and O’Leary point out that ‘time-limiting’ them 
would undermine their major function, the provision of security and 
stability.190  Consociationalists argue that a stable political framework and 
institutions allow the expression and negotiation of the differences and group 
needs at the heart of ‘intractable’ ethno-national conflicts.191  They suggest 
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that this, in the long term, may decrease the political saliency of ethnic and 
national identities and lay the foundations for peaceful democratisation.192   
Here lies the ‘consociational paradox’: 193  McGarry argues that ‘the 
institutional accommodation of rival groups and an extensive period of 
cooperation between them is more likely to transform identities in the long 
run than any of the integrationist options’.194   
Yet, the most fundamental criticism of consociational theory is precisely that 
it lacks ‘clarity from its adherents as to how it helps society move from 
conflict management to transformation’.195  In particular, critics argue that 
consociationalists are unclear as to how ethnic parties would evolve into 
parties with cross-communal appeal and how identity-based politics would 
transform into a democratic political system.  Consociations are criticised for 
their ‘elitism’: accordingly, power-sharing executives are insulated from 
effective opposition and elites are unaccountable to their passive and 
deferential public.196  They are also criticised for being inherently unstable. If 
they found their raison d’être upon societal fractures, then they will 
necessarily reduce politics to bargaining for communal rights. 197   The 
resulting entrenchment and further politicisation of ethno-national fractures 
can favour the exploitation of mutual fears by elites and descent into violent 
conflict.198   
Political critics of consociation suggest centripetalism as an alternative 
method of constitutional and political engineering.199  Centripentalists ‘place a 
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premium on promoting cross-ethnic electoral and party systems that make 
politicians reliant on the votes of different ethnic communities to gain 
election’.200  Yet, centripetalism generally encounters the resistance of local 
minority communities because it does not entrench their group rights.  
Moreover, polarisation of voting patterns along communal lines largely 
predates the establishment of consociations.201   
In fact, the ideal typology of liberal consociation responds directly to most 
political critiques.  Yet its practical implementations generally fall short of 
rewarding ‘whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic 
elections’.202  For example, the arrangements for self-designation of elected 
members of the Northern Ireland Assembly as ‘Nationalist’, ‘Unionist’ or 
‘other’ allows for the emergence of ‘others’.  Still, ‘others’ are penalised 
during cross-community voting procedures, which protect primarily the 
interests of Nationalists and Unionists.   
A further criticism of consociation is particularly relevant to the present 
analysis of education in deeply divided societies. Critics argue that 
consociational theory fails to account for potential social change and for the 
evolution of the saliency and content of conflictual identities.  They maintain 
that consociationalists accept uncritically ‘the primacy and permanency of 
ethnicity’ and emphasise primordial and fixed ascriptive identities.203  Finlay 
points out that consociational research takes ethnicity for granted and does 
not explain the mechanisms whereby it is acquired and able to evolve.204  As 
a consequence, critics maintain that the institutions, practices and narratives 
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of power-sharing would constrain ‘the space for other ways of being and 
other forms of politics’.205   
In particular, critics of consociation argue that power-sharing rests ‘on 
precisely the division it is supposed to solve’.206  Finlay maintains that the 
peace process in Northern Ireland reflects the ‘assumption that [each 
community] … [has] a special “cultural heritage”… which demands 
expression and recognition here, now and in perpetuity’.207  What Shirlow 
and Coulter polemically call ‘the “two tribes” model advanced within the 
Belfast agreement’ would contribute to casting societal divisions in 
‘marble’.208   Through a comparison of education reform in consociational 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, this thesis aims to analyse the 
identity-forming narratives conveyed through schools and to highlight the 
extent to which they help entrench and reproduce mutually exclusive 
communities. 
Moreover, Finlay argues that ‘communal segregation increases following the 
signing of the peace agreement’.209  Recent data from Northern Ireland raise 
some doubts: in 2001, over 50 percent of electoral wards were single identity 
(with 80 percent or more of their population from one community) but this 
proportion declined to 37 percent in 2011.  Yet, the same census data also 
show that most mixed neighbourhoods are ‘self-segregating at street 
level’.210  Surveys carried out by Hanf in Lebanon show that more people 
desired to live ‘among people with a similar background’ in 2006 than during 
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the civil war (in 1987).211  Beydoun explains this process as the ‘generalised 
confessionalisation [of Lebanon] since the war’, encompassing (among other 
phenomena) the increasing influence of religious authorities, the declining 
numbers of mixed residential areas, the proliferation of community-affiliated 
exclusive institutions and services.212  Finally, in Macedonia, a 2008 UNDP 
survey highlighted that ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians have only 
limited ‘interactions with people from other ethnic groups’: only 37 percent of 
ethnic Macedonians work with people of different backgrounds and only 64 
percent of ethnic Albanians have friends of other ethnic backgrounds.  The 
UNDP, without providing comprehensive data, reported sharp and increasing 
residential separation in Macedonia.213   Observing these data, critics of 
consociation in Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Macedonia question whether 
power-sharing can ultimately further reconciliation and conflict resolution.   
In fact, Lijphart warns that consociations make societies ‘more thoroughly 
plural’ in the short term.214  Yet, he views societal pillarisation as positive: 
decreasing opportunities for contact limit ‘the chances of ever-present 
potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility’.215  The proliferation of 
segmental rather than cross-communal networks would promote the internal 
cohesion of each community, furthering elite legitimacy and ability to 
compromise.216  
In contrast, the ‘contact hypothesis’ maintains that reconciliation requires 
contact between members of different communities. 217   To test the 
hypothesis, Hewstone et al. surveyed 811 adults in mixed and separated 
residential areas of Belfast over time. They proved that positive and 
sustained inter-communal contact (even when superficial or indirect) 
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promotes better inter-group relations by reducing mutual fear and anxiety 
and improving mutual knowledge and self-disclosure.218  Varshney similarly 
showed that inter-communal civic networks in Indian cities make them more 
resilient to external and internal tensions and shocks, and prevent descent 
into ‘endemic and ghastly’ inter-group violence.219   
Actually, consociation and inter-group contact are not mutually exclusive. 
The emergence of complex power-sharing provides an opportunity to 
promote contact within consociations and perhaps end the long-standing, 
sterile debate between ‘consociationalists’ and ‘integrationists’. 
Integrationists propose social transformation as an alternative to power-
sharing, positing that tackling civil rights, discrimination and socio-economic 
inequalities would in itself further reconciliation.220  They call for policies 
encouraging integration, economic convergence and participatory democracy 
to further overarching loyalties and cross-cutting cleavages.221   
Ethnic and nationalist categories may have been superimposed on an unjust 
social order, but social psychology explains that social identities change 
more slowly than material interests. This is why policies aimed at social 
transformation have failed to gain substantive support in deeply divided 
societies: here, integration often appears as a means to repress group rights 
or assimilate communities.222  This is not to say that specific measures aimed 
at reconciliation and social integration cannot be implemented in the context 
of complex approaches to consociational design: shared education in 
Northern Ireland is a prime example.223  
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It remains to be explored whether complex power-sharing provides the 
political context and stable conditions in which social transformation can be 
pursued.  The constraints consociation places upon specific peace-building 
initiatives also need to be explained.  This thesis argues that valuable 
evidence can be provided by a group of institutions overlooked in 
consociational research: non-political institutions, especially those that reflect 
and reproduce core identity-forming narratives.  Indeed, the Taif, Belfast and 
Ohrid agreements explicitly place non-political institutions (such as police 
forces and education) at the centre of transition from a conflict to a post-
conflict society.  
2.4 Why Education? 
Formal education is a particularly interesting non-political institution because, 
through curricula, structures and daily practices, schools produce, convey 
and reproduce key identity-forming narratives. Thus, they contribute to 
defining and redefining individual and collective identities, as well as the 
boundaries between communities in deeply divided societies.  
Cognitive approaches to learning highlight that ‘learners cannot understand 
reasons until they have already acquired a view … in order to be critical you 
must first be indoctrinated’. 224   Individuals are indoctrinated into the 
explanatory clusters, stereotypes and myth-symbol complexes of 
communities they belong to through a process of socialisation, ‘a process of 
learning through which an individual is prepared, with varying degrees of 
success, to meet the requirements laid down by other members of society for 
his behaviour’.225  Mass education systems were introduced in parallel to the 
extension of franchise in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and they 
responded to the needs of democratising ‘nation-states’ and of industrialising 
European economies. 226   The educational models developed in Britain, 
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France and other European powers were later ‘diffused by their respective 
colonial and/or ideological systems’. 227   Confirming Green’s view that 
‘education has been both parent and child to the developing nation state’,228 
mass compulsory schooling remains an instrument of socialisation into the 
values, assumptions and patterns of behaviour underpinning collective life in 
a society.  
Eckstein highlights that political systems are stable only if the ‘authority 
pattern [of governments] is congruent with the other authority patterns of the 
society of which it is part’. 229   In newly created democracies, elected 
governments depended on the acceptance of a ‘fictive image’ of cultural 
homogeneity within their borders and on collective support for their values 
and practices.230  Thus, schools were entrusted with transmitting a common, 
sanctioned myth-symbol complex to all citizens.  This included a 
standardised culture through a common language and official version of the 
past, common rituals and practices, and markers of belonging and identity.  
Socialisation of children into the values and culture laid out by previous 
generations would help assimilate the necessarily diverse citizenry and blend 
‘ethnic differences’.  It would also transmit stereotypes of different others 
(individuals not belonging to the nation-citizenry), sustain socio-political 
stability and create ‘the united public opinion necessary to the working of 
representative government’. 231   As Green summarises, mass education 
systems ‘tried to create the civic identity and national consciousness which 
would bind each [citizen] to the state and reconcile each [citizen] to the 
other’.232   
In sum, mass education systems reflect and reproduce the myth-symbol 
complex (or culture) of states, their internal patterns of authority, and the 
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narratives and principles upon which the political system is founded. These 
three functions of mass schooling are particularly problematic in deeply 
divided societies, where the culture of some communities does not coincide 
with that of the state, where authority patterns are perceived as unjust and 
where the legitimacy of political institutions is contested. 
2.4.1 Schooling as Socialisation into a Myth-Symbol Complex 
Bourdieu, in his analysis of class differences in France, views the state as 
the spokesperson of dominant classes and as the primary agency laying 
down the essential features of citizens and ‘others’.233  He shows that the 
process of education approximates the imposition of an arbitrary culture (the 
myth-symbol complex of a dominant social class, or of an ethnic group) by an 
arbitrary power (the state) for the purpose of perpetuating the social order 
and hierarchical pattern among (class or ethnic) groups.234  When social 
change occurs and hierarchical patterns among communities change, the 
contents and structures of schooling follow. The more dependent education 
systems are on the state, the slower they are in responding to social 
change.235  In this perspective, education reform is an expression of ‘conflict 
and competition between social class, ethnic, religious and gender 
groups’.236  Thus, negotiation over the contents and structures of compulsory 
education is an amplified debate over the fundamental identity (or identities) 
of a society.   
Moreover, Bourdieu argues that the practices and contents of schooling 
reflect a ‘legitimate culture’, which is the expression of the values and 
interests of dominant groups.  He maintains that the more arbitrary the power 
distribution in society, the further ‘legitimate culture’ is from the myth-symbol 
complex of some communities.237  Thus, rigid and illegitimate inter-group 
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hierarchies would create and reproduce a gap between arbitrary (or state) 
‘legitimate’ education and the culture of some communities.238  
Application of Bourdieu’s analysis to ethnic and national communities in 
deeply divided societies explains the continuing existence, alongside the 
state education system, of schools associated with specific communities. 
Through schools, the state attempts to socialise its citizens into a dominant 
myth-symbol complex: community schools may emerge as instruments of 
collective resistance to socialisation and assimilation.  As Chapter 3 shows, 
community schools in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia emerged as 
valuable ‘means of preserving group identity through generations’. 239   
Indeed, recent research in Northern Ireland confirms that individual 
identification with communities and expression of stereotypes increase 
markedly in the first years of primary school. 240   This suggests that 
compulsory education remains a tool to transmit ‘a set of predispositions 
towards certain cultural events and symbols and a deep sense of belonging 
to one community in opposition to the other’ or to the state.241   
2.4.2 Education as Socialisation into a Political Order 
Beyond expressing a particular culture and reproducing certain power 
hierarchies, compulsory schools affect individual political attitudes.  Easton 
argues that the survival of democratic political systems depends ‘upon the 
success of a society in producing children most of whom acquire positive 
feelings about it’.242  He demonstrates that, in the USA, children come to 
‘idealise’ or ‘hostilise’ the political system by becoming aware of an external 
authority superior to the family and by personalising key institutions.243  He 
refrains from drawing direct connections between adult political attitudes and 
children’s feelings, but he demonstrates that by age 11, children have 
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generally developed marked support or hostility towards the US political 
system.244   
Success in conveying diffused support for the political system depends first 
upon the stability of the political system.245  Second, it depends on the 
triangular relationship between the state, the ‘gatekeepers who could 
regulate the flow of support to the authorities’, and the citizens.246  In a 
deeply divided society, such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland or Macedonia, the 
elites and institutions associated with local religious, ethnic and national 
communities act as gatekeepers, mediating the interactions between the 
state and its citizens.  The state’s ability to bypass gatekeepers and nurture 
diffused support for the political system depends on its relationship with 
gatekeepers and on the cohesiveness of communities: the more cohesive 
the community, the harder it is for the state to bypass it. 
In this respect, Easton offers an important contribution to analysis of the 
constraints to political socialisation in deeply divided societies.  Chapter 3 
substantiates Easton’s findings and shows that the success of states in 
imposing a myth-symbol complex, and furthering positive feelings about the 
political system, depends on their relationship with the local ethnic 
communities.  When local communities are not cohesive or when states have 
a positive relationship with communal elites (or gatekeepers), states can 
succeed in conveying a culture and widespread support for the political 
system.  In contrast, when states have an antagonistic relationship with some 
local cohesive communities (such as during violent identity-based conflicts), 
states will attempt to shape ‘good loyal citizens’ and face the resistance of 
some communities, which attempt to form ‘good disloyal citizens’.247  The 
process of political socialisation into hostility or support for the political 
system also occurs through formal education.  
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2.4.3 Schools and Identity-Based Conflict 
Bourdieau and Easton confirm that education has a key nation-building 
function: it transmits core myth-symbol complexes (or cultures), furthers 
children’s internalisation of communal identities and contributes to the 
development of support (or hostility) towards the socio-political system.  The 
contents and practices of formal education can also contribute to instability 
within a state, and even to the outbreak and continuation of violent conflict 
among its population, because they reflect and reproduce socio-economic 
hierarchies and political allegiances.  In deeply divided societies, hierarchies, 
allegiances and identities often coincide with communal cleavages: this 
amplifies the economic, political and symbolic impact of education reforms on 
certain groups.   
Education policy can reproduce socio-economic inequality by restricting 
access to schooling and providing unequal educational opportunities to 
members of different communities.248   This can cause violent rebellions 
against the state, such as the 2001 ethnic conflict in Macedonia.249  Thus, 
education reforms after conflicts tend to focus on expanding access to 
compulsory schooling and assess progress through quantitative rather than 
qualitative indicators.250  These policies overlook the fact that higher average 
levels of education are not correlated to improved social harmony: social 
cohesion depends on how equally education levels are distributed. 251   
Moreover, the quality of education is as important as access to school: 
perceptions of differential quality and of unequal long-term returns to 
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schooling between members of different communities can motivate violent 
uprisings.252  
Politically, Brown sees education as a tool for inclusion or exclusion.253  
Through its contents, practices and structures, education may promote and 
convey inclusive overarching narratives of identity or reproduce exclusivist 
militant discourses.254  Above all, as Easton shows, schooling may promote 
either support for or opposition to the political system and the state itself.  
Hanf highlights that schools will succeed in assimilating a diverse population 
only if ‘the assimilating group [is] willing to accept members of other groups 
and the latter [is] willing to sacrifice at least certain aspects of their 
identity’.255  Thus, strong and hostile ‘gatekeepers’ may undermine state 
efforts to convey diffused support for the political order, erode attempts at 
conveying a culture or myth-symbol complex, and question the legitimacy of 
authorities. This contributes to the perpetuation of inter-group conflict.256   
Indeed, Chapter 3 will show that in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, education policy emerged as an arena for conflict between the 
state and ethnic communities, and among different communities, becoming 
enmeshed in the wider ‘ideological battleground’ over the identity and 
legitimacy of the state.257    
Symbolically, the contents and structures of education show whether a state 
recognises the myth-symbol complexes of all of its communities.258  Attempts 
to shape a culturally homogeneous society through schools imply the 
exclusion of the myth-symbol complexes of certain communities from the 
curricula and daily practices of schools: this may further inter-group 
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conflicts.259  Conversely, state failure to impose a sanctioned culture on 
children through common institutions, may lead to the emergence of 
separate schools, which become further markers of group membership.260   
Psychologically speaking, Bar-Tal demonstrates that schools are 
instrumental in reproducing the ‘collective orientation of fear… hatred and 
anger as well as guilt or pride’ functional to coping with intractable 
conflicts.261  He argues that during a conflict, ‘the whole educational process 
[is] directed to strengthen the rationale for the continuation of conflict, to 
develop delegitimisation of the rival, and to reinforce patriotism in order to 
secure and maintain mobilisation for the conflict, participation in it, and even 
the readiness to die for the collective’.262  Yet, the culture, attitudes and 
practices that help individuals and communities cope with protracted violent 
conflicts also hinder peace processes.   
In sum, schools can provide a motivating factor for rebellion263 but their 
structures and contents can also indirectly motivate the escalation (or 
perpetuation) of identity-based conflicts.264  Dupuy points out that education 
is addressed in peace agreements only when it is perceived to have 
contributed to violent conflict.265  This suggests that the negotiators of the 
Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements viewed schools as contributors to the 
three violent conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  By 
comparing education policy in these deeply divided societies, this thesis aims 
to highlight the contributions of schools to violent identity-based conflicts 
before offering insights on how education reform can foster reconciliation. 
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2.4.4 From War to Peace 
Bar-Tal clearly expresses the dilemmas intrinsic to education reforms after 
violent inter-group conflicts.  He argues that ‘after decades of indoctrination 
in which schoolchildren in societies engaged in intractable conflict were 
socialised for participation in such conflict… educational systems alone 
cannot redirect the society to change its ethos and culture’.266   
Continuing arguments over precisely how schools perpetuate inter-group 
conflicts, further complicate the formulation of education reforms.  Tony 
Gallagher, examining Northern Ireland, highlights three contending 
perspectives:  
‘first, that separate schools enhanced religious divisions by 
providing different curriculums that heightened inter-group 
antagonisms; second, that the mere fact of separation, allied with 
the hidden curriculum of separate schools, encouraged religious 
differences; and third, that the issue of separate schools was 
largely irrelevant as the main basis for violent conflict lay in the 
unjust relationship of domination and subordination between the 
majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland’.267  
The latter perspective holds that the remediation of unjust inter-group 
hierarchies solves conflicts in deeply divided societies.  Redressing 
inequalities is a necessary step towards conflict resolution, but this chapter 
has also shown that schools help socialise children into communal identities, 
myth-symbol complexes and attitudes to the political system.  These three 
elements are ‘psychological components’ of violent conflicts: they may 
‘contribute to a continuation of the conflict even after the initial, objective 
causes have become irrelevant’. 268   Thus, the redistribution of material 
resources and political power alone do not solve inter-group tensions in the 
long term.  This suggests that schools are independent actors in the 
reproduction and perpetuation of inter-group conflicts in deeply divided 
                                            
266 Bar-Tal, "Peace Education," 36. 
267 Tony Gallagher, "Balancing Difference,” 434. 
268 Taush et al.,  “The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” in Salomon and Cairns 
(eds.), Handbook on Peace Education, 75. 
 76 
societies: when unreformed, they may continue to convey the narratives and 
identities that sustained violent conflict. 
The other two theoretical perspectives hold that curricular contents, or the 
structures of schooling, perpetuate the narratives and hierarchies 
underpinning inter-group conflict.  They advocate different priorities for 
education reform after violent conflicts: changes to manifest curriculum (the 
explicit contents of education) or reforms of the daily practices and structures 
of schools (the hidden curriculum). 269   The Taif, Belfast and Ohrid 
agreements prescribe both reforms to the manifest and hidden curricula, 
confirming that in practice schools contribute to inter-group conflict both 
‘structurally (through separate schooling) and functionally (through curricula 
and teaching and learning processes that emphasise the development of 
separate national identities)’.270  
2.4.4.1 The	  National	  Subjects	  
There is considerable agreement that the contents of curricula embody 
‘legitimate’ knowledge, convey particular myth-symbol complexes and further 
allegiance or opposition to political institutions.271  The available literature 
points to ‘national subjects’ as areas of learning deemed crucial to the 
construction of nations and nation-states: language, history, geography, 
religious education and civic education are the prime instruments for 
divulgation of specific myth-symbol complexes.272    
As Chapter 1 mentioned, the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements emphasise 
reform of the curricula of national subjects: the Taif agreement focuses on 
producing unified curricula and textbooks for history and citizenship 
education;273 the Belfast Agreement promotes the Irish language;274 and the 
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Ohrid agreement addresses the linguistic demands of ethnic Albanians by 
granting funding to universities teaching in the language of at least 20 
percent of the population, guaranteeing mother-tongue primary and 
secondary education, and reaffirming the right of all children to learn the 
Macedonian language.275   
Thus, an evaluation of the political function of formal education in 
consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia requires 
comparative analysis of debates over the national subjects: Chapters 4 to 6 
look at history education, citizenship education and language policies in the 
three societies.276  This thesis shows that the contents of each national 
subject emerge from lengthy, and at times brutal negotiations between states 
and their communities, and among representatives of different communities.  
Negotiations over the contents and lexicon of curricula can ‘become cultural 
and ideological battlegrounds’ and reflect the state of inter-communal 
relations.277  As debates over history education in Lebanon highlight, this is 
also the case for teaching materials, particularly textbooks, whose existence 
‘implies that an agreed knowledge base has been determined as that which 
students need to know’.278   
In fact, Davies finds that reform of curricula and textbooks after violent 
conflicts concentrates either on sanitisation (elimination of controversial 
contents) or sensitisation (rewording of controversial contents).279  In a third 
approach, curricula and textbooks may be reformulated so as to ‘incorporate 
[a plurality of] group specific epistemological and ontological values and 
views’.280   Even when they reflect a consensus regarding the past and 
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visions for the future, a unified curriculum can be problematic when it does 
not speak equally to members of different communities.  Conversely, the 
promotion of different curricula reflecting the cultures and allegiances of 
different communities may deepen inter-communal distance and mistrust.  
Finally, multiperspective curricula are often controversial in post-conflict 
societies because they imply granting legitimacy to ‘a tradition aiming at 
some form of dismemberment of the state’.281  Thus, debates and decisions 
over curricula in consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
reflect the dilemmas incurred when attempting to construct ‘states that reflect 
and incorporate the diversity of their citizens and yet have an overarching set 
of values, ideals and goals to which all citizens are committed’.282   
2.4.4.2 The	  Structure	  of	  Schooling	  
Smith argues that states can shape the basic structure of the education 
system in three ways.  They can promote ‘conformity to a single set of 
dominant values (assimilation)’ through a system of mandatory, state-
sponsored, standard institutions; they can permit ‘the development of 
identity-based institutions (separate development)’, legitimising the authority 
of communities upon their children; and they can ‘encourage shared 
institutions (integration)’, by promoting, alongside other institutions, common 
schools.283   
The relationship between separate institutions and the development of 
differentiated identities is more ambiguous than that between curricular 
contents and exclusive identities, especially after a violent conflict.  In 
particular, the literature distinguishes between the impact of separate schools 
and of segregated schools.  Separate schools may be requested and 
voluntarily chosen by members of a particular community who ‘have access 
to an appropriate form of education for their young people’.284  In contrast, 
segregated schools are imposed legally as part of a wider system of 
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institutionalised discrimination in which ‘the state decides on the appropriate 
form, with or without the consent’ of communities.285   
Equally funded and legitimate parallel institutions may succeed in 
accommodating different cultures and allegiances in deeply divided 
societies.286  ‘Communitarians’ also argue that ‘wider cultural tolerance’ is 
rooted in specific communal values and is best promoted in separate 
schools, while ‘culturalists’ argue that shared schools cannot ensure the fair 
and equal representation of all communities and group identities.287  The 
promotion of a plurality of separate schools resonates with Lijphart when he 
observes that ‘the voluntary self-segregation that [autonomous communal] 
schools entail is acceptable as long as the option of multicultural and 
multiethnic education is also made available and provided that all schools are 
treated equally’. 288   Yet, Chapter 3 shows that the distinction between 
imposition and demand for separate schools is ambiguous in deeply divided 
societies, where communities often create separate institutions as a 
response to institutionalised discrimination and socio-economic exclusion.289   
Moreover, Gallagher contends that, ‘whether schooling systems are 
segregated or separate, there is evidence that such systems can have a 
detrimental impact on social cohesion’.290  Separate schools may exacerbate 
inter-group conflicts by reinforcing socio-economic cleavages, harden group 
boundaries by socialising children into opposing myth-symbol complexes, or 
‘initiate pupils into conflict’ by validating group differences and furthering 
mutual ignorance and suspicion.291  Conversely, mixed schools which do not 
deal with diversity and the roots of conflict, and which do not promote 
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cooperation between children from different backgrounds, may exacerbate 
inter-group hostility.292   
Chapter 7 considers in more depth the theoretical debate over whether 
separate schools further or hinder conflict resolution, and goes on to 
compare initiatives to promote inter-group contact through schools in 
consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  In fact, Davies 
argues that unlike curricula, the structure of the education system tends to go 
unchallenged in the aftermath of violent conflicts.293  This is the case for 
Macedonia, whose Ohrid Agreement does not mention structural reforms to 
schooling.  In contrast, the Taif Agreement calls for expansion in state 
education provision and envisages the establishment of state control over 
private schools, so as to ‘consolidate the process of national cohesion’.294   
Similarly, the Belfast Agreement calls for promotion of integrated education 
to further a ‘culture of tolerance at all levels of society’.295  Chapter 7 will 
comparatively trace these initiatives to determine whether political 
consociations affect the structure of education systems, and generate 
‘consociational’ education systems. 
2.5 Conclusion  
The influence of schooling on the adoption of ethnic and political identities is 
often deemed secondary to the influence of families and peers.296  The socio-
economic context and proximity to violence also affect the salience of ethnic 
identities: Connolly and Healey found that children who grow up in deprived 
areas in Belfast start identifying with a community and express ethnic 
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prejudices earlier than children who grow up in middle class areas.297  Magill 
et al. add that children’s attitudes are affected by their parents’ relationship to 
the conflict.298  In Northern Ireland, individual characteristics were also found 
to impact on the salience of certain conflictual identifications: in particular 
‘masculine sub-cultures’ impacted on the socialisation process of boys.299  In 
Lebanon, the UNDP found that religious background impacted on political 
preferences and actions but socio-economic background impacted on civic 
attitudes and social values.300   
Despite its obvious limits, formal education influences the individual process 
of identification with groups and the development of positive or negative 
attitudes to political systems and states.  Connolly and Maginn show that in 
Northern Ireland, children as young as three-years old can identify and 
express prejudice against ‘others’, but add that ‘the more that children are 
able to acquire attitudes that run counter to the general ethnocentric biases 
that they have learnt and continue to maintain, the more their overall levels of 
prejudice reduce’.301  Indeed, the state and its ethnic communities insist on 
controlling schooling precisely because of their ‘conviction that social 
attitudes are significantly affected in schools’.302   
Moreover, in contrast to the family and peer groups, the hidden and manifest 
curriculum of schools can be reformed centrally, and ‘what is taught in 
schools, how it is taught and how education is financed and delivered are all 
policy areas in which government decisions have both an early and lasting 
impact, for better or for worse’.303  Camargo Abello reflects that ‘while the 
formal education system responds in part to the structure of the society in 
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which it functions, it does, at the same time, have the capacity to construct 
alternatives for that society’.304  If ‘education systems do not cause wars’,305 
some aspects of formal education (such as differential access, unequal 
opportunities and legitimation of exclusive conflictual identities) certainly 
contribute to the outbreak and perpetuation of violent conflicts. 306   
Conversely, reforms in the curricula and structures of schooling may 
contribute to social cohesion, loosely understood as ‘the property by which 
whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound together through 
the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely 
on consensus rather than pure coercion’.307  By fostering social cohesion, 
education may contribute directly to the sustainability of peace processes.308   
Davies highlights first that educational choices made during peace 
negotiations or in their immediate aftermath, however casual, tend to solidify.  
Second, she argues that the trajectory of education reforms in post-conflict 
societies ‘depends on who is in charge after conflict’.309  In other words, 
education policy depends on the post-war political system and on its 
ideological rationale.  Bourdieu and Easton confirm that the contents, 
practices and structures of compulsory education are instrumental in 
reproducing the hierarchies and principles underpinning socio-political 
systems.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that, in consociations, 
education reform would be harnessed to reflect and reproduce the founding 
principles of power-sharing.   
This thesis is the first comparative research on the contents and structures of 
education in societies whose political system is based on consociational 
power-sharing. It aims to contribute to the theory and practice of conflict 
regulation through complex consociation.  It also intends to determine the 
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political function of schools in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, 
and to evaluate the extent to which they can be employed to aid transition 
out of violent conflict.  Before focusing on key debates education reform in 
consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, it provides an 
historical overview of the establishment and development of each education 
system. 
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3 Compulsory Education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia 
This chapter provides a historical and political background to the analysis of 
education reform in consociations that follows in Chapters 4 to 7.  It traces 
the evolution of education systems in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, and summarises wider efforts to build nation-states before the 
establishment of the current consociations in 1989, 1998 and 2001 
respectively.  It also considers the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements and 
subsequent political developments in the three societies.  A concluding 
section explains the political function of compulsory education during identity-
based conflicts. 
Education systems in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia emerged in 
the context of inter-communal conflicts within contested states.  As the 
territorial realities of controversial partitions crystallised, markers of identity 
evolved to reflect and frame political conflicts, and communal belonging 
came to be conflated with specific political attitudes and national aspirations.  
Markers of identity and belonging, myths of the past and loyalty (or 
opposition) to the state were at the core of the three conflicts. Schools, as 
sites of definition, legitimation and reproduction of language, ideology and 
historical narratives, emerged as symbolic (and at times physical) 
‘battlegrounds for the hearts and minds of the next generation’.310   
3.1 Lebanon 
In what is the territory of present-day Lebanon, the Ottoman millet system 
entrenched religion as a primary component of collective political identity,311 
while the 1864 Reglement provided for proportional representation of 
religious communities in the administrative council of the mutassarrifyya of 
Mount Lebanon. 312   The 1740 Franco-Ottoman treaty (Capitulations) 
established the precedent of foreign patronage over a religious community, 
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granting the French the right to intervene in Ottoman affairs to defend 
Christians. 313  European influence paved the way for the introduction of 
romantic notions of nationalism, which postulated the coincidence of nation 
and state.314  This context generated political practices characterized by a 
tribalism overwritten by religious differences.315  It contributed to construct 
some sects, or confessional communities as ‘quasi-nations’. 316   Before 
independence, and increasingly under the constraining parameters of the 
new independent state, the 18 sects treasured their histories and markers of 
identity and projected them upon the Lebanese state.  Thus, Lebanon’s 
nation-state building experience is defined by the dialectical, interdependent 
and often antagonistic relationship between the state and its communities.   
The following analysis traces education policy in four formative periods of 
Lebanon’s modern history: the French Mandate of 1920-1943, the 
establishment of independent Lebanon in 1943-1958, the consolidation of a 
corporate consociation between 1958 and 1974, and the civil war of 1975-
1989.  It then highlights the main reforms in the Taif Agreement and provides 
an overview of key political developments since 1990.   
It shows that debates over primary education between 1920 and 1989 
mirrored wider tensions between a weak state attempting to impose an 
overarching narrative of collective identity and strong religious communities 
determined to protect and project their group identities and narratives.  This 
created ‘the educational landscape, or shall we say archipelago, that is the 
Lebanese educational system’.317   
3.1.1 French Mandate (1920-1943) 
Having secured a ‘Mandate for Syria and Lebanon’ in the aftermath of World 
War I, French authorities defined the two new state entities and their borders.  
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To ensure the economic and strategic viability of the newly created Greater 
Lebanon, they annexed the four provinces of Beirut, the North, the South and 
the Bekaa (inhabited by large Sunni and Shia communities) to the 
mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon (populated primarily by Christians and 
Druze).318  Most Christians accepted the new borders, but from the early 
1920s Sunni Muslims contested them and ‘made it abundantly clear that 
Greater Lebanon, as a national entity separate and distinct from Arab Syria, 
was meaningless to them, and in the long term unacceptable’.319  In protest, 
they boycotted the 1921 census and their notables demanded the right of 
self-determination and unification with the rest of Ottoman Syria.320   
The Mandatory authorities also set out to build new state institutions in 
Greater Lebanon: Hanf argues that ‘the Jacobin ideas of many French 
administrators’ crumbled before the concerted opposition of local leaders, 
determined to protect ‘the fundamental rights of the communities’. 321  
Rapidly, the French authorities came to view inter-communal cooperation as 
the key to stability.  This meant that from birth, Lebanon’s institutions were 
liberal and democratic but not secular. 322   Thus, the 1926 constitution 
institutionalised a political system founded on the sharing of power between 
the elites of the different religious communities. 323   The 1936 Franco-
Lebanese treaty, paving the way for independence, further entrenched 
communal representation in government. 324   The confessional political 
system allowed considerable autonomy in decision-making for the French 
High Commissioner.  Successive French representatives juggled Maronite 
ambitions to dominate the new institutions and Muslim pan-Arab sympathies, 
                                            
318 Mattar, "Is Lebanese Confessionalism,” in Choueiri (ed.), Breaking the Cycle, 50; For a 
detailed account of the appeals of different Lebanese communities at the Paris Peace 
conference of 1919, see Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 25. 
319 Ibid., 169. 
320 Hanf, Coexistence, 65-66. 
321 Ibid., 67. 
322  Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilisation in Lebanese Politics," 
Comparative Politics 1, no. 2 (1969): 251; Makdisi, "Reconstructing", 24.  
323 Ironically, the 1926 constitution also specified the ‘temporary’ nature of confessionalism. 
Anna Ziadeh, Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon (London: Hurst, 
2006): 147.  
324 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership: Lebanon, Israel, Egypt (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1975): 35.  
 87 
while encouraging the emergence of new political and economic elites to 
replace traditional religious figures.325  
The Mandate also entrusted France with developing public education in 
Lebanon.326   As early as 1920, a Division of Education (becoming the 
Ministry of Public Education in 1926) was established to enforce central 
control over the education system, and to revive state schools.327   The 
French authorities attempted to use curricula and textbooks to encourage 
allegiance to the new state and promote peaceful coexistence among 
citizens belonging to different communities.  They warned that ‘a divided 
country will never be strong’328 and, behaving ‘as a colonial rather than as a 
mandatory power’ diffused primarily French culture. 329   French replaced 
Turkish as the official language taught in official schools, and the teaching of 
French became mandatory in all schools.  Beyond strengthening Lebanese 
cultural affiliation to France, this policy aimed to weaken ‘one of the major 
bonds of the nationalist movement, the Arabic language’.330  Similarly, the 
1925 national curricula guidelines warned that ‘differences among religious 
groups have caused a lot of bloodshed in the past’331 and attempted to 
submerge communal differences by conveying a Christian and philo-
European narrative of Lebanese identity.  Geography and History devoted a 
disproportionate amount of time to Europe and France, and most curricula 
emphasised Lebanese particularism, contrasting it with the history and 
identity of the Arab Middle East.332  
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In fact, different identities, informed by different interpretations of the past, 
thrived in Greater Lebanon, as exemplified by incensed debates over the 
contents of history textbooks for state primary schools in the 1930s.  In 1935, 
two Sunni scholars composed the History of Syria and Lebanon, a textbook 
reflecting a Syrian nationalist outlook and refuting Lebanese particularism.333  
As a response, the 1937 History of Lebanon relied on a Maronite 
interpretation of Lebanon’s past, emphasising the Phoenician rather than 
Arab ancestry of the Lebanese population, focusing on Lebanese specificity 
and downplaying or ignoring the Arab affiliations of parts of the population 
and their cultural and historic connection with Ottoman Syria.334  Only the 
vocal protests of representatives of the Muslim communities ensured that the 
History of Lebanon was never adopted as an official state school textbook.335  
The articulation of legitimate, overarching founding myths for a Lebanese 
state was arduous in and of itself, but ambitions to convey allegiance to the 
state through schools also faced insurmountable structural obstacles.  The 
1869 Ottoman Special Education Law had introduced public state schools in 
the mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon, but in 1918, most schools in Lebanon 
were foreign and private.336  Indeed, before the Mandate, education was 
provided mainly by missionary organisations, often sponsored by foreign 
powers who aimed, through schooling, to gain a foothold in the Levant.  
Thus, French missionaries educated mainly Maronite children while British 
and American missionaries focused on the education of Muslim children.337  
Ottoman state schools accounted for just over 20 percent of the schools in 
Greater Lebanon, and their operation was suspended in 1918 (after the 
Ottoman defeat in World War I).338   
Thus, in the 1920s the Mandatory authorities attempted to revive the state 
sector and succeeded in increasing the number of state schools from 91 in 
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1924 to 183 in 1941.  Still, public schools came to cater for only 16 percent of 
school children in 1941, while private schools affiliated to local religious 
communities accommodated 52 percent of children.339  This is because the 
French High Commissioner came to rely on representatives of the religious 
communities in expanding primary education: as early as January 1919, he 
offered generous subsidies to communities wishing to re-open or found 
private schools.340  Article 8 of the Mandate and Article 10 of the 1926 
Constitution also established that ‘there shall be no violation of the right of 
religious communities to have their own schools’.341   Far from violating 
communal rights to private schools, the state started providing them with 
regular financial aid from 1928.342  
In Greater Lebanon, the divide between private and public school came to 
coincide with socio-economic and communal cleavages.  State schools were 
expected to ‘remedy regional disparities’ and cater for the underprivileged, so 
from the 1920s their pupils were predominantly Muslim.343  Moreover, the 
limited reach of state schools explains partially the failure to socialise the 
population into overarching identities and to promote allegiance to the state 
during the Mandate.  Through subsidised private primary schools, religious 
communities continued to convey diverging and exclusive conceptions of 
identity, rooted in different interpretations of the past and projecting different 
visions for Lebanon’s future.344  
The Mandate was a formative period for the Lebanese state and for its 
education system.  The French authorities envisaged a liberal state whose 
schools shaped homogeneous Francophile Lebanese citizens, a vision 
hampered by the necessity to accommodate the local confessional 
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communities.  Since the 1920s, the institutionalisation of a confessional 
political system intertwined the fate of the Lebanese state with that of its 
religious communities.  The structure of the Lebanese education system 
mirrored this mutual interdependence: by the 1940s, schools were divided 
into private and public and further fragmented into institutions affiliated to 
specific communities.  Alongside the state, each community retained different 
narratives of Lebanon’s past and visions for its future and set out to convey 
them to children in private schools, whose activities were subsidised by the 
state.   
3.1.2 National Pact (1943-1958)  
Independence within the borders of Greater Lebanon was ‘the second choice 
of all parties, and all Lebanon could get in 1943’.345  The National Pact, an 
agreement between the Maronite and Sunni elites at the eve of 
independence, aimed to pave the way for independence from France by 
reconciling the two main political and national aspirations of Lebanon’s 
communities.346  Lebanese nationalists advocated an independent Lebanese 
nation-state, pointing at the socio-political exceptionality of Mount Lebanon 
and its tradition of mountain refuge for persecuted minorities.347  According to 
Lebanese nationalists, ‘the Lebanese remained Lebanese, regardless of the 
extent to which the outside world might choose to classify them as Arabs, 
because their language happened to be Arabic’.348  
In contrast, Arab nationalists maintained that the French-sponsored Greater 
Lebanon could not exist as a ‘nation-state separate and distinct from 
Syria’.349  On the one hand, Syrian nationalists called for the incorporation of 
Lebanese territory into a secular Syrian state encompassing the whole of 
Ottoman Syria.  On the other hand, Pan-Arabists aimed to establish (in their 
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view re-establish) a strong Arab state encompassing the whole Eastern 
Mediterranean.350  Choueiri summarises that through the 1943 National Pact, 
the Maronite community, the foremost advocate of Lebanese nationalism, 
recognised ‘the Arab character of Lebanon’, while the Sunni community, 
sidelining its support for Arab nationalism, accepted Lebanese independence 
from other Arab states.351  Thus, the independent Lebanese state was born 
through a ‘double negation’ of national aspirations.352   
The National Pact, initially a political expedient to achieve unity in the 
struggle against imperial France, would evolve into the backbone of 
Lebanon’s stability and very existence.353  A state rooted in the National Pact 
‘was not meant to express unity but to reconcile differences’,354 but the 
continuing ideological and political clash between Lebanese and Arab 
nationalisms ultimately ‘impede[d] the normal development of the state and 
[kept] its political legitimacy and ultimate viability continuously in question’.355  
Lebanon emerged in the 1940s as a corporate consociation: its executive 
operated as a grand coalition of communal representatives and a fixed 
number of parliamentary seats were allocated to each sect.  Lebanon’s 
corporate consociation helped insulate the central institutions from inter-
communal tensions, thereby ensuring their survival and stability even when 
tensions appeared between the weak central state and a decentralised 
political system based on mutually exclusive religious communities.356  Yet, 
by assigning parliamentary seats according to the six Christians to five 
Muslims ratio, the Lebanese corporate consociation created inflexible 
structures with limited room for reform in response to changing socio-political 
circumstances.  The National Pact established the parameters for future 
political struggles: Lebanon’s sects would attempt to project their narratives 
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of identity upon state institutions and to project their aspirations upon 
Lebanon’s borders.357  In particular, the ideological clash between Lebanese 
and Arab nationalism permeated Lebanese political struggles, setting the 
Maronite vision of Lebanon as ‘the last line of communal defence’ in a 
majority Muslim Middle East in opposition to the Sunni frustration with a state 
repressing their pan-Arab aspirations.358  
Moreover, Lebanon’s corporate consociation entrenched confessionalism as 
the basis for state legitimacy, thereby helping to cement inter-communal 
boundaries and to construct the collective political consciousness of 
communities that, in 1943, ‘were not equally confessional, or even 
confessionalist’.359  The political system was superimposed on existing local 
clientelistic networks, and local patrons often reinvented themselves as 
political representatives. 360   However, the corporate consociation also 
entrenched extensive non-territorial autonomy for the local confessional 
communities, and confessionalism emerged as the ‘unequally accepted and 
diversely interpreted contract … that stipulates the preservation of a minimal 
public space [for sects]’. 361   Thus, Salibi summarises that, since the 
independence of the Lebanese state, its citizens have been given two 
identities, one national and one communal or confessional:362 schools were 
one of the instruments employed to transmit these ‘hyphenated’ identities to 
children.363   
One of the architects of the National Pact reflected that ‘perhaps it is true that 
not all our countrymen are Lebanese in their hearts, but sensible policies can 
ensure that they are Lebanese in their minds’.364  Thus, the first Lebanese 
governments identified education policy as a nation-building priority and 
attempted to shape schools contributing to the development of a common, 
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overarching Lebanese sense of identity. 365   In 1943, the government 
declared its ambition that ‘our schools should graduate a generation unified 
in aims and national feelings’, and its successor presented schools as ‘the 
best soil to cultivate virtues and tolerance’. 366   Similarly, in 1946, the 
government wondered ‘how desirable it would be if on the national soil we 
unified school programmes to create a spiritual homogeneity among the 
citizens of the state.’367  Three reforms exemplify state efforts to employ 
schools as ‘instruments of national integration’.368  
First, in 1946 Arabic became compulsory in all Lebanese schools, and new 
curricula required the teaching of all subjects in Arabic, while English was 
introduced as a foreign language alongside French.369   Immediately, an 
argument emerged between bilingualists and monolingualists: advocates of 
Arabic monolingualism in schools were predominantly Muslim.  In contrast, 
bilingualists were predominantly Christian and viewed (French-Arab) 
bilingualism both as an economic advantage in the labour market, and, more 
importantly, as a reflection of ‘a double heritage, the Arab and the 
Western’. 370   As Chapter 6 explains, the debate over the language of 
instruction in state schools, as an expression of wider disputes over the 
identity and allegiance of the Lebanese, would continue until the end of the 
civil war. 
Second, in 1946 the government introduced new curricula: they aimed to 
convey, through geography, history, literature and citizenship education, 
uniform socio-political attitudes, pride for a common past and an overarching 
vision for the future. 371   The new curricula included more material on 
Lebanon and the Middle East than their predecessors and presented the 
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National Pact as the founding myth of a Lebanon ‘united for a day, united 
forever’.372   
Third, the state immediately identified private schools as its adversaries: in 
1946 it reported to UNESCO that students ‘who speak the same language 
and even belong to the same family find themselves at the end of their 
studies with a conception of various vital problems wholly dependent on the 
school they attended.’373  From 1946, private institutions were required to 
implement the national curriculum as a step towards the establishment of 
state control over the narratives and values transmitted in private schools.374   
However, with the deterioration in regional security due to the beginning of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, education reform receded in importance.375  
While ostensibly supporting state schools, Lebanese governments increased 
funding for private establishments.376  In 1956 a new class of schools was 
created: private free schools, which were fully subsidised by the government 
and offered free private education to underprivileged children.377  Enrolment 
in state schools declined as financial aid encouraged religious communities 
to open new schools that, the government noted, ‘absorb[ed] a good number 
of the pupils who frequented official schools’.378   
Moreover, a pivotal decree in March 1950 tempered previous emphasis on 
establishing state authority over private education.  It reaffirmed that all 
schools were to adopt the national curriculum, but allowed private schools to 
choose different textbooks, pedagogies and supplementary subjects.  
Moreover, it stated that only books on the history and geography of Lebanon 
required ministerial approval and only Lebanese students were to be taught 
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in Arabic. 379   Ultimately, the decree appeared to sanction communal 
prerogatives over the education of children.380  Rather than facing a sharp 
break from the Mandate era, private schools in independent Lebanon 
continued to convey different narratives of identity and founding myths of the 
nation to children from different confessional backgrounds.381   
Abouchedid and Nasser trace the ambiguities of early Lebanese education 
policies to the political system and argue that ‘perplexed by the politics of 
consociationalism, the Ministry of Education failed to express or even to 
maintain a consistent education policy’.382  More accurately, education policy 
expressed an underlying clash between ‘Muslims calling for cultural 
homogeneity’ and ‘Christians championing cultural heterogeneity’.383  This 
mirrored the fundamental tension at the heart of Lebanon’s power-sharing: 
below the surface of inclusive nationalism, simmered the divergent markers 
of identity, visions for the state and foreign policy orientation of different 
confessional communities.   
In a regional environment polarised between pan-Arab nationalism 
(championed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser) and the Baghdad 
pact (a pro-Western, anti-Communist organisation formed by Turkey, Iraq, 
the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran in 1955), the domestic conflict over 
foreign policy orientation strained Lebanon’s institutions and led to the 1958 
civil war.384   
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3.1.3 Compromises (1958-1974) 
The 1958 war can be best interpreted as the breakdown of a rigid corporate 
consociational political system, inadequate ‘to channel political and socio-
economic changes’.385  In particular, the war embodied the emergence of a 
Sunni challenge to the political predominance of the Maronite community and 
‘ownership’ of the executive Presidency. 386   Rather than settling the 
ambiguities at the heart of Lebanon’s nation-state building project, the 1958 
civil war institutionalised the ‘sanctity of the [National] Pact’. 387   In its 
aftermath, President Fouad Chehab embarked on extensive reforms and 
called for the ‘building of a new society’.388  He encouraged the fine-tuning of 
Lebanese political and non-political institutions to ensure equilibrium among 
the different sects: his ‘object was not the creation of a secular state, but to 
ensure that all communities got their share of the cake’.389  
This approach permeated education policy.  Some had seen the 1958 civil 
war as proof that the state had failed in furthering social cohesion through 
education.390  After 1958, the government set out to expand schooling and 
partly succeeded in reducing regional disparities over the following 
decade.391  State schools increased from 184 in 1941 to 1487 in 1980: the 
majority were located in the South, the Bekaa and the North, and over 60 
percent of state school students were Muslim.392   
Despite popular calls to improve the quality of state schools and increase 
government funding for public education, successive governments relied 
heavily on private schools to extend the reach of primary education.393  
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Private institutions expanded their educational provision and the number of 
Christian community schools increased from 451 in 1920 to 548 in 1977.  
The previously under-developed Muslim educational provision increased 
seven-fold over the same period, from 41 community schools in 1920 to 300 
in 1977.394   
Moreover, in 1959, the state transferred powers of inspection to the regional 
level and specified that, whilst state schools should be inspected, private 
schools would only be ‘supervised’.395  Private schools remained free to 
promote ‘their own divergent views of national identity and sense of civic 
loyalty’.396  Once again, the divergence in values and narratives was most 
apparent when looking at textbooks for the national subjects, particularly 
history.  Christian primary schools largely used textbooks that glorified a pre-
Arab Lebanese past, while the newly politically conscious Shia community 
produced The Enlightening History, which focused on the anti-colonial 
struggles of the ‘Arab nation’.397   
Finally, the government revised the national curricula in 1968.  In an attempt 
to sidestep the increasingly salient issue of Lebanese and Arab identities, the 
new curricula avoided references to the ‘Lebanese nation’, ‘Lebanese 
identity’ and other thorny social, political and civic issues.398  In the early 
1970s, the state eliminated exams for citizenship education and most 
schools stopped teaching it.  In its place, the government introduced one 
hour per week of religious education in all schools in 1973: the new subject 
was taught by clergymen chosen by religious authorities but paid by the 
state.399  
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Palestinian refugees emerged in this period as significant political actors and, 
as most other local political actors, relied partly on schools to convey 
identities and political allegiances to children.  About 100,000 Palestinians 
settled in Lebanon after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and a further 200,000-
500,000 arrived in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War and of the 1970 
ousting of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Jordan.400  
Palestinians resided in refugee camps and were marginalised from Lebanese 
society, politics and economy through an array of legal measures that 
prevented them from ‘participating in government, working in more than 70 
professions, accessing health and unemployment benefits, building and 
owning their own homes, travelling freely within Lebanon and obtaining a 
passport’.401  Palestinian children attended schools managed by the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA).  These schools followed the Lebanese national curriculum but 
their hidden curriculum conveyed a vision of Lebanon as a pawn in the Arab 
struggle against the state of Israel and as ‘Palestine’s surrogate 
battlefield’.402  Despite its official neutrality, the Lebanese state suffered the 
consequences of the PLO increasing military presence on its territory.403   
The 1969 Cairo Agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese Army 
transferred de facto sovereignty over Palestinian refugee camps to the PLO 
and committed Lebanon to a position of tolerance towards the PLO’s military 
actions against Israel.  Thus, from 1969, the PLO could act as ‘a state within 
the state’.  In return, the Cairo agreement bound the PLO ‘not to interfere in 
Lebanese affairs’.404  
‘Lebanese affairs’ were once again strained along familiar lines of identity, 
belonging and political allegiance.  Lebanese nationalism ‘deteriorated into a 
group ideology’ associated with the Christian right, while Arab nationalism 
had an appeal ‘almost exclusively among the Muslim masses’.405  Moreover, 
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Hanf notes that the early 1970s witnessed increasing social conflicts, which 
‘were not conflicts between communities but between social and economic 
groups and interests’.406  However, socio-economic fractures often coincided 
with confessional and national cleavages: Muslims (particularly Shia) were 
overrepresented in the lowest socio-economic group and among the least 
educated. 407   Thus, the Shia Movement of the Dispossessed (Amal) 
exemplifies the coincidence of communal and socio-economic interests: by 
founding new schools and orphanages, the movement exploited ‘the political 
potential of social assistance as a means of outflanking the traditional elites 
and entering the political arena’.408  
Adding to these overlapping socio-economic, confessional and national 
cleavages was the perception, particularly among Christians, that ‘the state 
could not guarantee the safety of its citizens’ against the Palestinian 
insurgency.409  The weakness of the central state was an intrinsic and valued 
aspect of communal autonomy in a corporate consociation, but in the 1970s 
it also ‘created insecurity, forcing factions to establish their own independent 
power structures and to look for support beyond Lebanon’s borders’.410  One 
after the other, Lebanon’s communities created militias. 
Hanf aptly summarises the main perspectives explaining Lebanese descent 
into civil war in the early 1970s: 
One thesis is that the sham conflict of the traditional political class 
could no longer conceal the fundamental economic contradictions 
in the country: it is regarded as a conflict between rich and poor.  
Another thesis holds that the conflict is one between a Lebanese 
nationalism mainly supported by Christians and an Arab 
nationalism with largely Muslim support: a conflict of identity.  A 
third thesis treats it primarily as a conflict between the concept of a 
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traditionalist, ‘confessional’ state and that of a modern, secular 
and politically integrated state: a conflict between pre-modern and 
modern politics.411 
 In fact, in the mid-1970s the positions of rival factions were ‘a lump sum’: 
Muslim communities proposed ‘a package of domestic, pan-Arab and 
Palestinian politics’ and challenged the Christian emphasis on sovereignty 
and stability. 412   Through schools and the media, communal actors 
disseminated divergent and hostile narratives: mutually exclusive identity 
markers and political allegiances both reflected and framed deepening 
communal polarisation, and inter-communal differences evolved into 
‘confessional labels and fighting banners’.413  
3.1.4 Civil War (1975-1989) 
In the 15 years of civil war, the impact of fighting, the population movements, 
the hollowing of state authority, the cantonisation of Lebanese territory, the 
re-emergence of communities as the primary provider of services to citizens, 
and the communal quasi-monopoly over education, further undermined the 
state education system.   
During the war, militia leaders channelled state financial resources to areas 
under their control and instituted ‘para-statal systems’ complete with 
autonomous education systems.414  Harik argues that the social institutions 
filling the gap of a retiring state ‘were also set to work on projects that 
specifically reinforced primordial communal attachments’. 415   Indeed, in 
South Lebanon, Amal opened over 33 state schools and Hizbollah employed 
Iranian funding to build and operate new theological schools.416  The new 
schools, beyond adding ‘legitimacy to new elites’, had an important political 
and military function: they provided rewards for the families of the fallen and 
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strengthened the social fabric so as to ‘keep residents on the land’.417 
Moreover, Harik shows that social institutions created by the rival militias in 
‘their’ territories ‘were made to illustrate deliberate models of the new 
republic that the planners hoped would arise in the aftermath of the civil 
war’.418  Schools reflected the narratives, identities, political ideologies and 
visions of the different confessional communities: thus, the communalism ‘of 
a Maronite [was] projected as Lebanese nationalism, of the Sunni Muslim it 
[was] Arab Nationalism…, of the Shiite [sic.] egalitarianism’.419   
Diverging outlooks were conveyed through, for example, the new contents of 
certain national subjects, such as history.  Indeed, the history curriculum 
emerged as a further ideological battleground in the midst of a war that, to 
more than one communal leader, was about the establishment of the ‘real’ 
history of Lebanon.420  In the areas under the control of the Progressive 
Socialist Party (PSP), new history books portrayed the Lebanese Republic as 
the creation of cunning Christian elites at the expense of other sects, and 
civic education classes conveyed socialist principles.421  Sunni and Maronite 
schools generally continued to formally teach history according to the state 
curriculum, but in practice their textbooks avoided discussing the origins of 
Lebanon’s ethno-religious communities, thus presenting them as mutually 
exclusive, immemorial and stable. 422   In particular, the history books 
portrayed the socio-economic development of each community as a parallel 
process, taking place in different geographical locations: this conveyed an 
image of innate Maronite orientation towards Europe and Sunni orientation 
towards the Arab world. 423   Thus, the history curricula reproduced the 
ideological building blocks of Lebanese nationalism and pan-Arabism on 
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which the National Pact and the very existence of independent Lebanon had 
been founded.    
Finally, in the territories controlled by militias, schools were employed as 
military recruitment grounds.  For example, one of the fighters recalled that in 
school 
we Muslims were told that the Christians intended to slaughter us, 
to throw us into the sea, and found a Christian state similar to 
Israel and allied with her, to spearhead the war against the Arabs 
and Muslims.  Those ideas mobilised us to fight against the 
Christians.  But I discovered later that the Christian youth were 
told that the Muslims wanted to establish a Muslim state, oust all 
the Christians, and join the Arab countries in their fight against 
Israel.424 
Ironically, in 1981 the government published the report Principles, Aims and 
Objectives of Education in Lebanon: Horizon 2000, an attempt to initiate 
comprehensive education reform.425  The ambition to create through schools 
‘a democratic being’ and to further ‘respect of the other – individual and 
collective’426 was not accorded political priority and was quickly sidelined in 
the context of civil war.427  In fact, the positions of religious and communal 
representatives over education are remarkably consistent with their positions 
in previous decades.  Before and during the war, the representatives of 
Christian schools advocated ‘cultural pluralism’, meant as the provision of 
equal state funding to religious schools and the promotion of an education 
furthering mutual recognition, respect and coexistence.  Cultural pluralism 
would teach Christians ‘that Muslims are not carbon copies of them and vice 
versa’.428  In contrast, Muslim educational councils consistently called for 
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better state education, for state supervision of private schools and for the 
‘unification of textbooks and instruction’ so as ‘to strengthen national unity 
and Lebanon’s identity, and its Arab relationships’. 429   Interestingly, and 
perhaps reflecting Christian weakness at the end of the war, the Muslim 
position would, almost unaltered, appear in the Taif agreement.  
3.1.5 The Taif Agreement and Beyond (1990-present) 
The Document of National Accord, known as the Taif Agreement, was 
approved by the Lebanese National Assembly in 1989 and ratified in August 
1990 (see Appendix 3 for the full text).  It attempted to settle controversies 
over Lebanon’s identity, borders and very existence, establishing that 
‘Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland 
for all its citizens’ and that ‘Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity’.430  
The agreement reflects the reality of Syrian and Israeli occupation of 
Lebanese territory in 1989.  It enshrines a ‘special relationship’ between 
Lebanon and Syria, further entrenched in the May 1991 Lebanon-Syria 
Treaty of Cooperation.431  The ‘special relationship’ was manifested most 
clearly in the continuing Syrian military occupation of the Lebanese territory 
and intrusion in Lebanese domestic politics.  Under occupation, the selective 
implementation of Taif’s provisions became ‘a potent lever of Syrian power 
over Lebanon’.432  In contrast, Taif advocates taking ‘all the steps necessary 
to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation’: this allowed 
Hizbollah alone among the Lebanese militias to retain its arms and continue 
military resistance in the South.433   
Domestically, the agreement re-established a consociation in Lebanon.  This 
reflected the ‘political culture of coexistence and compromise’ nurtured by the 
National Pact and expressed by most Lebanese citizens throughout the 15 
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years of war. 434   As mentioned, Taif assigned equal numbers of 
parliamentary seats to Christians and Muslims, and reaffirmed the customary 
assignment of the positions of president, prime minister and speaker of the 
chamber of deputies to a Maronite, Sunni and Shia respectively.  In the post-
war ‘constitutional “fine-tuning”’, presidential powers were reduced to the 
advantage of the speaker and, more substantially, of the prime minister.435  
Hudson argues that Taif was based on a ‘consociationalism-plus’ model.436  
Indeed, the agreement envisages the establishment of a complex 
consociation rather than a return to corporate practices.  This is most evident 
in its prescriptions for the phased abolition of political sectarianism, which 
were never implemented under Syrian occupation.437  Thus, the Lebanese 
political system relapsed into familiar corporate consociational patterns and 
into rigid structures unable to adapt to socio-demographic and strategic 
changes.  Under the Syrian aegis, the agreement was not implemented and 
the ‘troika’ of the president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament 
came to dominate the political system, overshadowing both the cabinet and 
deputies in decision-making.438  Successive governments between 1992 and 
2005 redefined the function of the state as ‘to make the economy 
“competitive” through the provision of infrastructure and a good business 
environment, but … play only a minimal role in income distribution and 
welfare provision.’439   This view of the function of the state would also 
influence education policy. 
The complex consociation established in Taif also relied on education reform 
as a complementary mechanism to further long-term stability.  The Taif 
agreement calls for the expansion of state elementary school provision, 
protection of private institutions, establishment of state control over private 
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schools, reform of national curricula and production of unified textbooks for 
history and civic education. 440   It establishes an explicit link between 
education policy and sustainable peace in Lebanon, echoing two recurring 
themes in the history of Lebanon’s education system: state attempts to 
establish control over private schools and state designs to promote 
overarching narratives and allegiances through the curricula.  Finally, the 
education reforms mapped in Taif reflect long-standing Muslim educational 
priorities in calling for ‘the re-socialisation of children along national unitary 
lines’.441  
Chapters 4, 5 and 7 explain debates over the reforms mapped out in Taif: the 
drafting of a unified history curriculum and textbook, the framing of a 
common citizenship education curriculum and textbook, and the redressing 
of the dichotomy between public and private schools.  They show that 
successive Lebanese governments reiterated rhetorical commitments to 
producing common curricula to convey ‘feelings of unity among citizens and 
the developments of notions of solidarity and fraternity’442 and to establish 
state control over private institutions. 443   Yet, the pluralist principles 
underpinning Lebanon’s corporate consociation also legitimise the thriving of 
parallel schools and of competing identities and allegiances.   
Indeed, in the early 1990s, the civil war appeared to have solved the 
fundamental debate over identity, teaching ‘the Lebanese that they [were] a 
nation and that they want[ed] to remain a nation’.444  It also appeared to have 
settled the long-standing struggles over borders, establishing that an 
independent Lebanese state should in fact exist.445  Yet, the momentous 
changes of 2000-2005 revived clashes over the intertwined issues of 
communities’ relative power in the state and of Lebanon’s alignments in the 
regional state system.  In 2000, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, and its 
conflict with Hizbollah reduced to inter-border skirmishes over the contested 
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territories of Shebaa, Ghajar and Kfar Shuba.  This, combined with the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2004 delegitimised Hizbollah’s military 
presence in Lebanon in the eyes of the majority of the Sunni and Maronite 
communities.   
Moreover, the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, and 
the subsequent Syrian military withdrawal from the Lebanese territory, 
triggered the polarisation of Lebanese politics into rival blocs: the pro-Syrian, 
pro-Iranian 8 March coalition, and the pro-Western 14 March coalition.446  
Knudsen and Kerr observe that from 2005 ‘this two-bloc system has left 
Lebanon ungovernable’.447  Indeed, the March 8 and March 14 coalitions 
hold fundamentally different perspectives on the 1990-2005 period, rely on 
rival external sponsors and express conflicting aspirations for the reform of 
Lebanon’s corporate consociation.448  They are headed by the Shia party 
Hizbollah and the Sunni Future party respectively, confirming that the most 
politically salient cleavage in post-2005 Lebanon is not between Christians 
and Muslims, but between Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslims.  Indeed, 
representatives of the Maronite community sit on both sides of the political 
divide. The Sunni-Shia cleavage solidified in 2008 when Hizbollah, protesting 
against government attempts to dismantle its telecommunications network, 
turned its weapons against fellow Lebanese citizens and occupied central 
Beirut.449  The 2011 Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, the influx of over a 
million registered Syrian refugees and the employment of Lebanese territory 
as a base for military operations both against and in support of the Syrian 
regime added fuel to the fire, and brought Lebanon back to the brink of war.   
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This section has shown that since its creation, the Lebanese state has 
existed in a complex, dialectical and interdependent relationship with its 
communities and that state institutions have evolved into arenas for clashes 
of identity and political allegiance, periodically tearing up the fabric of society.  
The same tensions have also permeated the education system: efforts to 
reform curricula and state schools in the 1940s exemplify the state’s drive to 
impose itself as a legitimate and hegemonic actor.  However, the founding 
principles of Lebanon’s consociation also legitimised communal control over 
certain private schools.  From the late 1950s, and increasingly during the civil 
war, the legitimacy of a state built on the principle of religious and communal 
pluralism came to depend on the extent to which each confessional 
community was included in state institutions and narratives.  This affected 
education policy: pluralism, initially viewed as the provision of mixed common 
plural schools, came to be understood as the provision of financial support 
for a plurality of communal institutions conveying diverging narratives of 
identity.450   
The history of Lebanon’s education system provides an important clue as to 
the political function of education in consociations: before and throughout the 
civil war, schools remained the primary ‘means of preserving and 
reproducing group identity’ in Lebanon.451  Chapters 4 to 7 will trace reforms 
of history education, citizenship education, the languages of instruction and 
the fragmented structure of the education system after the Taif Agreement.  
They question whether, as Barakat argues ‘patterns of socialisation prevail 
throughout Lebanon’s institutions – home, school, church, government and 
university.  These are complementary rather than conflicting agencies of 
socialisation’.452  In other words, Chapters 4 to 7 aim to trace education 
reform in post-Taif Lebanon and to determine in which ways the manifest and 
hidden curricula helped or hindered consociational politics. 
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3.2 Northern Ireland 
The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 established a devolved parliament in 
Stormont (Belfast), under the ultimate authority of the British Parliament, for 
six of the nine counties of the province of Ulster, severing what would 
become Northern Ireland from the emerging Irish Free State.  In contrast to 
Lebanon, the borders of Northern Ireland were dictated by demography: it 
was ‘the largest area [of the Irish isle] which could be comfortably held with a 
majority in favour of the union with Britain’.453  Here, societal cleavages 
crystallised in parallel to the solidification of the border in the 1920s and early 
1930s, and religious denomination emerged as the primary marker of 
identity.  To their respective counterparts, Catholic came to mean (Irish) 
Nationalist and disloyal to the Stormont parliament, while Protestant came to 
mean (British) Unionist and loyal to Stormont.  As Akenson puts it, the hostile 
reciprocal perceptions of Catholics as ‘traitors’ and Protestants as 
‘oppressors’, became ‘self-fulfilling predictions’.454   
At the time of partition, schools in Northern Ireland (like schools in Ottoman 
Lebanon) were largely under the control of local churches.  The Irish 
Education Act of 1831 had established non-denominational, free elementary 
education in Ireland under the premise that ‘admitting children of all 
persuasions should not interfere with the particular tenets of any [religious 
denomination]’. 455   Yet, clerical campaigns succeeded in bringing most 
schools under the control of the Protestant or Catholic clergies, and schools 
evolved into denominational establishments ‘that served their own faith 
communities’.456  Thus, by the late 1800s, Ireland had a dual and unequal 
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education system separated along denominational lines. 457   Separate 
schools protected and reproduced the Protestant distinctive identity within a 
majority Catholic Irish isle, and provided Catholic children with ‘a Catholic 
education, on Catholic principles, with Catholic masters and the use of 
Catholic books’.458  
This section considers education policies at the establishment of Northern 
Ireland (1920-1946), under Unionist political hegemony (1947-1967) and 
during the Troubles (1968-1998), before briefly introducing the Belfast 
agreement and subsequent educational reforms.  Reflecting on the 
complexity of Northern Ireland’s education system, Bell asserted that ‘if you 
were starting from a blank sheet of paper this is not what you would start 
from, everybody is in agreement with that’.459  This historical analysis of the 
political function of education in Northern Ireland shows that the complex 
structure of the education system is due to the fact that the different 
education sectors became further markers of identity.  Before and during the 
conflict, the Protestant/Unionist community and the Catholic/Nationalist 
community employed ‘their’ schools to reinforce religious and national 
cleavages and convey allegiance or opposition to the British state. 
3.2.1 Northern Ireland (1920-1947) 
Institutions in Northern Ireland were established under enormous socio-
political pressures, and the education system is no exception.  Unionists 
were determined to preserve their political dominance and control over the 
administration to ensure continued union with Great Britain.  They maintained 
that Catholics were intrinsically disloyal to the state but also feared 
Westminister’s indifference in the destiny of Northern Ireland.  In contrast, the 
Nationalist minority questioned the institutions and the very existence of 
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Northern Ireland as separate from the Irish Free State: they initially boycotted 
local institutions in the conviction that partition was reversible.460   
Kerr argues that in the early 1920s, ‘the government’s core objective was to 
dispel the notion that partition might be a temporary expedient prior to the 
unification of Ireland’.461  The creation of the first Northern Ireland Ministry of 
Education in 1921, provided an ideal opportunity to pursue this objective 
through the curricula and structures of compulsory schooling.  A committee, 
supervised by the Unionist Robert Lynn, was tasked with investigating the 
local education system: its recommendations would form the backbones of 
the 1923 Education Act (Northern Ireland).462  The 1923 Act established the 
basic architecture for Northern Ireland’s complex education system.  It 
created three school sectors: controlled schools, fully funded and managed 
by the state; maintained schools, partially funded and including limited state 
representation on the management board; and voluntary schools, privately 
funded and independently managed. 463   The first Northern Ireland 
government hoped that financial incentives and flexible management 
structures would persuade the local clergies to transfer schools to state 
management.  This would effectively establish the control of the secular state 
over an education system previously dominated by local churches.464   
The government’s approach to state building also permeated curricular 
choices.  Severing a further bond with the Irish Free State, Irish-language 
education was rapidly dismissed as a ‘purely sentimental thing’. 465  
Moreover, religious instruction was prohibited in state controlled schools.  
This is because Northern Ireland’s policymakers viewed religious 
denomination as the most divisive marker of identity in the province: Minister 
of Education Lord Londonderry hoped that a non-denominational state 
education system would attract pupils from both the Unionist/Protestant and 
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the Nationalist/Catholic communities and contribute to integration when 
‘union is so essential to the well-being of the province’. 466   Clerical 
marginalisation in education was also expected to bring about ‘a process of 
incremental integration’ and to foster allegiance to Northern Ireland.467  
Darby ironically observes that ‘with rare ecumenical spirit, all the churches 
opposed the [1923 Education] Act’.468  The Act was passed with no input from 
the Nationalist community: in their campaign against the very existence of 
the state, the Catholic clergy and laity refused to recognise the Ministry of 
Education, appealed to Dublin for school funding and boycotted the Lynn 
committee.469  Hereafter, the Catholic clergy refused to transfer its schools to 
state management, ostensibly fearing Protestant proselytism, but most 
probably concerned with the loyalty to the new state presumably fostered by 
controlled schools.470  Similarly, the Protestant clergy resisted pressures to 
transfer its schools to state management, claiming it would turn them into 
non-denominational ‘godless [state] schools’. 471   The United Education 
Committee called for Bible instruction in school and for ‘Protestant teachers 
to teach Protestant children’.472   
Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Craig was painfully aware of the need 
to close Unionist ranks before the 1925 general election and the final 
deliberations of the Irish Boundary Commission.  He agreed to amend the 
1923 Education Act to permit ‘simple Bible instruction’ and to allow controlled 
schools to appoint teachers on the basis of their religious denomination.473  
Rapidly, the Protestant clergy started transferring schools to state 
management but Unionist campaigns continued, complaining about the 
Catholic refusal to transfer schools to state management and demanding the 
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presence of school owners (the Protestant clergy) on the five Education and 
Library Boards (ELBs) which managed state controlled schools.474   
By 1930, the Protestant and Catholic clergies had eroded governmental 
resolve to establish a unified, non-denominational education system in 
Northern Ireland.  With the 1930 Education Act, the new Unionist government 
legitimised and enshrined the reality of separate schools catering for children 
of different backgrounds.475  As the Prime Minister concluded, with the new 
Act ‘it will be absolutely certain that in no circumstances whatever will 
Protestant children ever be in any way interfered with by Roman Catholics, 
any more than Protestants wish to interfere with Roman Catholic children’.476   
The Protestant clergy accepted full state funding but, in transferring schools 
to state management, retained the right to impart Bible instruction in state 
schools and to sit on school boards.477   Thus, with the 1930 Act, the 
government effectively acquiesced in the gradual transformation of non-
denominational state schools into de facto Protestant institutions.478  For its 
part, by 1930 the Catholic clergy had realised that Dublin would not 
financially support Catholic schools in the north and accepted the 50 percent 
funding being offered by the state to voluntary schools.  The clergy retained 
direct control of Catholic schools but started lobbying Stormont for full 
financial support.479  Hereafter, while turning a blind eye to Protestant clerical 
influence on controlled schools, successive governments would increase 
funding to Catholic schools.480   
The trajectory of Northern Ireland’s education policy appears parallel to that 
of Lebanon.  In both cases, new governments set out to create an education 
system that socialised children into overarching identities and into allegiance 
to the state.  In both cases, local confessional and national communities 
succeeded in shifting political priorities away from challenging children’s 
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physical and emotional separation in schools, and towards fostering the 
equality of separate schools through, for example, financial support for 
private (or voluntary) establishments.   
3.2.2 Limited Reform (1947-1968) 
After World War II, local legislation reinforced the dual and unequal structure 
of schooling, entrenching two ‘self-encapsulated’ educational sectors that 
were ostensibly ‘demarcated on religious lines’481 but also reproduced the 
national aspirations of the Unionist and Nationalist communities.   
The 1947 Education Act established the basic structure of Northern Ireland’s 
education cycles, introducing primary education up to age eleven, followed 
by a test determining each pupil’s academic ability (known as the 11-plus) 
and admission to either grammar or secondary school depending on the test 
results.482  The Act introduced mandatory Bible instruction and daily acts of 
worship in the controlled sector, thereby wiping out the last traces of 
Londonderry’s plan for an inclusive, non-denominational state education 
system.483  Hereafter, Protestant schools were swiftly transferred to state 
management.  The 1947 Education Act also provided 65 percent funding for 
voluntary schools who accepted two state representatives on their boards, 
and this increased to 80 percent in 1968.484  Thus, the 1947 Act ensured the 
survival and thriving of a Catholic maintained education sector outside state 
control.485  The 1947 Education Act and the 1968 Education Act therefore 
cemented the separate and parallel structures of Northern Ireland’s 
education system: in 1967, over 99 percent of pupils in state controlled 
schools were Protestant and 99 percent of pupils in maintained schools were 
Catholic.486  
Beyond separating children at a very young age, different school sectors 
socialised pupils into deeply divergent narratives and allegiances associated 
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with the Protestant/Unionist and Catholic/Nationalist community. 487   No 
national curriculum existed, so teachers ‘had almost complete autonomy to 
decide what was taught to students between the ages of 4 and 14’.488  
Catholic maintained schools argued that ‘the only agreed syllabus for 
Catholics is the catechism of their Church’489 but in fact complemented it with 
good doses of Irish nationalism, adopting textbooks produced in Dublin, 
teaching Irish history and the Irish language.  In contrast, state controlled 
schools adopted books produced in the UK and taught history from an 
English perspective. 490   Thus, the contents of schooling reflected the 
coincidence of denominational, national and political cleavages in Northern 
Ireland: children were taught different religious denominations but also 
different narratives which sustained the identity and national aspirations of 
Unionists and Nationalists.  Beyond fostering children’s identification with a 
community, schools in Northern Ireland also helped ‘determine whether a 
child would be loyal or disloyal to the state’.491  
However, the 1947 Act did not placate clerical dissent.  The Protestant clergy 
had succeeded in bending the state education system into de facto 
Protestant schools, but now ‘considered it unfair that the Catholics could opt 
to stay outside the state system and still benefit from public money’.492  In 
contrast, the Catholic hierarchy continued to demand full state funding for 
their schools. 493   Northern Ireland’s Catholics continued to experience 
systematic socio-economic and political discrimination, exemplified by 
occupational figures: in 1971, 16 percent of Protestant men held managerial 
positions compared to only 9 percent of Catholic men, while 16 percent of 
Protestant men were unskilled or unemployed compared to as much as 31 
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percent of Catholic men.494  In this context, Catholic schools were the main 
instrument for the social mobility of Northern Ireland’s minority and ‘the 
importance of separate Catholic schools was not only ideological or cultural, 
but, in a very real sense, material’.495   
In fact, by expanding access to education for all citizens, the 1947 Act had 
armed a ‘time bomb’: a new generation of Catholics ‘educated beyond the 
capacity or the willingness of society to find suitable work for them’.496  This 
new generation did not refuse to engage with Stormont: they accepted 
partition as a reality to be dealt with and realised that the Irish government 
would not act upon its irredentist claim to the north.  In their campaigns, they 
adopted the language of human rights and appealed for ‘British rights for 
British citizens’.  In the Unionist camp, Prime Minister Terence O’Neill was 
attempting to reformulate Unionism and ‘build bridges’ with the 
Catholic/Nationalist community.497  Still, the Unionist majority in the Stormont 
parliament only agreed to electoral reforms amending the local franchise to 
grant ‘one-man one-vote’ in April 1969.  By that time, the Troubles had 
already started. 
3.2.3 Troubles (1968-1998) 
Obershall concisely summarises that ‘the Troubles had three major clusters 
of collective violence’ followed by three attempts at political settlement: 
The first cluster started with the civil rights campaign of 1968 to 
1972 … [and] ended with the first major British peace and reform 
plan at Sunningdale in 1973 whose implementation was blocked 
by the 1974 election outcome and a massive Unionist Ulster 
Workers’ Council strike in 1974.  The second cluster was fuelled 
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by opposition to British counterinsurgency measures … The 
British and Irish governments undertook the second major peace 
initiatives that resulted in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 which 
was torpedoed by a massive Unionist non-cooperation campaign 
and Republican and Loyalist violence.  The third cluster of 
violence was the intensification of the IRA bombing campaign in 
1990-3 in Northern Ireland and Britain … [The] peace initiative 
started with the secret John Hume-Gerry Adams talks and the 
Downing Street Declaration in December 1993 and ended with the 
Northern Ireland Peace Agreement in Belfast on Good Friday, 
April 10, 1998.498   
Having established direct rule over Northern Ireland in 1972, London 
attempted to pacify the province through an ambiguous balancing of sticks 
(counterinsurgency and military interventions) and carrots (social policies 
promoting the social inclusion and equality of the Catholic community).  
During direct rule, the education system emerged as the primary ‘institutional 
scapegoat for the conflict’.499  Rather than the product of primordial religious 
differences, the fragmented education system was now seen as an 
independent factor contributing to inter-communal strife.  Research had 
indicated that ‘at best, prejudices are not diminished by education and, at 
worst, they are in fact strengthened’.500  Thus, British officials called on 
Northern Ireland’s schools to promote understanding and harmony between 
the Unionist/Protestant and Nationalist/Catholic communities through their 
curricula and by encouraging contact between children from different 
backgrounds.501    
The most ambitious attempt to employ schools for peace-building occurred 
during the short 1974 power-sharing executive.  In April 1974, Northern 
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Ireland Education Minister Basil McIvor called for the Assembly to create a 
new class of schools, ‘shared schools’, which would involve both the 
Protestant and the Catholic clergies in their management.502  McIvor argued 
that ‘the mixing of school children would contribute to the reduction of 
community tension in Northern Ireland' and envisaged that all controlled and 
Catholic maintained schools could, over the long term, evolve into ‘shared 
schools’. 503   Despite initial resistance, the power-sharing executive 
committed to support the establishment of shared schools.  Chadwick argues 
that ‘the 1974 decision showed that a Northern Ireland government, in which 
both Catholics and Protestants participated, could act to allow for shared 
schools’.504  Certainly, the Protestant clergy appeared ‘prepared to give at 
least a guarded welcome to the idea of shared schools’, mainly because 
mixed education could undermine Catholic control over some schools.505  
Still, the Catholic hierarchy was opposed outright.506  This opposition did not 
escalate only because the fate of ‘shared schools’ was intertwined with the 
destiny of the power-sharing government: when the power-sharing executive 
collapsed in May 1974, the plan for mixed schools was sidelined.   
Subsequent governments endorsed the ambition to create mixed schools but 
recognised that ‘integration will be best served by leaving it to develop … 
quietly, without publicity and certainly without overt pressure from 
Government’.507  The 1978 Education Act stated that future policy ‘should not 
create or perpetuate barriers against integrated education’508 and provided 
mechanisms for transformation of controlled and maintained schools to 
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shared establishments.509  Despite giving a powerful signal of intent, and 
laying the ground for the establishment of a third educational sector, the 
1978 Act failed to create momentum for integration of the existing schools: 
no school transferred to mixed status.510  The first integrated school, Lagan 
College, would be created in 1981 by an independent parent-led civil society 
organisation: All Children Together. 511   In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
expanding network of integrated schools impacted upon the educational 
discourse in Northern Ireland, making it difficult to express open political 
opposition to the mixed education of children belonging to 
Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist backgrounds.512  The success of 
integrated education also confirmed that initiatives for inter-communal mixing 
could thrive when independent from clerical and political pressures.513   
For its part, the Department of Education of Northern Ireland (DENI) started 
providing resources and material to facilitate joint activities among pupils 
from state controlled and Catholic maintained schools.514  It also introduced 
the voluntary cross-curricular theme of Education for Mutual Understanding 
(EMU) whose aims and contents are explained in Chapter 5.515  In a 1982 
circular, it clarified that DENI ‘is not questioning the right to insist on forms of 
education in schools which amount to segregation’ but qualified this ‘right’ as 
being ‘coupled to an inescapable duty to ensure that effective measures are 
taken to ensure that children do not grow up in ignorance, fear or even 
hatred of those from whom they are educationally segregated’.516  Still, the 
Catholic clergy remained suspicious, and maintained that ‘short of banning 
religion altogether, there is no greater injury that could be done to 
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Catholicism than by interference with the character and identity of our 
schools’.517  National identity, religion, community and school remained one 
and the same: only by attending Catholic maintained schools could children 
become part of the religious (and national) community. 
State ‘intrusion’ in schools culminated with the 1989 Education Reform Order 
(ERO), which aimed to standardise the educational experience of all children 
in Northern Ireland.  First, the 1989 ERO introduced a statutory curriculum to 
be implemented in all state-funded schools, which provided core contents for 
history education and institutionalised EMU as a compulsory cross-curricular 
theme.518  The introduction of a statutory curriculum opened a debate about 
the status of religious education, leading to the joint formulation of a core 
religious education curriculum by representatives of the Catholic Church and 
of three Protestant Churches (Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and 
Methodist).  This was a symbolically important step towards dialogue and 
reconciliation.519  Yet, it was also a limited step: to this day, it is unclear 
whether it is even possible to speak of a common religious education 
curriculum in Northern Ireland.  Today’s core religious education syllabus is 
flexible enough to allow two, deeply different approaches to religious 
education in the Catholic maintained and state controlled sectors.  In Catholic 
maintained schools, confessional religious education is taught to foster faith 
among Catholic children.  In controlled schools, non-denominational but 
Christian-focused education about religion is taught to predominantly 
Protestant children.  Thus, Arlow suggests that the core religious education 
curriculum is a ‘compromise between fundamentalist Catholics and 
fundamentalist Protestants’.520  At the very least, the dual structure of the 
core religious education curriculum confirms that religious denomination 
remains a fundamental and impermeable marker of communal identity in 
Northern Ireland, and that schools remain an instrument for reproducing and 
conveying it. 
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Second, the 1989 ERO expanded funding for the activities that brought 
together children from controlled and Catholic maintained schools and 
institutionalised them under the rubric of Inter-School Contact Schemes.521  
Echoing arguments voiced in the 1920s, the Catholic maintained sector 
opposed both EMU and inter-school activities because they might offer 
opportunities for proselytism.522  It also argued that EMU and Inter-school 
contact could ‘undermine the traditions of the society’,523 thereby implying 
that separate schooling was instrumental to the integrity and thriving of two 
supposedly mutually exclusive cultures in Northern Ireland.  Finally, the 1989 
ERO placed a statutory requirement on DENI ‘to encourage and facilitate the 
development of integrated education’: to this end, the government provided 
full funding for integrated schools.524   Both the state controlled and the 
Catholic maintained sectors raised cries of ‘social engineering’.525   
These protests were temporarily silenced by the 1993 Education Reform 
Order (ERO), which established full state funding for all schools that adopted 
the statutory curriculum and accepted state representatives on their 
governing boards.526   The 1993 ERO responded to London’s increasing 
political emphasis on parental choice in education but also reflected Northern 
Irish concerns.  In the late 1980s, research had found that the standard of 
education in Catholic maintained schools was lower than in state schools.  
Policymakers were deeply aware that schooling exacerbates violent identity-
based conflicts when different religious, national or ethnic groups have 
access to education of differing quality.  To redress this imbalance, the state 
started funding Catholic maintained schools on a par with state controlled 
and integrated schools.527  For its part, the Catholic Church modified the 
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schools’ management structures and created a Council for Catholic 
Maintained Schools (CCMS).528   
In 1995, Smith observed that Northern Ireland’s education system was ‘a 
genuinely segregated system … but in almost all the publicly measurable 
ways few obvious differences could be found’.529  Indeed, state controlled, 
integrated and Catholic maintained schools followed the same curriculum, 
participated to the same inter-school activities and were funded by the same 
state agencies.  Yet, they remained managed by separate bodies, and 
catered to different sections of Northern Ireland’s population: as such, most 
schools remained markers of identity and belonging.   
3.2.4 The Belfast Agreement and Beyond (1998-present) 
The Agreement finalised in Belfast on 10 April 1998530 was presented to the 
electorate and approved in two joint referendums in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland in May 1998.531  Like the Taif Agreement, the Belfast 
Agreement provided for the establishment of a complex consociation as a 
mechanism to regulate the Troubles.  However, Northern Ireland’s 
consociation differs from its Lebanese counterpart in being more liberal: 
rather than assigning a fixed proportion of parliamentary seats and cabinet 
positions to each community, it ‘rewards whatever salient political identities 
emerge in democratic elections’ but still provides strong institutional checks 
and balances to protect the interests and identities of Unionists and 
Nationalists.532  Despite its flexibility, Northern Ireland’s consociation had a 
delayed start: the Assembly was suspended between 11 February and 30 
May 2000, on 10 August 2001, on 22 September 2001 and from 14 October 
2002.  The Assembly was restored only on 7 May 2007, after the 2006 St 
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Andrews Agreement paved the way for the Democratic Unionist Party’s 
(DUP) acceptance of power-sharing with Sinn Féin.533   
Northern Ireland’s consociation is complex because it provides for devolution 
(under current British sovereignty) and a possible future transfer of the 
territory to Irish sovereignty (subject to majority opinion in a referendum).534  
Therefore, the Belfast agreement differs from Taif’s focus on unalterable 
borders.  This is because the Belfast agreement is foremost a settlement 
between Northern Ireland’s national communities, the Irish Nationalists and 
the British Unionists.535  Since 1998, Northern Ireland’s political institutions 
have been largely premised on the assumption that citizens identify with one 
of two ‘traditions’: the Protestant/Unionist tradition and the 
Catholic/Nationalist tradition are accorded ‘parity of esteem’.536  Thus, a local 
politician confirms that ‘the agreement is based on the institutionalised 
assumption of two communities, separate but equal, and living in peaceful 
coexistence’.537  
In contrast to the extensive provisions of the Taif Agreement, the Belfast 
Agreement maps only two education reforms.  McGarry and O’Leary argue 
that this is because Northern Ireland’s education system, allowing for choice 
between equally funded Catholic maintained, (de-facto Protestant) state 
controlled, and integrated sectors, already conformed to ‘liberal 
consociational’ principles.538  However, the Lebanese education system also 
reflected the consociational principle of communal autonomy at the end of 
the civil war.  Still, because of the insistence of Muslims, the Taif Agreement 
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provided for extensive education reforms to promote social integration and 
nation-state building through schools.  This suggests that the reforms 
mapped in the Belfast and Taif Agreements did not just reflect the 
necessities of the newly established consociational political systems: rather, 
they responded to the idiosyncrasies and political priorities of those political 
parties and communities that participated in conflict and entered into peace. 
Indeed, reflecting the newly entrenched inclusion of Nationalists in state 
institutions, the Belfast Agreement required the state to ‘place a statutory 
duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish-
medium education’. 539   It also called for ‘the promotion of a culture of 
tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and 
encourage integrated education’.540  These two reforms exemplify the dual 
function of education in the Belfast agreement: on the one hand, schooling is 
expected to protect and reproduce the mutually exclusive markers and 
narratives of identity of Northern Ireland’s confessional, national and political 
communities.  On the other hand, education is expected to provide 
opportunities for mixing and to encourage mutual understanding among 
children of different backgrounds.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will show that this 
tension seeped into debates over the curricula for history education, 
citizenship education and languages.  Chapter 7 will discuss how this dual 
political function of education impacted on reforms of the overall education 
system.   
Controversy over education policy was one of the first tests faced by 
Northern Ireland’s power-sharing executive.  The appointment of Martin 
McGuinness, a former Irish Republican Army leader, as Minister of Education 
in the first power-sharing executive, led to walkouts in schools and protests 
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against ‘placing… children’s development in the hands of a person with 
connections to paramilitaries’.541   
McGuinness’ outspoken opposition to academic selection at age 11 also 
proved highly contentious.  As mentioned above, since 1947 children had 
only been admitted to the prestigious grammar schools on the basis of a 
state-run test taken at the age of 11 (the ‘11-plus’).  Opponents of academic 
selection at age 11 argue that it perpetuates social stratification and leaves 
working-class pupils behind.542  Supporters of the 11-plus test see grammar 
schools as an instrument for social mobility, as part of the heritage and 
tradition of Northern Ireland and as key to academic excellence.543  The 
debate over the 11-plus test turned into a heated political battle because of 
the polarisation of Nationalist parties and Unionist parties into different 
camps: the former opposed academic selection while the latter supported it.  
A day before the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2002, 
McGuinness announced the elimination of the state-run 11-plus test.  The 
decision to eliminate it was only finalised by the British Minister responsible 
for education after a widespread consultation in 2004, and the last state-run 
11-plus test took place as late as 2008. Yet, the controversial decision to 
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abolish academic selection remained associated with the contentious figure 
of McGuinness.544   
In Unionist eyes, the abolition of the 11-plus embodied Nationalist political 
assertiveness but also ‘the ineffectual nature of Unionist political 
representatives’.545  The quality gap between grammar and non-grammar 
secondary schools in the state controlled sector remained much larger than 
in the Catholic maintained sector, so the abolition of academic selection was 
perceived as hitting the Protestant/Unionist community disproportionately.  
The abolition of the 11-plus, combined with three key interlocking structural 
reforms proposed after the Belfast agreement (the Entitlement Framework, 
Area Planning and the Education and Skills Authority discussed in Chapter 
7), led to ‘a sense of loss within the Protestant community of its schools 
whilst the Catholic sector remains largely intact’. 546   Once again, the 
education system was at the forefront of communal perceptions of relative 
disadvantage that could destabilise the peace process.  Indeed, by late 2012, 
Unionist perceptions of the negative returns of peace led to violent and 
protracted protests in Belfast. 
 
Before the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland’s education policies were 
largely premised on the assumption that ‘religion is the bedrock reality upon 
which the political, social, and constitutional structure of Northern Ireland 
rests’.547  Thus, efforts to establish mixed schools focused on neutralising 
religion by making schools non-denominational (in the 1920s), proposing the 
involvement of the Catholic and Protestant clergies in management (in 1974) 
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or presenting them as pan-Christian (as integrated schools).  Similarly, the 
introduction of a core curriculum for religious education was hailed as a 
momentous step on the path to reconciliation.548  The limited impact of these 
initiatives suggests that religion, far from a ‘bedrock reality’, was collectively 
constructed as an impermeable communal boundary in the context of a clash 
of competing nationalisms.  The ‘seemingly irresistible demand for 
segregated schooling’549 derived from the political function of schools as 
agents of socialisation into mutually exclusive ‘clusters’ of religious, national, 
socio-economic and communal cleavages. 550   The Protestant/Unionist 
community and the Catholic/Nationalist community employed their respective 
schools to convey diverging narratives of identity and attitudes to the state, 
thus preserving their internal cohesion and external political alignment. 
Before and during the Troubles, successive governments came to accept the 
maxim that ‘good fences make good neighbours’ and gradually accorded 
parity of funding and ‘esteem’ to all educational sectors.  Contrary to Taif, the 
Belfast Agreement did not challenge the existence of parallel and separate 
school sectors but endowed education with the dual function of preserving 
communal identities while promoting mutual understanding and tolerance.  
Chapters 4 to 7 will examine education reforms since 1998 to determine the 
principles guiding education policy in consociational Northern Ireland. 
First, though, an analysis of the development of education in Macedonia will 
shed further light on the political function of schools in deeply divided 
societies. 
3.3 Macedonia 
Macedonia embodies the paradigm of a contested state.  Its borders 
emerged from the partition of the territory of historic Macedonia, previously 
under Ottoman control, among Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece during the First 
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Balkan War (1913).551  Moreover, the state was first constructed under the 
aegis of Socialist Yugoslavia, which constituted Macedonia as a republic and 
engaged in extensive nation-building.  Finally, the Macedonian republic only 
became independent because of the collapse of federal Yugoslavia.   
This section considers the evolving political function of schooling alongside 
the development of Macedonia from a Serbian province (1918-1944), to a 
founding republic in socialist Yugoslavia (1945-1974 and 1974-1991), to an 
independent nation-state between 1991 and 2001.  Finally, it summarises the 
Ohrid agreement of 2001, which established a liberal consociation in 
Macedonia.  It shows that in the Macedonian territory, successive states 
attempted to employ education to convey a collective, overarching identity to 
their diverse population.  The curricula and the structure of the education 
system in the territory of present-day Macedonia mirrored the founding 
narratives and principles underpinning each state building project: schools 
evolved from an instrument of Serbian cultural assimilation in 1918-1944, to 
a vehicle for conveying Marxism in 1945-1991, to a tool for constructing an 
independent nation-state between 1991 and 2001.   
3.3.1 As part of Yugoslavia (1918-1989) 
Lampe shows that the history of the Yugoslav state was characterised by two 
distinct nation-building projects: the monarchical state (1918-1944) enforced 
Serbian dominance over the government and its cultural apparatus,552 while 
the Communist regime (1945-1989) articulated collective identity through a 
distinctive interpretation of Marxist doctrine, accommodating the diversity of 
the local population.553   Both the monarchy and the communist regime 
attempted to strike a balance between the demands and ambitions of 
Yugoslavia’s many ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.554  In this context, 
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schools were employed both as instruments for nation-state building and as 
tools to nurture the linguistic and cultural specificities of the different local 
communities. 
At the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918, the educational infrastructure in 
the territory of present-day Macedonia was almost non-existent.  As in 
Lebanon, in the historic territory of Ottoman Macedonia most schools were 
affiliated to religious establishments or neighbouring states (particularly 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece that hoped to gain a strategic foothold in 
Macedonia).555  When Serbia annexed present-day Macedonia in 1913, the 
Serbian military authorities started employing schools in ‘new Serbia’ to 
assimilate their subjects and impose allegiance to Belgrade.556   
3.3.1.1 A	  Serbian	  Province	  (1918-­‐1944)	  
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes emerged from the ashes of the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in 1918, and was renamed the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.  At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, 
Serbian representatives consistently refused to acknowledge the existence of 
non-Serbian people in present-day Macedonia and Kosovo.557  Indeed, the 
monarchical nation-state building project excluded both the ethnic 
Macedonian and the ethnic Albanian populations of Yugoslavia.   
Education policy from the late 1920s exemplifies the marginalisation of ethnic 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in the new state.  The Yugoslav state 
expanded access to schooling: in 1939 about 51 percent of children were 
enrolled in primary schools, compared to about 27 percent before World War 
I.558  Yet education policy and management were centralised in Belgrade, 
and Serbo-Croatian was imposed as the only language of instruction.559  
Moreover, in an attempt to convey allegiance to the new state, new textbooks 
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glorified the Yugoslav monarchy and promoted the image of Yugoslavs as a 
single people belonging to three ‘tribes’: the Serbs, the Croats and the 
Slovenes.560  Serbian history dominated the new narratives of the past while 
idealised portrayals of the tripartite Yugoslav nation ‘contradicted the reality 
of an unsolved national question’.561  In fact, local elites resisted Belgrade’s 
directions and continued distributing pre-war textbooks for over a decade.  In 
Croatia, textbooks emphasised multinational coexistence within the 
Habsburg Empire, whilst in Serbia (including the territories of present-day 
Kosovo and Macedonia) they completely ignored the multi-ethnic nature of 
the state.562  In most schools, the uniform textbooks distributed by Belgrade 
were introduced only in 1937.563  
In ‘new Serbia’ (present-day Macedonia) schooling remained an instrument 
for the assimilation of the local population into the ‘official culture’ of Serbian 
officers, teachers and colonists: use of the Macedonian and Bulgarian 
languages was forbidden in 1918 and traditional cultural expressions were 
suppressed.564  Despite a common resentment against Serbian political and 
cultural dominance of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,565 the population in ‘new 
Serbia’ was torn between Bulgarian and Macedonian collective identities.566  
Even the members of the main Macedonian nationalist parties were split 
between advocates of Macedonian independence and champions of unity 
with the Bulgarian nation.567  The ethnic Albanian population of ‘new Serbia’ 
was equally marginalised: they were considered ‘Albanian-speaking Serbs’, 
and use of the Albanian language was forbidden.568  From the mid-1920s, 
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the Yugoslav authorities also encouraged ethnic Albanians to declare 
themselves Turks and to migrate to Turkey.569  This did not placate Albanian 
demands for self-determination: armed resistance against Serbian rule in 
Kosovo and Western Macedonia continued into the 1920s and Islamic 
schools became ‘underground centres of nationalist education and anti-
government activities’.570  
The collapse and partition of the Yugoslav state along ethno-national lines 
during World War II is testament to Belgrade’s failure to formulate and 
convey an overarching identity to the citizens of Yugoslavia.571  The war also 
allowed for the expression of underlying clashes of competing nationalisms 
encouraged by foreign powers in the territory of Macedonia.  Italian occupiers 
nurtured Albanian nationalism, allowing the inhabitants of Kosovo and 
Western Macedonia to use the Albanian language in administration, 
schooling and even university education. 572   The Kingdom of Bulgaria 
occupied most of present-day Macedonia and the majority of the local ethnic 
Macedonian elites transferred their allegiances to Bulgaria.573  As part of their 
resistance to Italian, German and Bulgarian occupation, Yugoslav partisans 
created an Anti-Fascist Assembly of Macedonia, which purported to 
represent the interests of ethnic Macedonians and competed with Bulgarian 
authorities for popular allegiance.  This culminated in the Anti-Fascist 
Assembly of Macedonia proclaiming the creation of a Macedonian Republic 
as the nation-state of ethnic Macedonians in 1944.574   Nurturing ethnic 
Macedonian nationalism helped the partisan struggle against Italian and 
Bulgarian occupation of the Macedonian territory, but also reflected the long-
standing position of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which since the 1920s 
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had held that Macedonians constituted a distinct nation with a right to self-
determination.575  In fact, ethnic Macedonians lacked many of the attributes 
of distinct ethno-national groups in the 1940s: the daunting task of 
constructing a Macedonian nation would fall on the shoulders of the new 
Communist regime and its schools.   
3.3.1.2 The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia	  (1945-­‐1973)	  
The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed in November 
1945: it would embody a communist alternative to the Soviet Union and it 
would tirelessly search for a formula to promote the ‘brotherhood and unity’ 
of its ethno-linguistic communities.576  In contrast to the monarchy, the new 
communist regime recognised the existence of most ethno-linguistic 
communities on the federal territory, but established a firm hierarchy among 
three kinds of groups.577  Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Bosniaks 
(or Muslims) and Macedonians were ‘constituent nations’ and formed the 
largest proportion of the population in the constituent republics of Slovenia, 
Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
respectively.578  Despite being part of Serbia, the provinces of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina were also endowed with extensive territorial autonomy because of 
their distinctive demography: an Albanian majority in the former and over 26 
ethnic groups in the latter.  Territorial autonomy did not apply to the second 
and third categories of ethno-linguistic communities, ‘national minorities’ 
(communities which possessed ‘homelands’ outside Yugoslavia as in the 
case of Turks and Albanians) and ‘ethnic groups’ (communities deemed 
simply as a distinct ethnic group like the Vlachs).  Still, both national 
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minorities and ethnic groups were granted extensive cultural and linguistic 
rights in federal Yugoslavia.579   
The communist regime also established an explicit link between schooling 
and the thriving of Yugoslav ‘democracy’.  Höpken reflects that ‘highly 
fragmented societies need a kind of “universal ethics” to develop an 
integrative capacity’. 580  Yugoslavia’s universal integrative doctrine was 
Marxism, tainted with an overarching nationalism that accommodated the 
distinctiveness of constituent nations.  The education system was employed 
to convey this doctrine so as to ‘bring into being the new socialist man’, as 
the government declared in 1952.581  Beyond expanding access to education 
and making primary school compulsory and free,582  the state promoted 
curricula designed to ‘provide [Marxist] political training’.583  The national 
subjects were reformulated through Marxist prisms: geography divided the 
world into ‘bourgeois republics’ and ‘socialist democracies’584 while historical 
periodisation followed Marxist determinism and the progression of societies 
from slavery, to serfdom, capitalism and ultimately socialism.585  The history 
curricula were also employed to convey a ‘supra-nationalism’ founded on the 
struggle for freedom and statehood during World War II.586  Official narratives 
of World War II as a war of national liberation reflected the experience of the 
communist partisan resistance, but sidelined the collective memories of other 
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ethno-linguistic groups, such as that of ethnic Albanians under Italian 
occupation.587   
While promoting Marxism and emphasising the common historical 
experience of Yugoslav citizens, the state had to walk a fine line between 
encouraging allegiance to the federal state and recognising its multinational, 
multi-religious and multi-lingual citizenry.588  Indeed, as early as 1946 the 
federal state declared that Yugoslavia’s schools could succeed in promoting 
democracy only if they protected the linguistic rights of all recognised ethno-
linguistic communities in Yugoslavia. 589   Thus, successive governments 
expanded instruction in the languages of the ethno-linguistic communities in 
primary school. 590   Moreover, the federal state granted considerable 
autonomy in education policy to its constituent republics, allowing them to 
frame policies ‘in conformity with [their own] national culture, traditions, and 
level of development’.591  The republics exploited their educational autonomy 
to the point that, in 1956, the prominent politician Edvard Kardelj worried that 
textbooks produced in the republics could provide ‘nourishment for 
nationalism’ rather than promote Marxism.592     
The Republic of Macedonia was an exception to such worries: here, the 
federal state pursued a deliberate ‘policy of ethnogenesis’ motivated by its 
strategic and political interests.593  Nation-building in Macedonia aimed to 
solidify Yugoslavia’s southern border, to tie Macedonian identity to the 
federal state and to ‘counter and discredit’ Greece’s and Bulgaria’s ‘negation 
of [a Macedonian national] identity’ and their irredentist claims over the 
Macedonian territory.594  In fact, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, 
Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito had hoped to constitute a Balkan union of 
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socialist republics, including Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece.  Yet 
following Yugoslavia’s dispute with the Soviet Union in 1948, ‘overnight 
Belgrade became the staunch defender of the [territorial] status quo in the 
Balkans’.595   
The federal state employed both religion and language to cement an 
exclusive ethnic Macedonian identity within the borders of the Republic of 
Macedonia.  In 1958, the communist federal state supported the creation of a 
Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, separate from the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.  As Phillips observes, the Macedonian Orthodox Church 
‘was the only Christian church ever to have been set up by a Communist 
party in an atheist state’. 596   In fact, by creating a national church for 
Macedonia, the federal state aimed to strengthen Macedonian collective 
identity as distinct from the identity of its Christian Orthodox neighbours: 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. 597   To this day, the existence of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church remains controversial and its independence is 
not recognised by other Orthodox Churches.598   
Moreover, even before its official codification, completed only in 1953, the 
Macedonian language was adopted as the official language of the Republic 
of Macedonia and as a federal language, alongside Serbo-Croatian and 
Slovene. 599   The standard Macedonian language emerged as a further 
‘instrument for reducing Bulgarian cultural influences’ in the Republic of 
Macedonia: the language was deliberately codified so as to maximise its 
differences with the Bulgarian and Serbo-Croat languages.600 Schools in the 
Republic of Macedonia were employed to teach the new standard 
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Macedonian language to the local population. 601   In this, they faced 
enormous practical challenges: no textbooks in the Macedonian language 
existed and most teachers did not speak the newly codified standard 
language.602  Moreover, over 67 percent of the population of Macedonia was 
illiterate after World War II.603  The state succeeded in reducing illiteracy 
levels to under 36 percent by 1953 and to about 18 percent by 1971.604  
The expansion of access to education impacted on Yugoslavia’s national 
minorities and ethnic groups, which were granted the right to mother-tongue 
education.  By 1952, 25,645 pupils were enrolled in Albanian-language 
classes in the Republic of Macedonia and by 1972 this had expanded to 
54,801 pupils.605  Similarly, Turks were allowed to use their alphabet and 
mother-tongue in elementary school teaching.606  The expansion of mother-
tongue education resulted in the proliferation of separate schools catering for 
children from uniform ethno-linguistic backgrounds.  Belgrade, worried that 
this would further ‘the isolation of national minorities’, encouraged the 
merging of schools teaching in several languages and the opening of 
minority-language sections in Macedonian or Serbo-Croatian language 
schools. 607   In this, the Yugoslav regime differs from governments in 
Lebanon and Northern Ireland, which accommodated demands for the 
respect of different communities by funding a plurality of separate institutions 
rather than plural mixed schools.   
Despite attempts to encourage contact between members of different 
communities in Yugoslavia’s political and non-political institutions, ethnic 
Albanians remained alienated from the ideologies and narratives 
underpinning Yugoslavia’s state building project.  As a non-Slavic people, 
they were excluded by the pan-Slav ideal at the core of the federal state.608  
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This alienation was exacerbated by the memory of World War II: during the 
war, Albanian nationalists fought against Tito’s partisans to protect the 
Italian-sponsored administrative unit of ‘Greater Albania’ (including Kosovo 
and Western Macedonia).609  Greater Albania was dismembered at the end of 
the war but the brief attempt to establish a Balkan union, encompassing 
Yugoslavia and Albania, rekindled hopes of a ‘permanent solution to the 
Kosovo [and Western Macedonia] question’. 610   When Yugoslavia’s 
relationship with the USSR (and Albania) deteriorated and Belgrade was 
expelled from the Communist Information Bureau in 1948, ethnic Albanians 
became prime targets in the state-led ‘hunt for pro-Moscow elements’ within 
communist Yugoslavia. 611   Hereafter, Belgrade limited Albanian cultural 
expressions: it promoted measures against history teachers, the display of 
flags and the celebration of national holidays.612  
By 1968, large-scale demonstrations for Albanian ethno-linguistic rights 
erupted in both Kosovo and Macedonia: demonstrators demanded an 
Albanian-language university and recognition of Kosovo as a seventh 
constituent republic in Yugoslavia’s federation. 613   As a result of the 
demonstrations, the University of Pristina was established in 1969: ethnic 
Albanians in federal Yugoslavia now had access to mother-tongue instruction 
at every level of the education system.614 	  
3.3.1.3 Decentralisation	  to	  Dissolution	  (1974-­‐1990)	  
The 1974 Yugoslav constitution fine-tuned the relationship between the 
federal state and the six constituent republics, redistributing some powers to 
the local level.  Comisso argues that the new constitution made Yugoslavia a 
quasi-consociational state by establishing the equal representation of 
constituent nations in federal decision-making and a grand-coalition 
executive body, devolving decision-making to the republics, entrenching 
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isolated communal elites and legitimising highly autonomous ethnic 
communities.615  The 1974 constitution also increased the prerogatives of the 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and, without severing their territory from 
the Republic of Serbia, granted them ‘practically the same rights as the 
federal republics’.616   
The new constitution did not impact on the political function of education in 
Yugoslavia.  Schools were still expected to convey unifying overarching 
narratives of identity and ideological orientation and to accommodate the 
legitimate cultural expressions of ethno-linguistic communities.  Thus, the 
1974 constitution re-emphasised that ‘all education is to be Marxist’617 and 
the federal state reiterated the right to mother-tongue education for 
nationalities and ethnic groups.618  Yet the six republics were entrusted with 
most policy-making powers over education, including the responsibility for 
textbook and curriculum design.619  This entrenched disparities between the 
different republics in terms of access and quality of education: overall primary 
school enrolment had increased from 65 percent in 1953 to 95 percent in 
1988 in Yugoslavia.  Still, in 1988 only 0.8 percent of Slovenia’s population 
was illiterate while the figure was as high as 10.9 percent in Macedonia.620  
Devolution of decision-making in education also led to divergences in the 
contents of curricula.  According to Höpken, most textbooks throughout 
Yugoslavia emphasised ‘self-managed socialism’ and ‘brotherhood and 
unity’, but these ideological catchphrases only provided children with ‘codes 
necessary for behaving in conformity with the existing political system’ rather 
than furthering their allegiance, and diffused support for the state.621  Finally, 
the principle of proportionality underpinning Yugoslavia’s political system 
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affected curricula in another fundamental way.  From 1974, history curricula 
and textbooks in the republics applied ‘proportional considerations’ to 
Yugoslav history and the history of local ethno-linguistic communities.  As 
Höpken summarises, ‘the party simply applied to education the same kind of 
superficial quotas it had implemented’.622  This suggests that plural states 
may transpose the political expedients facilitating the operation of politics 
directly into their education systems.   
Education policy in Macedonia differed from priorities in the other Yugoslav 
constituent republics because of its emphasis on building a cohesive ethnic 
Macedonian identity while also promoting allegiance to the federal state.  
Contrary to other republics, in Macedonia textbooks and curricula explicitly 
focused on the national question, and the ‘national history’ of the Republic of 
Macedonia was emphasised at the expense of Yugoslav history.623   
Moreover, in the 1980s, ethnic Macedonian elites started employing the 
education system to integrate (or in ethnic Albanian eyes assimilate) the 
ethnic Albanian minority.624  In 1981, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had called 
for the establishment of an Albanian-majority republic in Yugoslavia and 
unrest had spilled over into the Tetovo region in North-Western 
Macedonia.625  Ethnic Macedonian elites feared the creation of a seventh 
republic in Yugoslavia: harbouring secessionist aims, the new republic could 
have revived Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims to Macedonian territory.626  
Therefore, Macedonian authorities supported Serbia’s hard line in Kosovo 
and harshly suppressed manifestations of Albanian nationalism in 
Macedonia. 627   New legislation prohibited assigning children certain 
‘nationalist’ Albanian names, banned some Albanian nationalist songs, 
replaced Albanian toponyms with Macedonian ones, and unsuccessfully 
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attempted to slow the demographic growth of Albanians by limiting welfare 
benefits for families with more than two children.628  
In this context, schools had two functions.  First, they were employed to 
assimilate individual ethnic Albanians.  New curricula increased the amount 
of Macedonian instruction in Albanian-language schools, Albanian-language 
textbooks were rewritten to further emphasise Macedonian identity and laws 
established the very high figure of 30 as the minimum number of pupils 
required to open Albanian-language classes.629  As a result, Phillips reports 
that between 1981 and 1989, the number of students in Albanian-language 
secondary schools was halved.630 Albanian teachers who refused to comply 
with the new curricula were removed from their positions. 631  Second, 
education entrenched the collective socio-political exclusion of the ethnic 
Albanian community.  Most of the Albanian elite had attended the Albanian-
language University of Pristina, but authorities in the Republic of Serbia 
closed the university in 1990.  This effectively deprived ethnic Albanians 
(who could attend primary and secondary school in the Albanian language 
throughout Yugoslavia) of access to university and motivated mounting calls 
for the creation of an Albanian-language university in Macedonia.  In the 
following decades, the issue of tertiary education in Albanian would emerge 
as a recurring theme in the relationship between ethnic Albanians and the 
independent Macedonian state.   
Throughout federal Yugoslavia, by the 1990s, the end of the Cold War added 
to the economic problems and increasing ideological uncertainty following 
Tito’s death in 1980, and eroded the legitimacy of Marxism as an overarching 
integrative doctrine for good.632  Debates over the relative powers of the 
federal state and of the constituent republics, strained relationships between 
Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia.  In Yugoslavia, as in Lebanon and Northern 
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Ireland, the conflict between different ethno-linguistic communities over 
distribution of power, national aspirations and legitimate narratives of identity 
in a contested state, sharpened inter-communal boundaries.  Ethno-
nationalist sentiments emerged as channels to convey local grievances to 
Belgrade, and new local elites appealed to revisionist ethno-centric 
narratives of the past.633  In Yugoslavia, ‘as the political climate of hostility 
worsened, categories of identity were reduced to stereotypes and 
prejudices’,634 and when Slovenia and Croatia amended their constitutions to 
introduce the right to secede from the Yugoslav Federation in 1991, the die 
was cast for the bloody dissolution of the federal state. 
3.3.2 Independent Macedonia (1991-2000) 
Ripiloski is right in observing that ‘statehood was effectively imposed on 
Macedonia by Yugoslavia’s collapse’.635  Macedonia’s elites were painfully 
aware of the serious economic, strategic and ideological consequences 
independence would bring.  Even in the midst of Yugoslavia’s break-up, most 
of the ethnic Macedonian politicians held on to the ideal of a future federation 
with Serbia,636 and even the independence referendum of September 1991 
allowed for Macedonia’s ‘right to join a future union of sovereign states of 
Yugoslavia’. 637   The peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from 
Macedonian territory left the newly independent Republic helpless.  The 
Yugoslav army had secured Macedonia’s contested borders and the nation-
building policies promoted by the Yugoslav federal state had largely shaped 
the distinctive linguistic and religious attributes of ethnic Macedonians.638  
Now ‘the Bulgarians asserted that Macedonia was part of great Bulgaria and 
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the Greeks swore that it was a sacred part of Greece.  The Serbs insisted 
that it was Southern Serbia and the Albanians that much of Macedonia was 
part of greater Albania’.639  Debates with Greece over Macedonia’s official 
name delayed the new state’s diplomatic recognition, admission to the United 
Nations and access to emergency international funding to sustain its weak 
economy.  Fears of a Serbian invasion, the disastrous economic 
consequences of its diplomatic isolation, the possible internal rebellion of 
ethnic Albanians, and spillovers of disorders from Kosovo all threatened the 
integrity and existence of the new state.640   Insecurity in its immediate 
neighbourhood heightened the elites’ fear of partition of the Macedonian 
territory between Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.   
In the context of strategic instability and threats to the integrity of an 
independent state, the new constitution redefined Macedonia as ‘a nation-
state of [the] Macedonian people’,641 constructing ethnicity as a fundamental 
pillar of citizenship.642  This reflected the intimate relationship between the 
state and the ethnic Macedonian community: as Rossos observes, to ethnic 
Macedonians, their ‘survival as a people and nation, and that of their 
language and culture, depend[ed] on the continuing existence of their 
state’.643  Thus, ethnic Macedonian nationalism grew ‘not so much from 
pride, but from desperation to survive’.644  Certain markers of identity and 
belonging assumed increasing political significance: the new constitution 
established Macedonian as the sole official language and recognised a 
special status for the Macedonian Orthodox Church, reaffirming the special 
function of language and religion in marking the boundaries of the ethnic 
Macedonian community.645   
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Government efforts to emphasise the congruence between state and ethnic 
community also influenced education policy.  The curricula were immediately 
reformed to ‘remove [Marxist] ideology’.646  This reformulation resulted in 
increasing focus on Macedonian ethno-religious attributes and symbols.  
Moreover, the national subjects presented the natural boundaries of the state 
as stretching to encompass all the territories inhabited by ethnic 
Macedonians.  Thus, geography and history were employed to show that 
most of the Macedonian ‘“national” territory [was] under foreign occupation 
by neighbouring states’.647  Furthermore, despite constitutional guarantees, 
successive governments failed to uphold the right to mother-tongue 
instruction for children belonging to the Albanian, Turkish and Serbian 
communities.  From 1995, all schoolteachers were required to be 
Macedonian citizens and to pass a Macedonian language test: this put 
teachers belonging to ethno-linguistic minorities in a highly unfavourable 
position.648  Requirements for the opening of minority language classes were 
also tightened, Albanian teachers who protested were dismissed and the 
Albanian teacher training college was closed.649  As a result, the number of 
Albanian-language secondary schools declined from ten in 1989 to only one 
in 1993.650   
Thus, ethno-linguistic minorities in independent Macedonia claimed they 
increasingly felt like ‘guests with certain rights’.651  Some, such as the Turkish 
community, had participated to the 1991 independence referendum and had 
supported the new constitution in the hope that ‘their support to the new 
regime in these dire times would be rewarded after the dust settled’.652  
Others, like the Albanians, challenged the legitimacy of the new state.  By the 
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early 1990s the Albanian community accounted for over 20 percent of the 
population of Macedonia.653  The main ethnic Albanian parties boycotted the 
independence referendum and the 1992 census, in protest at the new 
constitution. 654   Instead, in January 1992, the ethnic Albanian parties 
organised a referendum on the autonomy of North-Western Macedonia, in 
which the majority of the local ethnic Albanian population voted in favour.655  
The ethnic Albanian parties insisted that the 1992 referendum was purely 
demonstrative, and only called for recognition of the Albanians as an equal 
founding national group in Macedonia. 656  However, the results of the 
referendum rekindled fears of secession and partition among the 
Macedonian public.   
The debate over the establishment of an Albanian-language university in 
Macedonia came to epitomise wider struggles for the inclusion and rights of 
the Albanian community.657  In contrast to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, 
the first Macedonian constitution did not guarantee university education in 
Albanian.658  Mindful of how the Albanian-language university of Pristina had 
evolved into a nest of nationalist insurrection, the Macedonian authorities 
were determined to prevent the establishment of an Albanian-language 
university.  Therefore, successive governments encouraged the Saints Cyril 
and Methodius University of Skopje to establish admission quotas for 
members of ethno-linguistic communities with considerable success: by 
2005, about 150 Roma students attended university compared to only three 
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students in 1993, and the proportion of Albanian students also increased.659  
In 1997, despite violent protests by Macedonian lecturers and students, the 
government also established an Albanian-language institute within the 
Pedagogical Faculty of the university of Skopje.660  
These concessions did not suffice, and in the mid-1990s, the Albanian 
Intellectuals Assembly in Macedonia called for the establishment of an 
independent Albanian-language university.  The establishment of the 
University of Tetovo encountered considerable resistance: in 1994, the police 
bulldozed its buildings and arrested most of its leaders.661  In early 1995, the 
leaders of all the Albanian parties gathered for its opening ceremony but the 
following day the police stopped lessons and arrested the rector and several 
lecturers, who were subsequently jailed on charges of sedition.662  Most 
Albanian parties temporarily boycotted Parliament in protest: they argued 
that beyond entrenching the socio-economic inequality of ethnic Albanians, 
denial of the right to university education in the mother-tongue ‘reinforced the 
perception of ethnic Macedonian primacy of the state’. 663   Silently, the 
University of Tetovo continued its unrecognised activities and by 1999 it had 
enrolled over 4,500 students.664  
Macedonian authorities argued that the Tetovo University was illegal in two 
respects: it was private and it taught only in the Albanian language.  
Moreover, the government never received a proposal for its establishment 
and most of its academic staff did not meet the legal qualifications required 
for university lecturers.665  The fact that most of the university staff graduated 
from the University of Pristina only compounded ethnic Macedonian 
                                            
659 Risto Karajkov, "Roma in Macedonia: A Decade of Inconclusion?," Osservatorio Balcani e 
Caucaso, 16/05/2005; From 4 percent in 1993 to over 7 percent in 1997, Sidiropoulos, 
"Minority Protection," 146. 
660 Phillips, Macedonia, 71; Rosūlek,  “Macedonia in 2011”, in Risteska and Daskalovski 
(eds.), One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement, 72. 
661 Duncan M. Perry, "Republic of Macedonia: On the Road to Stability - or Destruction?," 
Transitions Online, 25/08/1995. 
662 Vetterlein,  “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, 11; Fabian Schmidt, 
"Macedonia: From National Consensus to Pluralism," Transitions Online, 29/03/1995; Perry,  
“Republic of Macedonia”, 79; Schmidt, "Macedonia." 
663 Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 58; Perry, “Republic of Macedonia”. 
664 Koppa, "Ethnic Albanians," p.51. 
665  Perry, “Republic of Macedonia”; Rosūlek,  “Macedonia in 2011”, in Risteska and 
Daskalovski (eds.), One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement, 72. 
 145 
suspicion that the University of Tetovo was the foundation stone for a parallel 
Albanian education system promoting nationalism and secession.666  This 
may have been the case in Kosovo, where the Kosovo Liberation Army 
benefited from underground para-state Albanian-language institutions (such 
as schools) in its resistance against Serbian authorities.667  The situation in 
Macedonia was different: Albanian political parties demanded constitutional 
changes and insisted on the establishment of an Albanian-language 
university, but they had also participated in coalition governments from 
1992.668  When tension between the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian 
communities escalated in the late 1990s, ethnic Albanian parties started 
complaining that the distribution of ministerial positions did not reflect their 
community’s demographic and political weight.669  
As in Lebanon and Macedonia, the intensification of inter-group tensions 
sharpened group boundaries and helped cement each community’s identity 
markers.  Thus, in the 1990s, religion emerged as a politically salient 
cleavage between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians and 
‘Albanianness and Macedonianness became rapidly and strongly associated 
with Islam and Christianity respectively’.670  This is because in the ethnic 
Macedonian imagery, conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and 
Kosovo (1998-1999) became intertwined with Islam ‘as a dangerous religion 
that favours irredentism and territorial expansionism’. 671   Whereas the 
conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo strengthened religious 
solidarity among local Muslim populations, 672  the singling out of ethnic 
Albanians ‘as embodying threat’673 can only be understood in the context of 
inter-communal relations within the Macedonian state.  Indeed, as early as 
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1995, ethnic Macedonian parties ‘fear[ed] that the Kosovo intifada [was] 
moving South’.674   
Reverberations of the Kosovo conflict, the increasing influx of Albanian 
refugees and the closure of borders certainly contributed to increasing 
tensions within Macedonia.  Yet, despite the presence of Kosovar fighters 
and political leaders, the National Liberation Army’s (NLA) insurgency in 
2001 was primarily ‘a struggle for greater inclusiveness and political 
authority’ within Macedonia.675  During the 2001 conflict, the speaker of the 
Macedonian Parliament disingenuously argued that ‘Macedonians thought 
they were doing everything right in terms of inter-ethnic relations’.676  In fact, 
the NLA articulated its demands only in terms of the rights of ethnic 
Albanians within Macedonia: the insurgents demanded equal constituent 
status for their community, official status for their language, more 
representation in the state administration and police, and a state-funded 
Albanian-language university.677   
3.3.3 The Ohrid Agreement and Beyond (2001-present) 
Macedonia’s ‘mini-war’ of 2001 was settled before it could escalate into a 
civil war engulfing the whole territory.678  More than in Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland, external powers were decisive in framing and enforcing the 2001 
Framework Agreement (known as the Ohrid Agreement and included in 
Appendix 3).  In August 2001, the President of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski, 
and the representatives of the four major ethnic Macedonian and ethnic 
Albanian political parties signed the agreement under the supervision of EU 
and US representatives.679   
The Ohrid agreement sanctioned the equality of all ethnic groups in the state 
by redefining Macedonia as a ‘multi-ethnic society’ and removing notions of 
                                            
674 Perry, “Republic of Macedonia”. 
675 Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 142. 
676  Stojan Andov, qtd. in International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 
19.  
677 Phillips, Macedonia, 87, 90. 
678  Engström, "Multi-Ethnicity or Bi-Nationalism?," 11. 
679 Ibid., 9; Armend Reka, "The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations in 
Macedonia," Human Rights Review 9, no. 1 (2008): 67  
 147 
Macedonians as ‘constituent people’.680  It also established a complex liberal 
consociation in Macedonia.  Macedonia’s consociation is liberal because its 
provisions are designed to accommodate demographic changes.  Members 
of Parliament are free to designate themselves as members of ‘communities 
not in the majority in the population of Macedonia’, and laws affecting the 
territorial and non-territorial autonomy of local communities can only be 
passed with the approval of those members of parliament who belong to 
minorities.681  Moreover, in contrast to the Taif and Belfast agreements, the 
Ohrid Agreement does not grant cultural and political rights to specific 
communities named in the agreement, such as the Maronite right to the 
presidency in Lebanon or the Unionist and Nationalist veto rights in Northern 
Ireland.  Instead, the Ohrid Agreement provides certain enhanced collective 
cultural and political safeguards for any community accounting for over 20 
percent of the population.  Currently, this means only the ethnic Macedonian 
and ethnic Albanian communities.   
The agreement states that there are ‘no territorial solutions to ethnic issues’ 
but responds to long-standing Albanian demands for decentralisation of the 
public administration.  Macedonia’s consociation is complex precisely 
because it provides for the devolution of decision-making to the municipal 
level.  The definition of municipal boundaries in 2001-2004 appeared to 
‘create communities in which either Macedonians or Albanians dominate’.682  
Thus, many ethnic Macedonians opposed the drawing of new municipal 
boundaries as ‘ethnic gerrymandering’, arguing that they might inhibit inter-
group conflict in the short term but could exacerbate long-term demands for 
federalisation and partition.683   
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Education was one of the first responsibilities devolved to the municipalities 
from 2005,684 but it also figures prominently in the Ohrid agreement.  During 
the ethnic conflict, the NLA demanded expansion of mother-tongue 
education and state funding for Albanian-language universities.  This reflects 
that language remains the most politically salient marker of ethnic identity in 
Macedonia.  Both demands were met: the Ohrid agreement reaffirmed rights 
to primary and secondary education ‘in the students' native languages’ and to 
learning the Macedonian language, and granted state funding for universities 
teaching in the language of at least 20 percent of the population.685  By 2004, 
two state universities taught in the Albanian language: the trilingual South 
East European University and the now legal University of Tetovo.  Alongside 
the Ohrid agreement’s provisions for positive discrimination in university 
enrolments, 686  higher education in the mother-tongue facilitated ethnic 
Albanian access to university: Ragaru finds that between 2001 and 2004 the 
proportion of Albanian students in university increased from 4.9 percent to 
14.9 percent.687  Similarly, Chapter 6 traces the success of provisions to 
expand mother-tongue instruction in primary and secondary schools, but it 
shows that policymakers consistently overlooked the broader implications of 
this expansion until at least 2008.  Indeed, as Chapter 7 highlights, post-
Ohrid education policy furthered the separation of students of different ethno-
linguistic backgrounds into different shifts (in which different groups of 
students attend school at different times of the day), buildings or schools.  
Thus, as in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, in consociational Macedonia, 
schools are becoming ‘parallel, non-intersecting communities’.688    
In fact, successive power-sharing executives presented schools as an 
instrument for social cohesion in Macedonia, and the 2005-2015 education 
strategy nostalgically longed to ‘restore the school’s lost status as the 
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dominant institutional agent for creating and conveying values’.689  Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 show that debates over history education, citizenship education 
and language ultimately concerned precisely discussions over which values 
should be created and conveyed by schools.  As in Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland, education reform in consociational Macedonia has to juggle the 
promotion of ‘belonging to the Republic of Macedonia’ with the ‘nurturing [of 
communal] national and cultural identity’.690   
The tendency to prioritise the latter prompted Koppa to suggest that perhaps 
the 2001 ethnic conflict was ‘not a struggle for inclusion, but a struggle for 
boundaries’.691  Continuing ethnic Albanian dissatisfaction with post-Ohrid 
political and cultural reforms substantiates this view and fuels ethnic 
Macedonian fears that ethnic Albanians see the agreement ‘only as the first 
gain enabling them to formulate further demands at the expenses of 
Macedonians’.692   
For their part, the majority of ethnic Macedonians perceived the agreement 
as being imposed upon the state by a pro-Albanian international 
community.693  Ethnic Macedonian parties had emphasised the nature of the 
state as an expression of the ethnic Macedonian nation in the 1990s; the 
Ohrid agreement did not tackle long-standing anxieties over the identity and 
integrity of the state, instead reviving fears of partition.694  Thus, from 2001, 
the majority ethnic Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE695 started reformulating 
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Macedonian identity in two respects.  First, it started relying on religious 
institutions as potential allies in fostering the internal cohesion of the ethnic, 
linguistic and political Macedonian community.  This seeped into curricular 
policy, igniting violent debates over the introduction of religious education in 
state schools.696  Second, VMRO-DPMNE politicians started portraying the 
ethnic Macedonian people as descending from a mythical Hellenistic past, 
and initiated an ‘antiquisation campaign’ which culminated in the 
megalomaniac urban revival project Skopje 2014.697   
The Turkish community and other minorities were excluded from the 
negotiation of the Ohrid Agreement and argue that the agreement has 
promoted an Albanian-Macedonian bi-national society and marginalised 
smaller ethno-linguistic communities.698   In education, as in many other 
political and non-political institutions, smaller communities ‘fear being 
“squeezed” between what they see as an insecure Macedonian majority and 
an aggressive Albanian minority’.699  
 
Since Yugoslav times, the ethnic Macedonian community has viewed the 
state both as its ultimate expression and as its protector in an insecure, 
predatory regional environment.  In Socialist Yugoslavia, the hegemonic 
public education system was employed to convey overarching identities of 
belonging and allegiances to the state.  These narratives were partially 
tempered by the recognition of the linguistic rights of ethnic communities. 
Independence, forced upon Macedonia by the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
changed the parameters of inter-group relations.  Schooling remained an 
instrument for nation-state building, but it was at the service of a new project: 
the Macedonian nation-state.  In an effort to prevent the creation of parallel 
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para-state institutions among the ethnic Albanian community, successive 
governments refused to establish an Albanian-language university and 
limited mother-tongue schooling.  Thus, in the 1990s, debates over education 
‘came to symbolise the struggle for all minority rights in the state’700 which 
culminated in the 2001 conflict. 
The following chapters will trace reforms of history education, citizenship 
education, languages and of the overall structure of the education system to 
determine whether the politics of consociation impacted on the manifest and 
hidden curricula of compulsory schools in the three jurisdictions in question. 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has surveyed the history of education systems in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia and traced the political function of schooling 
in these three societies.  It highlights that the contested states in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia faced similar challenges in three respects.  
First, France, Great Britain and Serbia established their borders on the fault 
lines of receding empires.  Initially, borders appeared porous and negotiable, 
morphing into effective frontiers only decades later.  Second, their borders 
cut through the homeland and ‘imagined community’ of certain ethnic, 
religious or national groups such as the Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, Irish 
Nationalists in Northern Ireland and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.  Third, 
the diverging identities and national aspirations of different ethnic, linguistic, 
confessional and national communities crystallised in the context of 
hardening frontiers and escalating inter-group conflict.  Group identities came 
to cluster around certain, politically salient attributes: in Lebanon and 
Northern Ireland the primary inter-group boundary was religious 
denomination, in socialist Macedonia it was language.   
Moreover, this chapter showed that education policy is deeply entangled with 
different nation-state building projects.  Until the early 20th Century, in the 
territories of present-day Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, 
education was a clerical and foreign prerogative, an instrument of 
socialisation into communal narratives and allegiances.  In the 1920s, it 
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became an instrument for nation-state building and in subsequent decades 
Beirut, Belfast and Skopje attempted to impose (or enforce) central control 
over the education system.  Just as the state attempted to ensure its 
legitimacy by conveying overarching founding myths and encouraging the 
mixing of schoolchildren of different ethnic, religious and national 
backgrounds, local communities too set out to reproduce their existence by 
transmitting their (mutually exclusive and maximally different) histories and 
markers of identity in separate institutions.   
Their success depended on the strength of the central state, on its ability to 
articulate overarching ‘integrative doctrines’ and, most importantly, on its 
permeability to communal interests and demands.  For example, both 
Lebanon and Yugoslavia promoted overarching value systems to justify the 
existence of the state: pluralism and Marxism, respectively.  Both doctrines 
provided for a legitimate role of confessional and ethnic communities in 
defining some of the contents of curricula (through Yugoslav devolution) or in 
running schools (through state subsidies to confessional schools in 
Lebanon).  In contrast, in Northern Ireland (in the 1930s) and Macedonia (in 
the 1990s), the state constructed institutions and narratives impermeable to 
the demands of the Irish Nationalists and ethnic Albanians.  Communities, in 
turn, jealously guarded (or even established) their parallel institutions, such 
as schools and universities.   
In this regard, an important difference emerged.  In Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland the solidification of territorial boundaries, the construction of state 
institutions, the exacerbation of ethno-political conflict and the expansion of 
compulsory education went hand in hand.  In contrast, inter-communal 
conflict in independent Macedonia emerged only after a fully functioning state 
educational system was in place.  Thus, in the 1990s ethnic Macedonian 
elites could appropriate the monopolistic state educational system to convey 
congruence between state and nation, projecting a Macedonian ethno-
national identity on other communities. 
This chapter demonstrated that the instruments employed by states and 
communities to convey narratives, identities and allegiances to children were 
remarkably similar in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  First, 
before the conflicts, states attempted to impose a uniform curriculum on all 
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schools.  Clashes with communal actors focused on the contents of the 
national subjects: history, citizenship education, religion and languages.  
Second, the history of the education system in Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia is also the history of communal attempts to maximise 
independence in educational affairs through separate schools reflecting, 
reproducing and entrenching societal cleavages.   
Similarly, the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid peace agreements aimed to employ 
schools for peace-building and reconciliation by mapping reforms of the 
curricula of three national subjects (history, citizenship and languages) and 
calling for new structures in the education system.  On the one hand, the 
education reforms promoted in the three peace agreements reflect the 
relative strength of religious, national and ethnic communities at the end of 
conflicts: in Lebanon, curricular reforms mirror closely the demands of 
Muslims; in Northern Ireland, support for Irish-language education 
accommodates the calls of the Irish Nationalist community; in Macedonia, 
state funding for Albanian-language universities responds to core ethnic 
Albanian requests.  On the other hand, the agreements aim, through schools, 
to construct and convey overarching narratives of belonging and allegiance 
to a new, inclusive state where different groups share political power.   
Chapters 4 to 7 will compare the experiences of consociational Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia in implementing the reforms mapped in their 
peace agreements.  They will consider debates over history education, 
citizenship education, the languages of instruction and over initiatives to 
promote common schools for children belonging to different backgrounds, 
respectively.  Each of these chapters aims to determine whether schools can 
help the stability of consociations, and to highlight constraining factors to 





4 Reforming History Education 
In 1999, an article posited that ‘the permanence of the peace process in 
Northern Ireland may depend on which model of history teaching 
emerges’.701  Militia leaders made similar arguments about Lebanon in the 
1980s.702  Analysing debates over history education in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia since the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements, this 
chapter confirms that history education was expected to contribute to the 
construction of overarching identities and to the promotion of reconciliation in 
the three societies.   
This chapter also shows that the model of history education adopted by 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia was affected by the 
consociational political system in three ways.  First, the lack of consensus 
over the end of conflict hindered the formulation of consensual overarching 
narratives of the past.  Second, debates over the political function of history 
education mirrored wider tensions between the principles of pluralism and 
parity of esteem at the heart of consociations.  Finally, the deregulation of 
curricula (in Lebanon), multiperspective curricula (in Northern Ireland) and 
proportional curricula (in Macedonia) contributed to the reproduction of the 
different (and potentially mutually exclusive) communal narratives of the past.  
Before analysing the three case studies, this chapter briefly surveys the 
literature on the political function of history education. 
4.1 History Education in Deeply Divided Societies: Theoretical 
Debates 
Most states devote very little time and financial resources to history 
education.  Moreover, the effective impact of history education upon 
children’s values and attitudes has never been quantified.703  Some argue 
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that history education at school has a minimal impact compared to the 
politicised oral narratives of families and communities.704  In actual fact, 
recent research shows that schools can contribute to the development of 
tolerant and inclusive views of the past in deeply divided societies.  Seixas 
found that families and communities influence ‘the process of establishing 
historical fact, assessing historical interpretation, and hypothesising about 
historical patterns’, while schools provide historical information for children.705  
In Northern Ireland, Barton and McCully found that until the age of 11, 
children’s identification with historical events and figures eludes political, 
national or communal alignments.  It comes to reflect their background only 
between the ages of 11 and 13.706  This would explain why history education 
is at the core of the most heated debates over education reform: it remains 
an effective instrument for shaping individual and group identity and 
influencing inter-group relations.   
Theories of ethnicity and nationalism recognise that historical narratives help 
construct ethnic and national groups and contribute to their internal cohesion: 
a ‘long common past’ may make group identities ‘more stable’ and 
‘integrative’.707  Cohesive ethnic and cultural communities reproduce their 
founding historical narratives, remember formative collective events and 
forget the inconvenient past, effectively becoming ‘communities of 
memories’. 708   In a state, history education may help integrate and 
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homogenise citizens, ‘tell[ing] the nation what their memories are supposed 
to be’, and reproduc[ing] collective identity across generations.709  Cultural 
homogeneity, in turn, serves to enable, or at least legitimise, life within the 
common political community of the democratic nation-state.710   
Historical narratives also help delineate the group and construct its 
boundaries by excluding and delegitimising its rivals. 711   Narratives 
contributing to nation-building are often ethnocentric, and may convey a 
sense of collective victimhood, portraying ethnic or cultural minorities as 
foreigners and free-riders.712  During violent conflicts, historical narratives 
often erase past experiences of coexistence and cultural hybridity and project 
upon the past distinctive and mutually exclusive ‘identity categories and 
classifications that are essentially modern socio-political formations’.713  This 
is because, as Bell et al. put it, ‘stories about the past are inevitably 
prescriptive and instruct people how to think and act’.714  By enshrining a 
political consensus over legitimate identities and reflecting power imbalances 
in societies, history curricula can help sustain a political order, maintain elite 
cohesion, legitimise control over the population and prevent structural 
change.715  They can also sanction marginalisation, political domination or 
even violence against minority groups.716  Above all, historical narratives can 
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inhibit peaceful change through the weight of the past and the ‘fear of 
betraying the sacrifices of one’s ancestors’.717   
If history education offers an interpretation of ‘the past to suit contemporary 
needs’,718 it can also reflect changing inter-group relations.  After conflicts, 
reform of history curricula may exemplify a wider intent to address ‘the 
legacies of conflict’, shape a new ‘common sense of national identity’, and 
signal a ‘changed identity on the part of the state’.719  Thus, history education 
can promote reconciliation, mutual understanding and trust by addressing the 
roots of the past conflict, and prevent them from poisoning the future.720  It 
can promote tolerance and equality by teaching the core historical narratives 
of rival communities721 and can encourage children to ‘see themselves as 
active forces for historical change’.722  
Generally, in post-conflict societies history education is entrusted with two 
responsibilities.  First, it is expected to provide a positive collective narrative 
of the past and help social cohesion building through the socialisation of 
children in a new patriotic collective memory.723  Second, it is expected to 
contribute to long-term reconciliation.  The dilemma is that in a deeply 
divided society, history education can promote long-term peace only by 
acknowledging the different history of groups ‘to designate their place not 
only in the past but also in present and future society’.724   
The model of history teaching employed in a society, therefore, can shed 
light on the main political function of history education.  Peter Seixas 
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identifies three approaches to history education: ‘the collective memory/best 
story approach’, the ‘postmodern approach’ and the  ‘disciplinary 
approach’.725  The ‘best story’ approach focuses on the contents of the 
curriculum rather than on its pedagogical approach, and provides a single 
narrative of the past.726   After conflicts, unified historical narratives can 
reformulate group identity inclusively, offer a balanced account of the past, 
discredit divisive narratives and remind citizens of peaceful past 
coexistence.727  Yet, it may be challenging to formulate a curriculum before 
historians have established an acceptable record of the past conflict.728  
Moreover, elites may have a ‘vested interest in retaining simple narratives 
that flatter their own group and promote group unity by emphasising sharp 
divergences between themselves and other groups’.729   Finally, a curriculum 
with explicit social and political objectives often fuels tensions and 
accusations of social engineering.730  For these reasons, McCully argues that 
‘a traditional narrative approach to teaching history [is] especially unsuited to 
a divided society’.731   
The ‘postmodern’ approach to history education consists of 
multiperspectivity: the presentation of the narratives of the past formulated by 
different groups in society, and evaluation of ‘how these stories serve present 
aims’.732  It addresses family and community narratives of the past directly 
and attempts to tackle ‘emotional dimensions’ and maximise history’s impact 
on attitudes and values.733  It aims to help students criticize and build on their 
background knowledge, and highlights the dialectical relationship between 
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different communal histories.734  It promotes history education as a ‘means of 
collective self-discovery’, concerned with ‘the examination of values, not their 
transmission’, eroding present ‘emotional barriers’ and promoting 
empathy. 735  Critiques of postmodern approaches argue that 
multiperspectivity can further relativism and the denial of established but 
politically inconvenient truths.736  
Finally, the ‘disciplinary’ approach to history education aims to convey 
familiarity with the sources and methods through which historical accounts 
are constructed.737  McCully argues that trust-building and reconciliation are 
best promoted through a curriculum building skills and values, rather than a 
content-oriented one.738  This is because a skills-based curriculum would 
teach that the value and meaning of documents and accounts changes over 
time, that interpretations of the past can be challenged through primary and 
secondary sources, that diversity can be understood and empathy can be 
developed, and that individual choices can affect history.739  Students would 
acquire the ability to express moral judgment, to respectfully engage in 
debates over the past and future, and learn self-control.740  Disciplinary and 
multiperspective approaches to history education could, in Maha Yahya’s 
words, contribute to social cohesion if social cohesion is ‘not about imposing 
a heterogeneous [sic.] identity on all these different groups but about… 
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promoting a sense of shared understanding, respect of difference and mutual 
dialogue’.741   
The political function of history education largely determines the curricular 
approach to the study of history, but is in turn affected by wider socio-political 
conditions.  In particular, Höpken shows that there are five socio-political 
preconditions to the production of a history textbook (or curriculum) furthering 
reconciliation.742  First, ‘conflict has to be at an end’.743  This in itself is 
problematic as forms of structural violence and separation persist in society 
after peace agreements are signed, as Chapter 7 shows.744   Cole and 
Barsalou argue that reform can be hampered if school structures reproduce 
inequalities.745   
Second, political elites must endorse a multiperspective approach to the past 
and avoid interference with curricula and textbooks.  Yet, Cole and Barsalou 
point out that political elites in post-conflict societies rarely wish to promote 
critical thinking or undermine established hierarchies and traditions. 746  
Religious institutions and the media can have an equally detrimental impact 
on the drafting process.747   
Third, society needs to be open to constructive reflection over the past to 
address ‘certain elements that served state-building needs but now stand in 
the way of reconciliation’.748  Thus, reform of history education requires a 
minimum level of trust within society, permitting open challenges to 
established narratives, revisions and discussion, without sparking violence 
within and outside the classroom.749   
Fourth, emotions must be manageable, otherwise a moratorium on history 
teaching might be necessary.  In the immediate aftermath of conflicts, states 
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often promote ‘amnesia’ to uphold stability and ‘move on’.750  Yet, the silence 
of official institutions can create a vacuum filled with competing and mutually 
exclusive communal narratives of history.751   
Fifth, the international community should refrain from ‘top-down’ interventions 
but also monitor the short and long term impact of reforms of history 
education.752   Cole and Barsalou add that successful reforms of history 
education need to be a political and educational priority and to be backed by 
widespread agreement over the aim of history education.753  Each of these 
provisos affected the process and outcomes of the initiatives to reform 
history education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia: they did so to 
different extents, and nowhere more destructively than in Lebanon. 
4.2 Lebanon  
In the 1980s, PSP leader Walid Jumblatt argued that the civil war, as a 
struggle over identity, could only end after agreement on a consensual 
history for Lebanon.754  Chapter 3 has shown that before and during the war 
history books emphasised Arab identity in Muslim schools, Phoenician roots 
in Christian schools and ‘unclear’ allegiances in state schools, where neither 
narrative prevailed.755  The conflicting narratives conveyed by schools had 
partly contributed to citizens’ ‘confusion about their identity’756 and to the 
violent conflict over the state’s identity and destiny.757   
Fortunately, the Taif agreement preceded consensus over Lebanese history.  
It attempted to reconcile two visions of Lebanon: that of Lebanon as an Arab 
state and that of Lebanon as an historical refuge for persecuted religious 
communities which coexisted and shared power. 758   In Taif, Lebanese 
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deputies advocated the unification of history curricula and textbooks to 
‘develop the national spirit’.759  Rather than embracing the suggestion of 
some scholars to present multiple narratives of the past in schools, Lebanese 
deputies favoured a ‘best story’ approach.  They maintained that a common 
history book would strengthen allegiance to the state at the expense of 
religious and political alignments, mend the fractures caused by the war, and 
reflect the new inter-communal power equilibrium.760  
Frayha sees the decision to employ history, alongside civic education, to 
promote reconciliation and social cohesion after the war, as a shift in ‘the role 
of schooling from one of institutionalised divisions to one endeavouring to 
construct national identity’.761  The 1995 New Framework for Education in 
Lebanon appears to confirm this view: it reiterated that the education system 
was to contribute to building trust and a cohesive society and that history 
education was to instil understanding of a common Lebanese history, 
highlighting the negative impact of conflict among Lebanese citizens and 
‘establishing an awareness that the needs of the present and ambitions [for] 
the future rely on the promotion of national unity’.762  Yet the Ministry of 
Education allocated only one hour per week to history education at the post-
primary level and only two weekly hours of social studies at primary level.763  
This suggests that in fact ‘the socialisation of students along national unitary 
lines’ was not a political priority in post-Taif Lebanon.764   
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4.2.1 Mission Impossible 
As director of the Centre for Educational Research and Development 
(CERD), Munir Abu Assali was tasked with initiating a full curricular reform, 
including what many saw as the ‘impossible mission’ of tackling the history 
curriculum, which had remained untouched since 1968-1970.765  Abu Assali 
argues that he insisted on some ground rules for reform.  He maintained that 
all political and religious groups should be involved in debates aimed at 
reaching ‘a new consensus’ based on an allegiance to Lebanon superseding 
previous confessional compromises.766  He insisted reforms should fulfil the 
promises of the Taif agreement.  He promoted transparent decision-making, 
with solutions reached by consensus rather than majority voting to ‘preserve 
unity among different communities,’ arguing that ‘we have different 
belongings so we cannot impose our point of view’ and that majority voting 
could ‘break’ the committee.767  Finally, he insisted on swift implementation of 
decisions, to avoid any political volte-face, and on the involvement of the 
public in policy evaluation and debate.768  
A committee including political and religious representatives was convened 
to finalise and publish the main aims and principles of a new history 
curriculum.769   According to a CERD officer, the committee also started 
drafting textbooks, completing six books.770   Abu Assali argues that the 
books drafted under his supervision reminded children that conflict among 
Lebanese citizens, and calls for external help could lead to ‘catastrophe’ and 
to the collapse of the state.  He maintains that the books presented 
Lebanon’s history as ‘the mixture of the different histories’ of the many 
religious communities, and encouraged respect for different perspectives.  
He also claims that they were designed to stimulate critical thinking through 
informed research, debate and group presentations.771  Still, between 1997 
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and 1999 curricula for every subject were published and distributed, except 
for history.   
4.2.2 A State Secret 
When government changed in 1999, the directorship of CERD changed 
hands and Nemer Frayha replaced Abu Assali.  Sidelining the existing 
curricula, a new education minister asked Frayha to create a new committee 
to review and ‘renew’ the history curricula and textbooks. 772   The new 
committee was composed of different members, regulated by different 
procedures and, according to Abu Assali, employing a different method of 
decision-making.  Abu Assali argues that Frayha abandoned decision-
making by consensus and that this explains his failure to finalise new history 
curricula.773  The new committee, which convened in 1999 to draft a new 
history curriculum, did include representatives of the many religious groups, 
but its operations were ‘handled almost like a state secret’.774   
It is known that the works of the committee were punctuated by deep 
disagreements and frequent resignations.  Bashshour suggests that debates 
centred on whether to emphasise Lebanese unity or the contribution of each 
specific community to Lebanese history.775  The then secretary of the drafting 
committee admitted that initial conflicts were primarily due to members’ 
attempts to impose their ‘own ideology’ over others and that the bone of 
contention was Lebanese identity: ‘some wanted to consider the Lebanese 
Arab since 4000 BC’, while others insisted on the importance of the Arab 
conquest of 636 AD and of later social and linguistic transformations.776  
Frayha, who chaired the committee, confirms that the struggles involved 
balancing two narratives of the past, and determining the extent of Arab-ness 
and of Lebanese cultural and ethno-national specificity.777   Still, Frayha 
                                            
772 Senior Officer, CERD, Interview. 
773 Abu Assali Interview. 
774 Munir Bashshour, "History Teaching and History Textbooks in Lebanon," paper presented 
at the conference on Learning about the Other and Teaching for Tolerance in Muslim 
Majority Societies, Istanbul: Centre for Values Education, 10/11/2005, 6. 
775 Ibid., 7-8. 
776 Joseph Abi Rached, qtd. in Frayha, "Developing Curriculum", in Tawil and Harley (eds.), 
Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion, 186. 
777 Ibid. 
 165 
maintains that the committee managed to establish a common understanding 
of controversial events and figures, from the characters of Emir 
Fakhreddine778 and Emir Bashir Shihab II,779 to the Palestinian involvement 
in Lebanon since 1948; from the causes of the 1975-1989 Civil War to the 
roots of Lebanese national identity.780   
Once the committee completed it, the curriculum was approved by an 
advisory council, examined by the Education minister, inspected by the 
Judicial Consulting Council, checked by the Cabinet and finally published in 
June 2000.781   Frayha recalls that the 2000 curriculum was founded on three 
guiding principles: Lebanese independence, Arab identity and opposition to 
the forces upsetting inter-communal coexistence. 782   Similarly to its 
predecessor, it promoted pride in Lebanese identity, encouraged belonging 
to Lebanon rather than to confessional communities, stimulated affiliation to 
the Arab world, and warned students as to the detrimental impact of conflict 
among Lebanese and foreign intervention, with emphasis on the ‘Zionist 
danger’.783  According to Frayha, the history curriculum published in 2000 
could help build a ‘common national memory’.784  
After finalising the history curriculum, CERD formed 11 textbook drafting 
committees, each comprising one historian, a textbook writer, a specialist in 
teaching methods and a class teacher, representing different religious 
                                            
778  Also known as Fakhr-al-Din II (1572-1635). Druze prince and Emir of the Chouf 
considered by some as the first ruler to seek the unification and independence of Lebanon. 
779 Also known as Bachir Chehab II (1767-1850). First Maronite ruler of the Emirate of Mount 
Lebanon, head of the Maronite forces in a rebellion against the Ottomans and in a war 
against the Druze in an attempt to establish control and obtain greater autonomy for Mount 
Lebanon. 
780 Frayha, "Developing Curriculum", in Tawil and Harley (eds.), Education, Conflict and 
Social Cohesion, 186-7. 
781 The committee was composed of three Christians and three Muslims, representing 
several different political parties. The curriculum was published in Presidential Decree 
No.3175 of 22 June 2000. Frayha, "Developing Curriculum", in Tawil and Harley (eds.), 
Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion, 186; Frayha, "Education as a Means", in Shuayb 
(ed.), Rethinking Education for Social Cohesion, 177; Frayha Interview. 
782 Frayha, "Developing Curriculum", in Tawil and Harley (eds.), Education, Conflict and 
Social Cohesion, 194. 
783 Bashshour, "The Deepening Cleavage,” in Hanf and Salam (eds.), Lebanon in Limbo, 
165-6. 
784 Frayha, "Developing Curriculum", in Tawil and Harley (eds.), Education, Conflict and 
Social Cohesion, 195. 
 166 
groups.785  A further committee, including three Christian and three Muslim 
scholars and headed by the CERD director, was formed to review the books.  
Whilst Frayha admits, ‘I’m not proud of it, it’s not pure academia’, he 
maintains that consensus among the six members was essential to ensure 
schools would adopt the books.786  
According to Frayha, the history books drafted during his mandate at CERD 
focused primarily on social rather than political and military history.  The 
curriculum looked at contemporary local history and family history, before 
considering the history of Lebanon from Phoenician times to the Taif 
Agreement.787  Frayha insisted on including the civil war in the history books, 
as the war had become the ‘cornerstone’ of family histories, with personal 
time often measured in terms of ‘before/after the war’.788  He also maintains 
that the textbooks attempted to be politically ‘neutral’, to encourage students 
to draw lessons from history without apportioning blame for past events.789   
In fact, while they were being distributed in 2001, the textbooks A Window 
unto History, for grades 2 and 3, were besieged by controversy, illustrating 
that their contents were far from uncontroversial.  In particular, Education 
Minister Abd-al-Rahim Murad claims he asked Frayha to delay distribution of 
the textbooks because he found some major mistakes, which could lead to 
‘political problems’.790  Murad insists that there were several major factual 
inaccuracies, but controversy focused on chapter 11 of the grade 3 textbook, 
titled: ‘They All Went and Lebanon Stayed: Independence of the Nation’.  
The chapter showed a timeline of invasions of Lebanon’s territory, from 2000 
BC to 1943 AD, including the 636 AD ‘Arab conquest’.791  The timeline and 
chapter title, according to Murad, portrayed Arabs as conquerors on a par 
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with the French, denied the Arab identity of Lebanon and suggested that ‘the 
Arabs were expelled from Lebanon’ like other conquerors. 792   This, he 
declared at the time, ensured that ‘Lebanon has no identity, it was lost or 
blurred’.793   
Frayha recognises that emphasis on Lebanese identity in the textbooks may 
have been ‘interpreted by some people as underplaying the Arab identity’,794  
but he objected that most countries use the idiom Al-Fatih Al-Arabi (‘the Arab 
conquest’) to describe the events of 636 AD.795  Prominent Muslim figures 
also publicly supported the textbooks and pointed out that they clearly did not 
claim that the Arabs had left Lebanon.796  Moreover, Frayha offered to cut the 
relevant page out of the textbook and CERD issued a statement that page 88 
of the grade 3 textbook contained mistakes and would be removed.797  It was 
not the first time a page had been cut from a Lebanese textbook: in 2000, for 
example, religious figures succeeded in removing a page from a biology 
textbook.798   
Still, the education minister insisted that the history textbooks should be 
seized and Frayha should be fired because he printed and distributed 
textbooks without direct ministerial approval.799  Frayha maintains that direct 
ministerial approval was not needed before publishing the textbooks and that 
Murad fuelled the controversy because he wanted to ‘get back at’ Frayha for 
obstructing the minister’s plans to open some private schools.800  He also 
recalls that a group of Lebanese historians lobbied the minister directly, 
arguing that the textbooks were not appropriate for students, but he claims 
their protests were  ‘ideological’ and motivated by financial interests 
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(defending the continued existence of a number of different textbook 
series).801  Yet others who participated in the drafting process recognise that 
disagreements over the interpretation of certain events ran deep between 
members of the drafting committee and among different religious 
communities. 802   Local observers confirm that the education minister 
exaggerated a marginal problem ‘for political reasons’ and that the 
withdrawal of history books owed more to Sunni political opposition and 
Syrian pressure than to any procedural concerns.803  Ultimately, copies of 
every grade 2 and 3 books were withdrawn, the printing of other textbooks 
was stopped and Frayha was ‘relieved’ of his duties.804   
Education minister Murad formed a new drafting committee to revise the 
curriculum and produce new textbooks.805   Before the new books were 
finalised, Murad was approached with complaints that their contents did not 
do equal justice to all the confessional communities of Lebanon.806  Work on 
the history curriculum and textbooks was simply suspended: Frayha 
comments ironically that the minister was clearly not ‘ready to fight’ for his 
new textbooks in such a politicised context.807   
4.2.3 Political Disagreement vs Historical Events 
In 2009, the new Education Minister Hassan Mneimneh formed a new 
committee for the drafting of history curricula and books.808   He convened 
representatives of the main religious groups and political parties and asked 
them to ‘extract’ a new curriculum from that of 2000.809  A new history 
curriculum for grades 2 to 9 was completed in 2010 and presented to the 
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Council of Ministers for approval in early 2011.810  Already a low priority, 
approval of the history curriculum was sidelined during negotiations over the 
composition of a new executive in January-June 2011.   
In mid-2011, a new education minister presented the history curriculum to the 
Cabinet and ministers started examining it with a view to ‘having their share 
in history and being presented positively’.811  The political representatives of 
each confessional community came face to face with the many divergent 
perspectives on Lebanon’s past812 and, as Daw put it, ‘every minister wanted 
to add points to the book to support his sect’.813  Thus, the process of 
‘cleaning up the dirty details, and putting the dirty laundry away and saying 
that didn’t happen’814  dragged on and even spilled over into Lebanon’s 
streets.   
In January 2012, it emerged that the new curriculum described the events of 
2005, leading to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, as ‘a wave of protests’, 
rather than the ‘Cedar revolution’.815  It was argued that the phrase ‘Cedar 
revolution’ had been coined by an American diplomat and was ‘sensitive to 
many in the country’.816  Supporters of the March 14 coalition (particularly the 
Christian Kataeb and Lebanese Forces) staged a demonstration, protesting 
that their parties’ contribution to independence was being expunged from 
official accounts of Lebanon’s history, whilst Hizbollah’s resistance to Israel 
was given a place of honour.817  Echoing the street, Kataeb deputy Samy 
Gemayel equated the Cedar Revolution to Lebanon’s second independence 
and asked whether ‘we have the right to remove Hizbollah’s liberation of 
South Lebanon from the history curriculum’. 818   In the midst of the 
controversy, Walid Jumblatt wondered ‘does disagreement in politics erase 
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historical events?’819  The answer is probably affirmative: unable to mediate 
an agreement, Prime Minister Najib Mikati declared a moratorium on history 
curricula and textbooks, and to this day, a unified history curriculum is one of 
Taif’s unfulfilled promises.820   
Beyond highlighting deep disagreements over the state’s identity and foreign 
orientation among Lebanese elites, the failure to formulate a sanctioned 
history curriculum and unified textbook means that schools are free to 
choose not to teach history.  Indeed, most students are taught history only in 
grades 9 and 12, when they sit an official exam including a test based on the 
1968-1970 curriculum. 821   When history is taught in other grades, 
controversial topics are often avoided to prevent fights. 822   Moreover, 
publishing houses are free to produce history textbooks on the basis of the 
1968-1970 curriculum.823  Books are approved by CERD on the basis of 
three criteria:  they have to follow the 1968-1970 curriculum, comply with the 
Lebanese constitution and avoid offence or discrimination on religious and 
communal grounds.824  CERD also checks imported textbooks to ensure they 
do not include illegal pictures and do not have Israeli authors.825  However, 
CERD is often unaware of the contents of textbooks used in private schools, 
especially when they are imported: in 2012, for example, it was found that a 
history book in use in an international school in Beirut listed Hizbollah as a 
terrorist organisation.826  
Most textbooks, as well as the questions posed in official exams, consider 
history only up until 1943, as ‘Lebanese parties have different points of view’ 
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on later events.827  By reaching ‘the end of history in 1943’,828 textbooks 
show ‘seemingly intentional forgetfulness’ of contemporary developments, 
including the 1958 and 1975-1989 civil wars and the roots and formation of 
the present political parties and consociational political system.829  Thus, the 
civil war remains the ‘gaping hole’ in Lebanese history education. 830  
Different communal narratives of the war are conveyed in an institutional void 
where they interact and compete, perpetuating each community’s sense of 
victimhood and myth of resistance.831  At the same time, these narratives fall 
short of encouraging patriotism, democratic participation and even an 
understanding of the origins and workings of Lebanon’s political system. 
Indeed, a 1994 study of history textbooks in Catholic schools highlighted that 
most books avoided controversial issues and emphasised multi-religious 
coexistence even at the expense of factual accuracy.832  Messara confirms 
that history textbooks portray Lebanon as a ‘tolerant society whose members 
love one another and associate as brothers’.833  However, different textbooks 
devote varying proportions of time to local, Arab, European and World history 
and emphasise different events.834   Even when they consider the same 
event, books employed in different schools often provide different 
interpretations: for example, the Lebanese nationalists executed by the 
Ottomans in 1916 are heroes in some books and traitors in others.835  History 
teachers also admit that their communal background influences their 
teaching: Christian teachers tend to present the French Mandate positively 
and to draw the origins of Greater Lebanon to Fakhreddine’s emirate in the 
                                            
827 Senior Officer, CERD, Interview. Exam questions for the Lebanese Baccalaureate for 
2002-2004 did not require any knowledge of events after 1946. Bashshour, “History 
Teaching”, 10. 
828 Antoine Messara, qtd. in Craig Larkin, "Beyond the War? The Lebanese Postmemory 
Experience," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, (2010): 620. 
829 Dorrington, Lebanese Historical Memory, 17; Abouchedid and Nasser, "The State of 
History", 71. 
830 Yahya Interview. 
831 Ibid.; Larkin, "Beyond the War?", 618, 620, 628. 
832 Bashshour,  “History Teaching”, 4. 
833 Qtd. in Larkin, "Beyond the War?", 620. 
834 Abouchedid and Nasser, "The State of History", 69-70. 
835 Abouchedid et al., "The Limitations of Inter-Group Learning", Twenty-one Syrians and 
Lebanese were executed symultaneously in Damascus and Beirut on May 6 for anti-
Ottoman activities. 
 172 
early 17th Century, while teachers in Muslim schools generally present 
Greater Lebanon as an artificial French creation.836  Thus, history education 
circumvents controversial issues and rhetorically emphasises inter-
communal coexistence and cooperation, but it also reproduces and 
legitimises communally specific, and mutually exclusive, narratives of 
events.837   
Abouchedid and Nasser confirm that students’ identities and their perception 
of the past are affected by school history in Lebanon.838  This substantiates 
the observation that, by promoting divisive rather than overarching narratives 
of the past, Lebanon may be ‘raising another generation of children who 
identify themselves only with their communities and not their nation.’ 839  
Moreover, present arrangements for history education do not build skills 
conducive to reconciliation and peace-building: they do not promote empathy 
and affection,840 convey multiple perspectives, or encourage acceptance that 
‘you will never be able to convert everyone to your beliefs’.841  Instead, 
Bashshour warns that history education furthers ‘a culture of memory [which] 
is very likely [a] breeding ground for submission and dependence’.842  
4.2.4 Fragmented Pasts 
In 1996 Abu Assali explained to a journalist that Lebanon had survived the 
war but ‘we are now in the [intensive] care unit’.  He argued that, rather than 
curing Lebanon, an injection of historical reality ‘may kill the patient’.843  In 
2014, the Lebanese patient is still waiting for an injection of historical reality.  
This is partly because, according to a CERD senior officer, policymakers 
missed the political honeymoon of the early 1990s, which provided a window 
of opportunity for the formulation of unified history textbooks.844  Hereafter, 
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the politicisation of debates over the history curriculum has exacerbated a 
wider tendency to disregard previous achievements in educational reform.845   
But the stalemate over formulation of a unified history curriculum signals 
wider conflicts over Lebanon’s history and over the origins of its 
consociation.846  Debates over the history curriculum mirror shifting political 
cleavages: in 2001, controversies focused on the familiar disagreement over 
the Arab or Lebanese roots of identity, reflecting the Muslim-Christian divide 
during the civil war.  Mirroring the political polarisation between the March 14 
and March 8 coalitions after 2008, recent debates about the history curricula 
have focused on the relative importance of the March 14 resistance to Syrian 
occupation as compared to Hizbollah resistance to Israeli occupation.  Thus, 
Yahya argues that by delaying the formulation of a unified history curriculum 
‘it’s almost as if we wanted to apply to history the amnesty laws that we 
applied after the civil war’.847  As an amnesty, silence over Lebanon’s recent 
history may help protect the integrity and stability of the political system, 
whose elites represent the groups involved in past violence.848  Current 
arrangements for history education certainly help the internal cohesion of 
Lebanon’s confessional and political communities: in 2009 most parties 
employed ‘selective memory of the war’ for political campaigns.849  
Moreover, Beydoun argues that attempts to create a unified history textbook 
exemplify the Lebanese state’s weakness, and the desire to ‘solve the 
problem once and for all because at the end of the day the state is in control 
of nothing’.850  Akar admits that ‘we’re never going to agree on a history’ and 
suggests that a single narrative history textbook may undermine the very 
historical skills which contribute to reconciliation and peace building.851  It 
would present a questionable account of the past and ‘teach the Lebanese 
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how to lie’, without even promoting individual or group self-esteem. 852  
Indeed, it may be time to recognise that Taif, rather than a detailed plan for 
education reform, ‘was [simply] a political text’,853 reflecting the balance of 
power among Lebanon’s communities at the end of the civil war and long-
standing Muslim insistence on employing schools as instruments of nation-
state building.  A move away from the ‘best story’ approach to history 
education would open new avenues for the Lebanese history curriculum: for 
example, teaching could be based on historical sources, on the presentation 
of the pasts of Lebanon’s many communities, and on the offer of ‘even 
opposing narratives of the same past event’, encouraging ‘students to 
gravitate toward their own version’. 854   Curiously, this is precisely the 
approach adopted in Northern Ireland. 
4.3 Northern Ireland  
As in Lebanon, there is no consensus in Northern Ireland over the past: the 
Unionist/Protestant and Nationalist/Catholic communities disagree on the 
roots of the Troubles, the most formative events of the past and the portrayal 
of historical figures.855   Until the 1990s, history education reflected this 
divergence.  As Chapter 3 explained, controlled schools (catering 
predominantly for Unionist/Protestant children) endorsed a British 
perspective on history and taught little or no Irish history:856  as a CCMS 
officer put it, ‘denying access to Irish history [was] a means of consolidating 
[children’s] Britishness’. 857   Conversely, Catholic maintained schools 
emphasised the historical connections to the Republic of Ireland, thus 
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strengthening the identity of ‘Catholic people [who] strongly identified 
themselves as Irish people’.858   
This is why the publication of a statutory core history curriculum in 1990 
appeared as a ‘little miracle’.859  First, the new curriculum bridged the gap 
between the histories taught in controlled and Catholic maintained schools, 
by imposing more focus on Irish history.860  Moreover, in an attempt to further 
overarching European identifications, most topics were presented through 
three geographical prisms: that of the island of Ireland, that of the British 
Isles, and that of Europe. 861   Second, the 1990 curriculum abandoned 
previous narrative, ‘best story’ approaches to history education and adopted 
multiperspectivity and a skills-based disciplinary approach.  Hereafter, history 
education aimed to present and legitimise different perspectives, promote 
individual and collective self-esteem and confidence, further empathy and 
understanding of different views and tackle controversial issues and events 
related to the conflict.862  
Indeed, Kitson observed that both the curriculum and the textbooks available 
for history were so balanced as to be ‘almost apolitical’.863  By focusing on 
social and material life, history education circumvented political divisions and 
avoided debates over controversial historical personalities.864   
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However, the long-term social impact of the new curriculum was criticised on 
three grounds.  First, a history education that overlooks individual agency 
may convey a nihilistic view of the past to children. 865   Second, the 
curriculum’s lack of narrative accounts of the past and of explicit links 
between the past and the present and its ‘aversion to national history fails to 
provide students with the one thing they may need most – a sense of shared 
identity’. 866   This might make teenagers vulnerable to the politicised 
narratives they encounter in their family or community.  Indeed, confirming 
Seixas’ hypothesis,867 research in Northern Ireland found that students often 
employ the factual information provided by history education to support their 
communal and partisan narratives, especially in Key Stage (KS) 3 and 4.868  
Because they see school history as unbiased, students draw from the 
curriculum to ‘support their developing identities’ and to inform views 
acquired outside class.869  
Third, Barton and McCully found that the curriculum provided more sources 
of identification and empathy for children of Unionist/Protestant background 
than for those of Nationalist/Catholic background.  They even proposed that 
‘a balanced and neutral course of study standardised for the whole region 
may not be up to the task of dealing with the emotionally charged uses of 
history in Northern Ireland’.870  These three criticisms informed the curricular 
revision announced in 1999. 
4.3.1 The 2005 Curriculum and its Weaknesses 
The curricular reform initiated in 1999 aimed to ‘cherish diversity, understand 
diversity and regard it as being a good thing rather than try and make 
everybody the same’.871  At primary level, history is studied through the 
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subject The World Around Us (including also science and geography).872  It 
aims to develop familiarity with historical sources, ability to identify different 
time periods and an understanding of historical change and knowledge of 
some historical figures.873  The 2005 curriculum does not prescribe how 
much time and emphasis should be devoted to history and does not 
prescribe topics or study units, but schools are expected to offer a ‘broad and 
balanced curriculum’.874  At post-primary level, history is generally studied as 
a freestanding subject.875  KS3 requires students to ‘investigate the long and 
short term causes and consequences of the partition of Ireland and how it 
has influenced Northern Ireland today’, 876  while KS4 offers the choice 
between studying ‘Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland’ in 1932-1949 or in 
1965-1985.877   Like its predecessor, the 2005 curriculum aims to foster 
multiperspectivity, enquiry, problem-solving and the ‘ability to challenge 
stereotypical, biased or distorted viewpoints with appropriately sensitive, 
informed and balanced responses’.878   
The 2005 curriculum is often presented as a model for other societies 
emerging from conflict, for two key reasons.879  First, whilst the curriculum ‘is 
not a free for all’, it is flexible enough to allow schools to focus on a local 
history which ‘connects them to their community’.  At primary level, the 
Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) provides 
support materials, but principals are allowed to frame a curriculum relevant to 
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pupils’ lives, including for example the history of local sites.880  Second, the 
Northern Ireland history curriculum adopts a disciplinary and multiperspective 
approach.  It expects children to ‘be critical’ and ‘come to their conclusions’ 
based on evidence, and encourages teachers to deal with diversity and 
address the recent past.881  To this end, CCEA produces a variety of support 
materials to help teachers tackle challenging issues.882  The curriculum offers 
many opportunities to challenge misconceptions and misperceptions of 
history, for example by pointing out that about a quarter of the men who 
enlisted in World War I from Ulster were Catholics,883 or that William of 
Orange’s army was multireligious and multicultural.884   
However, the implementation of the 2005 statutory curriculum for history 
education in Northern Ireland is still criticised. Like its predecessor, the 2005 
curriculum can appear aspirational in its ambition to employ history education 
to tackle societal attitudes and inter-communal prejudice.  In fact, in 2012 
only about 4.5 percent of pupils in Northern Ireland chose history as a 
subject at KS4, so a minuscule minority of students learned about post-1922 
history and the Troubles in school.885  Yet children are surrounded by the 
physical and ritual remains of the conflict, and often know their meaning only 
‘if they have some personal connection with it, and they are much more likely 
to remember the atrocities committed by the other side’.886  Additionally, 
despite findings to the contrary, 887  many teachers argue that student 
attitudes reflect the political background of their family and cannot be altered 
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in school.888  Thus, teachers often sidestep controversial issues to avoid 
offending students and some schools even avoid teaching modules on 
Northern Ireland at KS3 and KS4 as ‘it entails a study of the “isms” of 
Northern Ireland’s political parties’.889  As a consequence, many observers 
assume that history education does not tackle Northern Ireland’s 
controversial past and that this partly explains why teenagers have a 
distorted understanding of the conflict.890  Indeed, as recently as 2009, Magill 
et.al. found that many teenagers thought that the Troubles were about 
religion.891   
The 2005 curriculum has also been criticised on pedagogical grounds.  In 
particular, its focus on static units of study at primary level and its lack of 
explicit connections to the present may hamper children’s understanding of 
change, and of the relationship between the past and the present.892  It may 
also encourage students to draw selectively from the curriculum to support 
their developing political perspectives.893  Finally, the lack of an overarching 
historical narrative in the curriculum allows the persistence of different 
interpretations of the past between students belonging to different 
communities.894  Thus, Bell et.al. found that, depending on their background, 
some students described partition as ‘England separating from Ireland’, 
others as ‘Northern Ireland getting independence’ and others as ‘Ireland 
breaking with Britain’.895   
Some students even argue that controlled schools still avoid Nationalist 
perspectives of the past and vice versa, and that history classes can be 
arenas for the expression of prejudices and verbal attacks against ‘the other 
side’. 896   Certainly, the separation of pupils of different denominational, 
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political and national backgrounds into different schools makes it hard to 
employ history to challenge prejudices and communal narratives of the past.  
In contrast, teachers in integrated schools maintain that the mixed 
background of their students facilitates discussion, furthers debate over 
controversial issues and leads to drawing connections between the past and 
present.897  Thus, initiatives for shared education, discussed in Chapter 7, 
may impact positively on history teaching. 
4.3.2 An Escapable Connection? 
Surveys in Northern Ireland found that students regard school as an 
important, if not the most important, source of information about history.898  
However, this section has shown that the impact of Northern Ireland’s history 
curriculum upon children’s political, communal and national identities remains 
unclear and that debates continue over whether history education is 
‘stemming the tide’ of extremism or providing ammunition for it.899   
This is because, in contrast to the ‘best story’ approach adopted in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland’s history curriculum does not aim to endorse or supplant 
Unionist/Protestant and Nationalist/Catholic interpretations of the past.  
Rather, it suggests that ‘the connection between history and national identity 
is not an inescapable one’.900  The 1990 and 2005 history curricula attempt to 
circumvent the thorny issue of national identity by focusing on the 
development of historical skills, critical thinking and multiperspectivity.  These 
skills are instrumental to mutual understanding, tolerance and even 
reconciliation in post-conflict societies.901   
A comparison with Lebanon confirms that a skills-based history curriculum is 
more likely to contribute to mutual understanding and reconciliation than a 
‘best story’ approach, embodied in Lebanon’s controversial curricula of 2001 
and 2011.  This may be due to the lack of consensus over the end of conflict 
in both societies: Magill et al. found that in Northern Ireland many 
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respondents born in the 1990s thought that the Troubles had not ended in 
1998.902  Barton predicts the failure of a ‘best story’ approach to history 
education in a deeply divided society where communities have ‘diametrically 
opposed interpretations’ of the past, which ‘continue to be the source of 
political controversy and even violence’.903   
4.4 Macedonia  
Rather than attempting to deconstruct the relationship between history and 
national identity, the Yugoslav state employed history education for nation-
state building in the Republic of Macedonia.  Similarly, the newly 
independent Macedonian state, under the strategic and diplomatic pressures 
of the 1990s, attempted to employ history to legitimise its sovereignty and 
independence, and even prove the existence of a distinct ethnic Macedonian 
people.  This task proved arduous in a multiethnic, multilinguistic and 
mutlireligious country, whose past events are interpreted differently by the 
different ethnic communities, and whose historical heroes are ‘claimed’ by 
Greece and Bulgaria as their national heroes.904  
The first post-independence curriculum aimed at building a national identity 
founded on Slavism: it presented the past as the linear ‘story’ of the 
emergence of ‘state institutions and symbols’ associated with the ethnic 
Macedonian community.905   Textbooks were drafted and published by a 
government commission, but a local historian argues they mainly contained 
‘recycled history lessons’, drawn from previous curricula. 906   Moreover, 
Jordanovski found that the textbooks implanted ‘retrospective national 
feelings and strivings’ on the inhabitants of the territory of present-day 
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Macedonia907 and Koren found that ‘contemporary borders [were] projected 
on earlier periods’. 908   Thus, Macedonia was presented as unified and 
ethnically homogeneous throughout history: textbooks ignored that the Turks 
were a majority of its inhabitants during the Ottoman empire, and that Muslim 
Albanians have long inhabited the territory of present-day Macedonia.909  
They focused on the history of Greater Macedonia, emphasised the territorial 
losses from every military conflict and traced the fate of ethnic Macedonians 
in neighbouring states.910  They portrayed positively institutions and events 
conducive to the foundation of an independent Macedonian state, such as 
the creation of the Macedonian Republic as part of Yugoslavia and the 
creation of an independent Macedonian Orthodox Church.911  Finally, the 
curriculum sidelined those facts that deviated from a linear narrative of the 
past culminating in Macedonian statehood, such as the violent implosion of 
Yugoslavia and the history of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia.912  Most of 
these criticisms of the 1992 curriculum and textbooks are actually wider 
critiques of a ‘best story’ approach to history education and to the use of the 
past to foster the construction of a nation-state. 
4.4.1 A Proportional Curriculum 
In contrast to the Taif Agreement, Macedonia’s Ohrid Agreement impacted 
history education indirectly.  An Albanian historian explained that with the 
expansion of education in the language of ethnic communities ‘it was logical 
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to have something about their culture and history’ in the curricula.913  Thus, 
rather than simply recycling old content, the education minister convened a 
group of experts to fully revise the history curriculum.914   
The 10-member curriculum drafting committee included educational 
specialists, university experts (including four Albanian-speaking academics) 
and representatives of the main political parties.915  Rapidly, controversy 
ensued on the number of lessons to be devoted to the history of ethnic 
Macedonians and of ethnic Albanians in the history curricula.916   Thus, 
Mladenovski summarises the process of curriculum drafting as a protracted 
negotiation over the percentage of the contents devoted to each community, 
a game of ‘give us 20 percent [of the curriculum], we’ll give you 30 percent 
[of the curriculum]’.917  Ultimately, ethnic Albanian members of the curriculum 
drafting committee approved a new curriculum only because, for the first 
time, it provided for lessons on the history of ethnic Albanians for students in 
Macedonian-, Turkish- and Serbian-language classes.918   
The new history curriculum was introduced in primary schools and in 
academic secondary schools in 2005.919   History is part of Nature and 
Society up to the fifth grade of primary school, and is taught as an 
independent subject from sixth grade upwards for 80 minutes a week (two 
periods) in academic secondary schools.920  The 2005 curriculum is highly 
prescriptive: it includes the title, aims and contents of every lesson but the 
topics are often disjointed.921  Compared to its predecessor, it includes more 
lessons about non-majority ethno-linguistic communities.922  However, most 
of the curriculum focuses on ‘national history’, meaning the history of the 
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territory of historic Macedonia until its partition during the Balkan wars, and 
the history of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and its irredent lands in 
Greece and Bulgaria since 1913.923  Similarly to the Lebanese 1968-1970 
history curriculum, the Macedonian 2005 curriculum ends with Macedonia’s 
independence in 1991.924   
The new curriculum and the new history textbooks were criticised on 
pedagogical grounds in four respects.  First, the History Teachers’ 
Association of Macedonia complained that the curriculum was drafted behind 
closed doors, without involving primary and secondary school teachers.925  
As a consequence, the language and activities prescribed are often too 
complex for students and generally require some prior knowledge of 
historical events.926  Second, the curricula paid little attention to historical 
skills such as analysis of primary sources, critical thinking, identification of 
the causes and consequences of events, interpretation of change and 
continuity and development of empathy.927  Third, history teachers were not 
offered training, despite the introduction of new contents on ethnic Albanian 
history in 2005.  Thus, the ‘safest way to survive’ in classes of up to 40 pupils 
remained a knowledge-based, mnemonic and chronological approach to 
history teaching, fully reliant on the textbook.928   
Finally, the new history textbooks contained major factual mistakes.929  The 
inadequacy of teaching resources was exacerbated by teachers’ limited 
freedom of choice: since 2008 the state has published one history textbook 
for each language of instruction and distributed it for free in compulsory 
schools.930  The formal procedure for the adoption of the history textbook is 
unclear, and most institutions, including the Bureau of Educational 
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Development (BoE), deny any role in their drafting and revision. 931   It 
appears that the education minister issues calls for textbook proposals by 
independent groups of authors, evaluates them, and selects a proposal for 
each language of instruction.  Author groups then write textbooks in a very 
short time with very little monitoring. 932   Ethnic Albanian and ethnic 
Macedonian authors rarely cooperate in drafting books: different authors are 
tasked with the writing of the Albanian-language and of the Macedonian-
language textbook, as books written by Macedonians would be ‘set aside’ in 
Albanian language classes and vice versa.933   
Local and international observers criticised the potential social impact of the 
2005 history curriculum.  The proportional approach to curriculum writing, 
partially rooted in Yugoslav traditions, also reflects the political and 
administrative proportionality enshrined in the Ohrid agreement.  Thus, in 
Macedonia’s history curricula the amount of lessons devoted to each ethnic 
community is generally ‘based on [its] demographic scope’, with ethnic 
Albanians granted about 20 percent of lessons in the Macedonian-language 
history curriculum. 934   Curriculum-sharing according to proportional 
considerations generally satisfied the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic 
Albanians.935  Still, the Macedonian-language curriculum devotes only one 
lesson to the Vlachs and one to the Jews, but no lessons to the Roma, Turk 
and Serb communities. 936   By minimising the diversity of Macedonia’s 
population, some argue that history education undermines the self-esteem of 
children belonging to smaller minorities.937  Indeed, historian Boban Petrovski 
explains that Romas, because of their disadvantaged socio-economic status, 
‘are not in such a position that they can make demands’ on the history 
curriculum. 938   This suggests that, rather than simply reflecting the 
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demographic weight of a community, the history curriculum also mirrors and 
reproduces the power hierarchies among Macedonia’s ethno-linguistic 
communities.   
Furthermore, observing the lack of lessons about ethnic Turks in the history 
curriculum, Petrovski explains that Turks are expected to ‘identify’ with the 
history of the Ottoman Empire.939  The assumption that certain ethnic groups 
have an historical homeland outside the Macedonian territory also informs 
the Turkish- and Albanian-language curricula, which include more 
information about each community’s ‘country of origin’. 940   Rather than 
looking at ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, the Albanian-language curricula 
focus on the history of ‘Albanian lands’ (primarily Albania and Kosovo).941  
This backs Mladenovski’s view that the history curricula portray ethnic 
Albanians and ethnic Macedonians as if ‘we were talking about two separate 
states’ and substantiates an international observer’s warning that history 
books seem to teach that ‘this country is monoethnic’. 942   Indeed, the 
curricula and textbooks do not present past events as common to all the 
communities in Macedonia and often ignore local history.943  For example, 
the curriculum contains a lesson about the Macedonians during World War I 
and a separate one about the Albanians.944   
Thus, history education does not address the entangled history of 
Macedonia’s mixed populations, and presents the pasts of local ethnic 
communities as fully separate.945   In fact, the 2005 curriculum explicitly 
allows teachers to sidestep Macedonia’s diversity: out of 48 lessons, 
teachers only have to teach 36 of their choice, making 25 percent of the 
curriculum optional.946  Because of the limited number of lessons on non-
ethnic Macedonian communities, the choice to teach about them is up to 
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individual teachers.947  Macedonian teachers can avoid teaching Albanian 
history, while Albanian teachers can focus primarily on ‘ethnic Albanian 
history’.948  No state exam or central monitoring system exists to prevent 
children being taught the unchallenged historical narratives of Macedonia’s 
two largest ethno-linguistic communities.949  
Indeed, local observers warn that schools may be creating and reproducing 
two parallel and mutually exclusive histories for these two communities.950  In 
Macedonian-language textbooks, national history is generally the history of 
the ethnic Macedonian community, mobilised to convey a glorified and 
mythical (if often factually debatable) past.951  It helps define the roots of the 
Macedonian people, project them onto the past, and establish ownership of 
Macedonia’s territory. 952   Despite recent improvements, some Albanian 
activists also argue that Macedonian-language textbooks still contain false 
information and biased and discriminatory attitudes towards local minorities 
and bordering countries.953  For example, Xabir Deralla mentioned that all 
Albanians are presented as fascists in the lessons on World War II.954  For 
their part, Albanian-language curricula contain very little Macedonian history, 
and even less about the Albanian community in Macedonia.955  If Albanian-
language textbooks are less derogatory than the Macedonian-language 
ones, it is probably because they need to be approved by the ethnic 
Macedonian education minister before being distributed.956  Similarly to the 
Macedonian-language curriculum, the Albanian-language curriculum conveys 
a sense of victimhood and immemorial ownership of the Macedonian 
territory, delegitimising visions for a common, interdependent future.957  In 
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sum, through two parallel ‘best stories’, history education in Macedonia’s 
state schools helps consolidate the internal cohesion of the ethnic Albanian 
and ethnic Macedonian communities.958  
4.4.2 We are not Touching History 
In 2008, the Ministry of Education initiated a revision of all curricula in an 
attempt to update them and to introduce more ‘multicultural’ contents.959  
However, as one of the participants of the revision put it, ‘when it came to the 
history curriculum, [the government] said we are not touching this because it 
is a political decision’.960  
In fact, a special committee was formed to produce a revised history 
curriculum.961  It finalised the new curriculum for sixth grade which, mirroring 
evolving ethnic Macedonian narratives of identity, focused more than its 
predecessor on ancient myths and heroes (particularly the figure of 
Alexander the Great).962  Albanian historians complained that emphasis on 
antiquity has come at the expense of Albanian history963 and that history 
education was being used to sanction ethnic Macedonian ownership of the 
state.  Additionally, Greek and Bulgarian historians questioned the veracity of 
facts and interpretations in the new curriculum.964  Debates reached the 
European Parliament, where Bulgarian ambassador Dimitar Tsanchev 
threatened to block Macedonia’s EU accession and warned that if 
Macedonians ‘continue peering into the past, the sole historical fact they will 
find will be the Bulgarian identity of their Slavic population’.965  
Moreover, the curriculum drafting committee failed to produce new history 
curricula for grades 7 to 9 because of ‘some misunderstanding between 
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communities’.966  In particular, some argue that new drafts of the curriculum 
described Albanians as ‘mountain people’ thus inflaming ethnic Albanian 
media, public opinion and politicians.967  Others maintain the committee split 
over the number of lessons on Albanian history in the new curriculum.968  
The BoE declines knowledge of and responsibility for the process.  However, 
it is credible that the process broke down over the attempt to once again 
apply (political and demographic) proportionality to curriculum writing.  As of 
2013, teachers were still employing the 2005 curricula and making use of 
curricular provisions to avoid teaching 25 percent of the lessons.969   
Lazarevska argues that, because of Macedonia’s political and strategic 
instability, ‘it will never be a good enough time’ for a full revision of the history 
curricula.970  In Macedonia’s consociation, the present history curricula serve 
an important political function: they contribute to cement and delimit the 
ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian communities by reproducing their 
parallel ‘best stories’.  History education provides a glorious past for ethnic 
Macedonians, it proves their ownership of the Macedonian territory and 
legitimises Macedonia’s statehood and independence.971  It also entrenches 
the image of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians as each others’ 
victims and rivals: as an international officer notes, children ‘do not have a 
curriculum that tells them you live in a culturally and ethnically diverse 
country, embrace it, in fact, they’re telling them the opposite’.972  Ultimately, 
calls for ‘more emphasis on a history that unites’, rather than parallel 
communal narratives, have long fallen on deaf ears. As in Lebanon, in 
Macedonia the reform of history education is politicised but also marginal in 
political priorities.973   
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4.5 Conclusion  
Marthoz argues that ‘if geography provides an excuse to make war, history’s 
role is to prepare and justify it’.974  This also applies to peace.  Yet, this 
chapter demonstrates that the reform of history education is rarely a political 
and financial priority for post-war governments.   
This chapter has compared initiatives to reform history education in 
consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  It shows first that 
it is difficult to determine whether curricular reforms promote or just reflect 
conflict transformation and reconciliation.  Höpken’s suggestion that 
textbooks promoting reconciliation can only be produced once conflict has 
ended exemplifies this chicken-and-egg problem. 975   This vicious circle 
affects deeply divided societies such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, where there is no consensus over whether conflicts have ended.  
In fact, their consociational political systems are premised on the 
management rather than the resolution of violent inter-group conflicts.   
This chapter confirms that ‘if the political conflict is not resolved, it is 
impossible to elaborate’ an ‘institutionally legitimised version of what took 
place’.976   This explains why schools in Macedonia and Lebanon reach ‘the 
end of history’ before their respective conflicts.  It also suggests that 
Macedonia’s emphasis on nation-building through the history curricula is 
detrimental to mutual trust and reconciliation among the local ethno-linguistic 
communities.  Similarly, the obstinate attempt to formulate a unified history 
curriculum in Lebanon has, if anything, further polarised opinions over the 
past.  In both societies, historical narratives are easily mobilised by political 
and communal elites in the context of pervasive insecurity, fear of state 
collapse and relapse into violence. 977   In contrast, Northern Ireland’s 
experiment in decoupling history and national identity through a skills-based 
approach to history education has allowed the formulation of modules on the 
Troubles.  However, Northern Ireland’s approach also highlights the 
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challenges in promoting political stability in the absence of overarching 
narratives of the past, and confirms that a multiperspective history can be 
taught in schools only if political elites (and the communities they represent) 
endow alternative narratives of the past with a modicum of legitimacy.   
Moreover, debates over history education in these three deeply divided 
societies reveal a lack of consensus over the political function of history 
education.  On the one hand, history is expected to promote unity and social 
cohesion among citizens belonging to different ethnic, confessional, linguistic 
and political communities.  On the other hand, it is expected to further 
reconciliation by reflecting, acknowledging and valuing the specific narratives 
of each community.  Thus, this chapter demonstrates that initiatives for the 
reform of history education fail when they contradict the principles of 
pluralism and parity of esteem.  The failure to produce a unified textbook 
presenting a narrative, homogeneous history of Lebanon is an obvious 
example.  This chapter also shows that reforms take hold when they reflect 
and reproduce the socio-political building blocks of the three consociations 
by accommodating different narratives of the past (in Northern Ireland) or 
applying consociational expedients to curriculum drafting (as with 
Macedonia’s proportional curriculum).   
Finally, this chapter confirms that history education in consociational 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia does not challenge the 
socialisation of children into separate and potentially antagonistic narratives 
of the past.  Divergent histories are associated with the ethnic, confessional 
and national communities that participated in violent conflict and now share 
political power.  This consolidates the communities on which consociational 
politics is founded and legitimises, or at least does not challenge, the 
authority of those political leaders who participated in war.  Thus, history 
education may help stabilise the consociational political system in the short 




5 Formulating Citizenship Education  
Shared values and beliefs transcending identification with ethnic, 
confessional or national groups help states further social cohesion and 
political stability.978  Political stability, particularly in democratic societies, also 
depends on the active engagement and support of individuals, attainable 
only when individuals feel represented in (and by) state institutions.979  Thus, 
the teaching of citizenship education may contribute to political stability by 
conveying overarching values and beliefs, preparing children for ‘their roles 
and responsibilities as citizens’, and establishing a direct relationship 
between the state and its citizens.980   
However, in deeply divided societies, the roles and responsibilities of good 
citizens and the legitimacy of the state are contested.  Even the definition of 
citizenship is problematic when religious, ethnic or national groups mediate 
the relationship between the state and its citizens and, as in Lebanon, 
citizenship becomes ‘hyphenated’.981  This complicates the formulation of 
curricula for citizenship education in consociations.  After surveying the 
available theories on citizenship education in deeply divided societies, this 
chapter will trace the initiatives to reform citizenship education after the three 
peace agreements in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.   
5.1 Citizenship Education in Deeply Divided Societies: 
Theoretical Debates 
Osler and Starkey argue that in democracies citizenship is composed of 
three essential and complementary elements: status, feelings and 
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practice.982   Citizen status encompasses legal nationality: this may reflect 
biological heritage and the subordination of certain racial, gender and class 
groups.983  Citizenship practices are the skills and behaviours deriving from 
democratic and human rights values.984  Feelings of citizenship are part and 
parcel of identity but also depend on the inclusiveness of society and on its 
specific expressions of nationalism.985   
Leenders and Veugelers observe that ‘different citizenship concepts appear 
to be related to different pedagogical aims’ of citizenship education, as 
identified on a spectrum between minimal and maximal citizenship 
education.986  David Kerr shows that minimal citizenship education (or civic 
education) promotes a narrow definition of citizenship, often supports the 
exclusive interests of some groups, employs didactic teaching and focuses 
on knowledge acquisition. 987   It focuses primarily on citizenship status, 
conveying the rights and duties of citizens within the predefined legal 
framework of the state, and concentrates on political and governmental 
institutions, mechanisms for decision-making and governance, and only 
occasionally information about human and individual rights.988   
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Leenders and Veugelers argue that minimal civic education assumes the 
homogeneity of the population and aims to transmit fixed values to children in 
an attempt to promote loyalty and obedience and ‘to help integrate a diverse 
population into a single national culture’.989  The promotion of minimal and 
contested notions of citizenship, the emphasis on assimilation rather than 
diversity, and the attempt to erode group attachments through loyalty to the 
state and the promotion of individual rights can exacerbate inter-group 
tensions, especially if dominant groups ‘subordinate the very aim of 
educating children as civic equals, to perpetuate their own power’.990  Indeed, 
defining citizenship in terms of loyalty to the state can exclude certain 
communities in deeply divided societies.991   
In contrast, maximal citizenship education (or citizenship education) defines 
citizenship broadly and inclusively, conveying the contents and knowledge 
components of civic education but also questioning the processes leading to 
the emergence of current definitions of citizenship.992  To cultivate citizenship 
status, maximal citizenship education provides knowledge about the political 
system and society.  To promote citizenship practices, it encourages 
involvement in civil society, and actions improving the local and wider 
community.  Finally, to stimulate feelings of citizenship, it fosters debate, 
investigation, critical thinking about inclusive notions of citizenship, ‘socially 
useful qualities’ and value dispositions.993  Tawil argues that ‘method and 
content in the area of values education are inseparable’, so maximal 
citizenship education requires participatory methods, critical thinking, open 
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communication and debate, independent learning and group-work.994  Above 
all, it requires the practicing of citizenship skills.995  
Maximal citizenship education aims to show that identities are ‘multiple, 
nested and overlapping’. 996   Rather than breaking the link between 
individuals and ethnic, religious or national groups, it strives to construct 
superordinate identities and transversal loyalties, reconciling citizenship, 
individual rights and group membership. 997   In this approach, pride in 
citizenship and commitment to the state can only be developed if students 
are proud of their ethnic, national or religious identity and if the state 
recognises and values each of its cultural communities.998  This is why, after 
a violent conflict, maximal citizenship education can act ‘as a positive 
transformative force, rather than a means for indoctrination’.999   
It is widely accepted that children can be introduced to the values and 
principles underpinning citizenship in primary school, but the best time for 
political socialisation and the tackling of issues related to conflicts is after 10-
11 years of age.1000  In schools, civic and citizenship education can be taught 
as a separate subject: this ensures teacher training, provides a protected 
environment to practice values and behaviours, and endows civic and 
citizenship education with a higher status (as do official exams). 1001  
Citizenship can also be ‘integrated’ into a social studies course, allowing 
students to extrapolate findings from other subjects.1002  Finally, citizenship 
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can be a cross-curricular theme: this encourages coordination across several 
subject areas and a ‘whole school’ approach to certain founding values and 
principles.  Yet, a cross-curricular approach tends to be fragmented and 
weak, and risks marginalising citizenship in favour of higher status 
subjects.1003   
Moreover, citizen status, practice and feelings are not only conveyed through 
the manifest curriculum: beyond content (the curriculum), Kerr points at the 
influence of culture (from societal norms and traditions to the professional 
culture of teachers) and climate (school ethos, opportunities to practice 
values and explore controversial issues). 1004   Building on these three 
categories, Shuayb found that Lebanese schools adopt one of five 
approaches to citizenship education.  The passive approach promotes a 
subject-approach to citizenship education, with few school activities and 
focusing on exam preparation.  The avoidance or apolitical approach 
attempts to depoliticise the school by banning debates over politics and 
current affairs, teaching citizenship education didactically, offering limited 
extracurricular activities, and physically separating students belonging to 
different communities.  The extracurricular approach relies on extracurricular 
activities to practice some citizenship skills, but rarely allows students to plan 
activities or reflect upon them.  The multidimensional/structured approach 
integrates citizenship education in every aspect of school life and 
organisation, encompassing the relationship with the wider community, a 
democratic management system, an inclusive admission and hiring policy, 
extensive social and civic activities, active student councils and critical 
classroom pedagogies.  Finally, the paradoxical approach emphasises active 
pedagogies, provides a voice for students and extracurricular activities, but it 
does so within the confines of one community.1005   
Shuayb found a correlation between schools’ approaches to citizenship 
education and students’ political attitudes: students in schools applying the 
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passive and apolitical approaches are more likely to express sectarian 
opinions and prefer the exclusive company of students and teachers from 
their own community, and less likely to trust people belonging to other 
communities.  Students in schools applying the multidimensional and 
extracurricular approaches are less likely to trust sectarian parties and are 
more reticent to join them, preferring voting as a form of social participation.  
In contrast, students in schools adopting the paradoxical and apolitical 
approaches tend to trust sectarian parties and aim to join them.1006  Thus, 
Shuayb suggests that, to promote social cohesion in Lebanon, schools 
should move from a subject-based approach to citizenship education to a 
more holistic and multidimensional approach.1007  Analysis of initiatives to 
reform citizenship education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
shows that the three societies are moving towards more maximal 
approaches to citizenship education. 
5.2 Lebanon  
The Taif Agreement demanded the unification of the curricula and textbooks 
for both history education and citizenship education to ‘help bring [students] 
together around the same sense of national and civic identity’.1008   
Civic education had been an instrument for nation-state building since 
Lebanese independence.  The 1946 and 1968 curricula unsuccessfully 
attempted to establish the primacy of national identity over confessional 
belonging, overlooking inter-communal cooperation and ignoring the tension 
between confessional allegiance, communal belonging and national 
identity. 1009   Curricular contents also mirrored evolving inter-communal 
relations: the 1946 curriculum emphasised a collective ‘Lebanese identity’ 
but its successor, reflecting the gradual redistribution of power from the 
Christian to the Muslim community after the 1958 civil war, favoured an 
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overarching ‘Arab identity’.1010  Moreover, in 1973 the Ministry of Education 
suspended the civic education exams due to the increasing ideological 
polarisation of students over pan-Arab allegiances.1011  After the exam was 
cancelled most schools stopped teaching civic education.1012   
After the civil war, CERD allocated 30 yearly hours to the teaching of civic 
education, and tasked the subject with ‘shap[ing] a new generation of 
informed and responsible citizens who can contribute to post-war social 
reconstruction’.1013  If history education was expected to ground Lebanese 
national identity in a consensual narrative of the past, citizenship education 
was to convey ‘common principles based on national feelings of freedom, 
respect for others’ opinions, forgiveness, openness, equality, understanding 
of democracy and the meaning of citizenship’.1014   
5.2.1 Citizenship and Civic Education  
Similarly to the history education working group, the curriculum drafting 
committee for citizenship education included seven representatives of 
different confessional and political groups, with the notable exception of 
Hizbollah, which refused to participate, in opposition to the very ‘notion of 
“secular civic values”’. 1015   During its works, CERD director Abu Assali 
insisted on decision-making by consensus and an emphasis on the core 
values and principles of the Taif agreement.1016   
In contrast to the stalemate over history education, CERD succeeded in 
producing a unified curriculum for citizenship and civic education, approved 
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and published in 1997.1017  Citizenship and civic education would be taught 
only in Arabic and would develop skills of criticism and debate, peaceful 
conflict resolution and tolerance, empathy for diversity, and participation in 
collective life.  It would nurture loyalty to ‘Lebanese identity, land and country’ 
and further ‘awareness’ of Arab identity and openness ‘to the whole 
world’.1018   
The unified Morals and Civic Education textbook was developed by an 
equally diverse working group and approved by the government before being 
published and distributed in 2000.1019  According to Frayha the textbook had 
‘more of an impact than curriculum objectives at school, since students and 
teachers deal with textbooks on a daily basis’.1020   
Most experts, including those who participated in the drafting process, assert 
that formulating a curriculum for civic education was easier than for history 
because it had ‘less stakeholder interest’, was completed during a ‘golden 
period’ of political consensus, and enshrined collective aspirations over how 
citizens should behave in the future.1021   Akar adds that the curriculum 
embodies and furthers the nationalist objective of shaping a ‘Lebanese and 
Arab citizen’ and of employing nationalism and national identity to promote 
social cohesion, transcending communal divisions. 1022   It grounds the 
concept of citizenship in the relationship between the state and individuals 
and furthers ‘unity’ on the basis of collective belonging to a ‘dual Lebanese-
Arab identity’.1023  Expectations to ‘enhance’ an ambiguously defined national 
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identity and further exclusive allegiance to the state overshadow the values 
of freedom, justice, tolerance, human rights, inter-civilisational dialogue and 
peaceful conflict resolution.1024  
Akar notes that, with some minor exceptions, the curriculum and textbooks 
approximate closely the ideal type of civic education in their focus on 
developing knowledge of local political institutions and of laws and rights 
essential to political participation.1025  Frayha agrees that the citizenship and 
civic education ‘curriculum [aims] for social and institutional education’ but 
argues that it can also be employed to stimulate debates on the operation of 
state institutions or on controversial themes such as the issue of Palestine 
and the resistance to Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. 1026   In 
contrast, Abu Assali insists that citizenship and civic education aims to 
convey important skills such as debate, dialogue and critical thinking through 
active learning methods.1027   
5.2.2 The Weaknesses of a Nationalist Civic Education 
Lebanon’s political instability since 2005 confirms that citizenship and civic 
education has not succeeded in wrestling citizen allegiance away from 
communities and towards the Lebanese state.  Surveys confirmed that most 
students trust religious institutions and sectarian political leaders above 
government and state institutions.1028  A senior officer at CERD argued that 
citizenship and civic education is ineffective because the curriculum is not 
fully applied in schools.1029  In fact, Akar and Shuayb question whether, even 
when fully applied, the 1997 curriculum can promote education for 
democratic and inclusive citizenship in Lebanon.  They point at curricular 
contents and pedagogical approaches to prove that the unified curriculum 
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and textbook contribute very little to social cohesion, and may even erode the 
maximal notions of citizenship held by some students, discouraging their 
participation in public life and further fragmenting the Lebanese 
population.1030   
This is because the contents of the textbook and curriculum are ‘too idealistic 
and unrealistic’ in contrast to daily reality in Lebanon.1031  A 2003 evaluation 
confirmed that the ‘aims for citizenship and social cohesion were part of a 
political agenda aimed at satisfying the conscience of the different sectarian 
and political parties’.1032  Thus, ironically, the curriculum does not promote 
awareness of the concept and contents of citizenship as a fundamental value 
and does not discuss citizenship until grade 6.1033  Even then, citizenship is 
narrowly defined as a legal relationship between the state and the individual, 
and textbooks further a rigid nationalistic notion of citizenship founded on a 
dual Lebanese-Arab identity at the expense of individual allegiance to 
confession and community.1034  This minimises opportunities to reflect on 
multiple and interacting identities and allegiances.1035   
Indeed, the curriculum overlooks concepts relevant to Lebanon, such as 
‘plural society’, meritocracy, sovereignty and ‘institutional independence’.1036  
For example, it discusses and advocates majoritarian democracy rather than 
examining Lebanon’s consociation, its proportional distribution of institutional 
positions and communal control of personal status laws: this prevents debate 
over the benefits and shortcomings of consociation.1037  Thus, the curriculum 
does not offer practical guidelines for constructive participation in Lebanese 
society and politics.1038  Adonis Accra suggests that this stems from a focus 
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on the principles embodied in the Taif agreement, including transition 
towards majoritarian democracy, rather than on those institutionalised in the 
Lebanese constitution.1039   
El-Amine reflects that in a deeply divided society, unified ‘textbooks cannot 
create unity’: rather, they create cognitive dissonance. 1040   Students 
passively memorise and repeat the Morals and Civic Education textbook but 
deem its contents hypocritical and irrelevant to their daily lives.1041   By 
embodying institutional hypocrisy the curriculum can even demotivate 
students from participating in Lebanese political life.1042   
Moreover, curricula and textbooks focus on individual duties and obligations 
to the state rather than on individual rights, and place the expectations of 
society above individual needs and desires.1043  Thus, surveys found that 
students see knowledge of laws as the primary aim of citizenship and civic 
education: this reflects emphasis on knowledge and obedience rather than 
analysis and participation in textbooks.1044   
Finally, Accra criticises curricular contents for focusing excessively on 
security rather than peace. 1045   As a consequence, students come to 
understand the characteristics of model citizens as abiding by laws and 
working towards national unity, but also fighting for the country and armed 
resistance.1046  The textbooks avoid the civil war but contain a chapter on 
Lebanon’s enemies (focusing on Israel) and on its friends (focusing on the 
Arab League).1047   
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The citizenship and civic education curricula are also criticised for being 
technically weak because of a ‘disarticulation in the process of writing’ them, 
which resulted in a disharmonious curriculum and ‘schizophrenic’ books.1048  
Thus, curriculum goals are inconsistent and do not match the contents of 
textbooks, and even the contents of textbooks lack coherence.1049  El-Amine 
reflects that he does not see how the textbooks can promote citizenship, but 
observes that they clearly promote a ‘general understanding that we have to 
avoid such terms, such ideas, [such] pictures’.1050  
Indeed, despite the consensus on a nationalist notion of citizenship, technical 
weaknesses in the curriculum and textbook blur teachers’ understanding of 
the skills associated with citizenship education.1051  In some extreme cases, 
this leads to schools only teaching citizenship and civic education in grades 9 
and 12, before state exams.1052  More frequently, teachers rely on frontal 
teaching of the overloaded curriculum in a hierarchical environment, and on 
memorisation and rote learning of the textbook.1053  They rarely promote 
active methods or extracurricular activities, and they avoid existing 
opportunities for debate, discussion, interaction and participation.1054  This 
does not stimulate the internalisation of values and principles, and limits the 
exploration, practicing and learning of active citizenship.1055   
Akar argues that the current pedagogical approach erodes rather than 
cultivates students’ engagement with society and their motivation to act in the 
public arena.1056  It may undermine the aims of the 1997 curriculum by 
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depriving students of opportunities for critical thinking and breeding obedient 
rather than active individuals.1057  Avoidance of current affairs, entrenchment 
of undemocratic practices and denial of opportunities for practicing 
citizenship may also hamper the development of a sense of belonging.1058  
This is particularly the case in the state sector because of the lower quality of 
teaching, because activities organised in public schools require direct CERD 
approval, and because of a diffused policy of ‘no politics on campus’.1059  
Indeed, some argue that citizenship and civic education is taught differently 
in schools because of the ‘sectarian split’.1060  However, Shuayb proves that 
the divide runs between public and private schools rather than along 
communal lines.1061  She finds that public schools provide a less favourable 
environment to foster citizenship among students: they tend to be 
undemocratic and hierarchical, lacking opportunities to express opinions and 
practice democratic decision-making for both students and teachers. In 
addition, principals are often affiliated to political parties and generally afraid 
of the political opinions of students.1062  Public schools with a uniform student 
population adopt a passive approach to citizenship education, underpinned 
by the assumption that ‘sects are naturally cohesive’.1063  Public schools that 
have experienced sectarian or political conflict tend to adopt an avoidance 
and apolitical approach, banning debate over political and current affairs, 
teaching citizenship education didactically, offering limited extracurricular 
activities and attempting to physically separate students according to their 
religious or political affiliation.1064  In contrast, private schools are more likely 
to adopt a multidimensional/structured approach to education for citizenship, 
including participatory management structures, democratic school 
environments, structured school/community relationships, inclusive student 
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admissions, analytical and critical pedagogy and extensive extracurricular 
activities. 1065   As mentioned, Shuayb found that school approaches to 
citizenship education are correlated with students’ political attitudes, and 
called for a ‘move from subject-based approach to a multi-dimensional 
one’.1066   
Increasing social tensions led the Lebanese government to formulate a 
comprehensive Education Sector Development Plan in 2010, which included 
a ‘new approach’ to citizenship education.1067  In the same year, the Ministry 
of Education proposed a draft law requiring ‘all students in public schools to 
sing the national anthem every Monday morning and to perform the national 
oath in the first hour of each school day’.1068  A comprehensive project for 
citizenship and civic education reform, funded by the EU, was launched in 
September 2012 and includes the evaluation of curricula and teaching 
resources, the training of teachers and administrators to implement active 
citizenship, and the development of democratic school communities.1069   
5.2.3 Moral Preaching 
To El-Amine, the limits of citizenship and civic education in Lebanon 
exemplify the fact that education cannot be expected to ‘direct[ly] impact on 
the society… in terms of value and political content’.1070  Indeed, most of the 
weaknesses of citizenship education in Lebanon can be traced back to the 
nationalistic and minimalist approach to the subject adopted in the curriculum 
and textbook.  The Taif agreement entrusted civic education with social 
cohesion and nurturing a sense of national belonging after the war.  It was to 
do so through a notion of national identity, displacing religious and political 
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allegiances.1071  This approach left no space for reflection on the multiplicity 
and layering of identities that characterises any plural society: citizenship and 
civic education ignored communal values and allegiances and did not 
question the power relations within and between different confessional and 
political communities.1072   
Thus, according to Frayha, CERD succeeded in formulating a unified 
citizenship and civic education curriculum because its contents were ‘mainly 
statements about laws, rhetoric and moral preaching’.1073  The divergence 
between curricular contents and the reality of Lebanese civic and political life 
undermined the internalisation of feelings of citizenship. 1074   Moreover, 
citizenship and civic education does not cultivate skills conducive to the 
building of a cohesive democratic state.1075  In particular, it does not provide 
space for debate or the formulation and conveying of shared, agreed values 
central to citizenship, despite the clear ‘potential danger in not having, at 
least, a common aim or universal principles for living together’.1076   
Ultimately, this analysis of citizenship and civic education confirms that in 
Lebanon, as in other Arab states, ‘the political commitment to produce 
independent, creative students has been weak for reasons of self-
preservation – doing so would produce citizens capable of challenging 
authority - be it political, religious or traditional’.1077  
5.3 Northern Ireland  
As in Lebanon, Wylie argues that in Northern Ireland, ‘political conflict over 
the very existence of the state makes citizenship education necessary but 
extremely difficult to implement’.1078   Indeed, Arlow recalls that after the 
Belfast Agreement, ‘society was challenged to define’ democracy and to 
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formulate ‘shared values capable of underpinning a sustainable peace.1079  In 
2005, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland pointed out that ‘retaining 
the “status quo” was not an option’ and a new Government Policy and 
Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland (A Shared 
Future) mapped the way to an ambiguously defined ‘normal, civic society’.1080  
The document reaffirmed the right to oppose societal integration and to 
assert communal identities, but also envisaged ‘a shared society in which 
people are encouraged to make choices in their lives that are not bound by 
historical divisions’.1081  
From this context emerged the first curricula for personal development and 
mutual understanding and for local and global citizenship.  Participants in its 
formulation recognised that ‘it would be naïve to think that changing 
curriculum is going to change an entire culture and generation’, but felt that 
they were contributing to the promotion of peace and social cohesion.1082  
After all, in an education system fragmented along communal lines, curricular 
reforms were one of the few instruments for ‘mak[ing] some difference’.1083   
5.3.1 Elusive Bird: EMU  
Local and global citizenship and personal development and mutual 
understanding were not the first initiatives aiming to foster peaceful 
coexistence and reconciliation through school curricula.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, in the 1980s DENI introduced and expanded Inter-School Contact 
Schemes. 1084   The 1989 ERO also established Education for Mutual 
Understanding (EMU) as a statutory cross-curricular theme in all grant-aided 
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schools.1085  EMU attempted to ‘steer clear of political indoctrination or social 
engineering’,1086 but promoted ‘self-respect and respect for others, and the 
improvement of relationships between people of differing cultural 
traditions’.1087  Its objectives included understanding conflict and appreciating 
interdependence: it focused on intercultural learning and on understanding 
the complex relationship between the two main confessional and national 
communities in Northern Ireland.1088   
According to Smith and Robinson, EMU succeeded in changing the dominant 
discourse in Northern Ireland and in introducing a language that ‘allows 
people to express their support for cultural pluralism and political dialogue 
rather than sectarianism and political violence’.1089  However, Wylie found 
that EMU was ‘treating the conflict as the by-product of individual prejudice 
and intolerance, rather than recognising it as a deep-seated communal 
conflict, essentially political in nature’.1090  As a consequence, EMU almost 
ignored human rights and political literacy and, in focusing on the two main 
communities, neglected other forms of prejudice, such as racism and 
homophobia.1091  
Moreover, initially EMU was accused of having a political agenda and of 
attempting to dilute cultural identities.1092  Arlow argues that ‘many found 
EMU to be an elusive bird’ underpinned by vague, general and aspirational 
values and objectives.1093   Indeed, the implementation of EMU as a cross-
curricular theme curbed its impact: schools often lacked a comprehensive 
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approach to EMU, associating it with discrete inter-school visits and pushing 
it to the margins of the curriculum, leading to fragmented experiences.1094  In 
an attempt to create ‘oases of peace’, some schools avoided controversial 
issues and a 2000 study found that only a third of students had discussed 
sectarianism in class.1095   
In the late 1990s, a DENI working group confirmed that the impact of EMU 
was undermined by its cross-curricular approach, the schools’ culture of 
avoidance and lack of teacher training.1096   The 1999 report Towards a 
Culture of Tolerance: Education for Diversity called for schools to promote 
the values of pluralism, social justice, human rights, and responsibility and 
democracy. 1097   In the same year, CCEA called for the introduction of 
modules in citizenship education to contribute to the peace process.1098  
5.3.2 Formulating and Implementing Personal Development and 
Mutual Understanding and Local and Global Citizenship 
A 2001 consultation report found only limited support for the introduction of 
citizenship education in Northern Ireland.1099  Educational practitioners also 
worried about the commitment of the controversial Sinn Féin Education 
Minister McGuinness ‘to support lessons in citizenship when they [Sinn Féin] 
were quite clear that … at that time they didn’t support the state’.1100  An 
officer involved in the debate over the introduction of citizenship education 
recalls that it was ‘an interesting discussion, but it wasn’t a difficult 
discussion’: there was a broad consensus on the need for students to 
understand their rights and responsibilities, to appreciate the issues dividing 
them and to respect different cultures and identifications.1101  In contrast to 
his outspoken position over the 11-plus test, Arlow recalls that McGuinness 
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avoided expressing explicit support for citizenship education: ‘he was 
perceptive enough to realise if Sinn Féin was seen to be pushing this, then it 
would just immediately get opposition from the Unionist parties’.1102   
Thus, compared to the introduction of EMU in the 1990s, the introduction of 
local and global citizenship at secondary level and of personal development 
and mutual understanding at primary level were ‘astonishingly 
uncontroversial’.1103  Arlow argues that the Belfast agreement established a 
new political context and stimulated a political will to enact change.1104  The 
introduction of citizenship education thus reflects both the genuine desire to 
contribute to the newly established peace and the political need, with 
exclusive local control of education policy for the first time since 1974, ‘to 
show that they really did address peace and social cohesion’.1105   
The local and global citizenship curriculum was based on models developed 
by the University of Ulster’s Social, Civic and Political Education Project and 
adapted according to the results of extensive consultations and piloting.1106  
To address the substantial criticism that there had not been enough training 
for EMU, approximately five teachers from each post-primary school were 
trained on local and global citizenship. 1107   Trainings for personal 
development and mutual understanding were also offered to primary school 
teachers.1108  During the piloting phase, the contents of the curriculum were 
criticised only once in a political forum and, despite the worries of teachers 
and educational authorities, there were no complaints from parents.1109  In 
fact, Arlow admits that ‘sometimes I wonder if actually we were pushing 
things far enough’.1110  
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Local and global citizenship recognises that the population of Northern 
Ireland may not have a ‘shared history, but we’ve got to have a shared future’ 
and that citizenship education may encourage students to contribute to the 
society they are part of. 1111   Personal development and mutual 
understanding and local and global citizenship were introduced in schools 
between 2003 and 2009.  Citizenship is also implemented through cross-
curricular themes, including EMU and the cross-subject aim of ‘developing 
pupils as contributors to society’.1112   
In the early curriculum drafting stages, the University of Ulster and CCEA 
had called for the allocation of dedicated time for local and global citizenship 
to ensure that it didn’t ‘fall between the stones’ as EMU had.1113   Ultimately, 
personal development and mutual understanding and local and global 
citizenship were introduced as statutory requirements, but their mode of 
delivery is not specified.1114  Thus, schools can allocate a specific period, 
embed them as modules within another subject (generally Learning for Life 
and Work at secondary level and The World around Us at primary level) or 
teach them as cross-curricular themes.1115  
At primary level, personal development and mutual understanding deals 
mainly with community relations and with the handling of conflicts. 1116  
Reflecting the developmental stage of children and their understanding of 
groups and individuals, it avoids abstract notions, focusing on identities, 
attachments and personal relationships.1117  At KS1, it introduces children to 
the local and wider community, discusses group similarities and differences, 
and relationships with family and friends, and debates appropriate behaviour 
in conflict situations.1118  At KS2 it discusses how to develop and nurture 
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relationships and debates human rights, social responsibilities and the many 
causes of conflict.1119  Some have suggested that this may put ‘sectarianism 
into children’s heads’, but teachers argue that controversial issues can be 
discussed with primary school children sensitively and focusing on children’s 
immediate experience.1120  
In contrast, local and global citizenship at post-primary level considers four 
themes: inclusion & diversity, human rights & responsibilities, equality & 
social cohesion and democracy & active participation. 1121   It aims to 
investigate each issue in the local, European and global context, in an effort 
to ‘avoid parochialism but maintain a local focus’.1122  It is flexible enough to 
allow students and teachers to explore their areas of interest, and to discuss 
the more legal and political aspects of citizenship only when they impact on 
individual rights and citizens’ interaction with institutions.1123  Local and global 
citizenship is to be process-oriented: the values underpinning it ‘cannot be 
taught, they must arise from experience’.1124   
At KS3, the minimum requirements of local and global citizenship are usually 
taught as part of the compulsory module Learning for Life and Work.1125  
They include analysis of expressions of group identities, the impact of conflict 
on prejudice and racism and ways to manage conflicts.1126  By encouraging 
students’ understanding of human rights values, equality and power 
relations, and teaching them how to influence their immediate environment, 
local and global citizenship aims to encourage the construction of 
superordinate overarching identities.1127  At KS4, in preparation for GCSEs, 
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Learning for Life and Work is neither a compulsory nor a popular subject and 
encompasses areas such as local and global citizenship but also 
employability and personal development.1128   
When compared to EMU, local and global citizenship is more structured, less 
focused on conflict and reconciliation, less concerned with national and 
cultural identities and more focused on ‘moving beyond the conflict… to 
active citizenship’.1129   In contrast to the Lebanese citizenship and civic 
education, it reminds students of the multiplicity and layering of identities, 
including global and European identifications.1130  Indeed, Northern Ireland’s 
curriculum drafters recognised that excessive emphasis on a common 
identity can be perceived as a threat to communal belonging.  In contrast to 
their Lebanese counterparts, they maintained that it was neither possible nor 
desirable to ‘draw up a specification for an ideal citizen and frame that as a 
curriculum objective’.1131  Thus, similarly to history education, local and global 
citizenship attempts to sidestep patriotism, national belonging and loyalty to 
the state, referring primarily to international human rights instruments.1132  
Citizenship is defined in terms of equal rights and responsibilities rather than 
religious, national or cultural identity.1133  
Curriculum drafters admitted that ‘it has yet to be tested whether a concept of 
citizenship based on equal rights and responsibilities can help transcend 
these deeper, emotionally based loyalties’, but they hoped to construct 
democracy as a viable alternative to violence.1134  Indeed, Arlow reflects that 
local and global citizenship was ‘a product of its time’: during the piloting 
phase, in the early years of the peace agreement, ‘it felt like nothing was 
fixed’.1135  Through local and global citizenship, students are encouraged to 
imagine ‘a perfect world’ and provided with instruments to ‘narrow the gap’ 
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between their ideals and reality.1136  Local and global citizenship aimed to 
move beyond politically correct answers and debate students’ sincere 
opinions, to employ critical thinking, access emotional dimensions, and 
deconstruct the culture of avoidance and silence.1137  Despite the limits of 
hierarchical school settings, students are to be trained for life in a non-violent 
democracy, for active participation and for activism on local issues.1138  It was 
also meant to add quality to initiatives for inter-communal contact.1139  In 
sum, local and global citizenship aimed ‘to be transformative without being 
prescriptive about the outcome’.1140   
5.3.3 Still ‘Patchy’: The Limits of Personal Development and Mutual 
Understanding and Local and Global Citizenship 
Despite their ambitious aims, personal development and mutual 
understanding and local and global citizenship did not have a decisive impact 
on the community relations approach of most schools.1141  This is mainly 
because of the failure to allocate specific curricular time for them.1142  Some 
argue that the primary and secondary curricula have been developed 
separately so there is no progression or consistency of approach.1143  Arlow 
notes that personal development and mutual understanding allows teachers 
to avoid key controversial issues, but local and global citizenship at KS4 is an 
assessment-based and traditional subject, ‘almost like a watered-down 
politics’ course.1144  Others call for more discussion of conflict resolution, 
reconciliation and peace in the context of Northern Ireland, for more analysis 
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of the ‘positive use of traditional politics’ to enact changes locally and focus 
on the development of alternative and cross-cutting identities.1145   
In fact, the concepts and values underpinning local and global citizenship 
and personal development and mutual understanding remain contentious: for 
example, each community tries to appropriate the language of human rights 
to its own ends.1146  Moreover, Niens and Reilly found that school ethos 
impacts on the delivery of the curriculum: focusing on the ‘global dimension’ 
of local and global citizenship, they suggest that maintained schools 
emphasise the global Catholic community and its missionary activities, 
integrated schools focus on diversity and mutual understanding within 
Northern Ireland, and controlled schools concentrate on international links 
and exchanges.1147  This reflects the reality of the separation of children from 
different backgrounds in schools, and may hamper the effectiveness of local 
and global citizenship.1148  As Chapters 3 and 7 explain, most schools in 
Northern Ireland are by default non-inclusive: they are generally imbued with 
the values, traditions and symbols associated to one community.1149  In this 
context, the concepts of democracy, social justice and universal human 
rights may appear remote and hypocritical.1150  
Finally, an expert observed that recent emphasis on literacy and STEM 
subjects has eroded the time devoted to subjects with a community relations 
component. 1151   Training for local and global citizenship and personal 
development and mutual understanding teachers has also diminished, but 
many teachers still struggle to understand key values and principles, from 
‘social cohesion’ to ‘human rights’. 1152   As a consequence, teaching is 
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‘patchy, in some schools it is excellent, and in others it is barely done at 
all’.1153   
More broadly, experts have noted that the ‘feeling that we have peace, [and] 
sectarianism is a thing of the past’ has weakened emphasis on citizenship 
education, mutual understanding and community relations work.1154  A 2008-
2009 DENI review found that community relations initiatives remain marginal 
to curricular and non-curricular activities, and that teachers struggle to 
embed them, tend to avoid them and to treat them superficially.1155  Thus, in 
2011 DENI initiated a Community Relations, Equality & Diversity Policy to 
coordinate initiatives associated to EMU, to the Cross-Community Contact 
Scheme, to youth organisations and to the formal school curriculum.1156  The 
Community Relations, Equality & Diversity Policy aims to introduce students 
to ‘others they perceive to be different’ and to support them in dealing with 
difference and appreciating diversity.  It is flexible enough to focus on a 
variety of issues, from bullying to flags and emblems, and aims to act as ‘a 
tray that holds everything together’.1157  
5.3.4 Transformative, not Prescriptive  
It remains difficult to estimate the long-term impact of citizenship education in 
Northern Ireland.  However, the existence of multi-layered and 
multidimensional policies, from Cross-Community Contact Schemes, to 
EMU, to the Community Relations, Equality & Diversity Policy is an 
impressive achievement. 
A CCEA officer reflected that the introduction of local and global citizenship 
‘slip[ped] by almost unnoticed’.1158  Indeed, local and global citizenship and 
personal development and mutual understanding could be introduced 
because they aim ‘to be transformative without being prescriptive about the 
outcome’.1159  In contrast to their Lebanese counterparts, curriculum drafters 
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in Northern Ireland did not aim to shape an ideal citizen, develop allegiance 
and loyalty to the state, or encourage patriotism and nationalism.  Rather 
than proposing overarching identifications to suppress communal 
allegiances, local and global citizenship and personal development and 
mutual understanding are, like the Belfast Agreement, underpinned by the 
principle of individual free choice between two equally legitimate and equally 
valued political, cultural and national traditions.1160   
Citizenship education in Northern Ireland does not offer a solution to the 
fundamental question of ‘whether “our common future” will be about 
“integration” and “shared development” or whether it will be about “peaceful 
coexistence” and “separate development”’.1161  Rather, it aims to encourage 
students to imagine a future society: to stimulate their independent reflection, 
analysis and questioning of dogmas.  Experts hope that, indirectly, this 
approach will contribute to fostering common belonging and a desire for 
shared future development.1162  
5.4 Macedonia  
In Macedonia the outlines of a debate over the status, practices and feelings 
associated with citizenship crystallized at independence, when ethnic 
Albanians boycotted the independence referendum and organised an 
alternative referendum on territorial autonomy.1163   For their part, ethnic 
Macedonians often assumed they could re-join Yugoslavia at a later 
stage.1164  
In 1998 the Ministry of Education created a commission to oversee and 
implement all activities related to civic education.1165  If ‘centralisation was a 
strong sign of distrust’ towards those domestic and international experts who 
had piloted previous civic education initiatives, it nonetheless ensured top-
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down introduction of civic education in schools.1166  Civic education was 
officially introduced in 1998, and mainstreamed in 2001-2002 as a separate 
subject in grades 7 and 8 of primary school and in all grades of secondary 
vocational schools and as ‘curriculum inserts’ in all grades of academic 
secondary schools.1167   
Trajkovski argues that ‘the [2001] war spoiled the very ideas of citizenship, 
diversity and human rights’.1168  The NLA’s appeal to human rights as the 
justification for its insurrection undermined inter-communal trust and 
stimulated a widespread ‘feeling that others [were] out to get them’.1169  The 
Ohrid agreement’s provisions for proportional allocation of positions in the 
public administration left ethnic Macedonians marginalised and embittered, 
and ethnic Albanians increasingly determined to redress past 
discrimination.1170  This further problematised the definition of citizenship and 
the articulation of the relationship between the state and individuals. 
5.4.1 Lost in the Curriculum: Civic Education 
When asked about civic education, local analysts and practitioners disagree 
not only on its quality and impact, but also on its very existence.  Some think 
that the government eliminated civic education classes when it introduced 
religious education in 2008, others that civic education is a cross-curricular 
theme, others argue that it exists but admit that it is ‘very experimental’ and 
its contents and aims are unclear. 1171   In fact, arrangements for civic 
education in Macedonia are quite complex.  According to curricular 
documents, it is taught as an independent subject for 36 periods per year in 
grades 8 and 9.  In the early years of primary school and in secondary 
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school, according to a senior officer of the BoE, it is implemented as a cross-
curricular theme.1172  
The civic education curriculum for grades 8 and 9 is very detailed, and lists 
activities and objectives for each lesson.  Petrova-Gjorjeva argues that civic 
education focuses on problem-solving and on instructing children on societal 
norms and values; it refers more to action than to abstract knowledge and 
‘reflects social expectations’.  She argues that through civic education ‘rules 
of living in a community are determined for young people’.1173   
Petrova-Gjorjeva’s observations contrast with the official contents of the 
curriculum, which emphasise active learning methods, debate and discussion 
of controversial issues, and current affairs.  Formally, the curriculum invites 
analysis and discussion of a variety of topics, from human rights and 
responsibilities to democracy, from the European Union to the responsibilities 
of institutions and authorities, from public participation to obedience to laws, 
from the constitution to the role of the media in society, from international 
humanitarian law to the resolution of conflicts ‘caused by cultural, ethical and 
religious differences’.1174  The curriculum aims to convey knowledge, respect 
and tolerance for the different communities in Macedonia, further respect for 
human rights and democracy, and to strengthen collective social and cultural 
identities.1175  
The objectives of citizenship and multiculturalism also infuse the curricula of 
other subjects at every level, particularly the national subjects. 1176   
Educational strategies and legal documents similarly reflect a desire to 
develop mutual understanding, tolerance and allegiance to the Macedonian 
state.  For example, the 2008 Law on Elementary Education calls for the 
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development of cooperation, respect for diversity, understanding of human 
rights and freedoms, awareness of belonging to the state and development 
of pupils’ identities and personalities. 1177   The Concept of Nine-Year 
Elementary Education also calls for focus on democracy and 
multiculturalism.1178  Thus, Lazarevska summarises that ‘on paper it looks 
like everything is fine’.1179  
However, Sabani reflects that civic education ‘got a bit lost in the 
curriculum’.1180  This is certainly the most substantial critique of citizenship 
education in Macedonian schools: because of the poor implementation of 
curricula and educational strategies,1181 as mentioned, many analysts and 
practitioners are not even aware of its existence as a subject.   
Sabani argues that ‘small changes’ are needed to ensure implementation of 
the civic education curriculum: long term funding, the production of specific 
and comprehensive teaching materials (Macedonia still lacks a 
comprehensive resource pack for civic education), and the revision of 
existing textbooks.  In fact, current textbooks may further prejudice by 
ignoring some ethnicities (generally the Roma) and portraying others 
negatively (particularly Albanians and Turks).1182  Textbooks often include 
mistakes such as the statement that every ethnic group in Macedonia has a 
state, or wrong depictions of flags, including the Macedonian flag.1183    
Moreover, Carta et al. call for teacher training as teachers frequently lack the 
skills and capacity to promote multiculturalism and equality in the 
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classroom.1184  A wider culture of avoidance and hypocrisy may discourage 
teacher engagement in discussions about peace and tolerance, 1185  but 
didactic, memory-based teaching also hampers the development of 
democratic and active citizenship.1186  In fact, the OSCE found that some 
teachers encourage prejudices with their derogatory comments about other 
ethnic groups.1187  Thus, the introduction of inspections of civic education 
may improve the quality and effectiveness of the subject.1188  
Finally, as in the case of Lebanon, in Macedonia the contents of the civic 
education curriculum may not be relevant to everyday life.  For example, in 
the context of increasing residential and educational separation, curricular 
emphasis on the multiethnic character of Macedonia is not accompanied by 
contact between children belonging to different communities or visits to 
‘places from other communities’.1189  Moreover, as in Lebanon, the grade 8 
curriculum presents majoritarian democracy but it does not discuss or even 
mention consociation. 1190   This may be because citizenship education 
projects have been often ‘imported’ from abroad rather than being developed 
in Macedonia, and because books are frequently translations of ‘American’ 
textbooks.1191   
Some argue that it is a deliberate political decision not to employ teachers, 
books and financial resources to encourage peaceful multiculturalism and 
inclusive citizenship through civic education in Macedonia. 1192   More 
probably, the weakness of civic education reflects a lack of local capacity as 
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well as wider disagreement over visions for Macedonia’s future: as Schenker 
puts it, when they look at the future, ‘Albanians see one thing, Macedonians 
see 13 other things’.1193   
5.4.2 The Strategy for Integrated Education 
In 2010, the Ministry of Education approved the Strategy for Integrated 
Education, which aimed at the ‘education of youth of all ethnic groups in a 
multiethnic environment for the preparation [for] life in a multiethnic 
society’.1194  The strategy (considered in more depth in Chapters 6 and 7) 
addressed most of the criticisms levelled at civic education.  To provide 
opportunities for children belonging to different ethno-linguistic backgrounds 
to mix in schools, it called for the mainstreaming of joint extracurricular 
activities and suggested running mixed classes for some subjects, such as 
sports, foreign languages, music and art education.1195  To strengthen the 
teaching of civic education, the strategy mapped extensive teacher training in 
active learning skills and methods and in ‘interethnic’ communication.1196  It 
also demanded the ‘cleaning’ of existing textbooks and curricula and the 
establishment of standards to avoid stereotyping and discrimination of ethnic 
and linguistic communities in future educational materials.1197  Finally, the 
strategy called for the introduction of civic education as a discrete subject in 
every year of primary and secondary school.1198   
The strategy was sidelined because of controversies over language rights 
and policies. 1199   However, UNICEF and the BoE examined existing 
textbooks and curricula and established guidelines and methods for the 
drafting of future books, with the hope that by 2015 all textbooks in 
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Macedonia will be evidence-based and include multicultural contents.1200  
Moreover, whilst civic education was not introduced in all grades of primary 
and secondary school, the BoE and UNICEF formulated the compulsory 
cross-curricular theme of Life-Skills Based Education for primary school.1201  
The theme includes interactive methods and activities and is very similar to 
personal development and mutual understanding in Northern Ireland in its 
focus on five themes: personal development, interpersonal relationships, 
social relations, health and the environment.  Themes deal with a variety of 
issues, from confidence building to expressing opinions, from dealing with 
emotions to conflict resolution, from hygiene to attitudes to the media.  Life-
Skills Based Education also envisages the ‘building [of] a positive attitude to 
the nation’.1202  
It is too soon to estimate the long-term impact of these initiatives. Some 
critics, observing the flurry of activity, argue that international donors are 
simply employing Macedonia as a laboratory for experimental education 
policies.1203   
5.4.3 Towards a Civic Culture 
In Macedonia, there is considerable debate over whether it is time to move 
‘beyond the Ohrid Framework Agreement’, but citizenship education is not 
employed to stimulate discussion about the future.1204   The attempts to 
reform aspects of schooling related to citizenship education highlight two 
tendencies in the Macedonian education system.  First, international actors 
such as the OSCE, EU and USAID often urge local policymakers to frame 
and implement initiatives for stereotype reduction, inter-group contact and 
reconciliation. This is often interpreted locally as a capricious foreign 
interference.1205  Donor strategies are often met with local bureaucratic and 
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political resistance and projects are rarely implemented or mainstreamed 
comprehensively.  Failures in reforming education are blamed on the fact 
that ‘education is politicised’ and that local politicians are unaccountable.1206  
Second, most observers would agree that ‘the situation is better than ten 
years ago’.1207  Yet, schools do not challenge the socialisation of children into 
the values and practices sustaining and reproducing inter-communal conflict.  
Above all, Georgieva notes that schools do not teach students that politicians 
who belong to different ethno-linguistic communities can represent them and 
protect their interests.1208  As such, rather than conveying an overarching 
civic culture, they contribute to cementing ethnic and political cleavages. 
5.5 Conclusion  
Analysis of citizenship education in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia substantiates Lynn Davies’ bitter observation that ‘the most 
important threats to our survival are war, disease and environmental 
degradation.  Yet, peace education, health education and ecology are not the 
top curriculum areas’.1209  No society puts citizenship education at the top of 
the educational agenda.  In fact, despite rhetorical emphasis on a values 
dimension in education, and on the need for development of citizenship 
skills, schools are not assessed on the quality of their citizenship education 
programmes or based on ‘the quality of the citizens they graduate’.1210  The 
recent introduction of the Community Relations, Equality & Diversity Policy in 
Northern Ireland may be an exception. 
Moreover, this chapter confirms Smith’s observation that ‘citizenship 
education is inextricably linked to the political milieu in which it is 
introduced’. 1211   More than with history education, the effectiveness of 
citizenship education depends on the structure of schools and on their 
hidden curriculum.  Schools have the potential to impact students’ attitudes, 
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allowing them to ‘model some of the democratic ideals’ and pluralist practices 
of consociations.1212  However, participatory methods, critical thinking and a 
culture of debate challenge the ingrained structures of schools, society and 
politics.  It also remains unclear how far schools can promote democracy 
through their hierarchical and undemocratic structures. 1213   In Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia, schools also struggle to promote inclusive 
citizenship within exclusive establishments separated along linguistic, 
confessional or national lines.1214  Thus, school exchanges across communal 
lines may help the internalisation and development of practices and feelings 
of citizenship.1215  
Finally, effective citizenship education also requires a minimal definition of 
the concept of citizenship.1216   This chapter has shown that the lack of 
consensus over national identity and the future of the state in deeply divided 
societies problematises this definition.  As with history education, reaching a 
consensus over citizenship in consociations is challenging because of the 
tension between the ‘diversity agenda’ and the ‘social inclusion’ agenda.1217  
Thus, in Lebanon, citizenship and civic education emerged as a vehicle to 
promote patriotism and a unified but ‘hyphenated’ Arab-Lebanese identity 
after the civil war.  Emphasis on individual human rights and unmitigated 
loyalty to the state contrasts with the social and political reality of ‘a country 
where people are captives of the religious sects to which they belong: they 
are born in their sect’s hospital, taught at their sect’s schools, given 
employment through the assistance of the sect’s leadership, and end up 
being buried in the sect’s cemetery’.1218  Akar shows that the ‘hypocritical’ 
curriculum discourages students from participating in transformative 
politics.1219   
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In contrast, citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Macedonia strives 
towards a more multidimensional approach to the construction of an 
inclusive, equal and diverse community.1220  This approach requires local 
involvement in formulating curricula, extensive teacher training, allocated 
curricular time and appropriate teaching materials.  Without these things, 
citizenship education gets pushed to the margins of the curriculum, as in 
Macedonia.  Moreover, attention to sub-national identities is often perceived 
to undermine allegiance to the state, so the ‘balance between the 
preservation of cultural identity and allegiance to a shared vision’ remains 
problematic.1221  English introduces a further dilemma when he points out 
that in Northern Ireland, equal legitimacy and recognition is granted to ‘a 
tradition whose instinct is to support and maintain the state and … to a 
tradition aiming at some form of dismemberment of the state’.1222    
However, Smith suggests that opportunities to question the values and 
principles at the heart of citizenship, publicly and legitimately, facilitate the 
formulation of inclusive notions of citizenship in deeply divided societies.1223  
In this sense, local and global citizenship in Northern Ireland may offer a 
substantial contribution to the formulation of a consensual notion of 
citizenship, by providing what Pinson calls a ‘discoursive space’ for the 
renegotiation and expression of the meanings and contents of identities and 
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6 Languages of Instruction 
De Varennes reflects that state-building theoretically allows for ‘differences of 
race and religion [to] be put aside in an attempt to be neutral’ but ‘it is 
impossible for a state to remain language neutral in its communication 
activities’.1225  Indeed, the construction of state institutions, especially if they 
are democratic, drives states to choose one or more official languages to 
communicate with their citizens.  Official languages are not necessarily the 
languages spoken by members of local confessional, ethnic and national 
communities.  However, the choice of languages is rarely politically neutral in 
deeply divided societies.  Here, schools can help construct and spread the 
official languages of the state, but can also contribute to preserving and 
reproducing the traditional vernaculars of local communities. 
This chapter considers debates over the choice of languages of instruction in 
compulsory schools in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia since their 
peace agreements.  It shows that these debates reflected the new inter-
communal power hierarchies emerging out of the three conflicts and 
enshrined in the new consociational arrangements.  These debates also 
mirror two important differences.  First, the three societies have different 
degrees of linguistic diversity: in Northern Ireland, the overwhelming majority 
of the population speaks English as a mother-tongue; in Lebanon, Arabic is 
the only official language but French and English are widely spoken; 
Macedonia is more diverse linguistically: Macedonian is the official language, 
Albanian is spoken by over 20 percent of the population, and smaller 
communities speak Turkish, Romani, Serbian, Bosniak and Vlach. 1226  
Second, as Chapters 1 and 3 explained, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia differ in the political saliency of their linguistic cleavages. 
The concept of mother-tongue informs educational and political debates in 
the three consociations, despite continuing theoretical debates over its 
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precise definition.1227  This chapter employs the concept of mother-tongue to 
denote an individual’s native language, the language learnt first by a child, or 
even a community’s heritage language.  However, this chapter refutes the 
differentiation between the ‘national language’ (as an instrument of 
socialisation into national identity) and ‘foreign languages’ (as tools for socio-
economic mobility), common in the literature.1228  This chapter shows that 
this distinction is blurred in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia; it 
therefore considers all local, national and foreign languages.   
6.1 Teaching Languages in Deeply Divided Societies: Theoretical 
Debates 
The time allocated to languages in school curricula is far superior to the time 
devoted to other ‘national subjects’.1229  Moreover, debates over languages 
in education impact three core functions of schooling: the promotion of a 
shared identity, the achievement of ‘equality or at least a sense of social 
inclusion’ and the creation of human capital.1230   
Theories of nationalism highlight the intimate and exclusive relationship 
between the state and its official language(s). 1231   Gellner argues that 
standardised languages facilitated industrialisation, and later, through mass 
schooling, became identified with states and their cultures.1232  Conversely, 
Anderson sees the existence of a common vernacular and of print media as 
key to the birth of the first nations as ‘imagined communities’.1233  J.S. Mill 
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presented official languages as instruments for democracy, essential to the 
emergence of ‘the united public opinion necessary to the working of 
representative government’. 1234   Hobsbawm adds that by teaching a 
language, schools provide children with tools to communicate with the 
state.1235   
However, the state’s selection of official languages favours some linguistic 
groups while disadvantaging others: certain local languages may become 
‘dialectalised’ and associated with ‘tradition and obsolescence’ and, over 
time, become extinct.1236  In multilingual societies this choice reflects inter-
group hierarchies: the more prestigious languages (spoken by the dominant 
communities) are used for official functions such as government and 
education, while less prestigious vernaculars (spoken by marginalised or 
excluded groups) are relegated to the private domain.1237  Thus, the status of 
language in the education system often mirrors the status of linguistic 
communities in plural societies.1238   
Linguistic policy also reproduces the socio-economic and political status of 
communities and is ‘implicated in… competition between groups for material 
and symbolic resources’.1239  Schools that teach only in the official state 
language entrench the social hierarchies between individuals belonging to 
different linguistic communities.  This is because non-native speakers are 
‘understood not as having a different competence, but as being 
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incompetent’.1240  Children may face comprehension difficulties, frustration, 
cultural and cognitive dissonance, and be deprived of their identity, creativity 
and expressive potential.1241  In the long-term, Skuttnabb-Kangas argues that 
education in languages other than the mother-tongue leads to worse 
educational performances, higher drop-out rates, higher unemployment, 
increased drug use and suicide risk.1242   
Beyond its detrimental impact on individuals, ‘the one-language-one-nation 
ideology of language policy and national identity’ 1243  also contributes to 
violent conflict in plural societies, where linguistic cleavages coincide with 
ethnic, religious or national fractures.  On the one hand, the teaching of 
certain traditional languages may be perceived as threatening to the integrity 
and very existence of a state.1244  On the other hand, schooling in the official 
state language limits access to education and employment opportunities for 
some linguistic communities: Brown shows that this fuels violent inter-
communal conflict.1245  
Conversely, mother-tongue education provides a link between school, home 
and the local community, involves families in school life, allows the 
transmission of values and boosts self-esteem. 1246   It also aids the 
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acquisition of a second language and educational achievement.1247  Indeed, 
Thomas and Collier have found that the single most influential factor 
predicting the educational success of bilingual students is the number of 
years of schooling in the mother-tongue they experienced.1248  
This substantiates the claim that for liberal societies to be just, members of 
different communities should be endowed with different rights. 1249   For 
example, a just society would provide ‘promotion-oriented rights’ for linguistic 
minorities (such as instruction in the mother-tongue in state schools), thereby 
adapting ‘the nation-building process to the liberal postulate of equality of all 
citizens’.1250  Mother-tongue education should be provided at least up to the 
secondary school level, to guarantee some social mobility.1251   
However, instruction in minority or indigenous languages may be ‘regressive’ 
if it promotes self-ghettoisation and the long-term socio-economic exclusion 
of a linguistic community. 1252   Advanced learning of the official state 
language should complement the right to mother-tongue education to ensure 
that members of all linguistic communities can participate in economic, social 
and political life.1253   
The long-term socio-political impact of language learning depends on which 
model of language teaching is adopted in schools.  Models of language 
teaching vary along a continuum, from assimilation or monolingualism to full 
pluralism or multilingualism. 1254   Freeman Field confirms that language 
policies ‘reflect ideological assumptions about language, speakers of 
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language, and the role of schools in society’. 1255   Thus, monolingual 
programmes generally reproduce existing power structures and are often 
implemented in polities that deny the legitimacy or very existence of linguistic 
minorities.  As mentioned, monolingual education often hampers educational 
achievement, especially when children are forced to learn in the official 
language, regardless of their mother-tongue (‘submersion education’).1256  It 
may also further socio-economic exclusion through ‘segregation 
programmes’, which force children from minority backgrounds to be 
instructed through their low-status mother-tongue without learning the official 
language.1257  
In contrast, pluralistic approaches to languages generally rely on bilingual 
education, meant as ‘the use of two (or more) languages of instruction at 
some point in a students’ school career’.1258  However, they vary widely in the 
‘methods for coordinating the relationships’ between the different 
languages. 1259   These variations, according to Ruiz, reflect three broad 
societal ‘ideological orientations’ towards languages.1260  When the existence 
of non-official languages is perceived as a problem, schools adopt 
transitional programmes for ‘subtractive bilingualism’. 1261   In subtractive 
bilingualism, children initially learn in the mother-tongue but shift to the 
official language in the course of primary education to gain proficiency in the 
official language.1262  
When non-official languages are enshrined as a human right, schools adopt 
‘additive bilingualism’ and provide instruction in the mother-tongue and in the 
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state official language at all levels.1263  For example, the ‘language shelter’ 
model allows children belonging to a linguistic minority to learn in their 
mother-tongue while learning the official language as a subject.  Conversely, 
‘immersion programmes for indigenous people and minorities’ instruct 
children through the medium of a lost ancestral language to revive a native 
language community.1264  These approaches legitimise communal rights and 
strengthen group identity, so they gain broad political support only ‘when the 
risk of provoking divided loyalties, stoking secessionist fires, or sustaining 
cultural autonomy is low’.1265  
Finally, when societies perceive language as a resource, schools offer 
enrichment bilingual programmes.  For example, language immersion 
programmes for speakers of the official language allow children to be 
instructed through a minority or foreign language. 1266   This is rarely 
controversial because it ‘serves the interests of dominant groups in the 
society’1267 and allows middle class children to learn ‘elite or prestigious 
languages’.1268   
In plural societies, bilingual education furthers communal equality and mutual 
understanding by, at the very least, legitimising the culture and language of 
different ethnic, national or religious communities.1269  Byram also claims that 
language learning can promote ‘intercultural competence’ by relativising 
dichotomies of ‘us against them’, encouraging perspective-taking, 
challenging stereotypes, and bringing two or more cultures into a dialectical 
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relationship.1270  Ultimately, the impact of bilingual education on inter-group 
conflict largely depends on the model of bilingualism adopted and its effect 
upon the educational and socio-economic opportunities of members of 
different communities.  Maintenance and additive bilingual programmes have 
shown the best educational results, with better linguistic competences in the 
official language than immersion programmes.1271   
Despite this evidence, debates over languages of instruction in most divided 
societies remain linked primarily to the struggle for power and recognition of 
communities. Interestingly, this is not the case in Lebanon. 
6.2 Lebanon 
About 95 percent of Lebanon’s population speaks Arabic as their mother-
tongue, but linguistic plurality is ‘entrenched in the Lebanese psyche and the 
Lebanese education system’.1272  Indeed, Chapter 3 explained that modern 
schooling was born multilingual: since the 19th Century, foreign missions 
adopted French or English as languages of instruction and confessional 
communities ‘learnt the language of their tutelary nations’.1273  Thus, most 
Christian schools adopted French, Muslim schools emphasised Arabic, and 
American schools, generally attracting children of wealthy Sunni and Greek 
Orthodox backgrounds, employed English and Arabic.1274    
The French Mandate further entrenched bilingualism by introducing French 
and Arabic as official languages and requiring schools to teach sciences and 
social studies in French.1275  However, after Lebanese independence, Arabic 
was established as the sole official national language, and all schools were 
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encouraged to teach the Arabic language and to employ Arabic as a 
language of instruction for all subjects at all levels, including sciences.1276   
Emphasis on Arabic-medium education expressed a ‘zeal for independent 
national identity’ after decolonisation.1277  Yet, Diab suggests that this ‘hasty 
expression of national pride… did not result from careful planning’: it 
overlooked the deep rooting of foreign languages in Lebanon’s education 
system and the long tradition of teaching sciences in French and English.1278  
Thus, many private schools ignored government directives and retained 
French- or English-medium education. 1279   Rather than enforcing its 
decisions, in 1950 the government exempted foreign private schools from 
teaching Arabic, which remained compulsory only for Lebanese citizens.1280  
Moreover, the 1968 curricula affirmed that schools should ‘in principle use 
Arabic as [the] medium of instruction for all subjects’ but in practice allowed 
state schools to teach science in English and French.1281   
The educational debate over languages of instruction reflected a wider 
conflict over the identity and the regional orientation of the Lebanese state.  
Instruction in Arabic aimed ‘to [stimulate] Arab unity and identity’. 1282  
Conversely, by challenging the use of Arabic, ‘the defenders of a non-Arab 
Lebanon… [were] challenging Arabness on linguistic grounds’. 1283  
Unsuccessfully, certain Christian Maronite intellectuals even attempted to 
construct a ‘Lebanese’ language as distinct from the Arabic language.1284  
                                            
1276  Shaaban,  “Bilingual Education in Lebanon”, in Cummins and Corson (eds.), 
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Routledge, 2010): 164. 
1283 Bizri, "Linguistic Green Lines," 446. 
1284 Said Aql and Moris Awwad are the most prominent examples. Ibid. 
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More successfully, in the 1960s Christians largely insisted on multilingual 
education while Muslims favoured Arabic monolingualism.1285  As Chapter 3 
mentioned, this mirrored the clash between Muslim pan-Arab identifications 
and Christian ‘double heritage, the Arab and the Western’. 1286   It also 
reflected the political clash between ‘Muslims calling for cultural 
homogeneity’ and ‘Christians championing cultural heterogeneity’.1287   
These tensions culminated in the 1975-1989 civil war, which accelerated the 
linguistic fragmentation of the Lebanese education system.  Some schools 
taught every subject at every level in Arabic to convey the ‘heritage and 
historical depth of the Arab language’ to children,1288 while most of the newly 
founded private schools adopted English as their language of instruction.1289   
6.2.1 Enrichment Bilingual Education 
Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that the civil war did not solve fundamental 
debates over the identity of Lebanese citizens and the foreign orientations of 
the state.  Yet it largely solved past clashes over language policy.  Chartouni 
argues that after the Taif Agreement, arabisation did not appeal to a ‘Muslim 
community [that] has become more pluralistic in its cultural orientation and 
ethos and engaged in a massive policy of educational modernisation’.1290  
Similarly, Bizri demonstrates that Christian political parties abandoned the 
idea of a Lebanese language as distinct from Arabic as ‘utopian and 
economically harmful for Lebanon’.1291  A consensus emerged over Arabic as 
the mother-tongue and language of national affiliation, English as the 
                                            
1285 Chartouni Interview. 
1286 Chartouni, Conflict Resolution, 75; Theodor Hanf, Coexistence, 365. 
1287 Ibid., 365. 
1288  This was the case in the (Sunni) Makassed Schools according to Mandy Terc, 
"Iconisation and Linguistic Ideologies in Lebanon's Makassed Schools," Unpublished 
Research Paper (American University of Beirut, 2006). 
1289  Shaaban,  “Bilingual Education”, in Cummins and Corson (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Language and Education Volume 5, 255; Ghait and Shaaban, "Language-in-Education," 
105. 
1290 Chartouni, Conflict Resolution, 82. 
1291 Bizri, "Linguistic Green Lines," 448. 
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language of business, science and modernity and French as the language of 
high culture for some confessional communities.1292  
The 1995 New Framework for Education established that schools should 
ensure proficiency in the Arabic language ‘as the official national language’, 
but also teach at least one foreign language to further children’s ‘openness to 
foreign cultures’.1293  The 1997 curriculum effectively ratified the unofficial 
practice of multilingualism: schools could choose their language of instruction 
and the new curriculum entrenched bilingual education according to an 
enrichment model.1294  Thus, Arabic and one foreign language (English or 
French) are studied from first grade: foreign languages join Arabic as 
languages of instruction from grade 7 (and a second foreign language is 
taught from grade 7).1295  As clear in Figure 7, 52 percent of schools teach in 
Arabic and French, about 24 percent teach in Arabic and English and about 
24 percent offer instruction in the three languages.1296   
 
                                            
1292  Shaaban,  “Bilingual Education,” in Cummins and Corson (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Language and Education Volume 5, 259. 
1293 Ibid., 255. 
1294 Ghait and Shaaban, "Language-in-Education," 104. 
1295 See Appendix 1; Zakharia,  “(Re)Constructing Language,” in Menken and Garcia (eds.), 
Negotiating Language Policies, 167. 
1296  Central Administration of Statistics, State Statistical Yearbook, (Beirut: Central 
Administration of Statistics, 2010). 
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Figure 7: Lebanese Schools by Language of Instruction in 2010.1297 
 
In this Arabic-French-English trilingual education system, Arabic remains the 
only language of instruction that all students share.1298  This is partly because 
successive governments have insisted that the Arabic language is the only 
effective instrument by which to teach an overarching identity and affiliation 
to Lebanon.  Thus, the national curriculum requires schools to teach the 
national subjects (Citizenship and Civic Education, Geography, History and 
Arabic) in the Arabic language and students sit these four official exams in 
Arabic.1299    
Still, Shaaban found that the quality of Arabic teaching in state schools 
declined steadily since the 1970s and that despite political rhetoric, Arabic 
‘occupies a second place’ in most Lebanese schools.1300  This may be due to 
mnemonic and passive methodologies and to the lack of interesting contents 
in curricula and textbooks, which, according to some teachers, hinder the 
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learning of Arabic fusha. 1301   Moreover, deprived households and 
communities rarely speak standard Arabic and this hampers children’s 
learning. 1302   The conflict between different forms of spoken Arabic 
(ammiyya), together with the lack of teacher training programmes and 
reference materials, also sustains the preconception that Arabic is barely 
‘good enough’ for national subjects and not suitable to teach sciences.1303  
Ultimately, many Lebanese students struggle with reading and writing Arabic 
fusha, to the point that a campaign was launched in 2012 to safeguard the 
Arabic language in Lebanon in order to ‘protect the country’s identity and 
heritage’.1304  
Even many Islamic schools, which previously taught only in Arabic, started 
employing English and French as languages of instruction since 1999.1305  
For example, the Makassed schools, pressed by the ‘reality’ of student desire 
to master a foreign language, abandoned the ‘dream’ of Arabic 
instruction.1306  Terc argues that this decision exemplifies an ideological shift 
from viewing students as bearers of Arab unity and cultural heritage, towards 
a desire to form modern, adaptable, technologically savvy students who can 
combine ‘religion with national affiliation’.1307   
Indeed, in contrast to history, language policy has been largely de-politicised 
in Lebanon and parents often send their children to schools affiliated with 
different communities to learn English or French.1308  The Arabic language 
has also emerged as an overarching marker of Lebanese identity, and is 
                                            
1301 Fusha is the standard Arabic employed in writing, schools and official communication. 
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employed as a medium of instruction for the national subjects, in domestic 
life and in religious activity.1309  
6.2.2 Old and New Cleavages in Language Policy 
Bizri argues that ‘the choice of French and/or English as second and third 
languages in Lebanon is no longer associated with confession or class, but 
with aspirations to social success’.1310  Surveys confirm that students view 
the study of English as an essential instrument of socio-economic mobility 
and policymakers often agree: they perceive English as the language of 
business and science.1311  To an extent, the French language remains an 
expression of affiliation to French culture, particularly among Christians.1312  
Thus, being French-educated or English-educated remains a secondary 
marker of communal identity for certain Christians who value Arabic-French 
bilingualism.1313   
However, more than reflecting communal fractures, language policy in 
consociational Lebanon cements socio-economic cleavages.  Bizri confirms 
that ‘the famous Lebanese trilingualism with French, Arabic and English in 
reality [is] not accessible to all members of the nation’.1314  Indeed, access to 
multilingual education is a function of socio-economic status and the quality 
of language teaching in Lebanon’s ‘elitist educational system’ depends on 
individual ability to ‘afford … expensive private schools with strong English 
programmes’.1315   
In most schools, the quality of English and French teaching is poor: in 1993 
only 25 percent of students passed their English Baccalaureate exam.1316  
Foreign language teaching is largely based on text, memory and repetition, 
employs academic and artificial language and favours writing over speaking, 
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1310 Ibid., 452. 
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740; Murad Interview. 
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particularly when classes are crowded and children have different proficiency 
levels.1317  Moreover, students in public schools have access to fewer foreign 
language learning opportunities than students in private schools. 1318  
Children are rarely exposed to French or English after school, and lack 
opportunities to practice these foreign languages, particularly in ‘low socio-
economic status schools’.1319  In fact, pupils of middle-class backgrounds 
often speak French or English at home.1320  Thus, despite the curriculum 
being nominally the same, students in ‘low socio-economic status schools’ 
achieve lower levels of French and English and are unable to employ the 
foreign languages in science class.1321  In the long term, this entrenches 
socio-economic cleavages and hampers social mobility. 
6.2.3 ‘Practicality won over Principle’ 
Shabaan reflects that in the debates over languages of instruction, 
‘practicality won over principle’.1322  After the Taif Agreement, a consensus 
emerged over reconstructing Lebanon as a multilingual society and language 
policy was depoliticised.  Thus, Lebanon’s multilingual schools reflect the 
functional trilingualism of Lebanese society: Arabic is the mother-tongue and 
language of national affiliation, and English and French remain the 
languages of business and science.1323   
When it is successfully implemented, as in several private schools, 
Lebanon’s additive bilingualism creates citizens ‘whose mother-tongue is 
neither Arabic, nor French, nor English but the movement between all of 
them’.1324   Multilingualism cuts across confessional lines and may even 
strengthen an overarching Lebanese identity among a select group of 
                                            
1317 Ibid.,  256; Bahous, "Multilingual Educational Trends," 744. 
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wealthy trilingual citizens.  However, due to the weakness of language 
teaching in state schools, Lebanon’s multilingual education also entrenches 
socio-economic inequality and strengthens class cleavages.  This may fuel 
communal grievances and further long-term political instability when, as in 
the case of the Shia community, socio-economic and confessional cleavages 
coincide.   
6.3 Northern Ireland 
Like Lebanon, contemporary Northern Ireland is a largely monolingual 
region: just 3.7 percent of residents can speak, understand, read and write 
Irish and less than 1 percent have a similar knowledge of Ulster-Scots.1325  
However, Northern Ireland’s linguistic homogeneity is relatively recent: ‘the 
Irish-speaking community collapsed to the point of extinction’ only in the late 
19th Century. 1326   Declining numbers of native speakers paralleled the 
increasing ‘symbolic and to a degree… cultural status’ of Irish and its political 
relevance.1327   
Indeed, after partition, the consolidation of Northern Ireland as distinct from 
the Irish Free State became the main thrust of local language policies.1328  In 
1915 the Gaelic League had called for a Free Gaelic-speaking Ireland, 
thereby associating the Irish language with an Irish Nationalist project.1329  In 
contrast, the new Northern Ireland state education system, as Chapter 3 
explained, aimed to form loyal British citizens.  Thus, new curricula 
immediately marginalised the Irish language, equating it with foreign 
languages such as French and Latin.1330 By 1936 Prime Minister James 
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Craig openly opposed funding Irish teaching in schools on the grounds that 
‘we do not see that these boys being taught Irish would be any better 
citizens’.1331  His successor added that the state should not pay for the 
teaching of Irish, ‘chief object of which is to foment antagonism to Great 
Britain’.1332   
The Irish language in Northern Ireland remained taught in Catholic 
maintained schools. However, by the 1960s, it became relegated to a symbol 
of resistance to the state, and only the Troubles provided impetus for its 
‘revival’.1333  In 1971, ‘without any involvement by church and state’, a group 
of parents established the first Irish-medium school in West Belfast.1334  They 
presented Irish-medium schooling as part of a right to freedom of expression 
for the Catholic/Nationalist minority and called for access to the Irish 
language as part and parcel of ‘parity of esteem’.1335  Unionists remained 
suspicious of Irish, associating it with resistance to the Union.1336  However, 
the ‘minority rights discourse’ adopted by Irish-language activists resonated 
with the British state.  In the late 1980s the British government started 
presenting Irish as part of one of the two native cultural traditions of Northern 
Ireland rather than as a ‘foreign and subversive’ element.1337   
Education policy expressed the ‘reinvented’ role of the state ‘as a “promoter” 
of the Irish language’.1338  Irish was introduced in the 1989 curriculum and in 
1994-5 DENI provided funding for Irish-medium schools and curriculum 
material in Irish.1339  The British government argued that the Irish language 
was ‘an important strand in the complex cultural inheritance of Northern 
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Ireland… [and should] be valued as such by all sections of the 
community’.1340   
6.3.1 Irish-Language Education: Not in the Cold Anymore 
The Belfast Agreement recognised ‘the importance of respect, understanding 
and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, 
the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic 
communities’.1341   The British government also pledged to ‘take resolute 
action to promote’ the Irish language, to ‘facilitate and encourage the use of 
the language in speech and writing in public and private life’ and to ‘place a 
statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate 
Irish-medium education’.1342  
Figure 8 shows that the number of pupils in Irish-medium education has 
more than tripled in a decade.  In 2000, the sector accounted for less than 1 
percent of pupils in primary and secondary schools, in 2012-2013 it 
accommodated about 3 percent and was available in every county.1343   
                                            
1340 Central Community Relations Unit, 2 June 1997, qtd. in ibid., 136. 
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Figure 8: Number of Primary and Secondary School Students in Irish-Medium 
Education Between 2001 and 2013.1344 
 
Micheal O’Duibh of the Council for Irish-Medium Education (Comhairle na 
Gaelscolaíochta, CnaG) argues that Irish-medium schools expanded 
because of increasing parental demand.1345  He adds that before 1998, Irish-
medium education was underfunded, but the establishment of a statutory 
duty on DENI to ‘encourage and facilitate’ Irish-medium education, increased 
funding, and the creation of the CnaG in 2000 contributed to raising the 
profile of Irish-medium education.1346  The political influence of the Irish-
medium sector on the Nationalist leadership also helped secure favourable 
concessions: for example, shortly after the Belfast agreement, under the 
initiative of Education Minister McGuinness, the viability criteria for new 
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schools were lowered to an intake of as little as 12 pupils.1347  Ultimately, as 
O’Duibh summarises, Irish-medium schools ‘are not in the cold anymore’.1348   
CnaG portrays the Irish language as a powerful instrument for fostering 
cultural understanding and mutual respect among children belonging to 
different traditions in Northern Ireland.  The Together Through Culture 
project, for example, aims to foster interest in the Irish language as part of 
the heritage of both Protestant/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists.1349  Yet, 
CnaG still perceives ‘a certain element of negativity from Stormont’ towards 
Irish-medium education.1350  Indeed, Unionist parties remain suspicious of 
Irish-medium education, and often portray investment in the Irish language 
as a ‘waste of money when there is English-medium education’.1351  Whilst 
they do not dispute the right to learn Irish, they believe it should be ‘treated 
like all other proper languages rather than being given a special preference, 
it should be like whether you’re learning French or Italian’.1352   
In fact, Irish is different from ‘French or Italian’ in two respects.  First, to a 
substantial portion of Northern Ireland’s population, Irish is not a foreign 
language, but their lost native vernacular.  This is why Irish-medium 
education adopts the immersion method.1353  Total immersion education in 
the Irish language for children whose mother-tongue is English is offered in 
free-standing Irish-medium schools and in Irish-medium units in some 
English-medium schools.  Irish-medium streams in some post-primary 
schools allow pupils to learn some subjects in Irish.1354   
                                            
1347 Mcilwaine Interview. 15 pupils in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. Eurydice, Foreign 
Language Teaching in Schools in Europe, (Brussels: Euridyce, 2000): 29 
1348 O'Duibh Interview. 
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CnAG promotes the benefits of immersion education and bilingualism for 
pupils.1355  As mentioned, immersion education produces worse academic 
performances than both mother-tongue education (English-medium in this 
case) and a dual-language bilingual approach.1356  However, the immersion 
model is the most effective method to ensure the revival of an almost extinct 
linguistic community.  This explains why an immersion model was adopted in 
Irish-medium schools. These schools closely resemble language immersion 
programmes for indigenous minorities in their attempt to produce new 
speakers of a community’s heritage language.1357  Thus, the teaching of Irish 
remains largely confined to Catholic maintained schools and Irish-medium 
schools: only 6 percent of Irish-medium schools are controlled and most of 
their pupils have a Catholic/Nationalist background.1358    
The second difference between ‘French or Italian’ and Irish in Northern 
Ireland is that, while pools of Italian and French speakers transmit their 
languages to their children, in Northern Ireland the ‘acquisition of the Irish 
language will continue to depend upon the educational system rather than 
intergenerational transmission within family units’. 1359   Irish-medium 
education is therefore helping cement the Catholic/Nationalist community by 
reviving a linguistic community that largely coincides with a denominational 
and national tradition.  Thus, O’Duibh aptly qualifies Irish-medium as a 
‘cultural immersion method’.1360   
A recent ministerial Review of Irish-Medium Education recommended future 
expansion of Irish-medium education through Irish-medium streams within 
English language schools. 1361   Its future expansion will depend on the 
sector’s ability to ‘normalise Irish-medium education … [so that] it’s for all 
                                            
1355 O'Duibh Interview. 
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communities’:1362  O’Duibh reflects that in a predominantly ‘loyalist’ school, 
‘you may have to redefine the ethos of an Irish-medium school’.1363  
Future expansion of Irish-medium education also partly depends on DENI’s 
fulfilment of its statutory duties: in 2011, a High Court Decision criticised its 
performance, reiterating that the duty to facilitate Irish-medium education is 
not ‘merely aspirational’ but actually ‘intended to have practical 
consequences and legislative significance’.1364  For example, the immersion 
method requires different curricular approaches from those appropriate to 
other educational sectors, but according to CnaG, the Irish-medium sector is 
rarely consulted before DENI’s decisions.1365   
6.3.2 Ulster-Scots: Cashing in the Cheque  
An officer at the Ulster-Scots Agency suggests that the increasing profile of 
Ulster-Scots culture, heritage and vernacular since the Belfast agreement is 
due to the fact that ‘the peace process is freeing people’.1366  He argues that 
decreasing fear and insecurity eased pressures for Unionists to conform to a 
monolithic British identity and that the recognition of Ulster-Scots culture and 
vernacular promoted public interest.1367   
In fact, attention to Ulster-Scots is better interpreted as ‘a cultural “response” 
by Unionists to Nationalists’.1368  At the insistence of Unionist parties, the 
2006 St Andrews agreement redressed previous emphasis on the Irish 
language, establishing that ‘the Government firmly believes in the need to 
enhance and develop the Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture’.1369   
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Thus, since 2007, language policy in Northern Ireland has reflected the 
maxim that ‘if you do it for Irish you have to do it for Ulster-Scot’.1370  
However, advocates of the Ulster-Scots language recurrently call for more 
use of the vernacular in public life: recalling promises of parity of esteem, 
they complain that that  ‘over the years we have not been able to cash in that 
cheque’.1371   The Ulster Scots Agency offers extracurricular modules on 
Ulster-Scots language, heritage and culture for schools.1372  Newspapers 
periodically announce the imminent introduction of Ulster-Scots language 
modules in schools.1373  Indeed, reflecting the political function of the Ulster-
Scots vernacular, a prominent Unionist politician suggests that the teaching 
of Ulster-Scots in schools could consolidate Unionist identities: by 
transmitting key values and identities to children, it could ‘engineer you to 
be… a Unionist’.1374   
In fact, there are very practical reasons why the ‘cheque’ of full parity of 
esteem for Ulster-Scots has not been cashed in.  In particular, despite the 
wording of the St Andrews Agreement, a single, codified, ‘Ulster-Scots’ 
language does not exist.  The Ulster Scots Agency sponsors an Ulster-Scots 
Language Forum to standardise the many dialects and vernaculars, but the 
forum has not produced tangible results yet.1375 Ultimately, the lack of a 
standard Ulster-Scots language means that Ulster-Scots cannot be 
employed as a language of instruction.   
6.3.3 Parity of Languages 
As Chapters 1 and 3 explained, religious denomination and national 
allegiance emerged as the primary markers of communal identity before and 
during the Troubles.  Vernacular languages (Irish and Ulster-Scots) remain 
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only one of the attributes of communal belonging, and not necessarily the 
most significant or politically salient one.   
However, the expansion of Irish-medium education and the emergence of 
calls for Ulster-Scots-medium education suggest that these heritage 
languages are being constructed as a further marker of mutually exclusive 
communal (and political) identities.  Rather than emerging as sources of 
overarching identification, as Arabic in Lebanon, the Irish and Ulster-Scots 
vernaculars add a linguistic dimension to the confessional and national 
cleavages of Northern Ireland’s communities.  These vernaculars are rarely 
taught at home: by teaching them, schools help socialise children into 
mutually exclusive Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist ‘cultures’.   
6.4 Macedonia 
In Macedonia, language is the most politically salient identity marker and 
linguistic cleavages largely coincide with ethnic differences.1376  As Chapter 3 
explained, the codification of a Macedonian language was essential to the 
construction of an ethnic Macedonian collective identity. 1377   Albanian 
nationalism also employed language as an overarching marker of 
belonging.1378  Thus, after Macedonia’s independence, ‘the struggle over 
language rights constitute[d] efforts to legitimise the [Albanian] minority group 
itself and to alter its relationship to the [Macedonian] state’.1379  This struggle 
also affected education policy through long-standing debates over instruction 
in the mother-tongue.1380   
                                            
1376 See Appendix 2 for demographic data.  
1377 Maria-Eleni Koppa, "Ethnic Albanians," 52; See also Chapter 3. 
1378 Among Albanians, the Ghegs (in the north) and Tosk (in the south) are the two ‘regional 
subgroups’, David Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide. A Ready Reference Handbook 
(Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1998), 8. A significant proportion of Albanians is Christian, and 
Muslims belong to two different confessions (Sunni and Bektashish), Babuna, "The 
Albanians”. 
1379 May, "Language Education," in May and Hornberger (eds.), Encyclopedia of Language 
and Education Volume 1, 26. 
1380 Abdulla Azizi, "The Right to Education in the Republic of Macedonia: The Right to 
Education in One's Mother Tongue," Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 15, (2011): 
2435; Dawn Tankersley, "Bombs or Bilingual Programmes? Dual-Language Immersion, 
Transformative Education and Community Building in Macedonia," International Journal of 
Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 4, no. 2 (2011): 109. 
 251 
In Yugoslavia, children were taught in different classes depending on the 
language of instruction. 1381    The 1991 constitution of independent 
Macedonia granted the right to mother-tongue education, and the state 
provided primary and secondary education in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish 
and Serbian.1382  However, this right was severely restricted in practice.1383   
If most of the reforms included in the Ohrid Agreement were in the making 
before 2001, this was certainly not the case for linguistic reforms, which were 
implemented only because of the NLA demands during the 2001 conflict.1384  
As Chapter 3 explained, linguistic reforms reflected the new power relations 
between the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities in the 
context of the newly established consociation.   
6.4.1 The Unintended Consequences of Increasing Access 
The Ohrid agreement established ‘state funding… for university level 
education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of 
Macedonia’, and reiterated the right to compulsory education ‘in the students’ 
native languages’ and to learning the Macedonian language.1385  Hereafter, 
the entire thrust of education policy would shift towards expanding access to 
mother-tongue education for children of Turkish, Serbian and Albanian 
backgrounds.   
These provisions had a limited direct impact on primary schools, which had 
enrolled over 90 percent of children by 1999.1386  Moreover, the right to 
mother-tongue instruction at primary school level had long been remarkably  
                                            
1381  Sabani Interview; Interview with an Officer in an International Delegation, Skopje, 
11/09/2012. 
1382 For the structure of the education system, see Appendix 1. Also explained in Foundation 
Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma Language and Culture as 
an Elective Subject (Skopje: FOSIM, 2010); Officer in an International Delegation Interview. 
1383  Merle Vetterlein, "The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, 8. Also see 
Chapter 3. 
1384 Schenker Interview. 
1385 Article 6, Ohrid Agreement. For discussion of university education in Albanian, see 
Chapter 3. 
1386  The World Bank, School Enrolment, Primary (percentage net), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR?page=2 (last accessed 6/12/2014). 
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Figure 9: Percentage Students by Language of Instruction in Primary and 
Lower Secondary School in Macedonia Between 2000 and 2012.1387 
 
uncontroversial and ‘nobody prohibited [students from] choos[ing] another 
language of instruction’.1388  Figure 9 confirms that the Ohrid Agreement did 
not impact on the proportion of children attending primary school in 
Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish or Serbian.  For example, just over 31 
percent of pupils studied in Albanian in 2000-2001: the proportion increased 
to about 32 percent in 2006-2007 and about 33 percent in 2011-2012.1389  
 
                                            
1387 State Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2006); State 
Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2008); State 
Statistical Office, Primary, Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Schools at the End of the 
School Year, 2011/2012, (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013); State Statistical Office, 
Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013). 
1388 Ibid. 
1389 State Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2006); State 
Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2008); State 
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The picture is different at the secondary level, as Figure 10 shows.  Post-
agreement governments concentrated on expanding access to secondary 
education for students of ethnic minority backgrounds by, for example, 
building more secondary schools in deprived areas.1391  They also lowered 
the minimum number of children required to open an Albanian-, Turkish- or 
Serbian-language class, and made secondary education free and 
compulsory in 2008.  Thus, the proportion of students attending school in 
                                            
1390 State Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2006); State 
Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2008); State 
Statistical Office, Primary, Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Schools at the End of the 
School Year, 2011/2012, (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013); State Statistical Office, 
Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013). 
1391 Novkovski Interview; Sabani Interview. 
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Albanian grew steadily from 16 percent in 2000-2001, to 18 percent in 2006-
2007 and 29 percent in 2011-2012.1392   
Expansion of mother-tongue education at the secondary level may have 
‘increased respect for the state’ among members of some ethnic 
communities. 1393   Certainly, it signals that consociational Macedonia 
recognises, values and protects the different languages of its ethnic 
communities and by extension their cultural specificity.   
However, the successful expansion of secondary education in Albanian and 
Turkish had some unintended consequences for the wider education system.  
The growing number of students forced schools to operate several shifts 
(with different groups of students attending school at different times of the 
day) or to create satellite schools.  To this day, students are often divided 
into different shifts or buildings on the basis of their language of instruction, 
so the provision of ‘quality mother-tongue education… usually involves 
having no contact with the other [resident] community’.1394  Private ‘pilot’ 
English-medium schools are ethnically mixed but only cater for upper-middle 
class children.1395  Exceptions to the separation of children of different ethnic 
backgrounds in state schools are rare: a high-profile example is the trilingual 
elementary school Bashimi/Brastvo/Birlik in Gostivar.1396   Lack of contact 
between children of different backgrounds, as Chapter 7 discusses in more 
depth, may foster stereotypes and inter-group rivalry.1397   
Moreover, in ethnically and linguistically separate school environments, 
children of ethnic minority background struggle to learn the Macedonian 
language.  Since 2008, children attending school in Albanian, Turkish and 
Serbian have learnt English before the official state language.  The 
constitution guarantees the right to learn Macedonian at all levels of 
education, but in 2007 the ethnic Albanian Education Minister Suleiman 
                                            
1392 State Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2006); State 
Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2008); State 
Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013). 
1393 Officer in an International Delegation Interview. 
1394 Officer in an International Mission Interview. See also Chapter 7. 
1395 Officer in an International Delegation Interview; Sabani Interview. 
1396 Georgieva Interview. 
1397 Ibid. 
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Rushiti introduced the English language from first grade and delayed 
Macedonian language classes to fourth grade.1398  This reform indicated a 
shift from a language shelter model of bilingualism (with pupils studying in 
the mother-tongue but learning the Macedonian language as a subject) to a 
voluntary segregation model (with children instructed in their mother-tongue 
without gaining proficiency in the official language).   
The delay of Macedonian language classes to fourth grade may also have 
been ‘a message’ from the ethnic Albanian Education Minister to the ethnic 
Macedonian elites and the wider public: ‘I want to learn a foreign language 
before I learn the official language’. 1399   Thus, linguistic reforms in 
Macedonia’s education system remain an expression of, or even a tool for, 
wider power struggles in the consociation.1400  Current arrangements are 
detrimental to language learning, but also hold potentially destabilising 
consequences for the peace process.  First, they are depriving children of the 
basic means of communication across communal lines: a shared language.  
The poor quality of English-language education hampers the emergence of 
English as a shared language in Macedonia.  Second, young Albanians 
struggle to express themselves in Macedonian, and this may hamper their 
employment prospects in a Macedonian-dominated labour market.1401  For 
their part, most ethnic Macedonians ‘want other communities to want to learn 
the state language’, but refuse to learn Albanian or other local languages.1402   
There are only two, very original, models for bilingual education in 
Macedonia: Mozaik kindergartens and Nansen schools.  In both cases, 
parents often enrol children in bilingual schools because of their better 
infrastructure, superior quality of education ‘and educated personnel’.  They 
only come to appreciate the benefits of bilingualism at a later stage.1403  In 
the Mozaik kindergartens, two teachers work in parallel, speaking two 
                                            
1398 Veteroska Interview. 
1399 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1400 Interview with an Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Skopje, 18/09/2012. 
1401 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Grodzanovska Interview. 
1402 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Georgieva Interview. 
1403 Teacher qtd. in Tankersley, "Bombs or Bilingual Programmes?," 113. Interview with 
Veton Zenkolli (Project Manager, Nansen Dialogue Centre), Skopje, 12/09/2012. 
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languages to children. 1404   In schools adopting the Nansen model of 
integrated bilingual primary education, students belonging to two 
communities are taught in their mother-tongue in separate classes but every 
day they attend extracurricular activities in mixed groups.  Two teachers 
supervise the extracurricular activities, speaking the two working languages 
and paraphrasing each other.1405  Nansen Dialogue Centre Project Manager, 
Veton Zenkolli maintains that although students are never forced to speak 
languages other than their mother-tongue, they generally learn the school’s 
second language. 1406   He argues that the Nansen model performs a 
balancing act on the ‘thin line between integration and assimilation’.1407  This 
is because Mozaik kindergartens and Nansen schools accommodate both 
the principle of parity of esteem (by granting equal value, legitimacy and 
authority to both working languages and upholding the right to mother-tongue 
education), and the principle of pluralism (by promoting contact and 
cooperation).  As Chapter 7 shows, in deeply divided societies, initiatives for 
integration are particularly successful when, beyond fostering equality and 
relationship-building, they provide added value in terms of the quality of 
education. 
The expansion of access to education has also benefited the smaller 
communities (the Roma, Vlachs, Serbs, Bosniaks and Turks), allowing more 
children to access secondary education. 1408   Yet children belonging to 
smaller communities often struggle in primary school: Turkish- and Serbian-
language education may be available, but most children attend classes in 
Albanian or Macedonian.1409  These students often underperform and are 
excluded and sometimes even discriminated against, as they do not have 
                                            
1404 Children are aged 3 to 7. Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Interview. 
1405 The model was developed by the Nansen Dialogue Centre in cooperation with a team of 
educators, the state inspectorate and the BoE. Zenkolli Interview. 
1406 Ibid. The extracurricular activities are designed by the organisation and collected in a 




1407 Zenkolli Interview. 
1408 For their precise demographic weight, see Appendix 2; Ali Cupi Interview. 
1409 Ibid; Sam Vaknin, "The Education of Macedonia. Interview with Ljubica Grozdanovska of 
BID Consulting," 2007 http://www.globalpolitician.com/default.asp?23540-macedonia/ (last 
accessed 20/05/2013). 
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sufficient proficiency in the language of instruction.1410  As a consequence, 
drop-out rates among children belonging to smaller communities are higher 
than the national average: in 2008 only 44.6 percent of Roma children 
completed primary school, compared to a national rate of 82.6 percent.1411  
Thus, smaller communities have criticised post-Ohrid education policy for 
appeasing the demands of the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian 
communities, whilst appearing to ‘forget the others’.1412  They point out that 
the Ohrid Agreement’s provisions for administrative decentralisation favour 
Albanian language schools in municipalities controlled by Albanian parties 
and Macedonian language schools in municipalities controlled by 
Macedonian parties.1413  Moreover, schools are instrumentalised in wider 
power struggles: for example, in September 2012, the Macedonian daily 
Dnevik reported that DUI-controlled municipalities intended to close several 
Macedonian-language classes as a payback for the closure of an Albanian-
language class in a Macedonian-controlled municipality.1414   Preoccupied 
with the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, the government underinvested 
in areas populated by smaller communities, where schools often 
accommodate thousands of students in three or four daily shifts.1415   
6.4.2 Corrective Measures 
An international observer explained that the Ohrid agreement did not build 
‘bridges’ between the communities only ‘because it is a peace accord, it 
wasn’t an intensive, detailed reform package’. 1416   Yet by 2008, the 
Macedonian government was under strong international pressure to 
introduce ‘corrective measures’ in its education policy.  It attempted to do so 
through the Strategy for Integrated Education (intended to reverse the ethno-
                                            
1410  Most discrimination is reported against Roma children according to Spomenka 
Lazarevska; Grodzanovska Interview.  
1411  United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, Child-Focused Public 
Expenditure Review (Skopje: UNICEF Country Office, 2009): 43. 
1412  Grodzanovska Interview; Interview with Ana Mickovska (Policy Analyst, Centre for 
Research and Policymaking), Skopje, 10/09/2012; Ali Cupi Interview. 
1413 Sabani Interview. Chapter 7 discusses decentralisation in more detail. 
1414   Gotse Dechev School in Aerodrom. "Dnevik: Action for Eliminating Macedoanian 
Classes in Albanian Municipalities Continues," Focus Information Agency, 21/09/2012. 
1415 Grodzanovska Interview. 
1416 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
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linguistic separation in schools) and through the creation of a new Directorate 
for Development and Promotion of Education in the Languages of the 
Communities.   
The Strategy for Integrated Education was formulated by OSCE and the 
Ministry of Education to address the increasing separation of children of 
different ethnic backgrounds into parallel schools, and avoid ‘comparative 
disadvantages among the ethnic groups’ in future employment prospects.1417  
While the strategy was being drafted, ethnic Albanian parties ‘spoke quite 
clearly against it politically’ and expressed their worries that integration would 
amount to assimilation into a Macedonian culture and language.1418  They 
temporised and ‘came up with all kinds of excuses’, including complaints 
about the lack of preliminary consultation and local involvement, protesting 
that learning further languages would burden children.1419   In particular, 
ethnic Albanian parties resisted the strategy’s proposal to teach Macedonian 
as a subject ‘as soon as possible’ in Albanian-, Serbian- and Turkish-medium 
classes.1420  As a political counterweight, the strategy proposed offering the 
languages of ‘communities over 20 percent and the other communities’ as 
elective courses.1421  Ethnic Albanian parties argued that the strategy was 
asymmetrical: it forced children attending Albanian-, Serbian- and Turkish-
medium classes to study Macedonian from first grade, but it did not require 
children studying in Macedonian to learn another local language.1422  Such 
asymmetry was inevitable: the constitution demands the teaching of 
Macedonian to all citizens, but does not ‘give [anyone] means to force’1423 
Macedonian native speakers to learn other local languages.  Thus, as one of 
                                            
1417 Tamara Grncarovska, "Ambassador Herrero Interview in Utrinski Vasnik: Learning of the 
Language Should Not Bring These Divisions,"  
http://www.osce.org/skopje/67529?download=true (last accessed 21/04/2014) 
1418 Ibid. Schenker Interview. 
1419 Ibid; Interview with a Coordinator in the Ministry of Education, Skopje, 19/09/2012; 
Zenkolli Interview; Sinisa-Jakov Marusic, "Macedonia 'Very Surprised' by OSCE Letter," 
Balkan Insight, 28/01/2010. 
1420 The first draft called for introduction from first grade, but it was amended in the course of 
negotiations according to Harald Schenker. 
1421 Schenker Interview. 
1422 Schenker Interview; Zenkolli Interview. 
1423	  Schenker Interview.	  
 259 
the drafters of the strategy put it, forcing every pupil to learn Albanian would 
be ‘political suicide’.1424   
Even before the strategy was completed, Minister of Education Nikola 
Todorov announced that from September 2009, every child would learn 
Macedonian from first grade.  The OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities Knud Vollebaek admitted that ‘this initiative has caused some 
disquiet among non-majority communities’. 1425   In fact, ‘non-majority 
communities’ interpreted the announcement as a ‘pure provocation based on 
ethnic dominance’.1426  Ethnic Albanian political parties cried assimilation and 
the DPA appealed to the Constitutional Court.1427  Ethnic Albanian parents 
and teachers protested against the decision and from January 2010, 
students enrolled in Albanian language classes boycotted Macedonian 
lessons.1428  In July 2010, Macedonia’s Constitutional Court declared that 
teaching the Macedonian language from first grade contradicted existing 
laws and annulled the provision.1429  Todorov, who had emerged as ‘the 
saviour of Macedonian identity against the Albanians’, promised to ‘seek 
other ways to enforce the program’.1430   
Meanwhile, the Strategy for Integrated Education had ‘basically died with 
language’. 1431   After Todorov’s announcement, the strategy remained 
identified with one politically controversial provision: the introduction of 
Macedonian language lessons from first grade.1432  As explained in Chapters 
5 and 7, some aspects of the strategy were later implemented, but ‘language 
is a political issue, so it’s left aside’.1433  
                                            
1424 Schenker Interview. 
1425 Sinisa-Jakov Marusic, "Macedonia Court Annuls Controversial Classes," Balkan Insight, 
15/07/2010. 
1426 Deralla Interview; Interview with an Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Skopje, 
18/09/2012, Interview; Schenker Interview; Lazarevska Interview 
1427 Ibid.; Marusic, "Macedonia Court”. 
1428 Marusic, “Macedonia ‘Very Surprised’”; Deralla Interview. 
1429 Marusic, “Macedonia Court”. 
1430 Ibid; Schenker Interview. 
1431 Ibid. 
1432 Zenkolli Interview. 
1433 Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Interview. 
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Recep Ali Cupi explains that when the gulf between the ethnic Albanian and 
ethnic Macedonian communities deepened and violent incidents started 
occurring in schools, governments began focusing on educational initiatives 
for children of Roma, Turkish, Serb, Vlach and Bosniak backgrounds.1434  
Attention to the smaller communities increased after the sidelining of the 
Strategy for Integrated Education: they emerged as a potential political buffer 
between the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians.1435  Reform initiatives 
could be ‘tested’ on smaller communities and evaluated in a less politicised 
environment before being mainstreamed.1436  Similarly, smaller communities 
could provide badly needed legitimacy and support for educational change. 
To tackle the sense of political and educational exclusion of the Roma, 
Turks, Serbs, Vlachs and Bosniaks, the Directorate for Development and 
Promotion of Education in the Languages of the Communities (DDPELC) 
was created in 2002.  The DDPELC was tasked with furthering education in 
the Roma, Vlach and Bosniak languages, but initially maintained a low 
profile.1437   
The curriculum was also amended to introduce the elective subject in 
Language and Culture of the Roma, Vlach and Bosniak communities.1438  
From 2008, the subject was offered one hour per week in third grade and two 
hours per week between fourth and ninth grade. 1439   The Ministry of 
Education maintains that the elective subject is only open to children 
belonging to the Roma, Vlach and Bosniak communities.1440  Indeed, Cupi 
argues that the elective subject aims to benefit children who do not speak the 
language of the community they belong to at home or, as he puts it, ‘don’t 
know their own language’. 1441   The elective course aims to ‘strengthen 
[children’s] belonging, their identity, which is very important.  Not to give a 
                                            
1434 Ibid. 
1435 Ali Cupi Interview. 
1436 Ibid. 
1437 Ibid. 
1438 Qtd. in Foundation Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma 
Language and Culture, 15. 
1439 Ibid., 15. 
1440 Ali Cupi Interview; Lazarevska Interview. 
1441 Ibid. 
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space for cultural assimilation’.1442  This suggests that schools are employed 
to foster the internal cohesion and collective esteem of smaller communities 
in Macedonia’s consociation, in the hope that this will temper their sense of 
political exclusion. 
This approach produced negligible results.  For one, very few students 
selected the elective course in 2008-2009, leaving the Ministry of Education 
and international observers puzzled.1443  In fact, a study on Roma Language 
and Culture found that the elective subject was ‘more a declarative 
commitment of the government and relevant state institutions than [a] 
reality’.1444  Between 2008 and 2010, information about the subject often did 
not reach illiterate families, those taking seasonal work abroad or those 
without a permanent address.1445   The BoE, the Ministry, and individual 
schools provided contradictory information over who could select the 
subject,1446 and the minimum number of students required to establish a 
class was sometimes set at 15, sometimes at 20.1447  Even when classes 
were established, teachers lacked pedagogical training and teaching 
qualifications.1448  Curricula existed but no one had responded to the call for 
textbooks, so no teaching materials were available.1449  Finally, schools often 
discouraged parents from signing up and parents feared overburdening their 
children and singling them out as different from other pupils.1450  The study 
concluded that ‘the State has not secured [the] necessary preconditions for 
the implementation of the said elective subject’.1451   
                                            
1442 Ali Cupi Interview. 
1443 Lazarevska Interview. 
1444  Foundation Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma 
Language and Culture, 23. 
1445 Lazarevska Interview. 
1446  Foundation Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma 
Language and Culture, 15, 19. 
1447 Ibid., 16. 
1448 Lazarevska Interview. 
1449 The curricula were drafted by the BoE, linguists, philologists and community experts. 
The call for textbook proposals was issued in January 2009, three months after the 
introduction of the subjects in schools. Ali Cupi Interview; Foundation Open Society 
Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma Language and Culture, 17. 
1450 Ibid., 21; Lazarevska Interview. 
1451  Foundation Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma 
Language and Culture, 7. 
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Since 2010, the DDPELC has worked to address the shortcomings in the 
implementation of the elective subject in Language and Culture of the Roma, 
Vlach and Bosniak communities.1452  It organises meetings with parents in 
schools1453 and has appointed textbook authors and published textbooks.1454  
The DDPELC has also attempted to provide better training for teachers of 
Language and Culture of the communities, and to create University chairs in 
the languages of the smaller communities.  In 2012, it succeeded in 
introducing an elective course in Roma Culture and Language in the 
Pedagogical Faculty of the Saints Cyril and Methodius University.1455    
Enrolments in the elective classes have increased since 2010 but a 
fundamental dilemma remains.  The state provides education in the 
Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Serbian languages according to a 
language shelter (or even voluntary segregation) model.  Yet children from 
smaller ethnic communities are forced to study in a language that is not their 
mother-tongue.  They can only study their mother-tongue or heritage 
language as an additional subject.  This reflects the inter-communal power 
hierarchy in Macedonia’s consociation and contributes to reproducing it.  
Children from smaller minorities face greater difficulties at school because of 
their limited proficiency in the language of instruction, but they also have an 
additional workload compared to children of Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish 
and Serbian backgrounds.  Thus, the Foundation Open Society Macedonia 
observes that ‘the right of these communities to study their language and 
culture is being provided to the detriment of the principle of equality among 
pupils’.1456   
Ironically, these considerations are of limited interest to many parents, who 
often would prefer additional classes in English or Macedonian to the elective 
language and culture of the Roma, Vlach and Bosniak communities.1457  
While appreciating opportunities to cultivate their mother-tongues and 
                                            




1456  Foundation Open Society Macedonia, Analysis of the Implementation of Roma 
Language and Culture, 16. 
1457 Ibid., 21. 
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community traditions, members of smaller communities are deeply aware 
that ‘the market forces say you have to know Macedonian and if you want 
more you have to know Albanian’.1458  
6.4.3 Walking the Line 
Debates over language policy in Macedonia exemplify the need, in deeply 
divided societies, to walk the ‘very thin line between enjoying language rights 
and complete separation’.1459  The language of instruction in Macedonia’s 
state schools remains a bone of contention in highly symbolic debates over 
ownership of the state and its institutions, and the relationships between 
different communities, as demonstrated by the Strategy for Integrated 
Education.    
Debates over languages in Macedonia’s schools reflect the evolving status 
and hierarchy of different ethno-linguistic communities in the state, to an 
even greater extent than language debates in Lebanon and Northern Ireland.  
Thus, post-Ohrid language policies have hampered the learning of the 
Macedonian language among children of Albanian background and fostered 
the separation of Albanian and Macedonian children into different schools or 
shifts.1460  These are the unintended consequences of the newly established 
parity of esteem between the ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian 
communities.  Yet debates over the language of instruction in schools also 
highlight the marginalisation of the Turkish, Serbian, Roma, Bosniak and 
Vlach communities in consociational Macedonia. 
6.5 Conclusion  
This analysis of language policies in compulsory schools in Macedonia, 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon confirms that language is the nexus between 
the economic, cultural and political function of education in consociations.  
Debates over languages of instruction reflect both the political saliency of 
languages and the tension between two functions of education.  On the one 
hand, education is expected to provide the skills for future employment and 
                                            
1458 Officer in an International Delegation, Interview. 
1459 Interview with Officer in an International Donor, Skopje, 14/09/2012. 
1460 Zenkolli Interview; Sabani Interview; Ali Cupi Interview. See Chapter 7. 
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full participation in society.  This requires the mastering of the state 
language, as well as international languages.  Thus, in Lebanon schools 
have adopted a model of dual-language enrichment bilingualism (Arabic-
French or Arabic-English) and in Macedonia English-medium education is 
demanded and valued.  Even in deeply divided societies, when bilingualism 
is seen as key to social mobility and when it serves the ‘interests of dominant 
groups in the society’, it is less politically contentious and more ‘socially 
rewarded and recognised’ than the teaching of indigenous languages.1461   In 
contrast, the latter often musters ‘little support or opprobrium’.1462  
On the other hand, education reflects and reproduces inter-group relations 
and hierarchies.  Küper reflects that ‘political power and domination are not 
exercised in the language of those who are dominated’.  He adds that it is 
‘quite normal that a change of political power be accompanied by a change 
of language’. 1463   This chapter confirms that the Belfast and Ohrid 
Agreements inaugurated new language policies, mirroring altered political 
relationships and new inter-group hierarchies.  In consociational Macedonia, 
language policy reflects the demographic weight, political assertiveness and 
different political status of ethno-linguistic communities.  Communities ‘over 
20 percent’ (the ethnic Macedonians and Albanians) are provided with state-
funded university education in the mother-tongue.  Moreover, the state has 
long protected the right to mother-tongue education of the Macedonian, 
Albanian, Turkish and Serb communities through a ‘language shelter’ model 
of primary and secondary education.  Since 2007, this has evolved into a 
voluntary monolingual ‘segregation programme’.  In contrast, children 
belonging to the smaller and less assertive Roma, Vlach and Bosniak 
communities attend monolingual submersion education in the Macedonian or 
Albanian language.  Thus, schools reflect and reproduce inter-group 
hierarchies. 
                                            
1461 Cummins,  “Introduction”, in Cummins (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Education 
Volume 5, xiv. 
1462 Lo Bianco,  “Bilingual Education”, in Cummins (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and 
Education Volume 5, 41. 
1463 Küper,  “The Necessity”, in Ouane (ed.), Towards a Multilingual Culture of Education, 95. 
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Finally, this chapter shows that choices of languages of instruction can help 
create overarching markers of identity (as with Arabic in Lebanon) but also 
cement mutually exclusive ethnic, national and confessional communities.  
The latter is the case when language is a politically salient marker of identity, 
as in Macedonia, and when it overlaps with other salient cleavages, as in 
Northern Ireland.  Indeed, in Northern Ireland, schools are helping to 
construct heritage languages (Irish and Ulster-Scots) as further markers of 
communal identity.  As evident in Macedonia, decisions about the language 
of instruction and model of language teaching in deeply divided societies can 
further the physical and psychological separation between children belonging 





7 Intergroup Contact and Separation in Schools  
This chapter analyses the structure of the education system in consociational 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia to determine whether schools 
foster contact or separation between children from different backgrounds.  It 
first introduces the theoretical debate over the political function of separate 
schools in deeply divided societies, whose essence ‘concerns the right to a 
separate education… against the role that separate schools are perceived to 
play in perpetuating divisions and sectarianism’. 1464   Then, it considers 
initiatives to reform the structure of the education system in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia after the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid 
Agreements.   
This chapter shows that education policy in the three consociations 
navigated between the dual aims of protecting communal identities through a 
plurality of separate schools, and promoting social cohesion through plural 
mixed institutions.  It demonstrates that ultimately the three ‘consociational’ 
education systems privileged a plurality of separate schools over plural 
common schools.  Thus, as in curricular policy, successful initiatives to 
promote reconciliation through mixed schools also accommodated demands 
for group equality and a better quality of education. 
7.1 Separate and Common Schools in Deeply Divided Societies: 
Theoretical Debates 
Tracing the history of education systems in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, Chapter 3 demonstrated that the difference between educational 
separation and segregation is ambiguous when the boundary between 
imposition of and demand for separated schools is blurred.1465   Indeed, 
communities in deeply divided societies have historically viewed separate 
schools as tools to nurture and transmit specific aspects of group identity 
(such as history, language or religion).  Thus, many plural societies, including 
                                            
1464 Joanne Hughes, "Are Separate Schools Divisive? A Case Study from Northern Ireland," 
British Educational Research Journal 37, no. 5 (2011): 829. 
1465   Crispin Jones, "State Education and Minority Rights," in Minority Rights Group 
International, Education Rights and Minorities, 8; Tony Gallagher, Education, 118. 
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Lebanon and Northern Ireland, recognise the right to schools that protect and 
reproduce the cultural specificities of local communities.   
However, each society regulates the relationship between the state and 
communal schools in a different way.  For example, Lebanon’s education 
system approximates a model of communally-based schooling, with 
subsidised schools fully managed by confessional communities, and state 
institutions ‘for the unaffiliated’.1466  Communally-based schooling is criticised 
for furthering the ‘fragmentation of citizens into silos with unequal freedom, 
opportunity and civic status attached to each silo or citizen’.1467  In contrast, 
Northern Ireland approximates civic minimalism, which maximises school 
choice but enforces basic common educational standards through a common 
statutory curriculum.1468  Both in communally-based and in civic minimalist 
schooling, ‘too many of those with the power to choose opt for separate 
environments’, and schools generally cater for uniform student bodies in 
terms of their income, ethnicity or religion.1469  Such informal separation 
‘based on customs and practice’ is harder to erode than legally enforced 
segregation.1470  
Research suggests that separate schooling is an important expression of 
provisions for communal autonomy and group equality in consociations.1471  
This chapter confirms that separate schools reflect the principles 
underpinning political consociations.  It adds that consociational education 
systems are typically characterised by the existence of a plurality of state-
funded schools catering for children from different backgrounds.  This is first 
because separate schools can provide precious channels for upward social 
mobility in deeply divided societies.  Second, equally funded and equally 
legitimate separate schools may contribute to peace by enhancing feelings of 
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1467 Ibid., 87. 
1468 Ibid., 88. 
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citizenship and stimulating loyalty to a state that ‘reflects and values their 
cultural group’.1472  Thus, Skutnabb-Kangas claims that ‘accepting temporary 
physical segregation as a means for achieving educational, psychological, 
societal and political integration of minorities and majorities later on is an 
absolute necessity for a human rights oriented education’.1473  
Actually, separate institutions need to be carefully managed to ensure that 
‘physical segregation’ remains a temporary expedient and that they 
contribute to positive intergroup relations. 1474   If mismanaged, separate 
schools can perpetuate socio-economic inequality through, for example, 
lower quality education for certain communities.  Thus, they can act as the 
‘seal’ to iniquity rather than as an instrument for emancipation.1475  In turn, 
iniquity exacerbates inter-group conflicts when socio-economic cleavages 
overlap with communal cleavages.1476   
Beyond contributing to material inequality, Gallagher maintains that separate 
schools ‘can have a detrimental impact on social cohesion’ in two 
respects.1477   First, separate schools can socialise children into different 
cultures through politicised or nationalised curricula (‘cultural hypothesis’).1478  
Previous chapters have considered the ‘cultural hypothesis’ and 
demonstrated that even common history and citizenship education curricula 
can be employed to convey different and mutually hostile allegiances to 
children from different backgrounds, particularly when they attend separate 
schools.   
This chapter considers the second perspective on how separate schools 
contribute to the perpetuation of inter-group conflicts.  The ‘social hypothesis’ 
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holds that the very fact of separation along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines 
may ‘initiate pupils into conflict’ by validating group differences and 
encouraging prejudice, hostility and fear.1479   
Indeed, evidence suggests that separate schools, regardless of their 
manifest curricula, ‘may not rebuild social cohesion as readily as integrated 
schools where contact between children is sustained’.1480  First, in attempting 
to protect distinctive elements of group culture, schools may nurture 
‘essentialist identities’, which are easily mobilised for conflict.1481   Thus, 
separate schools may convey mutually exclusive political identities, 
reproduce images of communities as ‘homogeneous and fixed’ and ignore 
those identities that are ambiguous, multi-layered and overlapping, in order 
‘to maintain social harmony’.1482   
Second, Hughes shows that ‘cultural and physical isolation’ in school is 
correlated to feelings of ‘suspicion and fear’ towards members of other 
communities in Northern Ireland.1483  Indeed, separate schools can benignly 
accept ‘longstanding prejudices’ and discourage debate over the roots of 
conflict, thereby hampering mutual understanding and trust.1484  Combined 
with physical separation, this can perpetuate stereotypes, such as the belief 
that members of different communities have different physical 
characteristics.1485    
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Third, separate schools ‘set up processes that maintain separation in the 
school and out into life beyond school’.1486  They prevent the development of 
inter-group friendships and further endogamy, thereby preserving the 
symbolic and practical security of communities.1487  Moreover, when separate 
schools reflect the residential separation of communities into different areas, 
schools can become institutional symbols of communal hold over territory.   
Critics of separate schooling generally support the ‘contact hypothesis’, 
which also informs many educational initiatives in Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia.  Allport’s ‘contact hypothesis’ holds that ‘prejudice (unless 
deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by 
equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of 
common goals’. 1488   By extension, mixed schools would contribute to 
reconciliation in deeply divided societies.1489   
However, more tolerant individuals cannot be produced ‘by osmosis’: recent 
refinements to Allport’s initial hypothesis provide important insights on what 
kinds of contact are beneficial.1490  Optimal contact situations fulfil four basic 
conditions: equality between individuals or groups; cooperative contact 
activities presenting a common goal; avoidance of competitive situations; and 
legitimation of contact through institutional support. 1491   Moreover, when 
communal identities are salient during contact, prejudices are reduced ‘via 
generalisation’.1492  When contact encourages meaningful engagement with 
divisive issues, it furthers mutual knowledge and understanding and helps 
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define ‘who we are in relation to them’.1493  Finally, sustained and regular 
interaction among individuals from different backgrounds in a variety of social 
contexts can further ‘recategorisation’ or the adoption of overarching 
superordinate group identities.1494  In sum, when it meets certain conditions, 
as Hughes puts it, ‘contact is good, and the more of it the better’.1495   
Indeed, contact between individuals of different backgrounds helps reduce 
prejudices and anxiety in mixed environments; it encourages the exploration 
of personal and group identities and the understanding of multiple 
perspectives; and it provides opportunities to debate sensitive issues and 
further inter-group friendships.1496  In contrast to common misconceptions, 
contact does not dilute national or religious identifications.1497  Yet it results in 
more positive inter-group attitudes, increased empathy and respect for 
diversity, propensity for forgiveness, and more ability to appreciate, and even 
to take, alternative perspectives in a debate.1498  Contact may also affect 
long-term social attitudes: former integrated school students in Northern 
Ireland, regardless of their socio-economic background, are more supportive 
of mixed schools and mixed marriages, and more likely to adopt ‘neutral 
political position[s]’.1499  
Moreover, the beneficial impact of contact may extend beyond the immediate 
participants.  Recent research addressed the ‘transfer problem’, explaining 
how contact among a limited number of people can impact on wider 
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society.1500  It found that the knowledge that a friend or a family member has 
friends from a different community moderates and improves the inter-group 
attitudes of individuals. 1501   By reducing fear and anxiety, ‘vicarious 
friendship’ in turn contributes to prejudice reduction.1502   
Despite its benefits, contact is not a panacea.  First, contact may impact 
differently on different components of social cohesion and reconciliation.  For 
example, Janmaat shows that classroom diversity is positively correlated with 
tolerance, but not with trust and civic participation.1503  Thus, initiatives to 
promote reconciliation through schools cannot be limited to inter-group 
contact.  Second, contextual factors affect the impact of contact initiatives.  
For example, mixed education reduces anxiety and prejudices to a greater 
degree in mixed residential areas than in separated residential areas.  This is 
because in the former, inter-group contact is consistent with the values and 
norms promoted by families and local communities.1504   
Third, Donnelly points out that in post-conflict plural societies, individuals 
belonging to minority and majority groups perceive contact differently, and 
contact impacts them differently. 1505   Referring to Northern Ireland, she 
argues that members of minority groups tend to be less enthusiastic about 
mixed activities, and their attitudes are less affected by experiences of 
contact.1506  This may reflect each group’s interpretation of conflict: groups 
that view conflicts as the result of state-sanctioned inequality perceive 
personal relationships as irrelevant to peace-building.1507  Thus, they resist 
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overemphasis on contact as a mechanism for conflict resolution, arguing that 
it absolves the state from its responsibility ‘in the construction and 
maintenance of racial and ethnic divisions’.1508  Their political representatives 
are likely to ‘believe that as long as you have equality, everything else will fall 
into place’.1509   Conversely, when groups view conflict as resulting from 
dysfunctional inter-communal relations (as majority communities often do), 
their members tend to favour contact as a peace-building mechanism and 
report more benefits from it.1510   Their political representatives generally 
maintain that ‘we cannot hope to move beyond our present community 
divisions while our young people are educated separately’.1511  
This chapter shows that the tension between aspirations to encourage inter-
group contact and the desire to further group equality underpinned debates 
over structural reforms in the education systems of Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia after the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements. 
7.2 Lebanon 
Bashshour argues that the ‘issue of public versus private’ is key to 
understanding the relationship between the state, confessional communities 
and the education system in Lebanon.1512  He believes the following story 
exemplifies this relationship.  In 1947, notables in a small town were offered 
the opportunity to establish a free state school.  They refused, arguing it 
would threaten the viability of an existing private school, but accepted a cash 
gift from the state.  Bashshour explains that they ‘wanted money from the 
government but they [didn’t] want the government to open a school for 
them’.1513   This chapter shows that nowadays, international donors face 
similar attitudes when they set out to finance state schools.   
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Indeed, private schools have a long tradition in Lebanon and are a source of 
national pride and prestige: since independence they have embodied the 
principle of freedom of education, enshrined in Article 10 of the Lebanese 
Constitution, but also promoted ‘their own divergent views of national identity 
and sense of civic loyalty’. 1514   Chapter 3 explained that successive 
Lebanese governments declared they would establish state control over 
private education, but in practice they diminished state supervision over 
private institutions and entrenched the position of private schools by 
subsiding them.1515  When demands for equal opportunities for children from 
deprived backgrounds emerged in the 1960s, rather than investing in state 
education, governments expanded subsidies for private free schools.1516  
Until the 1970s, private schools competed against an expanding state 
education sector, but during the civil war state education dwindled and 
private institutions grew exponentially (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Schools by Foundation Year in Lebanon.1517 
 
The Taif Agreement called for the expansion of state education but also 
declared that ‘private education shall be protected and state control over 
private schools… shall be strengthened’.1518  As explained in Chapter 3, 
Muslim educational councils had long called for the expansion of public 
education and state control over private schools.  Conversely, 
representatives of Christian schools and political parties insisted on 
maximally independent private institutions.  The Taif Agreement attempted to 
square this circle.    
7.2.1 Private vs Public? 
The 1993 Education Development Plan reformulated the objectives of the 
Taif Agreement: it set out ‘to reinforce the public sector of education’ but also  
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 -    
 100  
 200  
 300  
 400  
 500  













































Public Private-Free Private 
 276 
 ‘to protect private education’.1520  Bashshour commented: ‘when it comes to 
private education you protect it, protect it against what?’1521  Indeed, Figure 
11 shows that the exponential growth in the number of private schools in 
Lebanon continued after the Taif agreement.  Most observers would agree 
that, since 1989, private education has continued to expand at the expense 
of a weakening state network.  This is because private schools have a better 
reputation than their state counterparts.1522  Moreno found that private school 
students perform 10-15 percent better than public school students in most 
identical exams.1523  Thus, by 2010, about half of Lebanese schools were 
private or private free (Figure 12), catering for the overwhelming majority of 
Lebanese children, as shown in Figure 13.   
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Figure 13: Percentage Students by Type of School in Lebanon in 2010.1524 
 
Despite the Taif Agreement, government institutional and financial support 
for state schools has been weak at best: World Bank consultant Moreno 
estimates that out of the 11 percent of Lebanese GDP spent on education, 
just over 2 percent of GDP ‘is public money into public schools’.1525  In a 
‘surreal’ policy, the Lebanese government provides extensive subsidies to 
private and private free schools, including educational grants to civil servants 
allowing state employees to send their children to private schools.1526   
Poor investment in state schools reveals the post-1989 diminished view of 
state responsibilities: rather than a provider of welfare, the state emerged 
simply as the facilitator of ‘a good business environment’.1527  It also reflects 
the inability of successive governments to implement their plans in a 
politically unstable context.  Finally, successive governments may have failed 
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to redirect investment from the private into the public sector because of the 
political influence of confessional communities, whose interests lay in the 
survival of private confessional schools.1528   
However, donors agree that the quality gap between public and private 
schools, and the weakness of public education, hampers social cohesion and 
trust in the Lebanese state.  In this view, private schools cannot promote 
‘national unity’ if they only cater to one confessional community.1529  Thus, 
the World Bank attempted to ‘generate some [social] glue’ by investing in a 
ten-years Education Development Project.1530  The project aimed to improve 
the quality of state education and change the perception that public schools 
are only for the ‘leftovers of society’.1531  Its impact was limited because most 
of its components were not institutionalised, embedded or implemented in 
the wider education system.1532  The USAID similarly attempted to overcome 
the ‘atrophy’ of the public educational sector through infrastructural 
investment, teacher trainings, community involvement in school activities, 
and extracurricular activities in 151 state schools throughout Lebanon.1533    
Officers in international organisations admit that in the initial stages of 
projects, local community leaders often campaign to divert part of the funding 
to private schools. 1534   Reflecting on the competition between state 
institutions and private communal schools for international funding, Kotob 
suggested that perhaps education is ‘a micro-dimension of what the country 
is’.1535  Indeed, donors appear to assume that confessional communities and 
the state are rivals.  For example, a USAID official explained that better state 
services, including schools, could help construct the Lebanese state as a 
reference point for citizens.  In turn, this would erode allegiance to 
confessional communities and encourage individuals to ‘think about 
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themselves as Lebanese’.1536  This perspective overlooks the fact that in 
Lebanon, national and communal identities are ‘hyphenated’ and that the 
consociational state exists in a complex, dialectical and interdependent 
relationship with its communities.1537  Education policy is an expression of 
this interdependent relationship.   
7.2.2 Sterilised Jars? 
Despite rhetorical support for state schools as tools to promote social 
cohesion, the Lebanese state remains protective of private schools: the latter 
are part and parcel of the cultural heritage of confessional communities and 
‘it would be anathema to allow the government to mingle and tamper with 
their things’.1538   
In contrast to Northern Ireland and Macedonia, in Lebanon, private schools 
largely drive initiatives for contact among children from different communal 
and socio-economic background.  For example, in Sidon the private Hariri 
schools are encouraging ‘economic and social’ mixing by cooperating with 
state schools.1539   UNRWA is also promoting extracurricular activities to 
promote contact between Palestinian and Lebanese children, such as 
marathons in Baalbek or Sidon and summer camps.  Al-Khatib argues that 
contact activities contribute to ‘promoting the mutual understanding [between 
Lebanese and Palestinian children as] a prerequisite to avoid the other face 
of the coin, the confrontation’.1540   
El-Amine adds that even separate private schools can contribute to social 
cohesion if they disseminate ‘a minimal level of common ideology about the 
state’ and ‘a minimum culture about citizenship’.1541  Previous chapters have 
shown that views of the state and of understandings of citizenship remain 
contested in Lebanon and that schools do not even convey a minimal ‘sense 
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of universality that we all have multiple identities’.1542  However, a 2008 
survey of ninth-grade students suggests that both state and private schools 
convey some components of citizenship: public school students expressed 
more ‘trust in government institutions’ and ‘love of country’, but private school 
students displayed more knowledge and understanding of citizenship.1543   
However, despite the Taif Agreement, the Ministry of Education has little or 
no control over private institutions, with three important consequences.1544  
First, Daw blames private, and especially religious, schools for the diverging 
outlooks of Lebanon’s citizens on ‘moral and ethical issues’.1545  A senior 
officer at CERD confirms that private schools use the national curricula to 
convey ‘their point of view, their view of Lebanon, the coexistence between 
Lebanese parties’.1546  Moreover, the affiliation of private religious schools 
impacts on their hidden curriculum: prayers, readings from the scriptures, 
religious symbols and exclusive extracurricular activities and summer 
colonies help socialise children into self-contained confessional 
communities.1547  Thus, Khalife argues that private religious schools are ‘like 
sterilised jars’ that insulate children from the reality of Lebanese pluralism.1548  
Second, schools affiliated to confessions and political parties can be 
employed to socialise children in particular political or religious 
orientations.1549   For example, Erlich and Kahati reported that in a Shia 
religious school affiliated to Hizbollah in a Lebanese village, ‘judging from 
appearances, one might think that [it] was in Iran’.1550  Fincham adds that 
UNRWA schools contribute to ‘construct “difference” between “Palestinians” 
and “others”’ because the atmosphere of UNRWA schools is affected by the 
                                            
1542 Akar Interview; Yahya Interview; Daw Interview. 
1543 United Nations Development Programme, Education and Citizenship, 35-36. 
1544 Mneimneh Interview; Shuayb,  “Education”, in Choueiri (ed.), Breaking the Cycle, 191. 
1545 Daw Interview. 
1546 Senior Officer, CERD, Interview. 
1547 Ali Khalife, "La Place De La Religion À L’école  " Confluences Méditerranée 56, (2006), 
154. 
1548 Ibid. 
1549 Kotob Interview. 
1550 Reuven  Erlich and Yoram Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts 
and Minds", Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre at the Israel Intelligence Heritage 
& Commemoration Centre http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_07_030_2.pdf (last 
accessed 30/04/2014) 
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history, politics and current events in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.1551  
This does not hamper consociational stability unless the manifest and hidden 
curriculum of schools questions the legitimacy and very existence of the 
Lebanese state.   
Third, Shuayb argues that confessional schools convey a sense of belonging 
and ‘care by the sect’ whilst ‘the passive education in public schools will lead 
to negative feelings towards the secular state’.1552  As a consequence, she 
shows that most children wish they attended private religious schools rather 
than public institutions.1553  This suggests that, beyond socialising children 
into communal and political identities, private religious schools also help 
entrench communities as the main provider of services to individuals.  In 
contrast, the weakness of state education fosters resentment towards the 
state. 
Moreover, Qabbani proposes that the private-public divide may reflect and 
entrench socio-economic divisions rather than communal fractures.1554  El-
Amine adds that ‘I don’t think those who fought in 1975 were from private 
schools, they were I assume from public schools from each side, poor 
people’.1555  In fact, Mneimneh observes that ‘public schools are not civic 
schools’.1556  They recruit from the most deprived socio-economic groups but 
they are also generally separated along communal lines.1557  Despite being 
secular and open to all applicants, they largely reflect the demography of 
their area and, due to the residential separation, children belonging to 
different communities attend different schools.1558  When a school caters 
predominantly for the members of a confessional community, teachers 
belonging to other confessions tend not to seek employment there. 1559  
Ultimately, public sector appointments often reflect the clientele of politicians: 
                                            
1551 Kathleen Fincham, "Nationalist Narratives”, 5; Al-Khatib Interview. 
1552 Shuayb,  “Education”, in Choueiri (ed.), Breaking the Cycle, 183. 
1553 Ibid., 167. 
1554 Qabbani Interview. 
1555 El-Amine Interview. 
1556 Mneimneh Interview. 
1557 Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Le Développement, 7; El-Amine Interview. 
1558 Moreno Interview; Akar Interview. 
1559 Ibid. 
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a wider patronage system instrumentalises ‘state institutions to promote 
one’s individual, factional, and communal interests’.1560   
In this light, it is easier to explain continuing state subsidies to private free 
schools that compete with public institutions.  Private free schools are major 
channels for corruption and patronage.1561  Access to private free schools 
depends on the goodwill of local politicians or charitable organisations.  
Moreover, UNDP found that citizens ignore that subsidised services are 
financed and effectively provided by the state.  Therefore, as UNDP put it, 
‘rights are repackaged as “favours”’. 1562   Indirect subsidies to private 
institutions strain government resources while entrenching the role of 
communities as intermediaries between the state and its citizens.1563   
7.2.3 A Communal Backyard 
Yahya argues that the Taif agreement provided an opportunity to shape a 
stronger, civic state, but in the following decades ‘the sectarian communities 
have entered into the state and they have sort of turned it into their own 
backyard’.1564  Lebanon’s consociational state and its institutions became 
‘extensions of … [communal] politics and negotiations’.1565   
This analysis of Lebanese education reforms substantiates Yahya’s view.  
First, despite the reforms mapped in the Taif Agreement, the state has little 
or no control over private institutions.  Second, the Lebanese state finances 
both public and (indirectly) private schools.  The public education sector 
remains ‘the weak and sick guy’ and the inferior quality of public services 
delegitimises the state.1566  In contrast, subsidies to private schools entrench 
the role of confessional communities and political parties as intermediaries 
between individuals and the state.  Thus, the fragmented structure of 
Lebanon’s education system has an important political function: it helps 
                                            
1560 Chartouni Interview. 
1561 El-Amine Interview; Bashshour Interview; Kotob Interview. 
1562 United Nations Development Programme, Lebanon Human Development, 27; Kotob 
Interview. 
1563 United Nations Development Programme, Lebanon Human Development, 133.  
1564 Yahya Interview. 
1565 Ibid. 
1566 Moreno Interview; Bashshour Interview. 
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consolidate confessional communities and legitimises their political elites.  
This confirms Moreno’s view that the obstacles to education reform lie 
‘outside the education sector’: he suggests that reforms which ‘erode the 
confessional system would threaten the political leadership’.1567   
7.3 Northern Ireland 
In contrast to Lebanon, Northern Ireland has virtually no private schools.1568  
Yet, Gallagher summarises that ‘for such a small place if you can think of any 
way of dividing the kids, we do it.  We divide them in terms of class, 
academic selection, we divide them in terms of religion, we divide them very 
often in terms of gender … [and] on the basis of language’.1569  Indeed, 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the proportion of pupils in each sector of 
Northern Ireland’s fragmented education system. 
 
                                            
1567 Moreno Interview; Jim Quilty, "Separate Learning”. 
1568 DENI lists only 17 independent schools that do not receive government subsidies and do 
not implement the statutory curriculum. Department of Education Northern Ireland, 
Independent Schools List, http://www.deni.gov.uk/index/schools-and-infrastructure-
2/schools-management/10-types_of_school-nischools_pg/schools_-_types_of_school-
independent-schools.htm  (last accessed 12/06/2014). 
1569 Gallagher Interview. 
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Figure 14: Primary School Pupils by School Type in Northern Ireland in 2012-
2013.1570 
 
Chapter 3 traced the emergence of Northern Ireland’s many state-funded 
education sectors, which differ in terms of their ethos and the backgrounds of 
their pupils, teachers and administrators.  State controlled schools avoid 
formal ‘ownership of Protestant identity’ but they have a ‘de facto Protestant 
status’.1571  Similarly, Irish-medium schools are ambiguous about their ethos 
but accommodate primarily pupils of Catholic and Nationalist background.1572  
Regardless of their communal affiliation, grammar schools have a good 
reputation for quality education and selectively admit pupils on the basis of 
their 11-plus test results.1573  In contrast, Catholic maintained schools are 
explicitly faith-based and openly express and convey a ‘shared sense of 
belonging to the Catholic faith community’ as well as elements of Irish 
                                            
1570 Department of Education Northern Ireland, “Pupil Enrolment by School Type," Northern 
Ireland Summary Data, http://www.deni.gov.uk/index/facts-and-figures-new/education-
statistics/32_statistics_and_research-
numbersofschoolsandpupils_pg/32_statistics_and_research-
northernirelandsummarydata_pg.htm (last accessed 22/04/2014). 
1571 Hughes, "Are Separate Schools Divisive?," 845. 
1572 O'Duibh Interview. 






















identity.1574  Finally, integrated education aims at the ‘education together in 
equal numbers of children who are more usually educated separately’ and 
has ‘constitutional and structural safeguards to encourage ownership [of 
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Recent data shows that in 2011, half of the children in Northern Ireland 
studied at schools where over 95 percent of students belonged to one 
community.1578  Figure 16 and Figure 17 confirm that Catholic maintained 
schools cater primarily for children of Catholic (and by extension Nationalist) 
backgrounds, while controlled schools accommodate primarily children of 
Protestant (and Unionist) backgrounds. 
 
                                            
1577  Department of Education Northern Ireland, "Pupil Religion by School Type and 
Management Type”, Northern Ireland Summary Data, http://www.deni.gov.uk/index/facts-
and-figures-new/education-statistics/32_statistics_and_research-
numbersofschoolsandpupils_pg/32_statistics_and_research-
northernirelandsummarydata_pg.htm (last accessed 22/04/2014). 
1578 Torney, “How Integrated”. 
Figure 16: Religion of Primary School Pupils by School Type in Northern 
Ireland in 2012-2013.1577 
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This section considers successive attempts to reform the fragmented 
structure of Northern Ireland’s education system since 1998.  Reform 
initiatives responded to two fundamental concerns.  First, as mentioned, 
some argue that separate schools perpetuate inter-communal conflict by 
limiting interaction between people of different backgrounds, allowing 
differential teaching of the common curriculum, and hampering dialogue over 
controversial topics.1580  Accordingly, separate schools ‘initiate children into 
separate customs and attitudes’ and ‘crystallise the religious and political 
                                            
1579 Ibid. 
1580  Kinahan Interview; Interview with Sam Fitzsimmons (Communications Director, 
Integrated Education Fund),  Belfast, 4/03/2013; Interview with Stephen Farry (Alliance MLA 
and Minister for Employment and Learning), Belfast, 25/02/2013; Telephone Interview with 
Expert of Primary Religious Education,  25/03/2013. 
Figure 17: Religion of Secondary School Students by School Type in Northern 
Ireland in 2012-2013.1579 
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differences of the two communities’.1581  Conversely, mixed schools would 
contribute to social cohesion and reconciliation or, as the Belfast Agreement 
puts it, ‘a culture of tolerance’.1582   
Second, demographic changes have cast doubts over the long-term financial 
feasibility of Northern Ireland’s education system.1583  In 2011-2012, DENI 
found 82,472 empty spaces in schools, equating about 150 empty 
schools. 1584   The 2006 Independent Strategic Review of Education 
suggested that school collaborations could lead to savings of up to 79.6 
million British pounds in the education budget.1585  Successive rationalisation 
reports also underlined the financial benefits of ‘a unified system of common 
schools’.1586  Ultimately, in the current economic climate, Storey claims, ‘we 
can’t have four of everything’.1587   
7.3.1 Facilitate and Encourage Integrated Education 
In 1998, the Belfast Agreement called for ‘the promotion of a culture of 
tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and 
encourage integrated education’.1588   Following this, DENI established a 
Towards a Culture of Tolerance: Integrating Education working group, which 
included representatives of different educational sectors and educational 
experts.  When the working group met, the representatives of CCMS 
proposed looking into ‘ways of promoting tolerance through all types of 
schools’ rather than only considering how to expand integrated schools.1589  
The terms of reference of the working groups were amended accordingly. 
                                            
1581  Priscilla Chadwick, Schools of Reconciliation, 134; Arlow Interview; Peter Cumper, 
"Parent Power: Building Bridges in Northern Ireland," Education and the Law 3, no. 1 (1991): 
31. 
1582 Appendix 3. 
1583 Expert of Religious Education and Citizenship Education Interview. 
1584 Torney,  “How Integrated”; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 28 
1585 Ibid., 9, 15, 56-57. 
1586 Ibid. 
1587 Qtd. in Lindsay Fergus, "Northern Ireland Schools ‘Must Cooperate or Face Closure’," 
Belfast Telegraph, 11/01/2012. 
1588 Appendix 3. 
1589 Tony Gallagher, "Balancing Difference”, 436. 
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This anecdote exemplifies the main challenge to the promotion of integrated 
schools in Northern Ireland: integration is understood in a myriad of ways.1590  
Indeed, public opinion polls highlight strong public support for integrated 
education, mixed schooling and more contact between children of different 
backgrounds.1591  However, polling questions present integrated education, 
mixed education and shared education as interchangeable, when in fact they 
are completely different methods of promoting inter-group contact through 
schools.  Integrated schools are ‘common schools attended by children of 
different traditions’. 1592   As Chapter 3 explained, they were created by 
parents and are founded, according to the Northern Ireland Council for 
Integrated Education (NICIE), on principles of equality, faith and values, 
social responsibility, and parental involvement. 1593   They enrol equal 
numbers of children belonging to the Catholic and Protestant traditions: far 
from being an empty ‘box-ticking’ exercise, this ensures that no community 
feels assimilable.1594  In contrast, mixed schools are ‘separate schools with a 
significant minority from other tradition’.1595   Finally, shared education is 
‘separate schools with some shared resources, pupil contact and 
collaboration between them’.1596   
 
                                            
1590 Mcilwaine Interview. 
1591 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 31-41. The yearly Northern Ireland Life and Times 
Surveys are the most apparent example. 
1592 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 5. 
1593  Ibid., 11. Equality, interdependence, inclusivity and celebration of other cultures 
according to McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic 
Conflict, 83; Interview with Baroness May Blood (President, Integrated Education Fund), 
London, 19/03/2013; Fitzsimmons Interview; Donnelly, "In Pursuit of School Ethos," 146. 
1594  Grant Maintained Integrated Schools enforce a 40:40:20 ratio, while Controlled 
Integrated Schools are expected to reach a 70:30 ratio within ten years of transformation. 
Mcilwaine Interview; Hughes and Donnelly,  “Is the Policy Sufficient?” in Bekerman and 
McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 122; Interview with John McCallister 
(Independent MLA), Belfast, 25/02/2013. 
1595 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 5. 
1596 Ibid. 
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This terminological ambiguity partly explains why, despite overwhelming 
support for more mixing in education, integrated education stagnates.  
Indeed, integrated schools have expanded from the 28 pupils in Lagan 
College in 1981 to the current 21,503 students in integrated education (or 7 
percent of total enrolments).1598  Yet Figure 18 shows that expansion peaked 
before the Belfast agreement and has slowed since 1999.1599  
There are also practical challenges to the expansion of integrated education.  
In particular, demographic and financial constraints hamper the 
establishment of new integrated schools.  Since the late 1990s, DENI has 
increased financial incentives for existing schools wishing to transform into 
                                            




northernirelandsummarydata_pg.htm (last accessed 22/04/2014). 
1598 Paul Connolly, Dawn Purvis, and PJ O'Grady, Advancing Shared Education. Report of 
the Ministerial Advisory Group (Belfast, 2013), xx. 
1599 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 13. 
Figure 18: Number of Students in Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland 


































































integrated establishments. 1600   Transformation ‘is a longer journey’: it 
requires progressive change in staff, integration of library contents, timetable 
changes and a new approach to curricula of, for example, religious 
education.1601  The procedures for transformation also remain complex: they 
involve a decision by the boards of governors, a public meeting, a public 
vote, a vote among parents and the approval of schools within a ten-mile 
radius.1602  This discourages transformation.  Indeed, DENI reports that 42 
schools in Northern Ireland are mixed (with 10 percent or more pupils of a 
different tradition) but have no intention of transforming.1603  Finally, DENI 
refuses a request for transformation if it threatens the viability of an existing 
controlled or Catholic maintained school.  In this case, children demanding 
integrated education are diverted into a different school sector.  As 
Fitsimmons notes, ‘that would not happen in any other sector; you would not 
force a Catholic child who wanted to go to a Catholic maintained school into 
a Protestant controlled school’.1604   
Thus, DENI has been accused of interpreting its statutory duty to ‘encourage 
and facilitate’ integrated education as ‘a requirement only to be responsive to 
parental demand rather than… actively seeking opportunities to increase the 
number of integrated or common schools’.1605  The Integrated Education 
Fund argues that parents would send their children to integrated schools if 
more places were available and reports that applications to integrated 
schools are frequently turned down because of the lack of places (1000 
applications were refused in 2001, and 500 in 2005). 1606   Still, not all 
integrated schools are oversubscribed, most parents ‘will choose a good 
school over an integrated school’ and there are relatively few demands for 
                                            
1600 Blood Interview; Mcilwaine Interview; Valerie Morgan and Grace Fraser, "When Does 
'Good News' Become 'Bad News'?," 372-375.  
1601 Blood Interview. 
1602 Ibid. 
1603 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 3. 
1604 Fitzsimmons Interview; Blood Interview. 
1605 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 3; Fitzsimmons Interview. 
1606  Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 44-47; Department of Education Northern Ireland, 
Towards a Culture of Tolerance. Integrating Education, (Belfast: Department of Education 
Northern Ireland, 1998): 8; Claire McGlynn, "Integrated and Faith-Based Schooling in 
Northern Ireland," The Irish Journal of Education 36, (2005): 52; McGlynn et al., "Moving out 
of Conflict," 152.  
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the transformation of existing schools to integrated status.1607   McDevitt 
points out that if there was a strong desire for integrated education, ‘all of our 
schools would be integrated by now, because we’ve had the option to… 
[integrate] for nearly forty years, and for 20-odd years we’ve had a duty.’1608  
7.3.2 A sterile debate? 
The most fundamental achievement of the integrated education movement is 
undoubtedly that ‘attacking the aim of educating children together has 
become increasingly difficult if not impossible in mainstream religion and 
politics’. 1609   However, despite the Belfast Agreement, the expansion of 
integrated schools remains highly controversial.  
First, it is criticised because of the purported impact of integrated schools on 
national and religious identities.  McDevitt observes that integrated schools 
convey ‘a common allegiance to a state’, thereby effectively privileging 
unionist over nationalist narratives of the state.1610  This may explain why the 
Catholic Church and CCMS maintain that mixing does not require integrated 
education. 1611  Moreover, integrated schools have been criticised for 
neutralising identities by, for example, not displaying symbols of national and 
confessional belonging.1612   Research confirms that integrated education 
affects social attitudes, generates more ‘positive positions’ on politics, 
religion, identity, mixed marriages and integrated schooling, and produces 
‘less extreme attitudes’. 1613   It may even facilitate the emergence of a 
                                            
1607 Donnelly Interview; Gallagher Interview; Bell Interview; Senior Officer (Education and 
Skills Authority) Interview. 
1608 McDevitt Interview. 
1609  Fionnuala O'Connor, A Shared Childhood, the Story of the Integrated Schools in 
Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2002): 64; Interview with Eimear Bush 
(Programme Manager, Special European Union Programmes Body), Belfast, 20/02/2013. 
1610 McDevitt Interview. 
1611 Murphy Interview. The St Columbanus College in Bangor is generally mentioned as an 
example of a Catholic maintained school where out of 597 pupils only 256 had a Catholic 
background in 2012. Torney, “How Integrated”. 
1612 Personal Communication with Ex-Principal in a Catholic Maintained School,  21/02/2013. 
In fact, research proves most schools’ emphasis on parity of esteem and on ecumenical 
Christianity, see: McGlynn, "Negotiating Cultural Difference," in in McGlynn et al. (eds.), 
Peace Education, 20; Chadwick, Schools of Reconciliation, 166; O'Connor, A Shared 
Childhood, 98. 
1613 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 9, 50. 
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complementary and overarching ‘integrated identity’ among students.1614  Yet 
inter-group contact does not impact national, religious or socio-political self-
identification among students.1615   Thus, political opposition to integrated 
schools may reflect more worry about electoral results than concern with 
religious and national integrity.1616  Indeed, Farry reflects that ‘political parties 
who are organised and who appeal to an electorate based on a sectional 
basis’ have no interest in promoting initiatives that would ‘undermine the 
cohesion of what are essentially separate constituencies’.1617   
Second, reflecting a long-standing tradition of Unionist insistence on 
integration through state controlled schools, in 2010 First Minister Peter 
Robinson called Northern Ireland’s education system ‘a benign form of 
apartheid’ and blamed the fragmented education system for the continuing 
divisions in society.1618   The DUP and other unionist parties argue that 
integrated schools receive preferential treatment, endanger state schools 
and contribute to their demise.1619  In particular, Storey views transformation 
to integrated status as a survival strategy, ‘a vehicle to try and squeeze out of 
the system all the benefits’. 1620   Echoing Bashshour’s view of private 
education in Lebanon, he adds that ‘the state system is good enough to give 
the money but it ain’t good enough for them [integrated and Catholic 
maintained schools] to be part of it’.1621   The rigid quotas and complex 
process of transformation discourage many schools from becoming 
integrated, but all of the 17 schools that have transformed to date are state-
controlled schools.1622  Thus, some argue that transformation is depriving the 
Protestant community of its schools while leaving the Catholic maintained 
                                            
1614 McGlynn et al., "Moving out of Conflict," 155; McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and 
McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 78. 
1615 McGlynn et al., "Moving out of Conflict," 154; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 50. 
1616 Blood Interview. 
1617 Farry Interview. 
1618 "Peter Robinson Calls for End to School Segregation," Belfast Telegraph, 16/10/2010. 
1619 O'Connor, A Shared Childhood, 68, 70; Storey Interview. 
1620 Ibid.; Hughes and Donnelly,  “Is the Policy Sufficient?,” in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), 
Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 131. 
1621 Storey Interview. 
1622 Interview with Kathryn Torney (Journalist, the Detail Tv), Belfast, 18/02/2013; Senior 
Officer, Belfast Education and Library Board, Interview; Blood Interview. 
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sector intact.1623  As noted in Chapter 3, the asymmetric impact of integrated 
education on the state controlled and Catholic maintained sectors has, since 
1998, added to Protestant/Unionist feelings of relative deprivation.   
However, integration through the state controlled sector is not a realistic 
option.  The state controlled system is ‘deemed as [religiously, culturally and 
politically] Protestant’ by all communities in Northern Ireland and this 
hampers the potential both for genuine integration and for beneficial inter-
group contact in state controlled schools.1624  Indeed, NICIE maintains that 
children belonging to minority traditions in both state controlled schools and 
Catholic maintained schools experience assimilation and hide their 
identities.1625  Even Robinson’s call for the end of educational ‘apartheid’ 
appeared to some as the expression of ‘anti-Catholic’ or anti-Irish 
attitudes.1626   
Moreover, Figure 19 confirms that enrolment in primary state controlled 
schools has declined steadily since the Belfast agreement.  The picture is 
similar for post-primary schools. 1627   Yet this has little to do with the 
expansion of integrated education: it reflects the overall demographic decline 
and the shrinking of the Protestant/Unionist community.1628   Additionally, 
pupils in Catholic maintained schools perform better than their peers in 
controlled schools: in non-selective Catholic maintained schools, 73.7 
percent of pupils gain five or more good GCSEs, compared to only 59.2 
percent in non-selective controlled schools.1629  Due to the better quality of 
Catholic maintained schools, increasing numbers of children of 
Protestant/Unionist background attend Catholic maintained schools.1630  
                                            
1623 O'Connor, A Shared Childhood, 168. 
1624 Blood Interview; Mcilwaine Interview. 
1625 Ibid. 
1626 Ibid.; Mcdevitt Interview. 
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1629 Nolan, Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 96. 
1630 "Parental Control Shaping Education," Belfast Telegraph, 27/01/2012. 
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Third, integrated schools are criticised for having failed to produce ‘wonderful 
citizens’ and ‘bring communities together’.1632  Research suggests that, in its 
emphasis on the benefits of contact per se rather than on schools’ 
contributions to tackling differences, the integrated education movement may 
have ‘lost a sense of purpose’.1633  In fact, until the recent introduction of the 
                                            




northernirelandsummarydata_pg.htm (last accessed 22/04/2014). 
1632 Murphy Interview. 
1633 Hughes and Donnelly,  “Is the Policy Sufficient?,” in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), 
Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 131. 
Figure 19: Pupil Enrolments by Primary School Type in Northern Ireland 
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Community Relations, Equality & Diversity Policy, inspections did not assess 
the depth of integration and the contribution of schools to mutual 
understanding and reconciliation. 1634   Thus, different integrated schools 
adopted different approaches to diversity and integration: at one end of the 
spectrum, proactive approaches involved planned policies and activities to 
further integration.  At the other end, passive approaches allowed integration 
to happen naturally. 1635   Passive approaches were more frequent in 
transformed integrated schools than in schools founded as integrated, 
particularly at the primary level.1636  Passive approaches to integration can 
make inter-group contact ineffective by, for example neutralising rather than 
making salient the identities of Protestant/unionist and 
Catholic/nationalist.1637   
To critics, the failure of integrated schools to produce ‘wonderful citizens’ 
confirms that social integration should be allowed to happen naturally rather 
than be encouraged.1638  In fact, recent research suggests that, despite its 
limits, integrated education has an overwhelmingly positive social impact in 
deeply divided societies.1639  Unlike short-term cross-community projects, it 
provides sustained and positive contact.1640  The quantity and quality of inter-
group contact predicts children’s attitudes to different others and propensity 
to forgive.1641  Thus, integrated school students display more respect for 
diversity, greater empathy and increased appreciation of different sides of an 
                                            
1634 Donnelly Interview; Hughes and Donnelly,  “Is the Policy Sufficient?”, in Bekerman and 
McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 131. The Community Relations, Equality & 
Diversity Policy is described in Chapter 5. 
1635 McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 
81. 
1636McGlynn, "Negotiating Cultural Difference," in in McGlynn et al. (eds.), Peace Education, 
20. 
1637 Hughes and Donnelly, “Is the Policy Sufficient?,” in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), 
Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 129. 
1638 Murphy Interview; Senior Officer, Belfast Education and Library Board, Interview. 
1639 Hughes Interview; Gallagher Interview; Blood Interview; McGlynn et al., "Moving out of 
Conflict," 154; McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic 
Conflict, 78; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 9; Paolini et al., "Effects of Direct and 
Indirect Cross-Group Friendships." 
1640 McGlynn et al., "Moving out of Conflict," 154. 
1641 Ibid., 153; McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic 
Conflict, 78. 
 297 
argument.1642  Mixed schooling also promotes security and confidence in 
mixed groups as well as mixed friendships.1643  Finally, recent research has 
demonstrated that friends and family members of individuals involved in 
sustained and positive contact through integrated education also experience 
reduced prejudice and anxiety. 1644   Despite these findings, even 
wholehearted supporters of integrated education admit that the integrated 
education movement did not create momentum for the integration of the 
whole education system and remains ‘a small sector that’s very closed within 
itself’.1645   
Indeed, Gallagher argues that the politicisation of arguments over separate 
and integrated schools in Northern Ireland has led to an increasingly ‘sterile 
debate’. 1646   Despite public opinion polls, it is clear that parents and 
communities treasure particular school sectors. 1647   In Northern Ireland, 
schools remain an expression of identity and culture and there is very little 
appetite for a non-denominational integrated system.1648  As McDevitt puts it, 
‘people relate to schools that they feel uphold their positive sense of identity, 
be that national, be that religious… be that cultural, be that social, be that 
political’.1649  For example, the Catholic/nationalist community views Catholic 
maintained schools as a symbol of its successful struggle for social mobility 
and political equality.  On the one hand, the CCMS defensively claims that 
separate sectors are ‘not necessarily working against the objectives of what 
was the Good Friday Agreement’.1650  On the other hand, Sinn Féin, holder of 
the education portfolio since 1999, maintains that ‘respecting diversity means 
                                            
1642 McGlynn et al., "Moving out of Conflict," 154; McGlynn, "Challenges," in Bekerman and 
McGlynn (eds.), Addressing Ethnic Conflict, 78. 
1643 Blood Interview; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 9; McGlynn et al., "Moving out of 
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1644 This mechanism is called ‘vicarious’ or ‘indirect’ contact. See: Paolini et al., "Effects of 
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1645 Gallagher Interview. 
1646 Ibid. 
1647 Bell Interview; McDevitt Interview. 
1648 Hughes Interview; Torney Interview. 
1649 McDevitt Interview. 
1650 Murphy Interview. 
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respecting diversity of provision’.1651  Reflecting its view of the conflict as 
resulting from state-sponsored inequality, Sinn Féin emphasises communal 
equality and parity rather than inter-group contact as the key to conflict 
management.1652   This results in the promotion of a plurality of equally 
funded education sectors.   
Moreover, if common schools existed, they would probably reflect the 
demographic realities of their separate catchment areas (as they do in 
Lebanon).1653  Indeed, over 90 percent of Northern Ireland’s public housing is 
separated.1654  In separate residential areas, schools can serve as bulwarks 
in wider ‘battles for territory’.1655  For example, during the 2001 Holy Cross 
School dispute, Protestant residents picketed the entrance to a Catholic 
primary school in north Belfast to prevent Catholic parents and children from 
walking through ‘their’ area.1656  This suggests that alternative models to 
accommodate group equality while building trust, confidence and tolerance 
may be necessary before promoting a mixed education system.1657   
7.3.3 Sharing 
According to the Ministerial Advisory Group on Shared Education, shared 
education is ‘two or more schools… from different sectors working in 
collaboration, with the aim of delivering educational benefits to learners, 
promoting the efficient and effective use of resources, and promoting equality 
of opportunity, good relations, equality of identity, respect for diversity and 
community cohesion’.1658  As mentioned, shared education is fundamentally 
different from integrated education: integrated education applies an 
                                            
1651  Interview with Senior Education Advisor, Council for Catholic Maintained Schools, 
Belfast, 18/02/2013. 
1652 Hughes Interview. 
1653 McDevitt Interview; Interview with a Senior Officer, Council for Catholic Maintained 
Schools, Belfast, 18/02/2013; Mcilwaine Interview. 
1654 Torney, “How Integrated”. 
1655 Fraser Agnew, qtd. in Colm Heatley, Interface: Flashpoints in Northern Ireland (Belfast: 
Lagan Books, 2004).  
1656 Ibid.  
1657 Mcilwaine Interview; Murphy Interview. 
1658 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xiii. 
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immersion model, while shared education is limited cooperation between 
different institutions.1659   
Gallagher traces the idea of shared education back to the reflection that 
separate schools institutionalise boundaries between children of different 
backgrounds, while integrated schools eliminate these boundaries.  ‘But 
would there be a way of leaving those boundaries in place but making them 
less important? Making them porous?’1660  The idea of shared education also 
emerged from the finding that ‘it is the cross-community contact of integrated 
education, rather than the ethos of integrated education, which promotes 
positive out-group attitudes’.1661  Thus, shared education attempts to provide 
opportunities for sustained, meaningful and positive inter-group contact 
without challenging the ethos and affiliation of schools.1662  In contrast to 
integrated education, which evolved into a third educational sector, it aims to 
permeate every existing sector of schooling by ‘bring[ing] the separate 
schools together on a curricular basis and offer[ing] children an opportunity to 
study together for a sustained period of time’.1663  Participating schools share 
their facilities and expertise and students move between schools for their 
classes.  For example, Shimna Integrated College, a school with ‘specialist 
status in modern languages’, employed shared education activities to share 
its language teachers with local primary schools.1664   
Recent evaluations confirm that sharing provides some of the same benefits 
as integrated education.  It allows children to meet different others, and 
provides sustained and regular contact even in very tense areas.1665  This 
results in less prejudice, increased trust and forgiveness, an increase in 
                                            
1659 Donnelly Interview. 
1660 Gallagher Interview. 
1661 McGlynn et al., "Moving out of Conflict," 157; Hughes Interview. 
1662 Ibid. 
1663 Hughes Interview. The first initiatives are the Sharing Education Programme of Queen’s 
University Belfast and the Primary Integrating/Enriching Education Programme financed by 
the Fermanagh Trust. 
1664 Gallagher Interview. Purdy et al., "Primary Languages," 153. 
1665 Donnelly Interview; Interview with Chris Hazzard (Sinn Féin MLA and Member of the 
Education Committee), Belfast, 18/09/2013; Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, 
xvii.  
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mixed friendships and declining anxiety.1666  In the short term, superficial 
contact may increase inter-group tensions, but schools are supported in 
managing the diversity created through cooperation.1667  
Moreover, sharing helps schools deliver the full range of the Entitlement 
Framework and complements Area planning.1668  The Entitlement Framework 
requires every school to provide a minimum of 24 courses at GCSE level and 
a minimum of 27 courses at A-level.1669  Its primary aim was to provide 
students with more educational opportunities, but very few schools are large 
enough to provide such a variety of academic and vocational subjects 
without collaborating with other institutions.1670  Thus, inter-school and inter-
sector cooperation ‘was a good thing that we didn’t anticipate when the policy 
was being developed’. 1671   Similarly, shared education encourages 
collaborative school networks and furthers teachers’ sharing of good 
practices across sectors.1672  This aids Area Planning, which aims to create 
positive interdependence between self-constituted networks of schools.1673  
In turn, school networks are expected to plan to reduce the number of empty 
desks while delivering a ‘range of options’ to pupils so they can help 
institutionalise the inter-sectoral networks established through shared 
education.1674   
Most education sectors support shared education: its academic and financial 
benefits make it appealing for school managers, parents and school 
principals.1675  Moreover, sharing is appreciated, but not ‘to such an extent 
                                            
1666 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 17; Hughes Interview; Connolly et al., Advancing 
Shared Education, xvii; Donnelly Interview. 
1667 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xviii; Gallagher Interview. 
1668 Bell Interview; Hughes Interview.  
1669 Enshrined in the 2006 Education Reform Order. At least a third of courses should be 
vocational and a third academic. Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 28; Murphy Interview; 
Gallagher Interview. 
1670 Murphy Interview; Senior Officer (Education and Skills Authority) Interview. 
1671 Ibid. 
1672 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xvii; Bell Interview; Mcilwaine Interview. 
1673 First proposed by the 2001 Burns report and by the 2004 Costello group as reported by 
Gallagher; Gallagher, "Balancing Difference," 436. 
1674  Gallagher Interview; Bell Interview; Senior Officer (Council for Catholic Maintained 
Schools) Interview. 
1675 McDevitt Interview. 
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that it would call into question whether or not their separate schools should 
exist’.1676  Indeed, some schools worry that shared education will erode their 
institutional identity or dilute their quality.1677  Yet Murphy reflects that ‘no one 
has really asked the question how is this affecting our value-based 
education’: most assume that the impact will be minimal.1678  Actually, shared 
education presents an important challenge to Catholic maintained schools: 
the need to ‘protect the distinctiveness of Catholic education as [it enters] a 
shared future with other sectors’.1679  This effectively ‘mirrors the challenge 
for society generally’. 1680   Shared education also challenges the state 
controlled sector.  As mentioned, inter-group contact is most beneficial when 
identities are salient and ‘we define who we are in relation to them’.1681  By 
avoiding ownership of a Protestant/Unionist identity, state controlled schools 
may be ‘denying Protestant children a basis on which to engage with their 
Catholic peers’.1682   
In contrast, supporters of integrated education view shared education as a 
‘watered down version’ of integration and worry that it may further legitimise 
the fragmented education system. 1683   Integrated education and shared 
education appear to be competing for pupils, political support and financial 
resources.1684  Moreover, in 2013 the Ministerial Advisory Group on Shared 
Education argued against promoting an integrated education system 
because ‘promoting one sector over others would be divisive’.1685  Thus, 
NICIE is justified in its ‘concerns that shared education is very much on the 
agenda and integrated education appears to be almost a dirty word’.1686  
                                            
1676 Gallagher Interview. 
1677 Senior Officer, Belfast Education and Library Board, Interview; Murphy Interview. 
1678 Ibid. 
1679 Ibid.  
1680 Ibid.  
1681 Hughes, "Are Separate Schools Divisive?," 845-846. 
1682 Ibid. 
1683 Torney Interview; Farry Interview. 
1684 Mcilwaine Interview; Donnelly Interview. 
1685 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xxi. 
1686 Mcilwaine Interview; Gallagher Interview. 
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Undoubtedly, public and political discourse has shifted from expanding 
integrated schools to furthering shared education. 1687   The 2011-2015 
Programme for Government includes no commitments to integrated 
education.  Rather, it promises more sharing of facilities and more 
opportunities to participate in shared education activities by 2015.1688  Recent 
polls also show higher public support for sharing in education than for 
integrated education. 1689   This is perhaps because shared education 
respects the institutional integrity of schools, allows parents to enrol children 
in the school of their choice, does not threaten the school as an expression 
of community identity and does not express explicit community relations 
aims.1690  In short, ‘it doesn’t have the same connotations as integrated 
education’.1691   
Public support may also reflect the fact that ‘the language of shared 
education is a catch-all term which all the key stakeholders can buy into’.1692  
All main political parties declared support for shared education in their recent 
manifestos.1693  Yet, there are a variety of interpretations of the ultimate aim 
of sharing: some envisage a single education system while others welcome 
only more connections between distinctive institutions.1694  Indeed, the most 
fundamental criticism of shared education is that there is no ‘end-game’ to 
sharing and this perpetuates acceptable levels of segregation.1695  Thus, 
some warn that sharing facilities may simply lead to ‘two schools under one 
roof’, an arrangement rarely conducive to better understanding and inter-
communal relations.1696  In contrast, advocates of shared education argue 
that no ultimate aim can be stated, as local models are allowed to develop 
organically within each network of schools.1697   
                                            
1687 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 4,7,8, 23; Donnelly Interview; Blood Interview. 
1688 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 25; Bell Interview. 
1689 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 46. 
1690 Hughes Interview; Donnelly Interview; McDevitt Interview. 
1691 Storey Interview. 
1692 Fitzsimmons Interview; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 18. 
1693 Bell Interview; Hughes Interview; Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 19-22. 
1694 Hughes Interview; McDevitt Interview; Bell Interview; Torney Interview. 
1695 Fitzsimmons Interview. 
1696 Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 6. This is evident in Macedonia.  
1697 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xvii. 
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Therefore, Gallagher sees several ‘possible futures here’: if shared education 
is mainstreamed, it could lead to a system of common schools or allow the 
survival of separate sectors which routinely cooperate.1698  In either case, 
shared education would help build relationships and cooperative networks 
across communal lines: these have been proven to contribute to peace in 
plural societies. 1699   Through inter-group cooperative networks, shared 
education may help move society ‘out of conflict and into a space where 
relations are different’.1700  The risk is that shared education initiatives may 
also get diluted to the point that ‘anything becomes shared education’.1701  
Ultimately, echoing the peace process, Gallagher argues that ‘what we are 
doing is creating a process with enough guarantees in it that people won’t be 
forced to go somewhere they don’t want to go and leave it up to people to 
make their own decisions later down the line’.1702  
7.3.4 Change in the air? 
Shared education is not the only innovation in Northern Ireland’s education 
system and most policymakers, experts and politicians recognise that 
currently, reforms ‘are all in the air’.1703  However, McCallister warns that 
current reforms may only be ‘reinforcing what you’re trying to move from’: the 
fragmentation of Northern Ireland’s education system.1704   
For example, during direct rule, the Education and Skills Authority (ESA) was 
planned as a technocratic body. It was expected to rationalise and streamline 
the structures of educational management in Northern Ireland, provide 
consistency of access to services and tackle educational 
underachievement.1705   Yet its establishment fell hostage to clerical and 
political interests. In 2007, the ESA governing board and wider structure 
were reframed to reflect the interests of owners of school buildings (the 
                                            
1698 Gallagher Interview; Expert of Religious Education and Citizenship Education Interview. 
1699 Gallagher refers to Varshney’s research on civil society in India. 
1700 Hughes Interview. 
1701 Gallagher Interview. 
1702 Ibid. 
1703 Gallagher Interview; Mcilwaine Interview. 
1704 McCallister Interview. 
1705 Senior Officer (Education and Skills Authority) Interview. 
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Methodist, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and Catholic Churches) and 
political parties.1706   
Further reforms to the ESA structure were presented to the Education 
Committee in 2012. However, the 2012 Education Bill encountered the 
staunch opposition of Unionist parties.  Controversies mounted over the 
exclusion of integrated and Irish-medium schools from the ESA governing 
body and over the extent of autonomy of voluntary grammar schools.1707  
Political representatives also debated the creation of a unified body to 
represent state controlled schools within ESA.  On the one hand, a unified 
controlled governing body could redress the fragmentation of the state sector 
and improve its performance.  On the other hand, it appeared to further ‘this 
other thing, that never existed before’ in state schools: a Protestant ethos.1708  
Through its governing board and supporting structures, the proposed ESA 
appeared to consolidate rather than erode the barriers between different 
education sectors.   
By September 2013, Kinahan summarised that ‘the Sinn Féin Minister knows 
that when the bill comes through we [UUP] will put in massive amendments, 
the DUP will put in massive amendments, and so the negotiations are going 
on’.1709   In April 2014, after a seven-year stalemate, Education Minister 
O’Dowd sounded the ‘death-knell’ for ESA and ordered DENI to stop working 
on its establishment ‘at this stage’.1710  
The continuing stalemate over ESA exemplifies the difficulties in eroding the 
structural barriers between institutions affiliated to different communities in a 
consociation.1711  It also highlights the failure of Sinn Féin’s approach to 
                                            
1706 Kinahan Interview; Gallagher Interview; Senior Officer (Education and Skills Authority) 
Interview; Blood Interview. 
1707 Interview with Chris Hazzard (Sinn Féin MLA and Member of the Education Committee), 
Belfast, 18/09/2013; Kinahan Interview; Storey Interview; Blood Interview; Farry Interview; 
Fitzsimmons Interview; Senior Officer (Education and Skills Authority) Interview; Hansson et 
al., Integrated Education, 4. 
1708 Mcilwaine Interview; Senior Officer, Belfast Education and Library Board, Interview. 
1709 Kinahan Interview. 
1710 Lindsay Fergus, "ESA: £17m Down the Drain as Death Knell Signalled for Single 
Education Body," Belfast Telegraph, 10/04/2014. 
1711 The unionist flag protests of winter 2012-2013, the failed Haass talks in late 2013 and 
political debates over welfare reforms framed the political context for the political stalemate 
over ESA. 
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education policy.  As with the abolition of the 11-plus test, Unionist parties 
resented that Sinn Féin had ‘decided education is going to be one way and 
one way only, and they’re going to get there, whatever means they need to 
choose’.1712  Whilst Sinn Féin eroded the resistance of all professional and 
educational bodies, Unionist parties still maintained that they would veto the 
Bill. 1713   No educational considerations explain the ESA stalemate: the 
Belfast Telegraph summarised that ‘what this shambles demonstrates is the 
dysfunction of politics at Stormont when it comes to compromise over party 
dogma or vested interests’.1714  
7.3.5 Less Divided but Not Less Diverse 
In 1998, the Belfast agreement called for ‘initiatives to facilitate and 
encourage integrated education’.  Yet most politicians argue that Northern 
Ireland’s fragmented education system has changed very little since 
1998. 1715   Ultimately, many accept that ‘the system will continue to be 
segregated along religious lines certainly for the foreseeable future’.1716  
Certainly the duplication of services is straining Northern Ireland’s finances, 
but a system of common schools is not a ‘realistic option’.1717   
Education reforms explicitly aimed at ‘community[-relations] outcomes’ 
generally fail when they challenge existing identities, communal institutions 
or religious establishments in consociations.1718 Northern Ireland’s shared 
education, with its emphasis on academic and financial benefits, may have 
succeeded in squaring the circle and placing sustained and meaningful inter-
group contact at the heart of education reform strategies.1719  Yet it has also 
                                            
1712 Kinahan Interview. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of academic selection. 
1713 Grammar schools were the last, Chris Hazzard, “Governors Board Association Support 
for ESA Welcome" http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/28964 (last accessed 15/04/2014); 
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1717 Hughes, "Are Separate Schools Divisive?," 847. 
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signalled a shift in political rhetoric ‘to education policies that plan for 
separate development rather than structural change’.1720  Indeed, in 2013 the 
Ministerial Advisory Group on Shared Education concluded that ‘while the 
vision of a plurality of schools is respected and encouraged this must be 
within the context where strong efforts are made to ensure that different 
types of school collaborate together in a sustained and meaningful 
manner’.1721  
There is still considerable disagreement on whether education reform should 
tackle the separation of schools along religious and national lines.  In 
particular, Hazzard summarises that ‘to separate our kids either on cultural 
background, religious background, even social background, is wrong,’ but it 
is equally ‘wrong to say that a faith based school can’t promote the ideals we 
want society to have’.1722  Thus, Sinn Féin has promoted education reforms 
aimed at encouraging socio-economic equality and socio-economic mixing in 
schools rather than attempting to employ schools for relationship-building 
between Protestants/Unionists and Catholics/Nationalists.1723  This approach 
has led to the ‘charade, that exists only in Northern Ireland, of academic 
selection’ and the ‘costly white elephant’ of ESA.1724  In turn, the stalemate 
over ESA validates the fear of many politicians that it is important that 
‘sharing does not become owned by any party, because once a party tries to 
own an issue, by definition, it excludes other parties from being able to 
support it’.1725   
Ultimately, this analysis of initiatives to encourage mixing in schools in 
Northern Ireland shows that education reform cannot change society, but it 
can make schools flexible enough to accommodate rather than hinder social 
                                            
1720  Hansson et al., Integrated Education, 66; Torney Interview; Gallagher, "Balancing 
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1721 Connolly et al., Advancing Shared Education, xxi. 
1722 Hazzard Interview. 
1723 Ibid; Bell Interview. 
1724 Bishop Donal McKeown, qtd. in "Cardinal Brady Accuses Catholic Schools of Getting 
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change and reconciliation.  After all, as McDevitt puts it, ‘you want [Northern 
Ireland] less divided but you don’t want it less diverse’.1726  
7.4 Macedonia 
Compulsory education emerged as a tool for building a nation-state in 
independent Macedonia.  Here, as Chapters 3 and 7 show, the right to 
education in the mother-tongue became a symbol of wider struggles for the 
inclusion of ethnic minorities in the institutions and narratives of the new 
state.  These struggles culminated in the 2001 conflict, which hampered the 
operation of some schools, created tensions within mixed schools and 
accelerated the residential separation of ethnic communities.1727   
The Ohrid Agreement aimed to tackle the socio-political inequality between 
ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians and to expand access to state 
services, including schools, for all citizens.1728  Chapter 7 demonstrated that 
after 2001, shared government succeeded in expanding access to mother-
tongue education for children of Albanian, Turkish and Serbian backgrounds.  
However, the agreement ‘does not provide any linkages’ between 
Macedonian-, Albanian-, Turkish-, and Serbian-language schools.1729  This 
section focuses on the impact of the Ohrid Agreement on the overall 
structure of Macedonia’s education system, examining provisions for 
decentralisation first, and initiatives to expand mother-tongue education 
second. 
7.4.1 Devolving Education 
Sabani argues that the Ohrid agreement impacted on primary education 
mainly through its provisions for decentralisation.1730  Indeed, the agreement 
called for enhanced ‘powers of elected local officials’ and enlarged 
‘competencies in … public services’ including education. 1731   This was 
                                            
1726 Ibid. 
1727 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Zenkolli  Interview; Officer, Ministry of 
Education and Science, Interview. 
1728 Hani Interview. 
1729 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1730 Sabani Interview. 
1731 See Appendix 3. 
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expected to allow educational change, to depoliticise decisions over 
schooling reforms, and to produce policies reflecting more closely the needs 
of all citizens, including the members of smaller ethnic communities.1732  In 
fact, decentralisation did not alter the basic structure of Macedonia’s 
education system.  Rather, it facilitated the evolution of its schools from 
instruments for nation-state building to tools for cementing the mutually 
exclusive ethnic, linguistic and political communities in the state. 
Education was one of the first responsibilities devolved to municipalities in 
2005.  Hereafter, municipalities became school founders and owners with the 
power to appoint school directors and pay for the salaries of teachers and 
supporting staff. 1733   Despite the official political discourse, Macedonia’s 
educational decentralisation was quite limited: the government could revoke 
unilaterally the powers of municipalities over education, and Skopje 
determined funding allocations, curricular contents and pedagogical 
approaches.1734   
Moreover, the impact of decentralisation was curtailed by the lack of local 
capacity among school directors, school boards and parent councils.1735  
Indeed, despite the creation of the ambiguous professional figures of 
municipal education instructor and municipal education officer, some mayors 
recognised their lack of local capacity and attempted to return their 
responsibilities to Skopje.1736   Additionally, school appointments came to 
reflect the clientelistic networks of politicians: new mayors repeatedly 
                                            
1732  Ministry of Education and Science, National Programme for the Development of 
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dismissed school directors and staff to replace them with individuals affiliated 
to their political party.1737   
Furthermore, decentralisation has not depoliticised the financing of 
education: critics report that unclear procedures for the allocation of block 
grants translate into higher financing for municipalities ruled by majority 
parties.1738  Similarly, procedures for the allocation of funding do not make 
the school network more adaptable to changing demography.  
Decentralisation may have made it easier to open Turkish-, Albanian- or 
Serbian-language classes. 1739   Yet decisions on whether to open new 
classes and build new schools are still in the hands of the Education minister.  
These decisions are dictated by political as much as financial concerns.1740  
Thus, Sabani and Lyon observe that the school network still reflects the 
demography of the 1960s and has not adapted to urbanisation or to the 
demographic growth of ethnic Albanians.1741  As a consequence, almost a 
third of Macedonia’s primary schools have less than 20 pupils, while many 
urban schools are overcrowded and operate in shifts (with different groups of 
students attending school at different times of the day).1742  Lyon explains 
that this is because successive governments have deliberately avoided 
redistributing resources from underpopulated areas to overpopulated ones.  
Such a decision would be ‘understandably sensitive’: ethnic Albanians inhabit 
overpopulated regions, while ethnic Macedonians are the majority in 
underpopulated zones.1743  Small schools in mountainous areas exemplify 
this problem, because ‘losing the… school, if that… school is monolingual, 
means losing out to the other community’.1744  Thus, rather than depoliticising 
education policy, decentralisation is contributing to the perception of schools 
as symbols of a community’s hold over a territory. 
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Finally, decentralisation has furthered an ethnic division of labour in 
education.  Frequently, the ethnic Albanian deputy-Minister of Education 
deals with Albanian-majority municipalities and Albanian-language schools, 
while the ethnic Macedonian Education Minister tackles issues in 
Macedonian-majority municipalities and Macedonian-language schools.1745  
To the public, the Ministry of Education appears ‘ethnically split’.1746  Far from 
enhancing its legitimacy, this hampers public trust in the Ministry of 
Education: it creates perceptions of a marginalised Albanian deputy-Minister 
and discredits ministerial initiatives in the eyes of the Albanian 
community. 1747   However, the ethnic division of labour also serves to 
construct an ethnic Albanian elite as the only political referent for the ethnic 
Albanian community, and ethnic Macedonian politicians as the only referent 
for the ethnic Macedonian public.  As such, it supports the short-term 
legitimacy and stability of consociational politics.    
7.4.2 Separating Education 
As explained in Chapter 6, post-Ohrid governments have attempted to 
narrow the educational gap between children belonging to different ethnic 
communities.  They have done so by expanding mother-tongue education 
and making primary and secondary school compulsory and free.1748  These 
reforms succeeded in expanding access to education for pupils of non-
Macedonian ethnic backgrounds, particularly at secondary level.1749  This 
may have legitimised the state in the eyes of ethnic communities, but it has 
not appeased criticisms for the differential distribution of educational 
resources.1750 Indeed, most initiatives did not tackle the quality of education, 
and ‘both sides complain of unequal treatment’. 1751   Albanian-language 
classes are overcrowded, and education in Albanian, Turkish and Serbian is 
deemed worse than Macedonian-language schooling. 1752   Conversely, 
                                            
1745 Ibid. 
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teachers and pupils in Macedonian-medium classes complain that Albanian-
language pupils pass exams with lower academic standards.1753  Perceptions 
of inequality add to wider inter-communal tensions. 
Moreover, the expansion of mother-tongue education has resulted, as the 
2010 Strategy for Integrated Education puts it, in ‘a set of almost four parallel 
education systems, depending on the language of tuition’.1754  A tendency to 
separate pupils of different backgrounds into different shifts and buildings 
started in 2001, when an ethnic Albanian teacher was attacked and beaten 
by students in a multiethnic school in Kumanovo.  As a response, ethnic 
Albanian students boycotted the school and, with their teachers and parents, 
initiated a hunger strike to lobby for a new, separate building.1755  Zenkolli 
asserts that ‘the Minister of Education at the time did not have the capacity to 
deal with the problem’.1756  The Minister sanctioned the construction of new 
primary and secondary Albanian-language schools located in an area 
inhabited predominantly by ethnic Albanians.  By 2006, Vetterlein observed 
that in Kumanovo ‘the segregation… [was] complete and both sides 
seem[ed] to be satisfied with the solution’.1757   This decision created a 
precedent: hereafter policy would reflect the maxim, if ‘they don’t mix … 
there’s no problem’.1758   
Thus, in post-Ohrid Macedonia, ‘ethnic separation is seen as a measure of 
conflict prevention’. 1759   In 2009, UNICEF reported that the number of 
multiethnic schools teaching in Albanian and Macedonian declined by over 
10 percent between 2001 and 2009.1760  By 2010 only half of Macedonia’s 
secondary schools offered instruction in multiple languages.  To this day, 
however ethnically mixed their student body, most schools are far from being 
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1755 "The Segregation Solution," Transitions Online, 26/05/2003; Vetterlein,  “The Influence of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, 17. 
1756 Zenkolli Interview; Ali Cupi Interview. 
1757 Vetterlein,  “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, 17. 
1758 Mickovska Interview. 
1759 Ministry of Education and Science, Steps Towards Integrated Education, 6. 
1760 Sabani Interview; United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, Study on 
Multiculturalism, 7.  
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‘integrated’.1761  Even in multilingual and multiethnic schools, students are 
often separated into different shifts depending on their language of 
instruction.1762  A 2010 OSCE study confirms that ethnic Albanian and ethnic 
Macedonian students rarely interact in school. 1763   Similarly, Tomovska 
reports that in a multilingual primary school (Albanian and Macedonian), 
children are separated into different parts of the building and the timetable 
ensures that they do not use the yard at the same time.1764  Indeed, in most 
schools the hidden curriculum prevents students from forming friendships 
with peers of a different background: administration and planning are often 
separate, resulting in separate celebrations, extracurricular activities and 
school trips.1765  This, in addition to worsening Macedonian language skills 
among ethnic Albanian pupils, hampers knowledge of others’ customs, 
mutual understanding and tolerance.1766  
Thus, Tomovska argues that violent incidents are often ‘the only experience 
children have of the shared yard and their peers’ from the other side of the 
school.1767  Arshinkovska adds that since 2008, the Ministry of Education has 
paid for private security to monitor school shifts and breaks.1768  For example, 
the Nikola Karev High School in the Karpos III municipality operates a first 
shift for Macedonian-language students, followed by a one-hour break with 
police guards and a second shift for Albanian-language students.1769  This 
has not necessarily allayed violent conflict:  Deralla warns that the presence 
of security guards may exacerbate tensions in mixed schools.1770  
                                            
1761 Hughes Interview.  
1762 In about half of the cases according to Schenker; Officer, Ministry of Education and 
Science, Interview; Coordinator in the Ministry of Education Interview.  
1763 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Spillover Mission to Skopje, Age, 
Contact, Perceptions, 20. 
1764 Ana Tomovska, "Social Context and Contact Hypothesis. Perceptions and Experiences 
of a Contact Program for Ten- to Eleven-Year-Old Children in the Republic of Macedonia," in 
McGlynn et al. (eds.), Peace Education, 98. 
1765 Mickovska Interview. 
1766 Arshinkovska Interview. 
1767 Ibid. 
1768 Interview with Rada Arshinkovska (Physics Teacher and Member of IEARN), Skopje, 
17/09/2012. 
1769 Grodzanovska Interview. 
1770 Deralla Interview. 
 313 
Violent clashes between students are a persistent feature of pre-election 
Macedonia, but wider political inability to tackle these fights has accelerated 
the fragmentation of schools into different buildings or ‘ethnic shifts’.1771  For 
fear of violent conflict, parents often demand separate shifts and buildings 
even in the absence of manifest conflict.1772  Others withdraw their children 
from mixed schools, transferring them to more uniform institutions ‘and then 
immediately the municipality will react and will close the whole Macedonian-
language class or vice versa’.1773  Beyond security concerns, these demands 
reflect a ‘widespread fear’ of assimilation.1774  Thus, new schools tend to 
open as monolingual.1775  This furthers the fragmentation of Macedonia’s 
education system into parallel, linguistically homogeneous institutions.  It also 
hampers the expansion of successful initiatives for mixed and multilingual 
education such as the Nansen model of integrated education.1776  ‘To be on 
the safe side’, even after successful cooperation in curricular and 
extracurricular activities, school principals generally prefer to avoid joint 
planning and refrain from encouraging mixing between students of different 
backgrounds and from amending staggered timetables that prevent inter-
group contact.1777   
Opportunities to meet peers of different backgrounds are equally limited 
outside school. 1778   This is partly because separate schooling reflects 
increasing residential separation. 1779   For example, children of Roma 
backgrounds generally attend schools in ‘the ghetto’, where they are not 
exposed to ‘different cultures’.1780  Separate schools are not equal: as an 
                                            
1771 Officer in an International Donor Interview; Arshinkovska Interview; Ali Cupi Interview; 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Spillover Mission to Skopje, Age, 
Contact, Perceptions, 20; Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Interview; Deralla 
Interview; Lyon, Decentralisation, 40. 
1772 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1773 Zenkolli Interview; Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1774 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Interview with Officer in an International 
Donor. 
1775 Ibid. 
1776 See Chapter 6. 
1777 Sabani mentioned two schools in Kumanovo. 
1778 Hughes Interview; Mickovska Interview. 
1779 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1780 This is because they are often prevented from enrolling in schools serving different 
catchment areas according to Recep Ali Cupi. 
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example, the Brakja Ramiz i Hamid school has a 90 percent Roma 
population and is the only school in Macedonia operating on four shifts, with 
a clear impact on the quality of instruction.1781  In an attempt to improve the 
quality of education and promote co-education between children of different 
ethnic backgrounds, Roma intellectuals called for the building of schools with 
mixed catchment areas.1782  These calls fell largely on deaf ears.   
Thus, according to Tomovska, schooling helps to cement the ‘parallel worlds’ 
of primary school children.1783   Parallel schools deprive students of the 
opportunity to interact across community lines and may further inter-
communal fear and mistrust, encouraging different opinions about the 
political and security situation, and compounding negative mutual 
perceptions.1784   
In particular, observers agree that Macedonia’s fragmented education 
system isolates children of ethnic Albanian backgrounds. 1785  Figure 20 
confirms that children belonging to the Roma, Vlach, Serb and Bosniak 
communities frequently attend Macedonian-language classes, where they 
mix with peers of multiple backgrounds.  Multilingual schools also generally 
combine Turkish- and Serbian- language classes with Macedonian-language 
classes in mixed shifts.  In contrast, the overwhelming majority of ethnic 
Albanian students attend Albanian-medium classes and are often separated 
into different shifts or buildings.1786  The building of new Albanian-language 
schools in Albanian-majority residential areas furthers the isolation of ethnic 
Albanian students and has even prompted accusations that the state is 
ghettoising the Albanian community.1787  
 
 
                                            
1781 Ljubica Dimishkovska-Grozdanovska, "A Poor Report Card for Macedonia's Schools," 
Transitions Online, 12 /01/2012. 
1782 Ali Cupi Interview; Officer in an International Delegation Interview. 
1783  She looks at ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian children. Tomovska, “Social 
Context”, in McGlynn et al. (eds.), Peace Education, 98. 
1784 Officer in an International Donor Interview; Arshinkovska Interview; Mickovska Interview. 
1785 Ibid. 
1786 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Ali Cupi Interview. 
1787 Officer in an International Donor Interview. 
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For their part, ethnic Macedonian political parties claim that ethnic Albanians 
employ schools ‘to conquer new territories’.1789  The ‘Autumn of Albanians’ in 
September 2012 appeared to validate this claim.1790   Albanian-language 
schools opened the academic year by flying the flag and singing the national 
anthem, ‘for another country, not another community, another country’: 
Albania.1791   Schools are emerging as institutional markers of communal 
                                            
1788 State Statistical Office, Primary, Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Schools at the 
End of the School Year, 2011/2012, Skopje: State Statistical Office, 2013. No comparable 
data are available for upper secondary schools. 
1789 In reference to Kumanovo, "The Segregation Solution," Transitions Online, 26/05/2003 
1790 Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Interview. 
1791 Officer in an International Mission Interview; Officer in an International Donor Interview. 
 
Figure 20: Students by Ethnic Belonging and Language of Instruction in 
Primary and Lower Secondary School in Macedonia in 2011-2012.1788 
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territory, and violent debates over school names exemplify this function.  
Fierce controversies erupted over changes from ‘Slavic [school] names to 
Albanian ones’1792 and attempts to rename Albanian-language schools after 
members of the NLA, and Macedonian-language schools after members of 
the Macedonian security forces who fought in the 2001 ethnic conflict.1793   
7.4.3 The Strategy for Integrated Education 
By 2009, international donors had reached a broad consensus on the need 
for more mixing between children belonging to different ethno-linguistic 
groups in schools. 1794   The resulting Strategy for Integrated Education, 
drafted by a working group of the Ministry of Education and an OSCE 
consultant, was conceived of as ‘part of a much wider strategy for promoting 
integration in the process of building a multi-ethnic society’.1795  As Chapters 5 
and 6 mentioned, the strategy suggested extensive curricular reforms and 
amendments to language teaching.  It also aimed to ‘provide corrective 
measures’ to redress the increasing fragmentation of the education system, 
to ‘safeguard community rights … [while] provid[ing] linkages’ and 
opportunities for interaction.1796  It was to provide impetus for new policies, 
standards and practices, based on the importance of contact between 
students belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups.1797  It claimed that 
‘primary schools are the proper terrain to start with integration processes, 
and secondary schools are the space where they should be deepened’.1798   
In contrast to Northern Ireland’s shared education initiative, Macedonia’s 
Strategy for Integrated Education employed ‘the ethnic side [as] the glue’ and 
then ‘implicitly… touche[d] on a lot of other qualitative things’ such as 
educational quality and modernisation.1799  It attempted to reverse the ethno-
                                            
1792 Vetterlein,  “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, 16. 
1793 Lyon, Decentralisation, 33. 
1794 Officer in an International Donor Interview. 
1795 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund,  Study on Multiculturalism, 21. 
1796 Officer in an International Mission Interview. 
1797  Schenker Interview; Officer in an International Donor Interview; Officer, Ministry of 
Education and Science, Interview; Tomovska,  “Social Context”, in McGlynn et al. (eds.), 
Peace Education, 93. 
1798 Ministry of Education and Science, Steps Towards Integrated Education, 17. 
1799 Schenker Interview. 
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linguistic separation of children in schools by, in the first instance, calling for 
municipalities to avoid opening ‘monoethnic schools’, building new schools in 
‘monoethnic areas’, or establishing shifts ‘along linguistic or ethnic lines’.1800  
Secondly, it proposed incentives to ‘promote and reward’ the 
institutionalisation of joint extracurricular activities in schools.1801  Finally, it 
planned for the introduction of joint classes in the least ‘language-sensitive’ 
subjects, such as IT, English, art, technical laboratories and physical 
education.1802  The strategy also addressed the changing of school names, 
the training of municipal education inspectors and officers, and the creation 
of new inspection criteria to reward schools’ contributions to inter-ethnic 
relations.1803  The breadth of proposals substantiates Sabani’s view that the 
main weakness of the strategy was that ‘it was too ambitious, it had too many 
goals’.1804  Indeed, OSCE consultant Schenker recalls that ‘at some stage we 
were thinking if ten percent of this gets implemented it’s a revolution’, but 
says that ‘now zero percent is implemented’.1805   
Chapter 6 explained that the Strategy for Integrated Education ‘basically died 
with [controversies over] language’.1806  The strategy spelt its own demise by 
treating the Albanian and Macedonian languages asymmetrically, despite 
them being the most politically salient identity markers of the ethnic Albanian 
and ethnic Macedonian communities.  The introduction of Macedonian-
language classes from first grade was perceived as crossing the ‘thin line 
between integration and assimilation’.1807  Thus, in 2012 Lazarevska honestly 
reflected that ‘from time to time we do think about that [the Strategy for 
Integrated Education], when… the High Commissioner comes here to check 
what is happening, then for two days the journalists talk about that, 
everybody talks about integrated education’.1808   
                                            
1800 Ministry of Education and Science, Steps Towards Integrated Education, 11. 
1801 Ibid.18; Schenker Interview. 
1802 Ibid.; Ministry of Education and Science, Steps Towards Integrated Education, 17. 
1803 Ibid. 
1804 Sabani Interview. 
1805 Schenker Interview. 
1806 Ibid. 
1807 Zenkolli Interview; see also Chapter 6. 
1808 Lazarevska Interview. 
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Actually, the Ministry of Education is also implementing those few aspects of 
the strategy that the government ‘has found appropriate and more easy to 
implement’.1809  The most high profile initiative is the Interethnic Integration in 
Education Project, financed by USAID and managed by the Macedonian 
Centre for Civic Education.1810  The project provides for community outreach, 
including work with the local media to encourage positive reporting on 
education.1811  It also builds capacity at a local level by training municipal 
staff involved in education planning, helping them develop local strategies 
and creating monitoring mechanisms and indicators for local inspectors.1812  
Local officers are encouraged to develop context-specific activities to 
promote inter-group contact: for example, ethnically homogeneous 
municipalities may decide to invest in student exchanges rather than in 
extracurricular activities. 1813   To help allay parental resistance to mixed 
activities, the project provides earmarked funding for the refurbishment of 
schools engaging in interethnic activities.1814  Finally, the project focuses on 
six ‘demonstration schools’ (including four schools catering for mixed student 
populations and two paired-up monolingual schools) to provide models ‘of 
best practices and lessons learned’.1815 
According to Schenker, the Interethnic Integration in Education Project was 
originally part of the Strategy for Integrated Education but ‘because the 
political side [of the strategy] is dead… [many] regard the USAID project as 
the strategy’.1816  He laments that as a consequence ‘they’re not pushing for 
the implementation of the strategy’.1817  In fact, the most apparent difference 
between the strategy and the Interethnic Integration in Education Project is in 
name.  USAID and the Macedonian Centre for Civic Education named the 
                                            
1809 Sabani Interview. 
1810 A five-years, five million US Dollars project explained at United States Agency for 
International Development, Interethnic Integration in Education Project ,  
http://www.usaid.gov/macedonia/fact-sheets/interethnic-integration-education-project (last 
accessed 3/12/2013). 
1811 Schenker Interview; Georgieva Interview. 
1812 Ibid. 
1813 Ibid. 
1814 USAID, “Interethnic Integration”. 
1815 Ibid.; Officer in an International Donor Interview. 
1816 Schenker Interview. 
1817 Ibid. 
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project, ‘interethnic integration’ (rather than ‘ethnic integration’) to emphasise 
the reciprocity and symmetry of initiatives.1818  Indeed, even the name of the 
Strategy for Integrated Education retains a negative connotation.  Zenkolli 
recalls that at the recent opening of a Nansen school, the mayor insisted that 
‘the strategy for integrated education will not be implemented in my 
municipality but the Nansen model for integrated education will be 
implemented’.1819  Thus, it is unlikely that the disparate initiatives loosely 
linked to the Strategy for Integrated Education will translate into mainstream 
policies in the current political climate.1820   
Moreover, Lazarevska points out that in Macedonia, debates over education 
and society in general focus on ‘integration’ rather than on ‘inclusion’.1821  As 
a result, she argues that the onus for change falls on minorities, absolving 
the most numerous ethno-linguistic groups of any responsibility.1822  With 
increasing socio-political polarisation of ethnic Albanian and ethnic 
Macedonian communities into parallel and mutually exclusive realms, smaller 
communities fear they ‘will cease to matter’ and will ‘just get assimilated’.1823  
As in the past, in the context of inter-group tensions, schools emerge as both 
potential instruments for assimilation and as channels for resistance.  For 
example, when ethnic Albanians were appointed as principals in two Turkish-
language primary schools in Vrapciste and Centar Zhupa, Turkish parents 
viewed the appointments as signals of Albanian intent to assimilate their 
children.  Boycotts and violent protests erupted.1824   
Ultimately, Cupi is justified in arguing that Macedonia’s ethnic communities 
value the protection and thriving of their distinctive languages and identities 
above shared schools.1825  In contrast to results of public polls in Lebanon 
                                            
1818 Officer in an International Donor Interview. 
1819 Zenkolli Interview. 
1820 Interview with Senior Officer, Ministry of Education and Science, Skopje, 19/09/2012. 
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and Northern Ireland, many citizens in Macedonia openly admit they would 
not ‘send their children to schools where another group is the majority’.1826  
Local political commitment to the promotion of inter-group contact through 
education also remains questionable.  Local politicians often present the 
Strategy for Integrated Education as an initiative driven by foreign donors 
and passively accepted by the Macedonian government. 1827   OSCE 
consultant Schenker admits that ‘I ended up doing the bulk of the work’ as 
the ‘interest in participation [of the Ministry of Education working group] was 
not so fantastic’.1828  He also recalls that the strategy was adopted by the 
Education Ministry partly because of ‘huge pressure, international pressure’ 
on ethnic Albanian politicians.1829  However, as Zenkolli argues, the most 
successful initiatives for mixed education give parents, local communities 
and local authorities ownership and a voice in the design of projects.1830   
7.4.4 Permanent Coexistence 
The Ohrid agreement reframed the Macedonian state to ensure the 
proportional representation of its people in its political and non-political 
institutions.  The new political context helped achieve extensive community 
rights, but, as an officer in an international mission reflects, ‘the safeguarding 
of rights has become an excuse to separate’.1831   
A generalised culture of silence and unwillingness to articulate the roots of 
Macedonia’s conflict may explain some of the difficulties in formulating 
context-appropriate education policies to aid inter-group relations. 1832  
However, Sabani explains that, despite ‘political commitment’ to quality 
education and inter-ethnic contact, ‘the investment is really going’ towards 
increasing access to compulsory education. 1833   Like their Lebanese 
counterparts, Macedonia’s political leaders have largely employed the 
                                            
1826 United Nations Development Programme, People Centered Analysis Report. 
1827  Zenkolli Interview; Officer, Ministry of Education and Science Interview; Hughes 
Interview; Officer in an International Delegation Interview; Novkovski Interview. 
1828 Schenker Interview. 
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1831 Officer in an International Mission Interview. Also argued by Loreta Georgieva. 
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education system to gain leverage within their own ethno-political 
communities.1834   
The evolving structure of Macedonia’s education system epitomises a wider 
process of communal pillarisation.  Local politicians and policymakers often 
nostalgically mention Macedonia’s long past of coexistence as their preferred 
model for a peaceful future.1835  In fact, Macedonia’s pre-Yugoslav past, 
according to Vetterlein, was marked by ‘the notion of permanent 
coexistence’, the peaceful cohabitation of different groups in the state with 
minimal interactions.1836  Similarly, in consociational Macedonia, knowledge 
of each other’s languages is dwindling, sources of common identification are 
rare and the physical and psychological distance between members of 
different ethnic communities is increasing.1837  In this context, the curricula 
and structures of compulsory education both reflect and contribute to 
cementing mutually exclusive ethnic, linguistic and political communities. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In 2005, Gallagher pondered the fact that in Northern Ireland ‘the 
outworkings of the peace process may have legitimised difference to the 
extent that [they] left little space for the articulation of any discourse of a 
common good’.1838  The same reflection applies to Lebanon and Macedonia.   
The Taif and Belfast Agreements mapped the establishment of state control 
over private schools and the expansion of integrated education, while the 
Macedonian Strategy for Integrated Education aimed to encourage contact 
among children of different ethno-linguistic backgrounds.  These three 
documents implicitly endorsed the position that separate schools affiliated 
with communities perpetuate conflict by conveying externally bound, fixed 
and mutually exclusive communal identities. 1839   Thus, they favoured 
sustained and meaningful inter-group contact in schools, and implied that by 
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helping reduce prejudices, political extremism and fear of different others, 
contact could contribute to the success of the three peace processes.   
However, political commitment to improving public schools in Lebanon, 
expanding integrated schools in Northern Ireland and implementing the 
Strategy for Integrated Education in Macedonia has been fickle at best.  This 
may be due to the numerous constraints on the formulation and 
implementation of successful initiatives for mixed education in deeply divided 
societies.  This chapter shows that initiatives for mixed schooling are 
successful when they have consistent institutional support (both political and 
financial), are tailored to local demands and conditions, and impact 
symmetrically on local communities.  To appeal to parents and teachers, they 
should also provide academic benefits for participants, such as an improved 
quality of education (as in Macedonia’s Nansen schools or in Lebanon’s 
private international schools), more curricular choice (as with shared 
education in Northern Ireland) or better facilities and personnel (as in 
Macedonia’s Mozaik kindergartens).  Finally, reforms that promote mixed 
schooling need to accommodate both demands for group equality and 
aspirations for better inter-communal relationships. 
Consociational governments in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
may also have neglected the promotion of common schools because, as 
Farry explains, ‘any issues that challenge the model on which our political 
parties are founded are the ones around which we have most difficulty 
finding agreement’.1840  Research in Northern Ireland has established that 
mixed schooling does not affect religious, national or ethnic self-definition but 
impacts social attitudes and political orientation.  Thus, common schools 
challenge the foundations of political parties and the integrity of their 
constituencies in deeply divided societies.  This chapter confirms that, rather 
than challenging the political system, schools in Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia reproduce the basic building blocks of political consociations: 
mutually exclusive confessional, ethnic, national and political communities.  
Thus, education systems evolve into ‘consociational’ institutions: they 
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accommodate a plurality of (equally funded) separate schools rather than 
encouraging the creation of plural common schools. 
Lijphart argues that autonomous schools are an expression of communal 
autonomy in consociations and that ‘the voluntary self-segregation that 
[these] schools entail is acceptable as long as the option of multicultural and 
multiethnic education is also made available and provided that all schools are 
treated equally’. 1841   Indeed, local communities generally treasure their 
separate institutions and present them as channels for social mobility and 
equality.  The Albanian community in Macedonia and the Shia community in 
Lebanon would probably agree with the CCMS that separate schools are part 
of their ‘collective determination to establish ourselves securely as equal 
citizens’. 1842   Despite their integrationist rhetoric, successive shared 
governments in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia have endorsed 
and legitimised this argument.  Thus, Northern Ireland and Macedonia fund 
equally and fully their separate schools while Lebanon subsidises the private 
sector indirectly (through grants and subsidies) and directly (through private 
free schools).  Separate schools allow for the exercise of patronage (in 
Lebanon and Macedonia), and for populist politics, including the politicisation 
of educational debates to the point of stalemate (as with debates over the 11-
plus test and ESA in Northern Ireland).  Thus, they help crystallise the 
boundaries between the ethnic and confessional communities that 
participated in conflict and now share political power.  By legitimising their 
political elites and consolidating mutually exclusive constituencies, they 
contribute to the short-term operation of consociational politics. 
However, this chapter also shows that the zero-sum politics of education 
policy often threatens the survival of unaffiliated institutions, such as 
multilingual schools in Macedonia and state schools in Lebanon. Even when 
they are equally funded by the state, separate schools are deeply different, 
and rarely equal.  For example, pupils in Macedonian-language schools, 
Lebanese private schools and Catholic maintained schools in Northern 
Ireland have access to a better quality of education than their peers in 
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Albanian-language schools, Lebanese state schools and state controlled 
schools in Northern Ireland.  In the long term, this is likely to have a negative 
impact on their employment opportunities, and to foster feelings of relative 
deprivation, which can destabilise peace processes.   
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8 Conclusion: Separate to Unite 
The Taif, Belfast and Ohrid Agreements established consociational power-
sharing to regulate three violent conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia.  To further long-term peace-building and reconciliation, these 
agreements also mapped reforms of compulsory education.  Specifically, 
they prescribed reforms in history education, citizenship education and 
languages of instruction, and recommended changes to the overall structure 
of the three education systems.   
This thesis has compared these reforms and traced subsequent debates 
over their implementation, focusing on approaches to history education, 
citizenship education, languages and attempts to encourage mixing between 
children of different backgrounds in school.  It confirms that the education 
systems of Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia differ because of 
‘deep-seated historical traditions now institutionalised in structures, practices 
and institutional cultures’. 1843   However, this study also shows that, 
regardless of local historical traditions and the contents of the peace 
agreements, debates over education policy in the three consociations 
converge.   
In consociational Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, education 
systems navigate between the Scylla of parity of esteem and the Charybdis 
of overarching pluralism.  On the one hand, schools are expected to promote 
unity and social cohesion among citizens belonging to different ethnic, 
confessional, linguistic and national communities.  On the other hand, they 
are expected to further reconciliation by reflecting, acknowledging and 
valuing the specific narratives of each community.  In this delicate balancing 
act, education policy adopts and reproduces consociational models and 
expedients.  For example, Macedonia transposes proportional representation 
into the contents of the history curriculum and its policies for mother-tongue 
education.  By granting more linguistic rights to children belonging to the 
largest communities, schools reproduce the power hierarchies between 
different ethnic groups in the state.  Similarly, Northern Ireland’s education 
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reforms are founded on the principle of parity of esteem for the 
Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist traditions.  The history curricula 
adopt a multiperspective approach and language policies help construct the 
Irish language and the Ulster-Scots vernacular as parallel legitimate markers 
of communal identity.  Finally, in the three societies, the consociational 
principle of communal autonomy legitimises the existence of separate 
schools catering only to certain communities.  This explains why Lebanese 
governments consistently protect private education; why integrated education 
remains a small, self-contained sector in Northern Ireland; and why the 
overcrowding of Macedonia’s secondary schools has been solved through 
‘ethnic shifts’ and buildings. 
This thesis set out to determine whether the Taif, Belfast and Ohrid 
Agreements, and the new patterns of power they institutionalised, 
fundamentally altered the political function of education in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia.  It shows that the political function of education in the 
three consociations remains remarkably similar to that of education during 
conflict.  Through their manifest and hidden curricula, schools reflect and 
reproduce the basic building blocks of a consociation: mutually exclusive 
ethnic, religious and national communities that participated in conflict and 
currently share political power.   
This reveals a lack of consensus over the end of conflict.  Perhaps this is not 
surprising, given that consociations are premised on the management, rather 
than the resolution, of civil wars.  Continuing debates over the past, the 
meaning of citizenship, markers of national identity, security, and the future 
of the state hinder the formulation and implementation of a consistent 
education policy.  Thus, debates over schools generally echo wider political 
struggles rather than reflecting purely educational concerns.  This is apparent 
from the ‘ethnicisation’ of educational debates, resulting in Northern Ireland’s 
controversies over ESA and the 11-plus test, in Lebanon’s stalemate over 
the history curriculum, and in Macedonia’s disputes over the teaching of the 
official state language in schools.   
This thesis also shows that consociations generate consociational education 
systems, which accommodate a plurality of separate narratives and 
institutions associated with different communities, rather than promoting 
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overarching contents and plural common schools.  Chapter 7 explained that 
separate schools help consolidate separate political communities and 
constituencies in consociations.  Similarly, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated 
that certain school curricula and pedagogical approaches can help legitimise 
communal elites, discourage student participation in transformative political 
life, and even hamper inter-group dialogue by depriving children of a 
common language.  The consolidation of mutually exclusive constituencies 
overlapping with local ethnic, confessional and national communities does 
not hamper the short-term operation of power-sharing.  Indeed, Lijphart 
views ‘the segmental isolation resulting from separate political and social 
organisations as a method [rather] than as a precondition of consociational 
democracy.’1844  Moving beyond the focus of consociational research on 
‘political (executive and legislative) issues’,1845 this thesis suggests that non-
political institutions can contribute to political stability in deeply divided 
societies.  In particular, through their manifest and hidden curricula, 
consociational education systems convey certain core values and practices, 
which may help create a culture of power-sharing.  The production and 
reproduction of this culture through schools, facilitates the short-term 
operation and stability of consociational politics and the re-establishment of 
power-sharing after violent conflicts. 
This thesis opens a debate on constructive approaches to the reform of 
consociational education systems to aid transition out of conflict.  It shows 
that too often ‘society itches and schools get scratched’.1846  The failure of 
the Taif Agreement’s ambitious integrationist initiatives confirms that 
education reform cannot be expected to change societies.  Still, the case of 
Norther Ireland suggests that appropriate policies can make schools flexible 
enough to accommodate and even encourage social change.  However, this 
study also demonstrates that three overarching factors constrain the 
formulation and implementation of education reforms in consociations.  First, 
reforms succeed only when they promote values congruent with those of the 
political system: they need to accommodate group equality while fostering 
                                            
1844 Lijphart, Democracy, 89. 
1845 McGarry and O'Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict, 13. 
1846 Hughes Interview. 
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overarching identities.  Second, education reforms face insurmountable 
opposition when they do not impact symmetrically on all the major ethnic, 
religious and linguistic communities.  Third, reforms with explicit social aims 
generate more resistance than open-ended initiatives, which, while perhaps 
furthering skills conducive to reconciliation, do not prescribe specific societal 
outcomes.  Thus, schools in consociations are unlikely to contribute to social 
cohesion by fostering integration.  The destiny of both the Lebanese history 
curriculum and the Macedonian Strategy for Integrated Education confirms 
that the top-down integration of schools and imposition of unified narratives 
may hamper, rather than further, reconciliation and transition out of conflict.   
Herein lies the paradox of education in deeply divided societies.  
Consociational education systems are unlikely to foster unity through a state-
promoted narrative and common schools.  Rather, they tend to 
accommodate separate institutions and mutually exclusive identity-forming 
narratives.  Thus, social cohesion and peace in consociational education 
systems can only be furthered by, as Gallagher puts it, ‘leaving those 
boundaries in place but making them less important, making them 
porous.’1847  For example, multiperspective curricula for history and active 
approaches to citizenship education can help expose students to different 
narratives and encourage them to think critically about the conflict.  Similarly, 
additive bilingualism in all schools can ensure that citizens belonging to 
different ethnic or national groups retain a common language of 
communication.  Curricular approaches to reconciliation need to be 
accompanied by sustained and positive contact between children belonging 
to different backgrounds.  Where mixed schools are not possible, context-
specific initiatives such as shared education can provide both academic 
benefits and opportunities for contact.   
These curricular and structural initiatives do not challenge communal rights 
to separate schools or the equal legitimacy of different narratives of identity, 
but they are examples of how education reform can make schools flexible 
enough to accommodate social change.  Moreover, additional overarching 
identities can emerge when children are exposed to multiple identity-forming 
                                            
1847 Gallagher Interview. 
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narratives and when they have friends from a variety of confessional, ethnic 
and national backgrounds.  Thus, well-managed consociational education 
systems can nurture forms of collective identification across communal lines.  
Plural, overarching identities should not be thought of as displacing or 
replacing communal allegiances.  Rather, they can help qualify and 
‘hyphenate’ individual belonging: this will make it harder to mobilise identities 
for violent conflict. 
Finally, this thesis confirms that consociation per se is not incompatible with 
initiatives for the long-term transition out of conflict.  The Taif, Belfast and 
Ohrid agreements provided for (albeit temporary) political stability and 
absence of violence: these are essential in order to formulate and implement 
education reforms aimed at reconciliation.  For example, shared education 
would not be possible without security and a modicum of inter-communal 
trust.  Similarly, multiperspective curricula require a minimum level of 
legitimacy for all the identity-forming narratives of the major local 
communities.  However, at times of instability, schools in both corporate and 
liberal consociations tend to convey mutually exclusive identity-forming 
narratives and to further the physical separation of children of different 
backgrounds.  Internal political instability and negative external pressures 
also transform schools into precious instruments of patronage (as in Lebanon 
and Macedonia).   
This comparative analysis of education reform in Lebanon, Northern Ireland 
and Macedonia suggests that consociational education systems, whilst 
fostering short-term political stability, can also contribute to the long-term 
vulnerability of power-sharing.  Schools can encourage prejudice and fear 
through their curricula, pedagogical approaches and separate structures. 
Macedonia’s ‘smaller communities’ also warn that consociational education 
systems may entrench the rights of certain politically assertive ethnic groups, 
while paving the way for the assimilation of others.  Last but not least, 
paraphrasing the landmark decision in Brown vs Board of Education, 
separate facilities are often perceived as unequal by different communities in 
 330 
deeply divided societies. 1848  In particular, when combined with unequal 
employment opportunities, separate schooling can stimulate collective 
frustration and feelings of relative deprivation, facilitating a relapse into 
conflict. Thus, this thesis shows that reforms in compulsory education have 
contributed more to maintaining the differences underpinning violent inter-
group conflict, than to promoting long-term reconciliation in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia.  
 
                                            
1848 Luther A. Huston, "High Court Bans School Segregation. 9-to-0 Decision Grants Time to 
Comply " New York Times, 18/05/1954. 
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Figure 21: Structure of the Lebanese Education System. 
 366 
The table below shows the Lebanese curriculum for compulsory education.  
The subjects analysed in this thesis are shaded.   
 
Table 1: Compulsory School Curriculum in Lebanon.1849 
 Periods per Week 
Subject Elementary School Intermediary School 

















Arabic 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
First Foreign 
Language 
(English or French) 
7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Second Foreign 





3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Citizenship and 
Civic Education - - - - - - 1 1 1 
History - - - - - - 1 1 1 
Geography - - - - - - 2 2 2 
Sciences 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 
Mathematics 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Technology - - - - - - 1 1 1 
IT - - - - - - 1 1 1 
Arts and Other 
Activities 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 
Physical Education 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total Periods per 
Week 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 35 35 
 
  
                                            
1849 International Bureau of Education, World Data on Education, Seventh Edition 2010/2011 
(Geneva: UNESCO, 2011). 
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The Education System and Compulsory School Curriculum in 
Northern Ireland 
Education in Northern Ireland is compulsory from age 4 (Foundation) to age 





























































































































































































Figure 22: Structure of the Education System in Northern Ireland. 
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The Northern Ireland curriculum does not allocate time periods for each 
subject area but requires schools to provide a ‘broad and balanced’ offer.  
The areas of learning considered in this thesis are shaded. 
 
Table 2: Compulsory School Curriculum in Northern Ireland.1850 










u u u u u 
Mathematics & 
Numeracy u u u u u 
The Arts u u u u u 
The World Around 
Us u u u   
Physical Education u u u u u 
Religious 





u u u   





Local and Global 
Citizenship) 
   u u 





   u u 
Science and 






 u u u u 
 
  
                                            
1850  Council for Curriculum Examination and Assessment, Northern Ireland Curriculum, 
http://www.nicurriculum.org.uk/ (last accessed 8/02/2014). 
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The Education System and Compulsory School Curriculum in 
Macedonia 









































































































































































































Figure 23: Structure of the Education System in Macedonia. 
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The subjects analysed in this thesis are shaded. 
 
Table 3: Compulsory School Curriculum in Macedonia.1851 
 Number of Weekly Periods 



















5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Macedonian for Pupils 
of Other Nationalities - - 2 2 3 3 2 2 
First Foreign Language - - - 2 3 3 3 3 
Second Foreign 
Language - - - - - 2 2 2 
Mathematics 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Nature and Society 2 2 2 - - - - - 
Nature - - - 2 - - - - 
Society - - - 2 - - - - 
History - - - - 2 2 2 2 
Geography - - - - 1 2 2 2 
Physics - - - - - - 2 2 
Chemistry - - - - - - 2 2 
Biology - - - - 1 2 2 2 
Art Education 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Music 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Technical Education - - - - 2 2 - - 
Physical and Health 
Education 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 











Vlachs, Roma or Other 
Language - 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Other Optional 
Subjects 3 3 5 8 7 7 11 11 
                                            
1851 International Bureau of Education, World Data on Education, Seventh Edition 2010/2011 












Lebanon’s Communities  
 
Table 4: 1932 Census, Lebanon.1852 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Maronites 226,378 29 
Greek Orthodox 76,552 10 
Greek Catholic 45,999 6 
Armenians 31,156 4 
Other Christians 22,308 3 
Sunni Muslim 175,925 22 
Shia Muslim 154,208 19 
Druze 53,047 7 
 
Based on the results of the 2005 elections, Muhammad Faour estimates the 
following demographic figures.   
 
Table 5: Estimated Percentage of the Three Largest Religious Sects in 
Lebanon (2005).1853 
 Percentage Total Population 
Maronites 19 
Sunni Muslim 21 
Shia Muslim 34 
Others 26 
 
In contrast, based on the numbered of registered voters by religious sect in 
2005, Salamey and Payne estimate the following demographic figures. 
 
                                            
1852 Lebanese 1932 Census, qtd. in Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 25. 
1853 Muhammad Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 912. 
************** 
Table 6: Number of Registered Voters in Lebanon (2005).1854 
 Number of Registered Voters 
Percentage Total 
Population 
Maronites 667,556 22.19 
Greek Orthodox 236,402 7.86 
Greek Catholic 156,521 5.20 
Armenian Orthodox 90,675 3.01 
Armenian Catholic 20,217 0.67 
Protestant 17,409 0.58 
Other Christians 47,018 1.56 
Sunni Muslim 795,233 26.44 
Shia Muslim 783,903 26.06 
Druze 169,293 5.63 
Alawite 23,696 0.79 
 
David Levinson provided a general description of Lebanon’s main 
confessional communities in 1998.   
Arabs [form] 95 percent of the population … There has been no 
census of ethnic or religious groups since 1932, although it is now 
believed that Muslims form about 70 percent of the population and 
Christians 30 percent.  …The Muslim population numbers about 
2.7 million, if the 70 percent estimate is correct.  It is made up of 
three major religious groups: Shi’ites [Shia], Sunni, and Druze.  
Shi’ite. Muslims believe that the leader of Islam should be a direct 
descendant of the founder of Islam, Muhammad the Prophet, 
through his son-in-law Ali.  In Lebanon, Shi’ites form about 60 
percent of the Muslim population and 40 percent of the general 
population.  Despite their numerical superiority, they have long 
been the poorest and least influential of the major groups.  Most 
                                            
1854 Salamey and Payne, “Parliamentary Consociationalism in Lebanon: Equal Citizenry vs 
Quotated Confessionalism”, 457. 
************** 
live in the south or in Beirut, where many fled during the civil 
war.1855 
The largest Shia parties are the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, and 
Hizbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah (both part of the March 8 bloc).   
Sunni Muslims differ from Shi’ites [sic.] in their beliefs about the 
proper leaders of Islam.  Although Sunni constitute the majority of 
Muslims in the world, they make up only about 30 percent of the 
Muslim population in Lebanon.  They live mainly in the cities of 
Beirut and Sidon and are active in commerce, business and 
government.1856 
The largest Sunni parties are the Future Movement, led by Saad Hariri (part 
of the March 14 bloc), and the Majid Movement, led by Najib Mikati (part of 
the March 8 bloc). 
The Druze … are a distinct Islamic sect, not accepted by Shi’ite 
[sic.] and Sunni Muslims as true Muslims.  They constitute about 
10 percent of the Muslim population in Lebanon and maintain a 
close-knit community centred on the leadership of two prominent 
Druze families.1857 
The Progressive Socialist Party, led by Walid Jumblatt (March 14 bloc) and 
the Lebanese Democratic Party led by Prince Talal Arslan (March 8 bloc) are 
the main Druze parties.   
Other Muslim groups include small populations of Kurds, Alawites, 
and Ismailis. 
Christians now form about 30 percent of the population of 
Lebanon.  This is a marked decrease from the 50 percent figure 
earlier in the Century.  It is the result of both a higher birth rate 
among Muslims, and emigration by Christians.  Most Christians 
are Arabs, the largest non-Arab group being the Armenians.  The 
most politically and economically significant Christian group is the 
                                            




Maronites, about 75 percent of the Christian population.  
Maronites are a Christian sect that split from the Eastern 
Christians of the Byzantine Empire in the 5th Century.  They 
managed to preserve their community from both Byzantine and 
Muslim influence by taking refuge in the mountainous region of Mt. 
Lebanon.  Some Maronites became formally linked to the Roman 
Catholic Church in Rome in 1736, although ties between the 
groups date from the 12th Century.  The Maronites have been 
closely aligned with the French, and many adopted the French 
language and culture.  Although a largely rural people, Maronites 
were the dominant political and economic group until the civil war 
of 1975.  In the 1990s, their numbers having been reduced, they 
see themselves as unable to compete politically with the 
Muslims.1858  
Maronite voters are split between the Lebanese Forces, led by Samir 
Geagea (March 14 bloc), the Kataeb Party, led by Amin Gemayel (also know 
as the Lebanese Phalanges Party, part of the March 14 alliance) and the 
Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun (March 8 bloc).  These three parties 
also purport to represent most Christians from other denominations. 
The second largest Christian group is the Greek Orthodox, a 
branch of the Eastern Orthodox Church.  They number about 
100,000.  Greek Orthodox families are members of Lebanon’s 
business elite.  They stress their Arab identity and maintain ties 
with other Greek Orthodox populations in the Middle East. 
The third major Christian group is the Greek Catholics, who 
separated from the Greek Orthodox Church in the 18th Century 
and affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.  Mainly a rural 
population, they number about 75,000.  Despite their tie to Rome, 
many of the Greek Catholic rites remain similar to those of the 
Greek Orthodox community.  The Greek Catholics also stress their 
Arab identity. 
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Other Christian groups in Lebanon are the Roman Catholics 
(whose population in the past was primarily European), 
Protestants, and adherents of the Jacobite, Chaldean, and 
Nestorian sects.  The major non-Arab Christian group is the 
Armenians, numbering nearly 175,000 earlier in the century but 
now far less because of immigration to Armenia.  Armenians 
arrived in Lebanon as refugees from Turkey during and after 
World War I.  involved in business activities in Beirut and northern 
Lebanon, they have been able to avoid deep involvement in the 
civil war.  They are members of the Armenian Apostolic Church, 
founded in the early 4th Century.1859  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Palestinians are often deemed Lebanon’s 
‘unrecognised sect’:1860 
Palestinians are an indigenous people in Palestine (now Israel).  
Most current residents came to Lebanon around the time of the 
1948 Israel-Arab war or were born in Lebanon.  Others have 
arrived in Lebanon since 1948 from other Middle Eastern nations.  
Official estimates place their population at 328,000, although they 
may number over 400,000.  Most Palestinians lived in refugee 
camps and settlements in the south of Lebanon.  Destruction 
caused by the civil war, Israeli raids and Palestinian factional 
disputes have led many of them to move north, and they now 
make up a large, poor minority in and around Beirut.  The 
Palestinians are split in a number of political factions, including 
those who support the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), 
those aligned with Syria, and those with ties to Iran.1861 
Due to the Syrian civil war, there are over one million registered Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon.  Similarly to the Palestinians, they are granted limited 
socio-economic and political rights.1862 
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Northern Ireland’s Communities 
The 2011 census found that 1.8 percent of Northern Ireland’s population 
declared they belonged to ‘minority ethnic groups’ (non-white). 1863  Their 
background is: 
 
Table 7: Minority Ethnic Groups, Northern Ireland (2011). 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Chinese 6,300 0.3 
Indian 6,200 0.3 
Mixed 6,000 0.3 
Other Asian 5,000 0.3 
Irish Travellers 1,300 0.1 
Other 10,500 0.5 
 
Among them, the only indigenous group are the Irish Travellers, who, 
according to Levinson: 
are ethnic Irish whose ancestors as long ago as the 5th Century 
came to be viewed as a distinct group because of their nomadic 
lifestyle and occupation as metalsmiths.  Although sometimes 
considered to be Gypsies – whom they resemble in lifestyle and 
with whom they have intermarried to a limited degree – Travellers 
are a distinct people of Irish ancestry.  Because of their metalwork, 
they were known as Tinkers, a label now considered insulting.  
Travellers continue to live a primarily nomadic lifestyle, although 
they are now a more urban group and sell products to the settled 
Irish population.  Travellers speak English as well as their own 
language, known as Cant or Shelta, and are mainly Roman 
Catholic.1864 
The 2011 census question on mother-tongue found that: 
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1864 Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 45 
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Table 8: Main Languages, Northern Ireland (2011). 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
English 1,681,171 96.8 
Polish 17,731 1 
Lithuanian 6,250 0.3 
Irish 4,164 0.2 
Portuguese 2,293 0.1 
Slovak 2,257 0.1 
Chinese 2,214 0.1 
Other 19,631 1.3 
 
A further question assessed individual abilities in Irish and Ulster-Scots: 
 
Table 9: Ability in Irish and Ulster-Scots (2011) 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Irish: 




Have Some Ability 
167,439 9.6 
Irish: 
Have no Ability 
1,550,813 89.3 
Ulster-Scots: 




Have Some Ability 
123,831 7.1 
Ulster-Scots: 
Have no Ability 
1,595,507 91.9 
 
The 2011 census also recorded national identity as: 
 
************** 
Table 10: National Identity, Northern Ireland (2011).1865 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
British Only 722,379 39.89 
Irish Only 457,482 25.26 
Northern Irish Only 379,267 20.94 
British and Irish Only 11,877 0.66 
British and Northern 
Irish Only 111,748 6.17 
Irish and Northern Irish 
Only 19,132 1.06 
British, Irish and 
Northern Irish 18,406 1.02 
Other 90,572 5.00 
 
Similarly, it found the following religious affiliations: 
 
Table 11: Religious Affiliation, Northern Ireland (2011).1866 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Catholic 738,033 40.76 
Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland 345,101 19.06 
Church of Ireland 248,821 13.74 
Methodist Church in 
Ireland 54,253 3.00 
Other Christian 104,380 5.76 
Other Religions 14,859 0.82 
No Religion 183,164 10.11 
Religion not Stated 122,252 6.75 
 
Because of the political salience of confessional affiliation, the 2011 census 
also asks about which religion the respondents ‘were brought up in’.1867 
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Table 12: Religious Background, Northern Ireland (2011). 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Catholic 817,385 45.14 
Protestant and Other 
Christian 875,717 48.36 
Other Religions 16,592 0.92 
None 101,169 5.59 
 
As for the description of Northern Ireland’s communities, Levinson states 
that, as of 1998: 
There are 1.6 million people living in Northern Ireland: Catholics 
are 40 percent of the population and Protestants are 58 percent.  
The Irish Catholics are Irish of Ireland, while the Irish Protestants 
are descendants of English and Scottish settlers who came during 
the period of British rule.1868  
He goes on to explain that: 
The UK retained control of Northern Ireland after [the Republic of] 
Ireland gained full independence … and since then, there has 
been a movement for independence and affiliation with Ireland by 
the Catholic Northern Irish – a movement that has been resisted 
by the Protestant Northern Irish and the British.1869  
In Northern Ireland, the largest Unionist parties are the Democratic Unionist 
Party, led by Peter Robinson, and the Ulster Unionist Party, led by Mike 
Nesbitt.  They largely appeal to Protestants/British.   
The largest Nationalist parties are Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams and the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party, led by Alasdair McDonnell.  They 
appeal primarily to the Irish/Catholic community.   
The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland is the largest ‘cross-community’ party 
and is led by David Ford. 
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Macedonia’s Communities 
According to the 2001 Macedonian census, the population of Macedonia is 
divided among the following ethnic groups: 
Table 13: Population by Ethnicity, Macedonia (2001).1870 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Macedonians 1,297,981 64 
Albanians 509,083 25 
Turks 77,959 4 
Romas 53,879 3 
Vlachs 9,695 0.4 
Serbs 35,939 1.8 
Bosniaks 17,018 0.8 
Others 20,993 1 
 
As this thesis explains, the mother-tongue is the most politically salient 
marker of communal identity in Macedonia. 
Table 14: Population by Mother-tongue, Macedonia (2001).1871 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Macedonian 1,344,815 66.5 
Albanian 507,989 25.1 
Turkish 71,757 3.5 
Romani 38,528 1.9 
Vlach 6,884 0.3 
Serbian 25,773 1.3 
Bosniak 8,560 0.4 
Other 19,241 0.9 
 
Religious allegiance overlaps to a great extent with ethnic and linguistic 
cleavages: 
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Table 15: Population by Religious Affiliation, Macedonia (2001).1872 
 Number of People Percentage Total Population 
Christian Orthodox 1,310,184 65 
Muslims 674,015 33 
Catholics 7,008 0.3 
Protestants 520 0.02 
Other 30,820 1.5 
 
Levinson explains that as of 1998: 
Macedonians are a Slavic people closely related to the 
neighbouring Bulgarians.  A distinct sense of Macedonian identity 
developed after the end of Ottoman rule … at first based on 
resistance in this region and the speaking of various regional 
dialects of Macedonian, a language similar to Bulgarian (claimed 
by Bulgarians to be a dialect of Bulgarian).  Macedonian identity 
was strengthened after incorporation into Yugoslavia as a republic 
… based on Macedonia’s political status as a republic, the 
creation of a new Macedonian language… and the establishment 
of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.  However, this church is not 
recognised by Eastern Orthodoxy, and many people continue to 
speak the regional dialects of Macedonia.1873 
The two major Macedonian political parties are VMRO-DPMNE (the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity), led by Nikola Gruevski and SDU (Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia), led by Zoran Zaev. 
Albanians may be descended, at least in part, from the Illyrians 
who settled in the region some 4,000 years ago, and this ancestry 
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has served to keep them distinct from neighbouring Slavic peoples 
who moved into the region several thousand years later.1874 
And: 
Albanians… claim that they number about 900,000 in Macedonia.  
They live primarily in north-western Macedonia near the border 
with Albania.1875 
The two major Albanian parties are the DUI (Democratic Union for 
Integration), led by Ali Ahmeti and the DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians), 
led by Menduh Thaci. 
The rest of the population is divided among: 
Gypsies [sic. Romas] numbered as many as two million before the 
demise of Yugoslavia.  … Before the wars, most Gypsies [sic.] 
were living in settled communities and supported themselves 
through wage labour and such specialised economic services as 
entertainment or selling used vehicles.  As elsewhere in Europe, 
Gypsies [sic.] in Macedonia lived outside mainstream society, 
although many spoke the language of the neighbouring groups 
and adhered to the same religions.1876 
Turks, … are a remnant population from the centuries of Ottoman 
rule.  As elsewhere in the former Ottoman Empire, people of 
Turkish ancestry are a vulnerable minority… 
The Vlach population is estimated at about 6,000.  Formerly 
nomadic sheep herders, Vlachs were settled forcibly by the 
Communist government and are now assimilated into Macedonian 
society.  Sometimes considered Romanian because their 
language is similar, Vlachs are a remnant population descended 
from the Illyrians and Thracians who have interacted with the 
Slavic population over the centuries in the Balkans.1877 
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Appendix 3 
The Document of National Accord (Taif Agreement) 
First, General Principles and Reforms:  
I. General Principles  
A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final 
homeland for all its citizens.    
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity.  It is an active and founding 
member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter.  
It is an active and founding member of the United Nations 
Organisation and is committed to its charters.  Lebanon is a member 
of the nonaligned movement.  The state of Lebanon shall embody 
these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.   
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect 
for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on 
social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, 
without discrimination or preference.   
D. The people are the source of authority.  They are sovereign and they 
shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.   
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual 
initiative and private ownership.   
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a 
mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability.   
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through 
fiscal, economic, and social reform.   
H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese.  Every 
Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under 
the supremacy of the law.  The people may not be categorised on the 
basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no 
fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in 
Lebanon].   
I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be 
legitimate  
II. Political Reforms  
************** 
A. Chamber of Deputies:  
The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full 
control over government policy and activities.  
1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the 
duration of the chamber's term.   
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy 
speaker, the chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from 
its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and 
in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies.  In 
case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately 
to fill the vacant post. 
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued 
unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such 
a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution 
passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the 
cabinet.   
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.   
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian 
restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the 
following bases:  
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.   
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.   
c. Proportionately between the districts.   
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be 
increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims.  As 
for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts 
whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this 
document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis 
through appointment by the national accord government that is 
planned to be formed.   
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not 
sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families 
shall be represented in it.  The senate powers shall be confined to 
crucial issues.   
************** 
B. President of Republic:  
The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the 
country's unity.  He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to 
preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution.  He is the supreme 
commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the 
cabinet.  The president shall exercise the following powers:  
1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.   
2. Head the Supreme Defence Council.   
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication.  He shall also be 
entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 
15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential 
office.  Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should 
the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the 
decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.   
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the 
constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the 
Chamber of Deputies.  After notifying the cabinet, the president may 
also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods 
provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the 
constitution.  In case the laws are not issued or returned before the 
end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be 
published.   
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.   
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber 
of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary 
consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially 
familiarise the speaker on.   
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.   
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the 
cabinet.   
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet 
ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties. 
************** 
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and 
award state medals by decree.   
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion 
and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only 
upon approval by the cabinet.  The cabinet shall familiarise the 
Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest 
and state safety make such familiarisation possible.  As for treaties 
involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and 
other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be 
concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.   
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of 
Deputies.   
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of 
Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.   
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any 
urgent issue beyond the agenda.   
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a 
special session whenever he deems it necessary.   
16. Grant special pardon by decree.   
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless 
he violates the constitution or commits high treason.   
C. Prime Minister:  
The prime minister is the head of the government.  He represents it and 
speaks in its name.  He is responsible for implementing the general policy 
drafted by the cabinet.  The prime minister shall exercise the following 
powers:  
1. Head the cabinet.   
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with 
the president the decree forming it.  The cabinet shall submit its 
cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence 
within 30 days [of its formation].  The cabinet may not exercise its 
powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it 
is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of 
affairs.   
************** 
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.   
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and 
decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.   
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws 
and requesting the reexamination of laws.   
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarise the 
president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the 
agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual 
session minutes.   
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; 
coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to 
ensure the smooth progress of work.   
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the 
presence of the minister concerned.   
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defence Council's deputy chairman.   
D. Cabinet: 
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.  The following are 
among the powers exercised by it:  
1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills 
and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its 
implementation.   
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise 
the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the 
civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.   
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.   
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in 
accordance with the law.   
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of 
the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout 
an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even 
though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends 
back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the 
government.  This right may not be exercised again for the same 
reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.   
************** 
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet 
sessions.  The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters.  
The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members.  
The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent.  If impossible, then 
by vote.  The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the 
members present.  As for major issues, they require the approval of 
2/3 the cabinet members.  The following shall be considered major 
issues: The state of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, 
general mobilisation, international agreements and treaties, the state's 
general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the 
appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, 
reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber 
of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status 
laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.   
E. Minister:  
The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the 
government's general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility.  
A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or 
unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him 
individually  
F. Cabinet Resignation: 
Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:  
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:  
a. If its chairman resigns.   
b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the 
decree forming it.   
c. If its chairman dies.   
d. At the beginning of a president's term.   
e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.   
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it 
on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote 
of confidence.   
************** 
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the 
republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval. 
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of 
Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special 
session until a new cabinet is formed.  A vote-of-confidence session 
shall follow.   
G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism:  
 Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.  To 
achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased 
plan.  The Chamber of Deputies election the basis of equal sharing by 
Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this 
objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of 
the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the 
Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables.  The 
council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of 
abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the 
cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan.  The following 
shall be done in the interim period:  
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and 
specialisation in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, 
and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance 
with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and 
equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and 
Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.   
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.   
III. Other Reforms  
A. Administrative Decentralism:  
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong 
central authority.   
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall 
be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the 
administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate 
serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.   
************** 
3. The administrative division shall be recognised in a manner that 
emphasises national fusion within the framework of preserving 
common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.   
4. Expanded administrative decentralisation shall be adopted at the level 
of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units ] through 
the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, 
to ensure local participation.   
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing 
the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the 
resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal 
unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.   
B. Courts:  
[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of 
the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and 
executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common 
coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the 
constitution on the other hand:  
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose 
task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed.  A special law 
on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.   
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to 
observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and 
contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.   
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional 
council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and 
observing the constitutionality of the laws:  
a. The president of the republic.   
b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.   
c. The prime minister.   
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.   
[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads 
of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters 
pertaining to:  
************** 
1. Personal status affairs.   
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.   
3. Freedom of religious education.   
[3] To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher 
Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.   
D.  Parliamentary Election Law:  
 Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the 
basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common 
coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient 
political representation of all the people's factions and generations.  This 
shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of 
unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.   
E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development:  
A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of 
the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy 
and providing advice and proposals.   
F. Education:  
1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the 
elementary stage at least.   
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasised in accordance with 
general laws and regulations.   
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private 
schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.   
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, 
strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's 
development and reconstruction needs.  The conditions of the 
Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to 
the university, especially to its technical colleges.   
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that 
strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, 
and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national [civic] 
education.   
G. Information:  
************** 
 All the information media shall be reorganised under the canopy of the law 
and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious 
tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.   
Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all 
Lebanese territories:  
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a 
strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord 
government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread 
the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories 
gradually with the state's own forces.  The broad lines of the plan shall be as 
follows:  
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be 
announced.  The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of 
Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of 
the national accord charter.  The president of the republic shall be 
elected.  A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political 
reforms shall be approved constitutionally.   
B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:  
1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without 
exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing 
the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to 
organised periodic training courses.   
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and 
departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and 
sea.   
C. Strengthening the armed forces:  
1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, 
and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the 
capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on 
their own.   
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces 
in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.   
************** 
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that 
they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in 
confronting Israeli aggression.   
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their 
security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.   
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganised to serve military 
objectives exclusively.   
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved 
fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to 
return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established.  
Legistlation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of 
reconstruction shall be issued.  Considering that the objective of the 
State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese 
territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal 
security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to 
Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the 
legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State 
of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with 
ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of 
the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of 
the political reforms constitutionally.  At the end of this period, the two 
governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National 
Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-
Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn 
Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a 
joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee.  An agreement shall also be 
concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and 
duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area 
and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state 
authorities where the forces exist.  The Arab Tripartite Committee is 
prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this 
agreement.   
Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:  
************** 
Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-
recognised Lebanese borders requires the following:  
A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council 
resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.   
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.   
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from 
the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the 
territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area 
adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the 
UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to 
provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the 
border area.   
Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:  
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true 
fraternal relations.  Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special 
relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, 
history, and joint fraternal interests.  This is the concept on which the two 
countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be 
embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a 
manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the 
framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them.  Therefore, 
and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed 
to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a 
source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to 
constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances.  
Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a 
base for any force, state, or organisation seeking to undermine its security or 
Syria's security.  Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, 
and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that 
poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.   
************** 
 
The Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations (Belfast 
Agreement) 
Declaration of Support 
1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the 
agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a 
new beginning. 
2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable 
legacy of suffering.  We must never forget those who have died or 
been injured, and their families.  But we can best honour them through 
a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement 
of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and 
vindication of the human rights of all. 
3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the 
basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and 
South, and between these islands. 
4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively 
democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political 
issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for 
any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or 
otherwise. 
5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, 
and equally legitimate, political aspirations.  However, we will 
endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and 
rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed 
arrangements.  We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure 
the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be 
established under this agreement.  It is accepted that all of the 
institutional and constitutional arrangements - an Assembly in 
Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation 
bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and 
the Constitution of Ireland - are interlocking and interdependent and 
************** 
that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South 
Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends 
on that of the other. 
6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this 
agreement to the people, North and South, for their approval. 
Constitutional Issues  
1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and 
Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will: 
i. recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, 
whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain 
or a sovereign united Ireland; 
ii. recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by 
agreement between the two parts respectively and without external 
impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of 
consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring 
about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right 
must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement 
and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; 
iii. acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern 
Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the 
island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to 
maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as 
part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that 
it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern 
Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; 
iv. affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise 
their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and 
(ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation 
on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective 
Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish; 
************** 
v. affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government 
with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on 
behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions 
and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality 
of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from 
discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and 
equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both 
communities; 
vi. recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may 
so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British 
and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not 
be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. 
2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly 
undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, 
to propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of 
Ireland and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. 
Annex A. Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British 
Legislation 
1. (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains 
part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the 
consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll 
held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1. 
(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that 
Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and 
form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before 
Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be 
agreed between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
and the Government of Ireland. 
1. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is repealed; and this Act shall 
have effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment. 
Schedule 1. Polls for the Purpose of Section 1 
************** 
1. The Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the 
purposes of section 1 on a date specified in the order. 
2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Secretary of State shall exercise the 
power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a 
majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland 
should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland. 
3. The Secretary of State shall not make an order under paragraph 1 
earlier than seven years after the holding of a previous poll under this 
Schedule. 
4. (Remaining paragraphs along the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
existing Schedule 1 to 1973 Act.) 
Annex B. Irish Government Draft Legislation to Amend the Constitution 
Add to Article 29 the following sections: 
1. The State may consent to be bound by the British-Irish Agreement 
done at Belfast on the ... day of ... 1998, hereinafter called the 
Agreement. 
2. Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise 
the powers and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or 
any part of the island of Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Constitution conferring a like power or function on any person or 
any organ of State appointed under or created or established by or 
under this Constitution.  Any power or function conferred on such an 
institution in relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or 
controversies may be in addition to or in substitution for any like power 
or function conferred by this Constitution on any such person or organ 
of State as aforesaid. 
3. If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, 
pursuant to the Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this 
Constitution referred to therein, then, notwithstanding Article 46 
hereof, this Constitution shall be amended as follows: 
i. the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Irish text: 
************** 
2. [Irish text to be inserted here] 
3. [Irish text to be inserted here] 
ii. the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the 
English text: 
Article 2 
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of 
Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation.  
That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance 
with law to be citizens of Ireland.  Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its 
special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its 
cultural identity and heritage. 
Article 3 
1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite 
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the 
diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united 
Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the 
consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both 
jurisdictions in the island.  Until then, the laws enacted by the 
Parliament established by this Constitution shall have the like area 
and extent of application as the laws enacted by the Parliament that 
existed immediately before the coming into operation of this 
Constitution. 
2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared 
between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective 
responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers 
and functions in respect of all or any part of the island." 
iii. the following section shall be added to the Irish text of this Article: 
8. [Irish text to be inserted here]" 
and 
iv. the following section shall be added to the English text of this Article: 
8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with the 
generally recognised principles of international law. 
************** 
4. If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and 
subsection 3, other than the amendment of this Constitution effected 
thereby, and subsection 5 of this section shall be omitted from every 
official text of this Constitution published thereafter, but 
notwithstanding such omission this section shall continue to have the 
force of law. 
5. If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section 
being added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be 
provided for by law, this section shall cease to have effect and shall be 
omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter. 
Strand One. Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland 
This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern 
Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive 
and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and 
interests of all sides of the community. 
The Assembly 
1. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing 
Westminster constituencies. 
2. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in 
respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six 
Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of 
taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this 
agreement. 
3. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community 
basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved 
responsibilities. 
Safeguards 
4. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community 
can participate and work together successfully in the operation of 
these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, 
including: 
a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee 
membership in proportion to party strengths; 
************** 
b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the 
Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human 
Rights Commission; 
c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed 
to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland; 
d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-
community basis; 
i. either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and 
voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations 
present and voting; 
ii. or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, 
including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist 
designations present and voting. 
Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in 
advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget 
allocations.  In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a 
petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly 
members (30/108). 
e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote 
equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem 
between the two main communities, and to investigate individual 
complaints against public bodies. 
Operation of the Assembly 
6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a 
designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes 
of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the 
relevant provisions above. 
7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a 
cross-community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above. 
8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of 
the Northern Ireland Administration.  The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of 
************** 
the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the 
d'Hondt system.  Membership of the Committees will be in broad 
proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the 
opportunity of Committee places is available to all members. 
9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and 
consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is 
associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation.  They will 
have the power to: 
• consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in 
the context of the overall budget allocation; 
• approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee 
stage of relevant primary legislation; 
• call for persons and papers; 
• initiate enquiries and make reports; 
• consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its 
Minister. 
10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be 
established as may be required from time to time. 
11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and 
report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in 
conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of 
Rights.  The Committee shall have the power to call people and 
papers to assist in its consideration of the matter.  The Assembly shall 
then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the 
matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure. 
12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the 
Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, 
voting on a cross-community basis. 
13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly 
shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without 
reference to this special procedure.  If this fails to achieve support on 
a cross-community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special procedure 
shall be followed. 
Executive Authority 
************** 
14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with 
Departmental responsibilities. 
15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into 
office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according 
to 5(d)(i) above. 
16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 
the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the 
d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in 
the Assembly. 
17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be 
convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister. 
18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, 
inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive 
Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to 
external relationships. 
19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, 
and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two 
or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals 
and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in 
dealing with external relationships). 
20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as 
necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to 
policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after 
scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis. 
21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as 
a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee. 
22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister.  All 
Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee. 
23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister 
and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office 
(Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good faith all the 
responsibilities attaching to their office. 
************** 
24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of 
responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive 
Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole. 
25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the 
Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the 
confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for 
failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set 
out in the Pledge of Office.  Those who hold office should use only 
democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be 
excluded or removed from office under these provisions. 
Legislation 
1. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for 
Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: 
a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it 
which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant 
legislation null and void; 
b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision 
on a cross-community basis is required; 
c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental 
Committee; 
d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish 
Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, 
between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament; 
e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions 
in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, 
especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained 
(e.g. social security, company law). 
2. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with 
the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary 
control. 
3. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts. 
4. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a 
Minister. 
Relations with other institutions 
************** 
30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level 
and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with 
paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community 
involvement. 
31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives 
and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective co-
ordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including 
on EU issues. 
32. Role of Secretary of State: 
a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, 
subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers; 
b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly 
legislation on reserved matters; 
c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet; 
d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation. 
33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for 
Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will: 
a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly 
legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to 
the control of Parliament; 
b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international 
obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland; 
c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select 
Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. 
34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established.  It will comprise 
representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, 
and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy 
First Minister.  It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, 
economic and cultural issues.  The First Minister and the Deputy First 
Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic 
Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to 
the Civic Forum. 
Transitional Arrangements 
************** 
35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without 
legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and 
working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning 
of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South 
Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies.  In this 
transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as 
shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to non-violence and 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to 
any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in 
good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe 
the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers. 
Review 
36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, 
including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's 
procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the 
interests of efficiency and fairness. 
Annex A. Pledge of Office 
To pledge: 
a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office; 
b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic 
means; 
c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in 
accordance with the general obligations on government to promote 
equality and prevent discrimination; 
d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for 
government; 
e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed 
within the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly; 
f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the 
Executive Committee and Assembly; 
g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct. 
Code of Conduct 
************** 
• Ministers must at all times: 
• observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving 
impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship 
of public funds; 
• be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the 
Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their 
stewardship of public funds and the extent to which key performance 
targets and objectives have been met; 
• ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, 
users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that 
Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an 
open and responsible way; 
• follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life; 
• comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds; 
• operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations 
and equality of treatment; 
• not use information gained in the course of their service for personal 
gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their 
private interests; 
• ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and 
hospitality that might be offered; 
• declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with 
their responsibilities.  The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests.  
Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests 
which members of the public might reasonably think could influence 
their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests; 
Strand two. North/South Ministerial Council. 
1. Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of 
relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the 
Oireachtas, a North/South Ministerial Council to be established to 
bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and 
action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation 
************** 
on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest 
within the competence of the Administrations, North and South. 
2. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides.  
Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First 
Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the 
Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the 
rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively.  
Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities 
attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations.  If a holder of a 
relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach 
in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First 
Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able 
to make alternative arrangements. 
3. The Council to meet in different formats: 
i. in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led 
by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Irish 
Government led by the Taoiseach; 
ii. in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each 
side represented by the appropriate Minister; 
iii. in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral 
matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement. 
4. Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the 
two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for 
consideration or action. 
5. The Council: 
i. to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-
operating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both 
Administrations, North and South; 
ii. to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of 
common policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and 
all-island benefit, and which are within the competence of both 
Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to 
overcome any disagreements; 
************** 
iii. to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation 
separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the 
competence of both Administrations, North and South; 
iv. to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island 
and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be 
established as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below. 
6. Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the 
defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in 
place for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction.  
Each side to remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas 
respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in place on 
either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined 
authority of those attending. 
7. As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the 
British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their 
transitional forms.  All three institutions will meet regularly and 
frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the 
Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to 
establish their modus operandi. 
8. During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the 
Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government 
operating in the North/South Ministerial Council will undertake a work 
programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at 
least 12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 
October 1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for 
mutual benefit will take place.  Such areas may include matters in the 
list set out in the Annex. 
9. As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at 
least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the 
following categories: 
i. Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for 
co-operation in each separate jurisdiction; 
************** 
ii. Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed 
implementation bodies on a cross-border or all-island level. 
10. The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other 
enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that 
these bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work 
programme, function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish 
Agreement and the transfer of powers, with legislative authority for 
these bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible 
thereafter.  Other arrangements for the agreed co-operation will also 
commence contemporaneously with the transfer of powers to the 
Assembly. 
11. The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit.  They 
will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed 
in the Council. 
12. Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in 
the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences 
and responsibility of the two Administrations. 
13. It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one 
cannot successfully function without the other. 
14. Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format 
described at paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format.  By 
agreement between the two sides, experts could be appointed to 
consider a particular matter and report. 
15. Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that 
the Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary 
public function. 
16. The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by 
members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil 
Service. 
17. The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant 
matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes 
and proposals under consideration in the EU framework.  
Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are 
************** 
taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU 
meetings. 
18. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider 
developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal 
numbers from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual 
interest and concern. 
19. Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent 
consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, 
representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other 
members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues. 
Annex 
Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the 
following: 
1. Agriculture - animal and plant health. 
2. Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges. 
3. Transport - strategic transport planning. 
4. Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and 
waste management. 
5. Waterways - inland waterways. 
6. Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers 
and fraud control. 
7. Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development. 
8. Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and 
their successors. 
9. Inland Fisheries. 
10. Aquaculture and marine matters 
11. Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-
border issues. 
12. Urban and rural development. 
Others to be considered by the shadow North/ South Council. 
Strand Three. British-Irish Council 
1. A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-
Irish Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial 
************** 
development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of 
these islands. 
2. Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and 
Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the 
United Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and 
the Channel Islands. 
3. The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; 
in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side 
represented by the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to 
consider cross-sectoral matters. 
4. Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever 
procedures for democratic authority and accountability are in force in 
their respective elected institutions. 
5. The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best 
endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual 
interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations.  
Suitable issues for early discussion in the BIC could include transport 
links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health 
issues, education issues and approaches to EU issues.  Suitable 
arrangements to be made for practical co-operation on agreed 
policies. 
6. It will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common 
actions.  Individual members may opt not to participate in such 
common policies and common action. 
7. The BIC normally will operate by consensus.  In relation to decisions 
on common policies or common actions, including their means of 
implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members 
participating in such policies or actions. 
8. The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will 
provide such financial support as it may require. 
9. A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish 
Governments in co-ordination with officials of each of the other 
members. 
************** 
10. In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will 
be open to two or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements between them.  Such arrangements could include, 
subject to the agreement of the members concerned, mechanisms to 
enable consultation, co-operation and joint decision-making on 
matters of mutual interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint 
decisions they may reach.  These arrangements will not require the 
prior approval of the BIC as a whole and will operate independently of 
it. 
11. The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop 
interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish 
Interparliamentary Body. 
12. The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of 
the Council, including a formal published review at an appropriate time 
after the Agreement comes into effect, and will contribute as 
appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising 
from the multi-party negotiations. 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
1. There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of 
relationships.  It will establish a standing British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference, which will subsume both the Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental 
Conference established under the 1985 Agreement. 
2. The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments 
to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual 
interest within the competence of both Governments. 
3. The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister 
and Taoiseach).  Otherwise, Governments will be represented by 
appropriate Ministers.  Advisers, including police and security 
advisers, will attend as appropriate. 
4. All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments.  The 
Governments will make determined efforts to resolve disagreements 
between them.  There will be no derogation from the sovereignty of 
either Government. 
************** 
5. In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern 
Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in 
relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent 
meetings of the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern 
Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put forward views 
and proposals.  These meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would 
also deal with all-island and cross-border co-operation on non-
devolved issues. 
6. Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include 
facilitation of co-operation in security matters.  The Conference also 
will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and 
policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved 
to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation 
between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-border 
aspects of these matters. 
7. Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration 
will be involved in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews 
referred to in paragraph 9 below to discuss non-devolved Northern 
Ireland matters. 
8. The Conference will be supported by officials of the British and Irish 
Governments, including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials 
dealing with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters. 
9. The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new 
British-Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established 
under it, including a formal published review three years after the 
Agreement comes into effect.  Representatives of the Northern Ireland 
Administration will be invited to express views to the Conference in 
this context.  The Conference will contribute as appropriate to any 
review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party 
negotiations but will have no power to override the democratic 
arrangements set up by this Agreement. 
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity 
Human Rights 
************** 
1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil 
rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community.  
Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the 
parties affirm in particular: 
• the right of free political thought; 
• the right to freedom and expression of religion; 
• the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations; 
• the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate 
means; 
• the right to freely choose one's place of residence; 
• the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, 
regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity; 
• the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and 
• the right of women to full and equal political participation. 
United Kingdom Legislation 
2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern 
Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the 
Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly 
legislation on grounds of inconsistency. 
3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British 
Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory 
obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their 
functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of 
opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; 
disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation.  
Public bodies would be required to draw up statutory schemes 
showing how they would implement this obligation.  Such schemes 
would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an 
assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, 
public access to information and services, monitoring and timetables. 
4. The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 
5 below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for 
defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in 
************** 
the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on 
international instruments and experience.  These additional rights to 
reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of 
both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken together with the 
ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.  Among the 
issues for consideration by the Commission will be: 
• the formulation of a general obligation on government and public 
bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the 
identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and 
• a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and 
to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors. 
New Institutions in Northern Ireland 
5. A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership 
from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be 
established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, 
with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised 
by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include 
keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and 
practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; 
providing information and promoting awareness of human rights; 
considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; 
and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing 
assistance to individuals doing so. 
6. Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the 
British Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to 
replace the Fair Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial Equality (NI) and the 
Disability Council.  Such a unified Commission will advise on, validate 
and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of 
default. 
7. It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider 
bringing together its responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated 
Department of Equality. 
************** 
8. These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster 
legislation in respect of the judiciary, the system of justice and 
policing. 
Comparable Steps by the Irish Government 
9. The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the 
protection of human rights in its jurisdiction.  The Government will, 
taking account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on 
the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, 
bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional 
protection of human rights.  These proposals will draw on the 
European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal 
instruments in the field of human rights and the question of the 
incorporation of the ECHR will be further examined in this context.  
The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent 
level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland.  
In addition, the Irish Government will: 
• establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit 
equivalent to that within Northern Ireland; 
• proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the 
Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities 
(already ratified by the UK); 
• implement enhanced employment equality legislation; 
• introduce equal status legislation; and 
• continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for 
the different traditions in the island of Ireland. 
A Joint Committee 
10. It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of 
representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and 
South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the 
island of Ireland.  The joint committee will consider, among other 
matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by 
all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed 
************** 
measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone 
living in the island of Ireland. 
Reconciliation and Victims of Violence 
11. The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and 
address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary 
element of reconciliation.  They look forward to the results of the work 
of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission. 
1. It is recognised that victims have a right to remember as well as to 
contribute to a changed society.  The achievement of a peaceful and 
just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence.  The 
participants particularly recognise that young people from areas 
affected by the troubles face particular difficulties and will support the 
development of special community-based initiatives based on 
international best practice.  The provision of services that are 
supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims will also be a critical 
element and that support will need to be channelled through both 
statutory and community-based voluntary organisations facilitating 
locally-based self-help and support networks.  This will require the 
allocation of sufficient resources, including statutory funding as 
necessary, to meet the needs of victims and to provide for community-
based support programmes. 
2. The participants recognise and value the work being done by many 
organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and 
respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern 
Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as 
having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement.  
Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such 
organisations and will positively examine the case for enhanced 
financial assistance for the work of reconciliation.  An essential aspect 
of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance 
at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and 
encourage integrated education and mixed housing. 
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity 
************** 
Economic, Social and Cultural Issues 
1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland 
Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for 
sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for 
promoting social inclusion, including in particular community 
development and the advancement of women in public life. 
2. Subject to the public consultation currently under way, the British 
Government will make rapid progress with: 
i. a new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland, for 
consideration in due course by a the Assembly, tackling the problems 
of a divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border 
areas, protecting and enhancing the environment, producing new 
approaches to transport issues, strengthening the physical 
infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources 
of rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres; 
ii. a new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland, for 
consideration in due course by a the Assembly, which would provide 
for short and medium term economic planning linked as appropriate to 
the regional development strategy; and 
iii. measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper 
("Partnership for Equality") and covering the extension and 
strengthening of anti-discrimination legislation, a review of the national 
security aspects of the present fair employment legislation at the 
earliest possible time, a new more focused Targeting Social Need 
initiative and a range of measures aimed at combating unemployment 
and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates 
between the two communities by targeting objective need. 
3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding 
and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern 
Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the 
various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth 
of the island of Ireland. 
4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK 
signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority 
************** 
Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the 
Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it: 
• take resolute action to promote the language; 
• facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and 
writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand; 
• seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would 
discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the 
language; 
• make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, 
representing their views to public authorities and investigating 
complaints; 
• place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to 
encourage and facilitate Irish-medium education in line with current 
provision for integrated education; 
• explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-
operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for 
achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in 
Northern Ireland; 
• seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial 
support for Irish language film and television production in 
Northern Ireland; and 
• encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment 
will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account 
of the desires and sensitivities of the community. 
5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and 
emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the 
new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in 
a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division.  
Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what 
action might be required. 
Decommissioning  
1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted 
on 24 September 1997 "that the resolution of the decommissioning 
************** 
issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation", and also 
recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above. 
2. They note the progress made by the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing 
schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the 
decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of 
paramilitary groups. 
3. All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total 
disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.  They also confirm their 
intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the 
Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to 
achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years 
following endorsement in referendums North and South of the 
agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall 
settlement. 
4. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress 
on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both 
Governments at regular intervals. 
5. Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the 
decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes 
into force by the end of June. 
1. Security 
2. The participants note that the development of a peaceful environment 
on the basis of this agreement can and should mean a normalisation 
of security arrangements and practices. 
3. The British Government will make progress towards the objective of 
as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements in 
Northern Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and with a 
published overall strategy, dealing with: 
i. the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed 
in Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful 
society; 
ii. the removal of security installations; 
iii. the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland; and 
************** 
iv. other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful 
society. 
4. The Secretary of State will consult regularly on progress, and the 
response to any continuing paramilitary activity, with the Irish 
Government and the political parties, as appropriate. 
5. The British Government will continue its consultation on firearms 
regulation and control on the basis of the document published on 2 
April 1998. 
6. The Irish Government will initiate a wide-ranging review of the 
Offences Against the State Acts 1939-85 with a view to both reform 
and dispensing with those elements no longer required as 
circumstances permit. 
Policing and Justice 
1. The participants recognise that policing is a central issue in any 
society.  They equally recognise that Northern Ireland's history of deep 
divisions has made it highly emotive, with great hurt suffered and 
sacrifices made by many individuals and their families, including those 
in the RUC and other public servants.  They believe that the 
agreement provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in 
Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and 
sustaining support from the community as a whole.  They also believe 
that this agreement offers a unique opportunity to bring about a new 
political dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy 
and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all 
sections of the community in Northern Ireland.  They consider that this 
opportunity should inform and underpin the development of a police 
service representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a 
whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely 
unarmed. 
2. The participants believe it essential that policing structures and 
arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective 
and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; 
accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the community it 
serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a 
************** 
coherent and co-operative criminal justice system, which conforms 
with human rights norms.  The participants also believe that those 
structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and 
order including responding effectively to crime and to any terrorist 
threat and to public order problems.  A police service which cannot do 
so will fail to win public confidence and acceptance.  They believe that 
any such structures and arrangements should be capable of delivering 
a policing service, in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the 
community at all levels, and with the maximum delegation of authority 
and responsibility, consistent with the foregoing principles.  These 
arrangements should be based on principles of protection of human 
rights and professional integrity and should be unambiguously 
accepted and actively supported by the entire community. 
3. An independent Commission will be established to make 
recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland 
including means of encouraging widespread community support for 
these arrangements within the agreed framework of principles 
reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with the terms of 
reference at Annex A.  The Commission will be broadly representative 
with expert and international representation among its membership 
and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 
1999. 
4. The participants believe that the aims of the criminal justice system 
are to: 
• deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community; 
• be responsive to the community's concerns, and encouraging 
community involvement where appropriate; 
• have the confidence of all parts of the community; and 
• deliver justice efficiently and effectively. 
5. There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other 
than policing and those aspects of the system relating to the 
emergency legislation) to be carried out by the British Government 
through a mechanism with an independent element, in consultation 
with the political parties and others.  The review will commence as 
soon as possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be 
************** 
made to the Secretary of State no later than Autumn 1999.  Terms of 
Reference are attached at Annex B. 
6. Implementation of the recommendations arising from both reviews will 
be discussed with the political parties and with the Irish Government. 
7. The participants also note that the British Government remains ready 
in principle, with the broad support of the political parties, and after 
consultation, as appropriate, with the Irish Government, in the context 
of ongoing implementation of the relevant recommendations, to 
devolve responsibility for policing and justice issues. 
Annex A. Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
Terms of Reference 
Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the agreement, the 
Commission will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of 
its findings, bring forward proposals for future policing structures and 
arrangements, including means of encouraging widespread community 
support for those arrangements. 
Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing 
arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and 
symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police 
service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as an integral 
part of, the community as a whole. 
Its proposals should include recommendations covering any issues such as 
re-training, job placement and educational and professional development 
required in the transition to policing in a peaceful society. 
Its proposals should also be designed to ensure that: 
• the police service is structured, managed and resourced so that it can 
be effective in discharging its full range of functions (including 
proposals on any necessary arrangements for the transition to policing 
in a normal peaceful society); 
• the police service is delivered in constructive and inclusive 
partnerships with the community at all levels with the maximum 
delegation of authority and responsibility; 
************** 
• the legislative and constitutional framework requires the impartial 
discharge of policing functions and conforms with internationally 
accepted norms in relation to policing standards; 
• the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law 
and the community they serve, so: 
o they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the 
law; 
o their powers and procedures, like the law they enforce, are 
clearly established and publicly available; 
o there are open, accessible and independent means of 
investigating and adjudicating upon complaints against the 
police; 
o there are clearly established arrangements enabling local 
people, and their political representatives, to articulate their 
views and concerns about policing and to establish publicly 
policing priorities and influence policing policies, subject to 
safeguards to ensure police impartiality and freedom from 
partisan political control; 
o there are arrangements for accountability and for the effective, 
efficient and economic use of resources in achieving policing 
objectives; 
o there are means to ensure independent professional scrutiny 
and inspection of the police service to ensure that proper 
professional standards are maintained; 
• the scope for structured co-operation with the Garda Siochana and 
other police forces is addressed; and 
• the management of public order events which can impose exceptional 
demands on policing resources is also addressed. 
The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other 
aspects of the criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing, 
including the role of the police in prosecution, then it should draw the 
attention of the Government to those matters. 
************** 
The Commission should consult widely, including with non-governmental 
expert organisations, and through such focus groups as they consider it 
appropriate to establish. 
The Government proposes to establish the Commission as soon as possible, 
with the aim of it starting work as soon as possible and publishing its final 
report by Summer 1999. 
Annex B. Review of the Criminal Justice System 
Terms of Reference 
Taking account of the aims of the criminal justice system as set out in the 
Agreement, the review will address the structure, management and 
resourcing of publicly funded elements of the criminal justice system and will 
bring forward proposals for future criminal justice arrangements (other than 
policing and those aspects of the system relating to emergency legislation, 
which the Government is considering separately) covering such issues as: 
• the arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary and 
magistracy, and safeguards for protecting their independence; 
• the arrangements for the organisation and supervision of the 
prosecution process, and for safeguarding its independence; 
• measures to improve the responsiveness and accountability of, and 
any lay participation in the criminal justice system; 
• mechanisms for addressing law reform; 
• the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice 
agencies on both parts of the island; and 
• the structure and organisation of criminal justice functions that might 
be devolved to an Assembly, including the possibility of establishing a 
Department of Justice, while safeguarding the essential independence 
of many of the key functions in this area. 
The Government proposes to commence the review as soon as possible, 
consulting with the political parties and others, including non-governmental 
expert organisations.  The review will be completed by Autumn 1999. 
Prisoners  
************** 
1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an 
accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including 
transferred prisoners, convicted of scheduled offences in Northern 
Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, 
similar offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners).  Any 
such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under 
national and international law. 
2. Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are 
not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit 
from the arrangements.  The situation in this regard will be kept under 
review. 
3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time 
frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners.  
The review process would provide for the advance of the release 
dates of qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the 
seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and 
the need to protect the community.  In addition, the intention would be 
that should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who 
remained in custody two years after the commencement of the 
scheme would be released at that point. 
4. The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give 
effect to these arrangements by the end of June 1998. 
5. The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures 
to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by 
providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance 
directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training 
and/or re-skilling, and further education. 
Validation, Implementation and Review 
Validation and Implementation 
1. The two Governments will as soon as possible sign a new British-Irish 
Agreement replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, embodying 
understandings on constitutional issues and affirming their solemn 
commitment to support and, where appropriate, implement the 
************** 
agreement reached by the participants in the negotiations which shall 
be annexed to the British-Irish Agreement. 
2. Each Government will organise a referendum on 22 May 1998.  
Subject to Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in 
Northern Ireland, organised under the terms of the Northern Ireland 
(Entry to Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996, will address the question: "Do 
you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on 
Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?".  The Irish 
Government will introduce and support in the Oireachtas a Bill to 
amend the Constitution as described in paragraph 2 of the section 
"Constitutional Issues" and in Annex B, as follows: (a) to amend 
Articles 2 and 3 as described in paragraph 8.1 in Annex B above and 
(b) to amend Article 29 to permit the Government to ratify the new 
British-Irish Agreement.  On passage by the Oireachtas, the Bill will be 
put to referendum. 
3. If majorities of those voting in each of the referendums support this 
agreement, the Governments will then introduce and support, in their 
respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be necessary to give 
effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will take whatever ancillary 
steps as may be required including the holding of elections on 25 
June, subject to parliamentary approval, to the Assembly, which would 
meet initially in a "shadow" mode.  The establishment of the North-
South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, the British-Irish 
Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the 
assumption by the Assembly of its legislative and executive powers 
will take place at the same time on the entry into force of the British-
Irish Agreement. 
4. In the interim, aspects of the implementation of the multi-party 
agreement will be reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in 
the particular case (taking into account, once Assembly elections have 
been held, the results of those elections), under the chairmanship of 
the British Government or the two Governments, as may be 
appropriate; and representatives of the two Governments and all 
relevant parties may meet under independent chairmanship to review 
implementation of the agreement as a whole. 
************** 
Review procedures following implementation 
5. Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise 
in its operation and, where no other institution is affected, take 
remedial action in consultation as necessary with the relevant 
Government or Governments.  It will be for each institution to 
determine its own procedures for review. 
6. If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which 
have implications for another institution, they may review their 
operations separately and jointly and agree on remedial action to be 
taken under their respective authorities. 
7. If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of 
institutions, or otherwise require amendment of the British-Irish 
Agreement or relevant legislation, the process of review will fall to the 
two Governments in consultation with the parties in the Assembly.  
Each Government will be responsible for action in its own jurisdiction. 
8. Notwithstanding the above, each institution will publish an annual 
report on its operations.  In addition, the two Governments and the 
parties in the Assembly will convene a conference 4 years after the 
agreement comes into effect, to review and report on its operation. 
Agreement between the Government of The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland 
The British and Irish Governments: 
Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 
1998 by themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out 
in Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter "the Multi-Party Agreement"); 
Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new 
beginning in relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland 
and between the peoples of these islands; 
Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples 
and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours 
and as partners in the European Union; 
************** 
Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and non-
violence which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks; 
Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and 
mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions; 
Have agreed as follows: 
 Article 1 
The two Governments: 
i. recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, 
whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain 
or a sovereign united Ireland; 
ii. recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by 
agreement between the two parts respectively and without external 
impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of 
consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring 
about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right 
must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement 
and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; 
iii. acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern 
Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the 
island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to 
maintain the Union and accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as 
part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that 
it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern 
Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; 
iv. affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise 
their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and 
(ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation 
on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective 
Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish; 
************** 
v. affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government 
with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on 
behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions 
and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality 
of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from 
discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and 
equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both 
communities; 
vi. recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may 
so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British 
and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not 
be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. 
Article 2 
The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where 
appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement.  In 
particular there shall be established in accordance with the provisions of the 
Multi-Party Agreement immediately on the entry into force of this Agreement, 
the following institutions: 
i. a North/South Ministerial Council; 
ii. the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section 
entitled "Strand Two" of the Multi-Party Agreement; 
iii. a British-Irish Council; 
iv. a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. 
Article 3 
1. This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and 
Irish Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 
which shall cease to have effect on entry into force of this Agreement. 
2. The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the 
aforementioned Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease 
to exist on entry into force of this Agreement. 
Article 4 
************** 
1. It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that: 
a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of 
implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled 
"Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement; 
b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to 
the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party 
Agreement shall have been approved by Referendum; 
c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to 
establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 
2. Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so 
far as it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this 
Agreement.  This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the 
receipt of the later of the two notifications. 
3. Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish 
Government shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of 
Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled "Constitutional 
Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement take effect. 
In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the 
respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. 
Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998. 
  
************** 
The Framework Agreement (Ohrid Agreement) 
The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of 
Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more 
integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-
Atlantic community.  This Framework will promote the peaceful and 
harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity 
and the interests of all Macedonian citizens. 
1. Basic Principles 
1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely 
and unconditionally.  Only peaceful political solutions can assure a 
stable and democratic future for Macedonia. 
1.2. Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary 
character of the State are inviolable and must be preserved.  There 
are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues. 
1.3. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society must be preserved 
and reflected in public life. 
1.4. A modern democratic state in its natural course of development and 
maturation must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets 
the needs of all its citizens and comports with the highest 
international standards, which themselves continue to evolve. 
1.5. The development of local self-government is essential for 
encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for 
promoting respect for the identity of communities. 
2. Cessation of Hostilities 
2.1. The parties underline the importance of the commitments of July 5, 
2001.  There shall be a complete cessation of hostilities, complete 
voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups and their 
complete voluntary disbandment.  They acknowledge that a decision 
by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a 
general, unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a 
political solution to the problems of this country, a clear commitment 
by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the 
parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO forces 
will operate. 
************** 
3. Development of Decentralised Government 
3.1. A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that 
reinforces the powers of elected local officials and enlarges 
substantially their competencies in conformity with the Constitution 
(as amended in accordance with Annex A) and the European Charter 
on Local Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of subsidiarity 
in effect in the European Union.  Enhanced competencies will relate 
principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, 
environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local 
finances, education, social welfare, and health care.  A law on 
financing of local self-government will be adopted to ensure an 
adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfill all 
of their responsibilities. 
3.2. Boundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the 
completion of a new census, which will be conducted under 
international supervision by the end of 2001.  The revision of the 
municipal boundaries will be effectuated by the local and national 
authorities with international participation. 
3.3. In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the 
needs and interests of the local population, local heads of police will 
be selected by municipal councils from lists of candidates proposed 
by the Ministry of Interior, and will communicate regularly with the 
councils.  The Ministry of Interior will retain the authority to remove 
local heads of police in accordance with the law. 
4. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation 
4.1. The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under 
the law will be respected completely.  This principle will be applied in 
particular with respect to employment in public administration and 
public enterprises, and access to public financing for business 
development. 
4.2. Laws regulating employment in public administration will include 
measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all 
central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within 
such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and 
integrity that govern public administration.  The authorities will take 
************** 
action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public 
administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of 
under-represented communities.  Particular attention will be given to 
ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally 
reflect the composition and distribution of the population of 
Macedonia, as specified in Annex C. 
4.3. For the Constitutional Court, one-third of the judges will be chosen by 
the Assembly by a majority ofthe total number of Representatives that 
includes a majority of the total number of Representatives claiming to 
belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of 
Macedonia.  This procedure also will apply to the election of the 
Ombudsman (Public Attorney) and the election of three of the 
members of the Judicial Council. 
5. Special Parliamentary Procedures 
5.1. On the central level, certain Constitutional amendments in 
accordance with Annex A and the Law on Local Self-Government 
cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, 
within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives 
claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia.   
5.2. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local 
finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of 
municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there 
must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to 
belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of 
Macedonia. 
6. Education and Use of Languages 
6.1. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will be 
provided in the students' native languages, while at the same time 
uniform standards for academic programs will be applied throughout 
Macedonia. 
6.2. State funding will be provided for university level education in 
languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of 
Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements. 
************** 
6.3. The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment 
in State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the 
majority in the population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects 
equitably the composition of the population of Macedonia. 
6.4. The official language throughout Macedonia and in the international 
relations of Macedonia is the Macedonian language. 
6.5. Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is 
also an official language, as set forth herein.  In the organs of the 
Republic of Macedonia, any official language other than Macedonian 
may be used in accordance with the law, as further elaborated in 
Annex B.  Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which 
at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other 
than Macedonian may use any official language to communicate with 
the regional office of the central government with responsibility for 
that municipality; such an office will reply in that language in addition 
to Macedonian.  Any person may use any official language to 
communicate with a main office of the central government, which will 
reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. 
6.6. With respect to local self-government, in municipalities where a 
community comprises at least 20 percent of the population of the 
municipality, the language of that community will be used as an 
official language in addition to Macedonian.  With respect to 
languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of the 
municipality, the local authorities will decide democratically on their 
use in public bodies. 
6.7. In criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused 
person or any party will have the right to translation at State expense 
of all proceedings as well as documents in accordance with relevant 
Council of Europe documents. 
6.8. Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official 
language other than Macedonian will also be issued in that language, 
in addition to the Macedonian language, in accordance with the law. 
7. Expression of Identity 
7.1. With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of 
Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local 
************** 
public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the 
majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and usages. 
8. Implementation 
8.1. The Constitutional amendments attached at Annex A will be 
presented to the Assembly immediately.  The parties will take all 
measures to assure adoption of these amendments within 45 days of 
signature of this Framework Agreement. 
8.2. The legislative modifications identified in Annex B will be adopted in 
accordance with the timetables specified therein. 
8.3. The parties invite the international community to convene at the 
earliest possible time a meeting of international donors that would 
address in particular macro-financial assistance; support for the 
financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of 
implementing this Framework Agreement, including measures to 
strengthen local self-government; and rehabilitation and 
reconstruction in areas affected by the fighting. 
9. Annexes 
The following Annexes constitute integral parts of this Framework 
Agreement: 
A. Constitutional Amendments 
B. Legislative Modifications 
C. Implementation and Confidence-Building Measures 
10. Final Provisions 
10.1. This Agreement takes effect upon signature. 
10.2. The English language version of this Agreement is the only authentic 
version. 
10.3. This Agreement was concluded under the auspices of President Boris 
Trajkovski. 
Done at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001, in the English language. 
Annex A. Constitutional Amendments 
Preamble 
************** 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the 
present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their 
predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and 
struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and 
responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is 
valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, 
equal in rights and obligations towards the common good -- the Republic of 
Macedonia, in accordance with the tradition of the Krushevo Republic and 
the decisions of the Antifascist Peoples’ Liberation Assembly of Macedonia, 
and the Referendum of September 8, 1991, they have decided to establish 
the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state, with the 
intention of establishing and consolidating rule of law, guaranteeing human 
rights and civil liberties, providing peace and coexistence, social justice, 
economic well-being and prosperity in the life of the individual and the 
community, and in this regard through their representatives in the Assembly 
of the Republic of Macedonia, elected in free and democratic elections, they 
adopt 
Article 7 
The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official 
language throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in the international 
relations of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an 
official language, written using its alphabet, as specified below. 
Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language 
other than Macedonian shall also be issued in that language, in addition to 
the Macedonian language, in accordance with the law. 
Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 
percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian 
may use any official language to communicate with the regional office of the 
central government with responsibility for that municipality; such an office 
shall reply in that language in addition to Macedonian.  Any person may use 
any official language to communicate with a main office of the central 
government, which shall reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. 
************** 
In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official language other than 
Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law. 
In the units of local self-government where at least 20 percent of the 
population speaks a particular language, that language and its alphabet shall 
be used as an official language in addition to the Macedonian language and 
the Cyrillic alphabet.  With respect to languages spoken by less than 20 
percent of the population of a unit of local self-government, the local 
authorities shall decide on their use in public bodies. 
Article 8 
The fundamental values of the constitutional order of the Republic of 
Macedonia are: 
the basic freedoms and rights of the individual and citizen, recognised in 
international law and set down in the Constitution; 
equitable representation of persons belonging to all communities in public 
bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life; 
Article 19 
The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. 
The right to express one's faith freely and publicly, individually or with others 
is guaranteed. 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in 
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and 
groups are separate from the state and equal before the law. 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in 
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and 
groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable 
institutions, by ways of a procedure regulated by law. 
Article 48 
Members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop 
their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols. 
The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of all communities. 
************** 
Members of communities have the right to establish institutions for culture, 
art, science and education, as well as scholarly and other associations for 
the expression, fostering and development of their identity. 
Members of communities have the right to instruction in their language in 
primary and secondary education, as determined by law.  In schools where 
education is carried out in another language, the Macedonian language is 
also studied. 
Article 56 
The Republic guarantees the protection, promotion and enhancement of the 
historical and artistic heritage of Macedonia and all communities in 
Macedonia and the treasures of which it is composed, regardless of their 
legal status.  The law regulates the mode and conditions under which 
specific items of general interest for the Republic can be ceded for use. 
Article 69 
For laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols, the Assembly makes decisions by a 
majority vote of the Representatives attending, within which there must be a 
majority of the votes of the Representatives attending who claim to belong to 
the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.  In the 
event of a dispute within the Assembly regarding the application of this 
provision, the Committee on Inter-Community Relations shall resolve the 
dispute. 
Article 77 
The Assembly elects the Public Attorney by a majority vote of the total 
number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the 
votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
The Public Attorney protects the constitutional rights and legal rights of 
citizens when violated by bodies of state administration and by other bodies 
and organisations with public mandates.  The Public Attorney shall give 
particular attention to safeguarding the principles of non-discrimination and 
************** 
equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all levels and in 
other areas of public life. 
Article 78 
The Assembly shall establish a Committee for Inter-Community Relations. 
The Committee consists of seven members each from the ranks of the 
Macedonians and Albanians within the Assembly, and five members from 
among the Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and two other communities.  The five 
members each shall be from a different community; if fewer than five other 
communities are represented in the Assembly, the Public Attorney, after 
consultation with relevant community leaders, shall propose the remaining 
members from outside the Assembly. 
The Assembly elects the members of the Committee. 
The Committee considers issues of inter-community relations in the Republic 
and makes appraisals and proposals for their solution. 
The Assembly is obliged to take into consideration the appraisals and 
proposals of the Committee and to make decisions regarding them. 
In the event of a dispute among members of the Assembly regarding the 
application of the voting procedure specified in Article 69(2), the Committee 
shall decide by majority vote whether the procedure applies. 
Article 84 
The President of the Republic of Macedonia 
proposes the members of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations; (to be 
deleted)… 
Article 86 
The President of the Republic is President of the Security Council of the 
Republic of Macedonia. 
The Security Council of the Republic is composed of the President of the 
Republic, the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Ministers 
heading the bodies of state administration in the fields of security, defence 
and foreign affairs and three members appointed by the President of the 
Republic.  In appointing the three members, the President shall ensure that 
************** 
the Security Council as a whole equitably reflects the composition of the 
population of Macedonia. 
The Council considers issues relating to the security and defence of the 
Republic and makes policy proposals to the Assembly and the Government. 
Article 104 
The Republican Judicial Council is composed of seven members. 
The Assembly elects the members of the Council.  Three of the members 
shall be elected by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, 
within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of 
Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in 
the population of Macedonia. 
Article 109 
The Constitutional Court of Macedonia is composed of nine judges. 
The Assembly elects six of the judges to the Constitutional Court by a 
majority vote of the total number of Representatives.  The Assembly elects 
three of the judges by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, 
within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of 
Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in 
the population of Macedonia. 
Article 114 
Local self-government is regulated by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a 
majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to 
belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.  
The laws on local finances, local elections, boundaries of municipalities, and 
the city of Skopje shall be adopted by a majority vote of the Representatives 
attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the 
Representatives attending who claim to belong to the communities not in the 
majority in the population of Macedonia. 
Article 115 
************** 
In units of local self-government, citizens directly and through representatives 
participate in decision-making on issues of local relevance particularly in the 
fields of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, 
local economic development, local finances, communal activities, culture, 
sport, social security and child care, education, health care and other fields 
determined by law. 
Article 131 
The decision to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the Assembly 
by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives. 
The draft amendment to the Constitution is confirmed by the Assembly by a 
majority vote of the total number of Representatives and then submitted to 
public debate. 
The decision to change the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-
thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives. 
A decision to amend the Preamble, the articles on local self-government, 
Article 131, any provision relating to the rights of members of communities, 
including in particular Articles 7, 8, 9, 19, 48, 56, 69, 77, 78, 86, 104 and 109, 
as well as a decision to add any new provision relating to the subject matter 
of such provisions and articles, shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the 
total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the 
votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
The change in the Constitution is declared by the Assembly. 
Annex B. Legislative Modifications. 
The parties will take all necessary measures to ensure the adoption of the 
legislative changes set forth hereafter within the time limits specified. 
1. Law on Local Self-Government 
The Assembly shall adopt within 45 days from the signing of the Framework 
Agreement a revised Law on Local Self-Government.  This revised Law shall 
in no respect be less favourable to the units of local self-government and 
their autonomy than the draft Law proposed by the Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia in March 2001.  The Law shall include competencies 
************** 
relating to the subject matters set forth in Section 3.1 of the Framework 
Agreement as additional independent competencies of the units of local self-
government, and shall conform to Section 6.6 of the Framework Agreement.  
In addition, the Law shall provide that any State standards or procedures 
established in any laws concerning areas in which municipalities have 
independent competencies shall be limited to those which cannot be 
established as effectively at the local level; such laws shall further promote 
the municipalities’ independent exercise of their competencies. 
2. Law on Local Finance 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly a 
law on local self-government finance to ensure that the units of local self-
government have sufficient resources to carry out their tasks under the 
revised Law on Local Self-Government.  In particular, the law shall: 
• Enable and make responsible units of local self-government for raising 
a substantial amount of tax revenue; 
• Provide for the transfer to the units of local self-government of a part 
of centrally raised taxes that corresponds to the functions of the units 
of local self-government and that takes account of the collection of 
taxes on their territories; and 
• Ensure the budgetary autonomy and responsibility of the units of local 
self-government within their areas of competence. 
3. Law on Municipal Boundaries 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised law on municipal 
boundaries, taking into account the results of the census and the relevant 
guidelines set forth in the Law on Local Self-Government. 
4. Laws Pertaining to Police Located in the Municipalities 
The Assembly shall adopt before the end of the term of the present 
Assembly provisions ensuring: 
• That each local head of the police is selected by the council of the 
municipality concerned from a list of not fewer than three candidates 
proposed by the Ministry of the Interior, among whom at least one 
candidate shall belong to the community in the majority in the 
************** 
municipality.  In the event the municipal council fails to select any of 
the candidates proposed within 15 days, the Ministry of the Interior 
shall propose a second list of not fewer than three new candidates, 
among whom at least one candidate shall belong to the community in 
the majority in the municipality.  If the municipal council again fails to 
select any of the candidates proposed within 15 days, the Minister of 
the Interior, after consultation with the Government, shall select the 
local head of police from among the two lists of candidates proposed 
by the Ministry of the Interior as well as three additional candidates 
proposed by the municipal council; 
• That each local head of the police informs regularly and upon request 
the council of the municipality concerned; 
• That a municipal council may make recommendations to the local 
head of police in areas including public security and traffic safety; and 
• That a municipal council may adopt annually a report regarding 
matters of public safety, which shall be addressed to the Minister of 
the Interior and the Public Attorney (Ombudsman). 
5. Laws on the Civil Service and Public Administration 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly 
amendments to the laws on the civil service and public administration to 
ensure equitable representation of communities in accordance with Section 
4.2 of the Framework Agreement. 
6. Law on Electoral Districts 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised Law on Electoral 
Districts, taking into account the results of the census and the principles set 
forth in the Law on the Election of Members for the Parliament of the 
Republic of Macedonia. 
7. Rules of the Assembly 
The Assembly shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly 
its Rules of Procedure to enable the use of the Albanian language in 
accordance with Section 6.5 of the Framework Agreement, paragraph 8 
below, and the relevant amendments to the Constitution set forth in Annex A. 
8. Laws Pertinent to the Use of Languages 
************** 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly 
new legislation regulating the use of languages in the organs of the Republic 
of Macedonia.  This legislation shall provide that: 
• Representatives may address plenary sessions and working bodies of 
the Assembly in languages referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 
of the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A); 
• Laws shall be published in the languages referred to in Article 7, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in accordance 
with Annex A); and 
• All public officials may write their names in the alphabet of any 
language referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) on any official 
documents.   
The Assembly also shall adopt by the end of the term of the present 
Assembly new legislation on the issuance of personal documents.  The 
Assembly shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly all 
relevant laws to make their provisions on the use of languages fully 
compatible with Section 6 of the Framework Agreement. 
9. Law on the Public Attorney 
The Assembly shall amend by the end of 2002 the Law on the Public 
Attorney as well as the other relevant laws to ensure: 
• That the Public Attorney shall undertake actions to safeguard the 
principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of 
communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public 
life, and that there are adequate resources and personnel within his 
office to enable him to carry out this function; 
• That the Public Attorney establishes decentralised offices; 
• That the budget of the Public Attorney is voted separately by the 
Assembly; 
• That the Public Attorney shall present an annual report to the 
Assembly and, where appropriate, may upon request present reports 
to the councils of municipalities in which decentralised offices are 
established; and 
************** 
• That the powers of the Public Attorney are enlarged: 
• To grant to him access to and the opportunity to examine all official 
documents, it being understood that the Public Attorney and his staff 
will not disclose confidential information; 
• To enable the Public Attorney to suspend, pending a decision of the 
competent court, the execution of an administrative act, if he 
determines that the act may result in an irreparable prejudice to the 
rights of the interested person; and 
• To give to the Public Attorney the right to contest the conformity of 
laws with the Constitution before the Constitutional Court. 
10. Other Laws 
The Assembly shall enact all legislative provisions that may be necessary to 
give full effect to the Framework Agreement and amend or abrogate all 
provisions incompatible with the Framework Agreement 
Annex C. Implementation and Confidence-Building Measures 
1. International Support 
1.1. The parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor 
and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Framework 
Agreement and its Annexes, and request such efforts to be 
coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. 
2. Census and Elections 
2.1. The parties confirm the request for international supervision by the 
Council of Europe and the European Commission of a census to be 
conducted in October 2001. 
2.2. Parliamentary elections will be held by 27 January 2002.  
International organisations, including the OSCE, will be invited to 
observe these elections. 
3. Refugee Return, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
3.1. All parties will work to ensure the return of refugees who are citizens 
or legal residents of Macedonia and displaced persons to their homes 
within the shortest possible timeframe, and invite the international 
community and in particular UNHCR to assist in these efforts. 
************** 
3.2. The Government with the participation of the parties will complete an 
action plan within 30 days after the signature of the Framework 
Agreement for rehabilitation of and reconstruction in areas affected by 
the hostilities.  The parties invite the international community to assist 
in the formulation and implementation of this plan. 
3.3. The parties invite the European Commission and the World Bank to 
rapidly convene a meeting of international donors after adoption in 
the Assembly of the Constitutional amendments in Annex A and the 
revised Law on Local Self-Government to support the financing of 
measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing the 
Framework Agreement and its Annexes, including measures to 
strengthen local self-government and reform the police services, to 
address macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Macedonia, 
and to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction measures 
identified in the action plan identified in paragraph 3.2. 
4. Development of Decentralised Government 
4.1. The parties invite the international community to assist in the process 
of strengthening local self-government.  The international community 
should in particular assist in preparing the necessary legal 
amendments related to financing mechanisms for strengthening the 
financial basis of municipalities and building their financial 
management capabilities, and in amending the law on the boundaries 
of municipalities. 
5. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation 
5.1. Taking into account the recommendations of the already established 
governmental commission, the parties will take concrete action to 
increase the representation of members of communities not in the 
majority in Macedonia in public administration, the military, and public 
enterprises, as well as to improve their access to public financing for 
business development. 
5.2. The parties commit themselves to ensuring that the police services 
will by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the 
population of Macedonia.  As initial steps toward this end, the parties 
commit to ensuring that 500 new police officers from communities not 
in the majority in the population of Macedonia will be hired and 
************** 
trained by July 2002, and that these officers will be deployed to the 
areas where such communities live.  The parties further commit that 
500 additional such officers will be hired and trained by July 2003, 
and that these officers will be deployed on a priority basis to the areas 
throughout Macedonia where such communities live.  The parties 
invite the international community to support and assist with the 
implementation of these commitments, in particular through screening 
and selection of candidates and their training.  The parties invite the 
OSCE, the European Union, and the United States to send an expert 
team as quickly as possible in order to assess how best to achieve 
these objectives. 
5.3. The parties also invite the OSCE, the European Union, and the 
United States to increase training and assistance programs for police, 
including: 
• professional, human rights, and other training; 
• technical assistance for police reform, including assistance in 
screening, selection and promotion processes; 
• development of a code of police conduct; 
• cooperation with respect to transition planning for hiring and 
deployment of police officers from communities not in the majority in 
Macedonia; and 
• deployment as soon as possible of international monitors and police 
advisors in sensitive areas, under appropriate arrangements with 
relevant authorities. 
5.4. The parties invite the international community to assist in the training 
of lawyers, judges and prosecutors from members of communities not 
in the majority in Macedonia in order to be able to increase their 
representation in the judicial system. 
6. Culture, Education and Use of Languages 
6.1. The parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to 
increase its assistance for projects in the area of media in order to 
further strengthen radio, TV and print media, including Albanian 
language and multiethnic media.  The parties also invite the 
international community to increase professional media training 
programs for members of communities not in the majority in 
************** 
Macedonia.  The parties also invite the OSCE to continue its efforts 
on projects designed to improve inter-ethnic relations. 
6.2. The parties invite the international community to provide assistance 
for the implementation of the Framework Agreement in the area of 
higher education.   
  
************** 
Appendix 4: Methodological Note 
Study Methods and Design 
The study was designed as a qualitative comparative study of three cases: 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. Qualitative analysis allows for the 
consideration of unquantifiable or unmeasured information, and this is crucial 
when the case studies lack comparable datasets (and often official data). 
Moreover, qualitative methods accommodate the nuances of political 
debates, negotiations, and reform, allowing for the identification of systemic 
factors and constraints affecting education reforms. 
As the Introduction explains, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia were 
chosen as the three case studies because of one key similarity and two 
important differences. They all experienced violent inter-communal conflicts, 
subsequently regulated through consociational power-sharing.  However, the 
three jurisdictions are located in three different regions, with different 
historical experiences and strategic realities. Moreover, the three power-
sharing arrangements vary on a spectrum between corporate and liberal 
consociation. The three societies also present a great advantage for data 
collection and comparative research: in contrast to consociations such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq, the educational decision-making 
structures of Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia are centralised in 
Beirut, Belfast and Skopje.  
The criteria for selection of the three case studies comply with the Most 
Different Systems Design (MDSD) method of comparative research, which 
‘compares countries that do not share any common features apart from the 
political outcome to be explained [the education system] and one or two of 
the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome [violent inter-
group conflict regulated through consociation]’.1878 This method was deemed 
most appropriate to investigate the phenomenon of education policy, which is 
deeply rooted in the history and political tradition of specific societies, as 
shown in Chapter 3. The MDSD method neutralizes partly the impact of 
                                            
1878	  Todd	  Landman,	  Issues	  and	  Methods	  in	  Comparative	  Politics,	  (London,	  Routledge:	  2008):	  70.	  
************** 
context-specific historical, cultural and strategic factors on education 
systems.  
This study is also designed to minimise the weaknesses of the MDSD 
method. First, the MDSD method is criticised for considering only a limited 
number of case studies. This limitation is particularly relevant to research 
about power-sharing, because of the small number of existing consociations. 
However, MDSD is appropriate to the present study, which seeks to shed 
light on a previously unexplored phenomenon rather than to test existing 
theories.  
Second, it is challenging to choose negative case studies to substantiate 
research adopting the MDSD method.1879 In this thesis, Chapter 3 analyses 
the history of education systems in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia and shows that similar educational priorities and structures only 
emerged after the establishment of consociational power-sharing. This 
minimised the number of independent variables, while also providing for two 
negative case studies (Northern Ireland before the 1990s and Macedonia 
before 2001). 
Third, the MDSD method is criticsed as being prone to selection bias.1880 
Accordingly, MDSD helps to draw connections between particular factors 
(consociational power-sharing) and the outcome of interest (the shape of the 
education system), but does not establish firm causality. Thus, this study 
presents consociation as a necessary factor for the emergence of a 
consociational education system. However, it does not identify consociational 
power-sharing as the sufficient cause for the promotion and implementation 
of specific education reforms. Further multi-methods research on a larger 
number of case studies will be necessary to determine a precise causal 
relationship.  
                                            
1879	  Landman,	  77.	  
1880	  Ibid.,	  72.	  
************** 
Interviews 
Table 16 contains the list of individuals approached for interviews as part of 
this study. Interviewees belonged to seven categories: government members 
(ministers and ex-ministers), spokespersons of political parties, bureaucrats 
in the main ministries and educational management organisations (including 
the different educational sectors in Northern Ireland), scholars and curriculum 
writers, officers in international organisations, members of NGOs active in 
the education sector and ‘others’ (mainly journalists). Comparable numbers 
of individuals belonging to each category were contacted in each jurisdiction. 
As evident from Table 16, they included members of all the main 
communities and political parties, as well as international observers. 
The present study focused on the relationship between the post-conflict 
political system, elites and the education system. This is why the author did 
not conduct interviews with teachers or observed their practice in the 
classroom. Instead, this thesis relies on the secondary literature to evaluate 
how the curriculum is delivered in each society. 
Among those contacted, government members (ex-ministers) were most 
likely to refuse interviews by arguing that they were too busy or by not 
responding (four in Lebanon, and three in Northern Ireland and Macedonia). 
Spokespersons of political parties, and members of parliamentary education 
committees, were similarly likely to refuse interviews. In Lebanon, this was 
probably due to the tense political situation in the summer of 2012, when 
fieldwork was conducted. In Macedonia, linguistic barriers may have played a 
role in discouraging the responses of party members. Finally, in Northern 
Ireland, some MLAs were too busy for interviews during the first research 
trip, but they were interviewed during a second research visit. Because of 
financial constraints, follow-up visits could not be conducted in Lebanon and 
Macedonia. 
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and three hours, and they took place 
in locations chosen by the interviewees. The author obtained consent from 
the study participants according to the King’s College London Code of Ethics 
prior to the interviews, and participants were offered the opportunity for their 
names to be anonymised. Sixteen participants requested anonymisation. 
************** 
Most interviews were conducted in English at the request of the interviewees. 
Only Abd-al-Rahim Murad, Khaled Qabbani and Anwar Daw requested an 
Arabic-English interpreter and they were provided with one. Most of the 
interviews were recorded with the consent of the participants, and the author 
took extensive notes both during the interviews and immediately after. 
Recordings were transcribed by the author (or the interpreter) immediately 
after the end of the research visit, and the analysis was based on the 
interview transcripts. 
Three sets of similar questions were asked to all participants:  
• What has changed in education since 1989/1998/2001? 
• Does education contribute to social cohesion/reconciliation/peace in 
Lebanon/Northern Ireland/Macedonia? In which respects? 
• Which education reforms do you think are most necessary? What are 
the challenges to these reforms? 
Additional specific questions on their area of expertise, personal experience 
and opinions were asked to each respondent.  
Table 16: List of Individuals Contacted and Interviewed 
 Name Position/Expertise Interviewed? Category 
L Hassan Diab Minister of Education No response Government 
L Gaby Layoun Minister of Culture No response Government 
L Abd-al-Rahim Murad Minister of Education Yes Government 
L Hassan Mneimneh Minister of Education No response Government 
L Khaled Qabbani Minister of Education Yes Government 
L Bahia Hariri Minister of Education Busy Government 
L Nazih Khayyat Future Movement  No response Political Party 
L Ali Fayyad Hizbollah No response Political Party 
L Anwar Daw PSP Yes Political Party 
L Samy Gemayel Kataeb Busy Political Party 
L Nada Mneimneh Ministry of Education Yes Bureaucracy 
L Layla Fayad CERD Director Busy Bureaucracy 
L Mounir Abou Assali CERD Director Yes Bureaucracy/ Scholar 
L Nemer Frayha CERD Director, Lebanese University Yes 
Bureaucracy/ 
Scholar 
L Anonymous Senior Officer CERD Yes Bureaucracy 
L Adnan El-Amine American University 









L Charles Chartouni Lebanese University Yes 
Scholar/  
Politics 
L Antoine Messara Saint Joseph University Busy Scholar 
L Munir Bashshour American University of Beirut Yes Scholar 
L Ahmed Beydoun American University of Beirut No response Scholar 
L Anonymous Senior Official USAID Yes 
International 
Donors 
L Walid Al-Khatib UNRWA Yes International Donors 







L Wafa Kotob UNICEF Yes International Donors 
L Juan Manuel Moreno World Bank Yes International Donors 
L Tarik Alami ESCWA Busy International Donors 
L Maha Yahya UNDP Yes International Donors 





L Elie Awad Youth for Tolerance Yes NGO 
NI John O’Dowd Education Minister Busy Government 
NI Catriona Rouane Education Minister Busy Government 
NI Martin McGuinness Education Minister No response Government 
NI Danny Kinahan UUP, Education Committee Yes Political Party 
NI Mervyn Storey DUP, Education Committee Yes Political Party 
NI Conall McDevitt SDLP, Education Committee Yes Political Party 






Yes Political Party 
NI Chris Hazzard Sinn Féin Yes Political Party 
NI Anonymous Senior 
Officer 
Belfast Education and 
Library Board Yes Bureaucracy 
************** 
NI Richard Hanna CCEA Yes Bureaucracy 
NI Andrew Bell DENI Yes Bureaucracy 
NI Senior Officer  Education and Skills Authority Yes Bureaucracy 
NI Paula McIlwaine NICIE Yes School Sector 
NI Terry Murphy CCMS Yes School Sector 
NI Anonymous Senior 
Education Advisor CCMS Yes School Sector 
NI Micheal O’Duibh CnaG Yes School Sector 
NI May Blood President, Integrated Education Fund Yes School Sector 
NI Sam Fitzsimmons Integrated Education Fund Yes School Sector 



























Yes International Donor 
NI 
Michael Arlow 






NI Lindsay Fergus Journalist Busy Other 
NI Kathryn Torney Journalist Yes Other 
NI Anonymous Officer  Ulster-Scots Agency Yes Other 
NI Project Manager Nerve Centre Yes Other 
M Pance Kralev Minister of Education Busy Government 
M Sulejman Rushiti Minister of Education Busy Government 
M Nikola Todorov Minister of Education No response Government 




Education Committee No response Political Party 
M Ana Pavloska-Daneva SDUM Education Committee No response Political Party 
M Dragisha Miletik SSPPM Education Committee No response Political Party 
************** 
M Desira Imeri DUI Education Committee No response Political Party 
M Gazmend Aliji DPA Education Committee No response Political Party 
M Izet Zekiri NDP Education Committee No response Political Party 
M Muhammad Hoxa DUI spokesperson No response Political Party 
M Menduh Thaci DPA President No response Political Party 
M Kenan Hasipi Democratic Party of Turks of Macedonia No response Political party 
M Recep Ali Cupi DDPELC Yes Bureaucracy 
M Hana Darlishta Pedagogic Service No response Bureaucracy 
M Bilijana Aeksoska 
Trenevska Ministry of Education No response Bureaucracy 
M Anonymous Officer Ministry of Education  Yes Bureaucracy 
M Anonymous Senior 
Officer Ministry of Education  Yes Bureaucracy 
M Anonymous 















M Anonymous Albanian 
Historian 
Institute of Albanian 
Culture and Heritage Yes Scholar 
M Boban Petrovski University of Skopje Yes Scholar 
M Ana Mickovska Centre for Research and Policymaking Yes Scholar 
M 




M Anonymous Officer International Mission Yes International Donors 
M Anonymous Officer World bank Yes International Donors 
M Anonymous Officer International Donor Yes International Donors 
M Anonymous Officer International Delegation Yes 
International 
Donors 
M Spomenka Lazarevska FOSIM Yes International Donors 
M Nora Sabani  UNICEF Yes International Donors 
M Rada Arshinkovska Physics Teacher and Member of IEARN Yes 
Practitioner/  
NGO 
M Veton Zenkolli Nansen Dialogue Yes NGO  
************** 
Centre 
M Albert Hani Forum ZFD Skopje Yes NGO 
M Loreta Georgieva MCCED Yes NGO 
M Xhabir Deralla Civil Yes NGO 
M Vilma Venkovska-
Milcev 
Search for Common 
Ground No response NGO 
M Emilja Tudjarovska Expert on Education Management Yes Other 
M Ljubica Grozdanovska Journalist Yes  Other 
 
  
 
 
